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Abstract 
This thesis examines the role of historical experiences in guiding cultural preferences for the use of 
the armed forces for maintaining domestic security in Britain and France. It finds that in recent years 
the level of threat from Islamist terrorism faced by both states has been comparable and yet two 
distinct sets of strategic preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically have emerged. To 
understand these differences this thesis poses three core questions: first, do Britain and France’s 
cultural preferences for acceptance or rejection of domestic military deployments derive from the 
perception of the national historical experience? Second, do these cultural preferences have a 
constraining effect on strategic behaviour? And third, if evidence of historically-derived cultural 
constraint can be found, what accounts for episodes of change in strategy over time?  
It hypothesises that these preferences stem from their respective strategic cultures. These strategic 
cultures have been cultivated through a series of ‘formative moments’ in their past which constrain 
their behaviour in the present. Changes in strategy will occur in the event of a receptive cultural 
environment and a strong leader and institutions who are capable of enacting change. However, 
enduring cultural preferences will always be evident in strategic behaviour. This thesis addresses 
the subject through a unique methodology that combines qualitative and quantitative techniques. 
First by charting all significant domestic deployments between 1800 and 2019 and coding each 
deployment according to its purpose, it seeks to identify the ‘formative moments’ in Britain and 
France’s past that may be guiding their cultural preferences. Then, over a thousand speeches and 
statements from British and French policymakers at each formative moment are analysed and 
compared in order to trace enduring cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically 
over time.   
Ultimately, the purpose of this thesis is to understand the nexus between history, culture, and 
behaviour and its constancy or temporality over time. After all, if the trend in the modern era 
towards deploying the military on the national territory to fulfil a wide variety of tasks continues, it 
will be essential to understand the cultural sensitives attached to domestic deployments and the 
conditions under which they may be deemed acceptable.    
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
‘The past is never dead. It’s not even past.’ 
William Faulkner, Requiem for a Nun, 1951 
In June 2016, the French politicians Olivier Audibert-Troin and Christophe Léonard argued 
in a parliamentary report that ‘in terms of the employment of the armed forces on the national 
territory, Western democracies have adopted different systems, largely determined by their 
history.’1 These ‘different systems’ for the use of the armed forces internally have been 
particularly evident in Britain and France’s respective responses to the perceived threat of 
Islamist terrorism post-2015. In France, a ‘long-lasting’2 mass deployment of the army under 
Opération Sentinelle has been implemented, while in 2017 in Britain there was an 
‘absolutely temporary’,3 ad hoc engagement of the armed forces under Operation Temperer. 
This goes to the heart of what this thesis intends to explore: first, as Audibert-Troin and 
Léonard’s report suggests, whether Britain and France’s cultural preferences for acceptance 
or rejection of domestic military deployments do indeed derive from the perception of the 
national historical experience? Second, whether these cultural preferences have a 
constraining effect on strategic behaviour? And third, if evidence of historically-derived 
cultural constraint can be found, what accounts for episodes of change in strategy over time? 
This thesis adopts a novel approach in answer to these questions. First, it will chart hundreds 
of significant domestic military deployments in Britain and France since 1800 in order to 
identify a series of ‘formative moments’4 in each state’s past. At each of these formative 
moments, based on the assumption that language is a mode of cultural expression and will 
therefore reflect the norms and values of the state, the rhetoric of key policymakers 
concerning the use of the armed forces is analysed to ascertain what the preferences for the 
1 Audibert Troin, Olivier & Léonard, Christophe. ‘Sur la présence et l’emploi des forces armées sur le territoire 
national’. Assemblée Nationale. Rapport d’Information, N° 3864. Commission de la Défense Nationale et des 
Forces Armées, 22 June 2016, p. 58 
2 Drian, Jean-Yves le. ‘Rapport au Parlement relatif aux conditions d’emploi des forces armées lorsqu’elles 
interviennent sur le territoire national pour protéger la population.’ Sénat, Séance du 15 mars 2016.  
3 Operation Temperer: Everything you need to know, ITV Report, 24 May 2017. See: 
https://www.itv.com/news/2017-05-24/operation-temperer-will-see-armed-forces-deployed-on-streets/  
(accessed 25/05/2017) 
4 This thesis defines a formative moment as an incident involving the domestic deployment of the armed forces 
that led to either a dramatic increase, or a dramatic decrease in the number of deployments for that particular 
purpose thereafter. It can be thought of a branch point that has led to either a continuation or shift in strategy.  
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use of the armed forces were at the time; in total over five hundred speeches and statements 
are analysed for each state. The cultural preferences expressed in the language at each 
formative moment are then compared to derive evidence of enduring cultural themes and 
historical influences over time. Further evidence of cultural preferences for the army’s role 
is then found in the representations of the military through a series of recruitment campaigns. 
Finally, the extent to which evidence of historically derived cultural constraint can be found 
in the strategic behaviour of Britain and France is examined by investigating the integration 
of the military into each state’s counter-terrorism architecture from the 1970s culminating 
in operations Temperer and Sentinelle. 
That historical experiences are important in guiding preferences for the use of force 
domestically is reflected in the large body of literature on strategic culture, particularly the 
work of the Anglo-American scholar Colin S. Gray. He argued that strategy, or particular 
strategies, are not selected willingly by a polity from a menu of strategic choices,5 but rather 
will derive from that state’s perception of the past, the interpretation of the meaning of 
particular historical experiences, and a subconscious sense of what constitutes the most 
appropriate course of action.6 This implies that culture sits at the centre of the nexus between 
historical experience and behaviour, serving as the ‘perceptual lens’7 through which we view 
and interpret the world; not only will it colour our behavioural preferences in the present and 
for the future, but it will also influence the lessons we choose to learn from the past. 
It is this perspective that will be adopted in this thesis. Clearly, the study of culture is fraught 
with difficulties, not least those of definition and causality and this thesis does not set out to 
wade into the long-standing debate between cultural and historical determinism. Rather, it 
will argue that the divergent cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces post-2015 
that can be observed in Britain and France may well be a function of different perceptions 
of the national historical experience. For the purpose of this thesis, these dissimilar 
approaches will be referred to as their strategic cultures, defined here as the set of actions, 
5 See also: Porter, Patrick. Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes (London: Hurst 
Publishers, 2009) - Here he also uses the analogy of a menu of strategic choices within the specific realm of 
warfighting to argue that strategic choices are not immutable but will change over time.  
6 Gray, Colin S. ‘British and American Strategic Cultures’, paper prepared for Jamestown symposium 2007: 
‘Democracies in Partnership: 400 Years of Transatlantic Engagement’, 18-19 April 2007, p. 37; Gray, Colin 
S. ‘National Style in Strategy, The American Example’, International Security, Fall 1981, vol. 6, no. 2, p. 22
7 Snyder, Jack L. ‘The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations’, RAND
Corporation, September 1977, p.v. See also the anthropologist Franz Boas’ assertion that we wear
‘Kulturbrille’, ‘cultural lenses’ which influence the way we see the world. Boas, Franz. The History of
Anthropology. Science, October 1904, vol. 20, no. 512, p. 517
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habits, preferences and expectations concerning the use of force resulting from the collective 
perception of the national historical experience. 
Clearly, strategic culture cannot be considered the only factor at play in guiding state 
responses. For example, some studies such as that of Jeremy Shapiro and Daniel Byman 
contend that cultural arguments reduce the problem of why states respond differently to 
‘unhelpful stereotypes’ and instead the different capabilities and resources of a state account 
for divergent responses.8 Other studies, such as that of Xinsheng Liu et al., insist that policy 
preferences depend on social‐economic‐political characteristics and threat perceptions.9  
Given the claims outlined by Shapiro, Byman, and Liu, what follows is a brief discussion of 
Britain and France’s use of the armed forces on the national territory post-2015, the 
responses by certain policymakers in justification of their responses, and the overarching 
opinions of the general population. It intends to explore whether arguments for divergent 
behaviour based on factors such as capabilities, resources and threat perceptions are more 
valid or whether each state seems to have instead adopted their own idiosyncratic responses 
that run contrary to assumptions that behaviour may be a function of rational, goal-oriented, 
and largely acultural action.  
1.1. Similar threat, different responses 
In the wake of the terrorist attack in Paris on 13 November 2015, the Modern Left senator 
Jean-Marie Bockel, stated that there had been ‘a substantial change in the nature and scale 
of the threat targeting [the] national territory’10 On the nature and severity of the threat 
presented by Islamist extremism, Britain and France agree. Between 2001 and 2018 they 
have experienced seventy attacks at the hands of groups inspired by the Salafist tradition 
(twenty-two in Britain, forty-eight in France).11 Furthermore, according to data available on 
the Global Terrorism Database, both the targets of the attacks and the means used by 
8 Shapiro, Jeremy and Byman, Daniel. ‘Bridging the transatlantic counterterrorism gap’, Washington 
Quarterly, 29:4, Autumn 2006, pp. 33-50 
9 Liu, Xinsheng; Mumpower, Jeryl L.; Portney, Kent E.; Vedlitz, Arnold. ‘Perceived Risk of Terrorism and 
Policy Preferences for Government Counterterrorism Spending: Evidence From a U.S. National Panel Survey’, 
Risks, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy, March 2019, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 102-135 
10 Bockel, Jean-Marie. 10 - Rapport au Parlement relatif aux conditions d’emploi des forces armées lorsqu’elles 
interviennent sur le territoire national pour protéger la population’, Sénat, Séance du 15 mars 2016. See: 
https://www.senat.fr/seances/s201603/s20160315/s20160315_mono.html (accessed 07/06/2018) 
11 Author’s calculations based on data gathered from the Global Terrorism Database. See: 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/ (accessed 07/06/2018) 
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terrorists have overlapped: the government, the military, the police, private citizens and 
property, religious figures and institutions, and transportation have all been targeted since 
2001 in both of these states with vehicles, knives, firearms, and bombs (including suicide) 
all being used at some stage and often in combination.12 
This convergence in the nature of the threat is also reflected clearly in each state’s threat 
perception. The Pew Research Center found that, in Britain and France, Islamic State ranked 
as the greatest threat in 2016 and 2017.13 In addition to these comparable threat perceptions, 
the capabilities of each state also compare: each is a liberal democracy with comparable 
GDPs, army sizes, and police and intelligence capabilities (see table 1).  
Table 1. French and British resources and capabilities, compared. 
France Britain 
GDP per Capita – US $ (2019)
14
 49.4 thousand 48.7 thousand 
Population (2020)
15
 65.3 million 67.9 million 
Active Service Personnel (2016)
16
 203,000 153,000 
Defence Expenditure (2019)
17
 $ 52.3 billion $ 54.8 billion 





For Byman, Shapiro or Liu, the overlap between these preconditions should imply similar 
responses. Yet distinct approaches by the two countries to the threat have emerged, 
12 Firearms have been used in Britain post-2001, although not successfully. The only occasion when use of a 
firearm in a terrorist attack was attempted was in 2013 after Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale killed 
Lee Rigby. When the police arrived on the scene, Adebowale aimed and fired a non-functioning revolver at 
the police, which exploded in his hand. The police subsequently opened fire at Adebowale, injuring him.  
13 PEW Survey, July 2016. See: http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/13/europeans-see-isis-climate-change-as-
most-serious-threats/  
http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/08/01/globally-people-point-to-isis-and-climate-change-as-leading-security-
threats/ (accessed 02/08/2017) 
14 World Bank. ‘GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) - France, United Kingdom’. See: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=FR-GB (accessed 12/08/2020) 
15 Countries in the World by Population. See: http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-
country/ (accessed September 2017) 
16 Chalmers,Malcolm. Decision Time: The National Security and Defence Capability Review 2017 – 2018, 
Whitehall Report 1 – 18, RUSI, p. 8 
17 International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2020, Top 15 Defence Budgets 2019. See: 
https://bit.ly/3kDaR1x (accessed 12/08/2020) 
18 Key Figures on Europe, 2015 edition, Eurostat Statistical Books. (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2015), p. 43 
19 Hargreaves, Jodie; Husband, Hannah; Linehan, Chris. Police Workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 
2017, Statistical Bulletin 10/17, Home Office. See: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/630471/hosb1017-police-
workforce.pdf (accessed 13 July 2017) 
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particularly in terms of the use the armed forces on the national territory. This is in spite of 
a convergence in the nature and severity of the threat from radical Islamist groups, 
comparable threat perceptions from the general public, and similar and capabilities and 
resources; then President François Hollande’s response to the November attacks epitomises 
this:  
France is at war. The acts committed Friday evening in Paris and near the Stade de France, 
are acts of war… They constitute an aggression against our country, against its values, 
against its youth, against its way of life…We want to invest the Republic with all the 
necessary force that this new context of war calls for…
20
  
In fact, Hollande used the term ‘war’ fifteen times during this speech in an unequivocal 
militarisation of the threat. His use of the term ‘necessary force’ hinted at the government’s 
intention to broaden of the scope of Opération Sentinelle, which had first been implemented 
in January 2015 after the Kouachi brothers attacked the offices of Charlie Hebdo. Initially, 
Sentinelle had involved the deployment of 10,000 soldiers in static guarding positions at 830 
‘sensitive sites’ across the country. However, in accordance with the operational contract of 
December 2013, this number of troops could only be maintained on the national territory for 
a month.21 Consequently, the number of service personnel deployed under Sentinelle was 
steadily reduced over the summer.  
The attacks in November saw a return to the figure of 10,000 troops, supplemented by 
thousands of police and gendarmes, as well as service personnel from the Air Force and 
Navy. The troops would no longer be employed in relatively static guarding positions but 
would take part in dynamic patrols that were similar in character to those carried out on 
operations abroad. With thousands of heavily armed troops in full battle dress patrolling the 
streets of France, Hollande’s notion of a ‘new context of war’ and the explicit militarisation 
of the threat was evident. 
In contrast, following the attack on Charlie Hebdo, British policymakers had devised a 
contingency plan in the event of a similar ‘marauding’ attack on British soil. It would be 
called Operation Temperer and would allow for the deployment of up to 5,100 troops across 
the country in order to ‘augment armed police officers engaged in protective security 
20 Hollande, François. Les messages du Président de la République au Parlement, Sénat, 16 November 2015. 
See: https://www.senat.fr/evenement/archives/D46/hollande.html (accessed 03/04/2017) 
21 LOI n° 2013-1168 du 18 décembre 2013 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2014 à 2019 
et portant diverses dispositions concernant la défense et la sécurité nationale. 1.3.2 
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duties’.22 The first time that Operation Temperer was enacted was on 23 May 2017, on the 
day following the suicide bombing at the MEN Arena in Manchester. In a carefully-worded 
statement prior to the operation’s implementation, prime minister Theresa May announced 
that ‘[t]he police have asked for authorisation from the Secretary of State for Defence to 
deploy a number of military personnel in support of their armed officers’. Clarifying the 
terms of the operation she stated that 
…armed police officers responsible for duties such as guarding key sites will be replaced by 
members of the armed forces, which will allow the police to significantly increase the 
number of armed officers on patrol in key locations. You might also see military personnel 
deployed at certain events, such as concerts and sports matches, helping the police to keep 
the public safe. In all circumstances, members of the armed forces who are deployed in this 
way will be under the command of police officers.
23
  
Unlike Sentinelle, which involves the constant patrolling presence of troops on the national 
territory, Britain’s approach to the use of the armed forces is more ad hoc. Temperer can 
only be enacted when the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) raises the threat level to 
‘Critical’ prompting a COBR(A) (Cabinet Office Briefing Room (A)) briefing where the 
decision to deploy the military may be taken.24 Even then, the troops will be subordinate to 
the civil power on operational matters and their duties remain short term and ‘static’.25 
Clearly there are significant differences in terms of the practical aspects of Sentinelle and 
Temperer and also in the rhetoric used by policymakers in each state. These differences are 
also reflected in public preferences on whether or not to use the armed forces for counter-
terrorism purposes. In France, according to a 2017 survey that was made public in 2018 by 
the Defense Information and Communication Delegation (DICoD), 83% of those questioned 
approved of Sentinelle.26 In Britain there seems to be far less public support for the army to 
play a role in domestic security; a poll conducted by the author in January 2020 found that 
22 This is a widely-quoted excerpt from the leaked minutes of a meeting of the National Police Chiefs Council 
in 2015. First released by the Mail on Sunday: Beckford, Martin. ‘Revealed: Secret plan to put 5,000 heavily-
armed troops on streets of Britain to fight jihadis in event of a terror attack’, Mail on Sunday, 25 July 2015. 
See: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3174590/Secret-plan-5-000-heavily-armed-troops-streets-
Britain-fight-jihadis-event-terror-attack.html?ito=social-facebook (accessed 2109/2016) 
23 ‘PM statement following second COBR meeting on Manchester attack’: 23 May 2017, Prime Minister’s 
Office. See: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-following-second-cobr-meeting-on-
manchester-attack-23-may-2017 (accessed 24/05/2017)
24 CONTEST – The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, June 2018, HM Government, p. 67 
25 Operation Temperer: Everything you need to know, ITV Report, 24 May 2017. See: 
https://www.itv.com/news/2017-05-24/operation-temperer-will-see-armed-forces-deployed-on-streets/  
(accessed 25/05/2017) 
26 IFOP-DICoD, mars 2018. ‘Les chiffres clés de sondages de la Défense’, 14 juillet 2018 
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among the British public just 39% approve of the use of the armed forces in the event of a 
terrorist attack.27  
Evidently there are clear differences not only in the rhetorical responses from key 
policymakers, but also the practical steps taken for the purposes of countering terrorism and 
public preferences for the use of the armed forces internally. The reason for these 
divergences does not seem to be differing resources, capabilities or threat perceptions. The 
inescapable conclusion is that preferences for the use of the armed forces on the national 
territory are instead determined by other factors such as the perception of historical 
experiences and the influence this has on cultural preferences. 
1.2. The role of history 
Britain and France’s historical experiences with the armed forces on the national territory 
have been very different. France has relied on the armed forces for domestic security to a far 
greater extent than Britain and for different reasons. For example, while both states have 
seen episodes of serious civil unrest, in Britain this has usually amounted to large gatherings 
that were perceived to have become unruly or riots that have been quelled by force, usually 
at the hands of localised militia or yeomanry units. Arguably the most infamous of these is 
the massacre at St. Peter’s Field (Peterloo massacre) in 1819 which saw eighteen deaths at 
the hands of the Manchester yeomanry.  
Britain’s experience with civil unrest stands in stark contrast to the French case. As well as 
several riots and protests, many of which were far bloodier than Peterloo, France has also 
experienced several revolutions (in 1789, 1830, 1848 and 1871) that have altered the nation’s 
political landscape. The precedent for the people rising up and toppling the established 
political order has meant that the suppression of civil disorder or perceived insurrection and 
revolution in France’s history has been particularly harsh. Rather than just localised units 
such as the Gendarmerie, the French state has also felt compelled to deploy thousands of 
regular troops against the people on dozens of occasions throughout its history and, if the 
27 A poll conducted by the author while working for Coriolis Technologies on a project on perceptions of 
national security. Results used with their permission. A representative sample of 1000 participants were 
surveyed. Survey conducted in January 2020.  
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highest death toll estimates are taken, then the casualties from France’s revolutions are in 
the hundreds of thousands.28    
Furthermore, unlike Britain, France’s armed forces have been required to engage in a 
number of conflicts on the national territory in in its modern history – defined here as post-
1800. Since 1800, France has been engaged in six wars that have been fought, at least in 
part, on the French mainland and have been occupied by enemy forces on five of these 
occasions.29  France has also experienced two coups d’état since 1800: the first in 1851 and 
the second in 1958. The latter incident led to led to an enduring suspicion among French 
policymakers that the armed forces could act as potential kingmakers due to the army’s role 
in forming the fifth republic. Britain of course experienced something similar during the 
English Civil War, however, within the time frame of this thesis, Britain has not seen the 
military play such a direct role in domestic politics – even concerns that the Heathrow 
deployment in Britain in 1974 was an imminent coup were shown before parliament to be 
false by Viscount Colville of Culross.30  
Britain and France have also taken vastly different approaches to the threat of terrorism. In 
Northern Ireland, Britain initially deployed 21,000 troops under Operation Banner, but then 
transitioned to an approach that gave more authority to the police and intelligence agencies. 
In Algeria, in contrast, France’s strategy had ‘barely any non-military element.’31 There were 
further differences in their counter-terror strategies developed in the wake of the attack at 
the 1972 Munich. Britain and France both formed dedicated counter-terrorist forces that 
were able to operate domestically; in Britain, the response was to alter the focus of operations 
of the (now renowned) Special Air Service (SAS) as well as introducing conditions for ad 
hoc military engagement under Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP). In France, it 
prompted the formation of the military unit known as the Groupe d’intervention de la 
Gendarmerie nationale (GIGN) and the creation of a framework for more long-lasting and 
overt military engagement under the plan vigipirate, which was enacted in France following 
the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) bombing campaign in the summer of 1995 in France.   
28 Forrest, Alan and Middell, Matthias eds. The Routledge Companion to the French Revolution in World 
History. (Oxon: Routledge, 2016), p. 180 
29 N.B. This excludes the war in Algeria. France has been occupied on six occasions if Italy’s occupation during 
the Second World War is also counted.  
30 Viscount Colville of Culross. ‘Heathrow Exercise: Use Of Armed Forces’, Hansard Archives, 16 January 
1974, vol. 348, col. 1049 
31 Heuser, Beatrice and Shamir, Eitan eds. Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and 
Strategic Cultures. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 366 
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These historical experiences serve to illustrate a broader pattern of divergent strategic 
behaviour in relation to preferences for the use of the military on the national territory. 
Rather than making objective, cost-benefit analyses of the threat environment in order to 
determine the most appropriate course of action, it seems that formative moments in each 
state’s past have cultivated entrenched, culturally guided preferences regarding whether or 
not to use the armed forces domestically.  
The relevance of historical experience in determining cultural preferences for the use of the 
armed forces has been reflected in the vast body of literature on civil-military relations and 
counter-terrorism in Britain and France. For example, Keith Jeffrey writes that negative 
historical experiences have meant that British policymakers have been ‘hesitant to cross’ the 
boundary between minimum force through the police and maximum force through the 
army.32 Similarly, the British historian Anthony Babington writes that military deployments 
on the British mainland have typically been seen as ‘odious’ and only ever as a ‘last resort’ 
and ‘in aid of the civil power.’33 This is reflected in the recent counter-terrorism literature. 
For example, Emma Murray and Paul Taylor’s 2019 article on the role of the army for 
countering-terrorism post-2015 refers to ‘soldiering by consent’34 in clear reference to the 
historical principle of ‘policing by consent’ that was established in 1829.  
On the subject of the French approach, the historian Laurent Henniger examines how France 
has typically maintained order on its national territory since the French Revolution arguing 
that the army has played a major role throughout its history. However, the coup d’état in 
1958 led to a reduction in the army’s internal duties with the gendarmerie ending up the 
‘real winners’ in terms of maintaining domestic security.35 The French academic Elie 
Tenenbaum argues similarly that there is a ‘long and complex history which links the 
[French] Army to its national territory and whose legacy is still felt today.’36 Tenenbaum’s 
focus on Sentinelle illustrates that France may well have recovered from the suspicion of the 
army that existed among policymakers during the Cold War, but that a philosophy of 
32 Jeffrey, Keith in Peter J. Rowe and Christopher J. Whelan eds.; Military Intervention in Democratic 
Societies; Chapter 2; Military aid to the Civil Power in the United Kingdom – an historical perspective. (Kent: 
Croon Helm, 1985), p. 51 
33 Babington, Anthony. Military Intervention in Britain, From the Gordon Riots to the Gibraltar Incident. 
(London: Routledge, 1990) p. 1 
34 Murray, Emma and Taylor, Paul. ‘“Soldiering By Consent” and Military–Civil Relations: Military Transition 
Into the Public Space of Policing’, Illness, Crisis, and Loss, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 235-254 
35 Henniger, Laurent. ‘Le maintien de l’ordre en France depuis le XVIIIe siècle’, Revue Défense Nationale, 
January 2016, no. 786, pp. 57-64 
36 Tenenbaum, Élie. ‘La Sentinelle Égarée? L’armee de Terre face au terrorisme’, IFRI, June 2016, vol. 68, p. 
10 
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‘complementarity’ between the civil and military forces has become an important part of the 
French approach to internal security and counter-terrorism.37  
Other literature attempts to draw direct comparisons between the approaches of different 
states either to explain or to understand why divergent behaviour can be observed. In the 
counter-terrorism literature, Richard Aldrich and Wyn Rees argue that the different ‘strategic 
cultures’ of the US and European states such as Spain and the UK mean they are 
‘predisposed to deal with security issues in a particular way.’38 Of course, one could make 
the argument that in this case the different capabilities, resources, and threat perceptions are 
playing more of a role. Further, the extent to which a European strategic culture exists is 
hotly debated.39 Instead, it is more appropriate to compare, as Frank Foley does, states with 
similar precondition, but different responses. Indeed, Foley’s argument has a great deal of 
merit in the context of this thesis. He contends that divergent ‘historical legacies’ have 
generated ‘distinctive norms, institutions, and routines’ with respect to their responses to a 
similar threat.40 His overarching argument uses the metaphor of a ‘shadow of the past’ that 
seems to have guided the respective approaches of Britain and France; the metaphor is apt 
since a shadow is eternal and inescapable. You may not always be aware of its presence, yet 
it is always there.  
In summary, it would seem that cultural preferences deriving from the perception of the 
national historical experience, or their ‘strategic cultures’, are constraining behaviour.  
However, to simply invoke ‘strategic culture’ as the answer to why Britain and France’s 
preferences for whether or not to use the armed forces domestically differ would be to 
dismiss the nuances of each state’s historical experiences, the relationship between these 
experiences and their respective cultures, as well as the potential for their cultures to change 
over time. Accordingly, the following sections outline the overarching research question and 
hypotheses that guide the thinking in this thesis, followed by the aims and objectives for the 
study. 
37 Ibid. p. 37 
38 Rees, Wyn and Aldrich, Richard; ‘contending cultures of counterterrorism; transatlantic convergence or 
divergence?’ International Affairs, September 2005, vol. 81, no. 5, pp. 906-916 
39 Meyer, Christoph O. ‘Convergence towards a European strategic culture? A constructivist framework for 
explaining changing norms’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 11, no. 4, 2005, pp. 523-549; 
Rynning, Sten, ‘The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?’ Security Dialogue, 2003, vol. 34, no. 4, 
p. 481; Lindley-French, Julian 'In the Shade of Locarno: Why European Defence is Failing', International
Affairs, 2002, vol. 78, no. 4, pp. 789-811.
40 Foley, Frank. Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 316
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1.3. Research question and hypotheses 
Given the discussion above, the primary research question that this thesis seeks to address 
is: what accounts for such marked differences in preferences for domestic military 
deployments in Britain and France?  
To this research question the following hypothesis is posited: formative moments in each 
state’s past cultivate entrenched, culturally-guided preferences (“strategic cultures”) 
regarding whether or not to use the armed forces domestically that will be traceable over a 
longue durée in modern history.41 
While clearly not the only factor that guides state behaviour, the notion that different 
strategic cultures may lead to different state responses seems to be a sensible conclusion to 
draw. However, it still lacks specificity. After all, the superficial acceptance of the idea that 
the broad notions of historical experience and cultural preferences influence behaviour is 
arguably overly deterministic and implies a certain immutability in strategy. In reality, this 
is not the case; for example, Britain went from using the armed forces quite extensively on 
the national territory for the purposes of quelling riot and protest in the nineteenth century, 
to using them just five times for that purpose in the twentieth century and none so far in the 
twenty-first. Furthermore, both Sentinelle and Temperer seemed to constitute a strategic 
shift. France’s approach was, by the admission of multiple French policymakers, 
‘unprecedented’42 and, in Britain, in July 2005, the London bombings did not prompt a 
response that involved the overt deployment of regular troops on the streets.  
Given these apparent anomalies, this thesis is secondarily concerned with the following, 
related, question: if formative moments in the past do indeed lead to general strategic 
continuity across the longue durée, what accounts for episodes of change in strategy?  
To this question, the following is hypothesised: 
41 The longue durée, meaning a long period of time, is a concept that derives from the French Annales school 
of historiography. It will be discussed further in the literature review and methodology.  
42 Valls, Manuel cited in Marc de Boni. ‘Manuel Valls: ‘La menace terroriste est d’une ampleur inégalée’’, 
Le Figaro, 23 April 2016: https://bit.ly/32vdICD (accessed 15/10/2017); Drian, Jean-Yves le. ‘10 - Rapport au 
Parlement relatif aux conditions d’emploi des forces armées lorsqu’elles interviennent sur le territoire national 
pour protéger la population.’ Sénat. Séance du 15 mars 2016. See: 
 https://www.senat.fr/seances/s201603/s20160315/s20160315_mono.html (accessed 20/09/2018) 
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1. Strategy, just like culture, of which it is a part, will evolve over time as a result of
the emergence of different threats, the availability of new technology, and gradual
normative progression. Thus, different periods of time will exhibit slightly different
cultural preferences for the use of force.
2. The occurrence of rapid changes is usually contingent on the presence of certain
conditions, namely: a serious exogenous shock; social institutions that are capable of
inciting change; a leader or government that is willing to push the changes through;
and a cultural climate that is receptive to a shift.
3. Nevertheless, and in keeping with the primary hypothesis that formative moments in
each state’s past cultivate entrenched, culturally-guided preferences, even in the
event of a rapid shift in approach, a state’s response will still exhibit certain enduring
and traceable cultural themes.
1.4. Aims, objectives, and scope of project 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive and original insight into 
the relationship between historical experience, culture and strategic behaviour regarding the 
use of the armed forces domestically in Britain and France. There are myriad studies on the 
role of historical experience as a guide to behaviour, including many studies on strategic 
culture which use the concept as a convenient shorthand to argue that culture and historical 
experience matter in a general sense. However, the literature has often either been stymied 
by definitional disagreement, assumptions that culture is too nebulous a concept to be used 
in empirical analysis, or has focused on too narrow a period of time to draw any serious 
empirical conclusions about enduring cultural characteristics.  
This thesis moves towards rectifying many of these issues. Instead of a narrow time 
timeframe that may neglect the potential for continuity and change in strategy, it will 
examine the longue durée; a concept derived from the French Annales school and 
subsequent studies on collective mentalities, with the objective of tracing over two hundred 
years of domestic military deployments in Britain and France. This will facilitate the 
identification of a series of formative moments in Britain and France’s past that may have 
given rise to the current preferences regarding whether or not to use the armed forces on the 
national territory.  
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As noted previously, this thesis views culture as the lens of perception through which more 
tangible historical experiences are viewed and through which state-specific notions of 
appropriate strategic behaviour are decided. Thus, while culture itself cannot be used as a 
variable, we can make assumptions about other modes of cultural expression that will reflect 
cultural values. For the purposes of this thesis, language is used as a proxy for culture in 
order to compare and contrast the themes that emerge at various eras, and subsequently trace 
the transmission of certain norms across time. This is due to the fact that, as Gray argues, 
something must be ‘sufficiently established and enduring to merit description as cultural.’43 
Thus, if enduring themes are identified in the rhetoric, it will be possible to conclude with 
reasonable certainty that cultural preferences which derive from historical experience are 
constraining the approaches of Britain and France.  
It then aims to connect the dots between a theoretical assumption of cultural constraint and 
tangible policy examples. Consequently, it will assess: first, how cultural preferences have 
filtered into how the armed forces are represented through recruitment campaigns over time 
(i.e. is maintaining national security portrayed as an internal or an external duty); and second, 
how cultural preferences have affected modern internal deployment patterns for the purposes 
of countering terrorism through the development of counter-terrorist units in the 1970s, the 
formation of legislation that integrated the armed forces into each state’s counter-terror 
response (e.g. MACP in Britain, or plan vigipirate in France) and finally through operations 
such as Temperer and Sentinelle. Thus, the conclusion of the thesis is that not only do 
formative moments in the past foment certain entrenched cultural preferences for the use of 
the armed forces, but that these cultural preferences are constraining the approaches of 
Britain and France.  
A secondary aim of the thesis is to fill a significant gap in the literature related to studies on 
domestic security. The majority of studies on strategic culture are ‘outward looking’ in that 
they analyse strategic culture in the context of the use of force as a component of a state’s 
foreign policy.44 While an outward focus is clearly also correct, it is argued here that through 
the exclusion of a crucial domain of strategy, this approach risks losing the full picture. The 
contention is that this is a gap to address urgently given the trend towards deploying the 
43 Gray, Colin S. ‘British and American Strategic Cultures’, paper prepared for Jamestown symposium 2007: 
‘Democracies in Partnership: 400 Years of Transatlantic Engagement’, 18-19 April 2007, p. 37 
44 Meyer, Christoph O. The Quest for a European Strategic Culture; Changing Norms on Security and Defence 
in the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006)  
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armed forces domestically more often in the modern era even in states such as Britain that 
have for a long time been assumed to be averse to the idea.  
Despite this need for more studies in this area, at the time of writing, a Google scholar search 
for articles on Operation Temperer returns just one serious result and even this is in a medical 
journal.45 This is despite the fact it has been five years since details of the contingency plan 
became public knowledge as well as its unprecedented nature and the implications it has for 
the future of Britain’s counter-terrorism efforts. The same could be said for the French case, 
while there are immeasurably more articles on the subject of Sentinelle, there are few direct 
comparisons with the British case. A study such as this that compares the approaches of 
Britain and France, will add significantly to the literature.  
A tertiary aim of this thesis is practical, rather than academic. It is hoped that by enhancing 
our understanding of why Britain and France have assumed their respective strategic 
positions and the historical events that seem to have exerted the most influence on current 
behaviour, it will facilitate better (or more nuanced) policy decisions in the future. Much of 
the evidence that this thesis will present indicates a growing role for the military in Britain 
and France in matters of domestic security in both an active and passive capacity. If the 
military is going to be expected to fulfil a variety of internal roles in the future, perhaps 
armed and among the people it is charged with protecting, then understanding the 
sensitivities, preferences, and expectations surrounding the domestic use of the armed forces 
will be of paramount importance.  
Previous studies have tended to take a limited approach to the subject of either strategic 
culture or preferences for the internal role of the armed forces. It is hoped that the 
combination of conceptual originality, academic and theoretical rigour and practical utility 
will make this thesis a worthwhile contribution to the literature as well as laying the 
analytical foundations for future research projects on homeland defence and the role of 
culture in the future.  
1.5. Relevance of topic 
45 Murray, Emma and Taylor, Paul. ‘“Soldiering By Consent” and Military–Civil Relations: Military Transition 
Into the Public Space of Policing’, Illness, Crisis, and Loss, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 235-254 
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The topic of domestic military deployments has increased in relevance dramatically over the 
years since work on this thesis began in late 2016; its central theme of exploring the differing 
strategic approaches of Britain and France had been prompted by the tragic events that had 
affected France in 2015. At this point in time, in France, the mass deployment of the military 
under Opération Sentinelle had been in full force for over a year and, in Britain, high-ranking 
policymakers had devised covert plans for the implementation of Operation Temperer. 
Expectations in France were that Sentinelle would be scaled back once the state of 
emergency was lifted, while in Britain, policymakers undoubtedly hoped that the Temperer 
contingency plan would never have to be used – particularly given the general public 
aversion to the idea of domestic military deployments.  
Despite these expectations, during the course of this research, there have been a number of 
developments that have challenged prevailing assumptions about cultural preferences for 
domestic military deployment and afforded the thesis even greater relevance. In 2017, 
Operation Temperer was activated twice following the tragic events in Manchester and 
Parsons Green leading to hundreds of troops being deployed across the country, an action 
deemed ‘provocative’ by Baroness Jenny Jones.46 At the time of writing, Sentinelle is not 
only still in full force, but its remit even seems to have shifted from a specific counter-terror 
operation to a more general, permanent presence on France’s streets. This was exemplified 
in 2019 when the Gilets Jaunes movement, which began in 2018 as a protest against the 
imposition of an increase in fuel tax, escalated into episodes of sporadic violence in a number 
of French cities. This led then government spokesperson Benjamin Griveaux to announce 
on 20 March 2019 that troops deployed as part of Sentinelle would supplement the French 
police in their efforts against the protestors.47 The Military governor of Paris, Bruno Le Ray 
then raised eyebrows during an interview with franceinfo when he stated that the soldiers 
involved in Operation Sentinelle would also be used in an operational capacity.48 This 
prompted a fierce debate in France about the appropriateness of using force against one’s 
own population.   
46 Austin, Henry. ‘Secret plans to deploy soldiers on UK streets in the aftermath of a terror attack are ‘shocking’ 
and ‘provocative’, says peer’, The Independent, 26 July 2015. See: 
 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/secret-plans-to-deploy-soldiers-on-uk-streets-in-the-
aftermath-of-a-terror-attack-are-shocking-and-10417364.html (accessed 22/09/2017) 
47 Griveaux, Benjamin. ‘Benjamin Griveaux: le Président de la République a indiqué que ‘le dispositif 
Sentinelle’ allait être ‘renforcé’, BFM TV, 20 March 2020. See: https://bit.ly/311qWq1 (accessed 24/03/2020) 
48 Le Ray, Bruno. ‘Des soldats de Sentinelle mobilisés samedi pour la manifestation des ‘gilets jaunes’: ‘les 
ordres seront suffisamment clairs pour qu'ils n'aient pas d'inquiétude à avoir’, Franceinfo, 22 March 2020. See: 
https://bit.ly/3iNCRhb (accessed 24/03/2020) 
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Similar debates emerged in the British media in 2019 following the Ministry of Defence’s 
(MoD) announcement of Operation Redfold which placed 3,500 troops in a state of 
‘readiness’ in order to deal with any disruption that may occur in the event of a no-deal 
Brexit and ‘support any Government department on any contingencies they may need.' These 
troops would be deployed in addition to those already on standby as part of Operation 
Temperer. Junior Defence Minister Tobias Ellwood was even quoted as stating that as many 
as 50,000 troops would be placed on standby ‘in case of civil unrest’ and that scenarios for 
the imposition of martial law had been proposed49 as such indicating a potential transition in 
the strategic thinking of Britain’s policy makers: the notion of domestic military 
deployments was no longer considered taboo or a ‘last resort’, but rather a ‘first resort’ in 
the event of internal crises.50 
The Covid -19 pandemic in early 2020 emphasised this notion of ‘first resort’ in both Britain 
and France and underscored the notion that the military should be expected to engage across 
a wide spectrum of threats. By March in Britain, 250 military personnel were deployed in 
aid of the Civil Power in their response to the crisis, with a further 20,000 troops on 
standby.51 In France, Opération Résilience was launched on 25 March 2020 and was 
described as an ‘unprecedented’ military operation. Its purpose was to aid in the 
‘decongestion of the areas most heavily affected by the coronavirus’ as well as to ‘ensure 
the protection of sensitive military and civilian sites, as well as surveillance and deterrent 
presence missions in support of the internal security forces.’52 This differed from Britain’s 
objectives for the military; according to an MoD press release, ‘[t]he armed forces stand 
ready to assist civilian authorities if required, but there are no current plans for the military 
to participate in the enforcement of public order.’53 Thus, although the last few years have 
certainly revealed a greater appetite for the use of the armed forces in a domestic context, 
the character of any potential deployment still differs from that of France. 
49 Coates, Sam. ‘Troops must be ready for Brexit chaos, says defence minister Tobias Ellwood’, The Times, 5 
January 2019. See: 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/troops-must-be-ready-for-brexit-chaos-says-defence-minister-tobias-
ellwood-s8sppbrsr (accessed 09/07/2020) 
50 ‘First resort’ was a phrase that was used during a discussion between the author and Major Drew Houston 
of the Ministry of Defence’s Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre.  




52 Ministère des Armées. Dossier de Presse — Opération RÉSILIENCE — 29 mars 2020, pp. 3-4 
53 COVID Support Force: the MOD’s contribution to the coronavirus response, Ministry of Defence. 23 March 
2020. See: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/covid-support-force-the-mods-contribution-to-the-coronavirus-
response (accessed 23/03/2020) 
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As debate globally on the subject of the utility of domestic force evolves and questions over 
the legitimacy or appropriateness of using the armed forces domestically are raised,54 there 
has never been a better time for a thesis that addresses this subject matter. It is hoped that 
this thesis will go some way to illuminating the formative moments in Britain and France’s 
past that have led to their current policy outlook and, through greater understanding of the 
cultural norms and values of each state and their effect on behaviour, may help inform 
decision making in the future.  
1.6. Research structure 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review. This chapter provides an in-depth examination of the 
theory of strategic culture and related fields. Its aim is not only to critically evaluate the 
literature, but also to fill a perceived gap related to enduring disagreements on continuity 
and change in strategic cultures. It first looks at the early works of Homer, Thucydides, and 
Herodotus to argue that the notion of national styles has existed for millennia. It then 
examines some of the literature from sociology and anthropology, which can be seen as the 
academic ancestors of strategic culture. It will then analyse critically the existing body of 
literature on strategic culture across the so-called ‘three generations’. It is argued that a 
number of serious deficiencies still exist in the literature, particularly relating to what 
accounts for both continuity and change in strategic culture, which is something this thesis 
intends to address. 
Chapter 3 – Methodology. Building on the lessons from the literature, this chapter argues 
that culture is the context to behaviour and thus cannot be used as a variable in its own right. 
Instead, it must be viewed as the lens of perception through which we view the world. Based 
on this argument, this chapter introduces a methodological framework for understanding the 
relationship between historical experience, culture and behaviour, taking into account the 
potential for both continuity and change. It then proposes the analysis of rhetoric, which is 
a mode of cultural action, in order to assess the potentially constraining effect that culture 
has on behaviour. It presents a unique methodology that charts two hundred years of 
domestic military deployments in Britain and France in order to identify specific eras of 
54 See the debates in the US media following Trump’s federalization of the National Guard and his statement 
on the need for ‘overwhelming force’ against and ‘domination’ of the protestors. See also Defense Secretary 
Mark Esper’s prompt for the military to ‘dominate the battlespace’ in order to restore order; an astonishing 
turn of phrase implying the protestors were akin to enemy soldiers and the national territory, a field of battle. 
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deployment and the formative moments that created shifts in approach. It then explains how 
the language used by policymakers at each of these branch points is analysed in order to 
identify instances of cultural continuity and change and how this is then matched to tangible 
policy decisions such as Temperer or Sentinelle.       
Chapter 4 – The historical origins of Britain’s preferences for domestic military 
deployments. This chapter begins by looking at the increased level of threat from Islamist 
terrorism post-2015 and the policy responses that this provoked. It examines the typical 
reaction of discomfort exhibited by the British regarding the armed forces domestically, 
raising the question why this is. It then introduces the data used for the remainder of the 
chapter. It traces over two hundred years of domestic deployments in Britain to identify a 
series of formative moments that have influenced policy and ushered in a new era of 
domestic deployment. These formative moments are identified as the St. Peter’s Field 
(Peterloo) massacre, the General Strike of 1926, the Heathrow exercises of 1974, the Iranian 
embassy siege of 1980 and Operation Temperer of 2015 to 2017.  It argues that Britain’s 
responses can be better understood when placed in a historical context. Therefore, the 
aftermath of the Wars of the Three Kingdoms and the Interregnum are examined as the 
context to current attitudes for the use of force domestically.  
It then looks at the use of the armed forces for quelling episodes of civil unrest over time 
making the argument that the Peterloo massacre was one of the most formative moments in 
Britain’s history in terms of its effect on modern preferences for the maintenance of internal 
security. It analyses the responses to the Peterloo by policymakers at the time and then looks 
at the impact it had through the formation of the Metropolitan Police in 1829. A comparison 
of the responses to Peterloo, the General Strike and the Tottenham riots is then made to argue 
that an entrenched cultural aversion to the use of the armed forces for quelling civil unrest 
has developed over time; an aversion which has been fortified by the perception of the army 
as an expeditionary force.  
Chapter 5 – The British army and domestic counter-terrorism operations. This chapter 
begins by arguing that although the British typically exhibit a distaste for domestic military 
deployments, the threat from terrorism constituted a different type of threat that challenged 
policymakers’ assumptions about appropriate strategies regarding the use of the armed 
forces. It examines the institutional development of Britain’s counter-terrorism response 
from the 1972 Munich Olympics attack, to Operation NIMROD during the Iranian Embassy 
siege. Again, it analyses the responses of policymakers to this operation to argue that despite 
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a different threat, the same enduring norms of subordination to the civil power, last resort, 
and proportionality are evident.  
Finally, it examines the post-2001 counter-terrorism era. IT briefly examines the impact of 
the 9/11 attacks and the July 2005 bombing in London before examining the development 
and subsequent rhetorical responses to Operation Temperer. It argues that although it 
appeared to represent a shift in strategy, the enduring norms listed above are still evident in 
the rhetoric. Furthermore, through an examination of modern army recruitment campaigns, 
it is argued that the British still see the army as a force that fights abroad, not at home lending 
weight to the argument that historical experiences and cultural preferences constrain 
behaviour.   
Chapter 6 – The historical origins of France’s preferences for domestic military 
deployments. This chapter begins by looking at the tragic events of 13 November 2015 in 
Paris and the response the attacks from the civil forces and the military through the 
implementation of Opération Sentinelle. It argues that, unlike the British case, there is 
general acceptance of the military in a domestic role. Once again, it asks why this is the case 
and suggests that France’s long historical precedent for deploying the military on the 
national territory has given rise to these preferences. Like the British case, the chapter then 
traces over two hundred years of domestic deployments finding a significant historical 
precedent in France for the use of the armed forces on the national territory for the purposes 
of quelling riot, protest and revolution, defending from invasion, carrying out coups d’état, 
countering-terrorism as well as more passive duties such as providing personnel during times 
of national crisis and providing disaster relief. It identifies France’s formative moments as: 
(1871), the Languedoc revolt (1907), the First World War (1914 – 1918), Défense 
Opérationnelle du Territoire (1950s) and Opération Sentinelle (2015 – present). It then 
argues that the French Revolution respresents an important point in France’s history, which, 
although outside the scope of the data analysis for this thesis, must still be discussed given 
its effect on modern France. 
It then examines France’s use of the armed forces for countering riot and protest. It begins 
by examining some of the context in the 1800s before analysing the responses of 
policymakers to the use of the armed forces during the Commune. It compares these 
responses to those during the Languedoc winegrowers strike in 1907 to argue that a marked 
shift in France’s cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically occurred 
from general acceptance in 1871 to general rejection in 1907.     
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Chapter 7 – The French army and the ennemi de l’intérieur. The first section of this 
chapter deals with France’s use of the armed forces for the purpose of defending against 
invasion. It argues that the First World War was a rare moment of national unity and, 
following on from the events of Languedoc in 1907, entrenched France’s preference for the 
armed forces not to be used against the people. It then briefly examines the post-Second 
World War environment and the perceived return of the ennemi de l’intérieur through the 
resurgent PCF in the 1940s and the resultant formation of Cold War doctrine such  as 
Défense intérieure du territoire (DIT) and Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire (DOT). 
It links this concept of the ennemi de l’intérieur to the French response to the growing 
terrorist threat in the 1970s and focuses on the idea that the army’s counter-terrorism role 
has largely reflected the principles for protection (rather than intervention) outlined in DOT. 
It then examines Sentinelle and argues that while it certainly represented a shift in France’s 
approach, analysis of the language, the fundamental protective remit of the operation, and 
the modern recruitment campaigns which illustrate a simultaneous internal and external role, 
in fact Sentinelle is broadly consistent with nearly two hundred years of French history. 
Chapter 8 – Conclusions and further research. This chapter summarises the approach 
taken in the thesis as well as the findings from the two cases. It then compares convergences 
and divergences in Britain and France’s respective approaches. It links the findings to the 
literature on strategic culture in order to fulfil the thesis’ aim of clarifying the debate. Finally, 
some suggestions for future research projects are made.     
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
This chapter aims to shed some light on the debate on strategic culture, a concept which has 
been accused of being ‘immodest’,55 ‘incomprehensible’,56 ‘deeply contested’,57 lacking a 
‘unitary definition’58 and therefore of being ‘of limited utility.’59 The criticisms are not, for 
the most part, unfair. Part of the problem is with the concept of culture itself which, as the 
novelist and Marxist theorist Raymond Williams once wrote, is ‘one of two or three of the 
most complicated words in the English language.’60 The complexity of the concept is due to 
the fact that culture cannot necessarily be considered a variable in its own right. Instead it is 
a system of meaning that comprises a variety of interdependent variables. The difficulty in 
researching and operationalising culture has led some scholars to suggest that we jump ship 
and abandon the concept entirely.61    
This would perhaps be too defeatist since, as Jeremy Black writes, despite being 
‘frustratingly malleable,’ culture is still essential to understanding state behaviour.62 Indeed, 
some scholars such as the influential German anthropologist Franz Boas even contended 
that, as a determinant of behaviour, culture exceeds biology in importance.63 Whether this is 
the case or not, culture is clearly too pervasive and vitally important to strategy to be ignored, 
regardless of the pitfalls and potential methodological tensions that inevitably arise with its 
inclusion.  
Relatedly, this chapter does not intend to get bogged down in definitions of strategic culture 
and follows Colin Gray in suggesting that definitional disagreement on the term is ‘rather 
foolish since there is general agreement on the content of the subject and, roughly, on how 
55 Haglund, David G. ‘What Good Is Strategic Culture? A Modest Defence of an Immodest Concept’, 
International Journal, Summer 2004, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 479-502 
56 Lock, Edward. ‘Refining strategic culture; Return of the Second Generation’, Review of International 
Studies, 2010, vol. 36, no. 3, p. 686 
57 Bloomfield, Alan and Nossal, Kim Richard. ‘Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: 
The Cases of Australia and Canada’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 28, no. 2, p. 286 
58 Biehl, Heiko; Giegerich, Bastian; Jones, Alexandra eds. Strategic Cultures in Europe – Security and Defence 
Policies across the Continent. (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2013), p. 11 
59 Lock, Edward. ‘Refining strategic culture; Return of the Second Generation’, Review of International 
Studies, 2010, vol.36, no.3, p. 687 
60 Williams, Raymond. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. (London: Oxford University Press, 
1976), p. 49  
61 Abu-Lughod, Lila. ‘Writing against culture’ in Richard G. Fox, Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the 
Present. (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 1991), pp. 137-54 
62 Black, Jeremy. War and the Cultural Turn. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), p. 43 
63 Degler, Carl N. Culture versus Biology in the Thought of Franz Boas and Alfred L. Kroeber. (New York, 
Munich: Berg Publishers, 1989) 
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it functions.’64 Rather, it aims to clarify the debate by distilling the literature into a workable 
framework for understanding the nexus between historical experience, culture, and 
behaviour. This chapter, and indeed the thesis, treats culture, and by extension strategic 
culture, as something responsive and dynamic, as something that actuates and is actuated by 
both behaviour and the perception of the national historical experience. 
The central contention is that strategic culture is fluid in nature. This has implications for 
the ongoing debate as to what accounts for shifts in strategy if historically-derived cultural 
norms are meant to constrain behaviour.65 It will argue that while the literature is broadly 
correct in the argument that a serious exogeneous shock will generate rapid and long-lasting 
shifts in strategy, a change will still not occur if any one of the following three conditions 
are absent: 1) strong institutions capable of catalysing change; 2) a bold leader willing to 
enact a change; and 3) a cultural climate that is receptive to a shift. It is hoped that the 
perspective introduced in chapter will help elucidate how certain norms may shift, remain 
constant, and be transmitted across time.  
It first examines the early works of ancient scholars such as Homer, Thucydides, and 
Herodotus to argue that the notion that different states may exhibit different characteristics 
has been evident in the literature for millennia. It will then discuss the development of the 
discipline by examining some of the early works in sociology and anthropology focusing on 
the importance of perception. It will then examine the literature on strategic culture, drawing 
a distinction between the different ‘generations’66 of thought and critically evaluating its 
weaknesses. The lessons from the literature will then help inform the methodological 
approach that is adopted in this thesis.  
2.1. National Styles 
The basic point that states may adopt different national styles towards the use of force as a 
result of their unique ‘character’, ‘culture’, or ‘way’ is evident in texts written millennia ago; 
64 Gray, Colin S. Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture. Paper prepared for: Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, 31 
October 2006, p. ii  
65 See Jeffrey Lantis’ interesting article which addresses precisely this point: Lantis, Jeffrey and & Charlton, 
Andrew A. ‘Continuity or Change? The Strategic Culture of Australia’, Comparative Strategy, 2011, 30:4, pp. 
291-315
66 A phrase coined by Alastair Iain Johnson in his essay ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International
Security, Spring 1995, vol. 19, no. 4
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circa 8th Century B.C. Homer’s epic poem The Iliad reveals a number of examples that refer 
to a particular national way of war or culture. For example, in a direct comparison of Trojan 
and Greek fighting styles; he writes that ‘…the Trojans advanced with shrieks and cries like 
cranes … But the Greeks moved forward in silence, breathing courage, filled with 
determination to stand by one another’.67  
We see similar arguments, in The Histories, written by ‘the father of history’, Herodotus, in 
5th century B.C. The Histories provides a detailed account not just of the Greco-Persian wars, 
but also of the different geographies, customs, and cultures of the states involved; for 
example, in describing a conversation between the king of Sparta, Cleomenes, and the leader 
of Miletus, Aristagoras. Aristagoras states his belief that victory over the Persians ‘…will 
be an easy task, for these foreigners have little taste for war, and you [the Greeks] are the 
finest soldiers in the world. The Persian weapons are bows and short spears; they fight in 
trousers and turbans – that will show you how easy they are to beat!’68 Here, Herodotus is 
not just contrasting approaches to battle, but is also introducing the notion that the Greeks 
would likely emerge victorious as war was a part of their culture.   
Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War is most frequently cited as the earliest in-
depth account of national styles in strategy.69 It is an account of the conflict fought between 
431 and 404 BC between the powerful city-states of Sparta and Athens in which he notes 
that Athenians were driven by the lust for victory and glory, compared with the more 
reserved approach to war taken by the Spartans. In the speech of the Corinthians, it is written 
that if the Athenians ‘win a victory, they follow it up at once, and if they suffer a defeat, they 
scarcely fall back at all.’ Meanwhile, Spartans are characterised as a far more timid people 
whose aim it is ‘to avoid harming others, and then to avoid being harmed.’70  
The classic texts on military strategy contain similar observations. Sun Tsu’s The Art of War, 
written in the 5th century B.C., urged dedicated planning when preparing for war by 
examining the political leadership of warring nations. Sun Tsu wrote that national styles will 
differ based on each country’s unique political context, in particular whether one 
67 Homer, E.V. Rieu trans (2003 edition) The Iliad, (Penguin Group, London), p. 45 
68 Herodotus; The Histories (1996 edition), (London: Penguin Group, 1954), book 5, verse 49, p. 296 
69 Heuser, Beatrice and Shamir, Eitan eds. Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and 
Strategic Cultures. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 8; Lantis, Jeffrey S. ‘Strategic Culture 
and National Security Policy’, International Studies Review, Autumn, 2002, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 87-113;  
70 Thucydides; Rex Warner trans. History of the Peloponnesian War. (London: Penguin Group, revised edition 
1974) p. 76, book 1: 70-71; Zaman, Rashed Uz. ‘Strategic Culture: A ‘Cultural’ Understanding of 
War’, Comparative Strategy, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 70-71  
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government may be ‘cruel’, the other ‘humane’ - this philosophy is summed up by his well-
known and often-quoted maxim: ‘know your enemy’.71  
At the turn of the 19th Century, the celebrated military theorist Carl von Clausewitz 
demonstrated the same acuity of thought. He argued that war, as a contest of wills, was ‘a 
part of man’s social existence’. The will, according to Clausewitz comprised moral factors 
among which were ‘the warlike virtue of the army and its popular spirit’;72 categories that 
can be thought of as essentially cultural. Further, in book eight of his magnum opus, On War, 
he compares the ways of war and the strategic aims adopted by various peoples throughout 
history. ‘The semibarbarous Tartars’ he writes, pursued the aim of ‘subduing’ or ‘expelling’ 
their enemies. While ‘the republics of antiquity, Rome excepted’ possessed small armies and 
thus pursued the limited aim of plundering local towns.’73 Even his classic definition of war 
as ‘the continuation of policy by other means’74  embodies the notion that state policies may 
vary and, thus, so too will their approaches to the conduct of war.  
2.2. Sociology, anthropology and the role of historical experience 
Of course, none of these early works explicitly used the term ‘culture’ in the sense that we 
understand it today. Indeed, culture was not considered to be something specific to a nation, 
as a distinct set of ideals, symbols, meanings, and practices, until the 18th Century when, 
according to Williams, ‘its occasional use as an independent noun’ can be found.75 It is the 
disciplines of sociology and anthropology that can be credited with a specific focus on 
society, culture, and their effects on behaviour.  
There is clearly a recognition of the merits of these early works to strategic studies literature 
since, in 1973, the celebrated nuclear strategist Bernard Brodie wrote that ‘[g]ood strategy 
presumes good anthropology and sociology’76; a statement referred to by Gray as ‘one of 
the wisest observations in the entire history of strategic thought.’77  It is therefore prudent to 
71 Sun Tsu; Cleary trans.  (1998 edition) The Art of War, p. 8 
72 Clausewitz, Carl von. Vom Kriege, Book III ch. 3-5 quoted in Heuser, Beatrice. Reading Clausewitz. 
(London: Pimlico, 2002), p. 81  
73 Clausewitz, Carl von; Howard, Paret trans. On War. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 230-232 
74 Ibid. p. 28 
75 Williams, Raymond. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1976), p. 51 
76 Brodie, Bernard. War and Politics. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1973), p. 332 
77 Gray, Colin S. Modern Strategy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1999), p. 131 
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briefly examine some of the key arguments from these disciplines, which are often omitted 
from the strategic culture literature, but which still have great utility even today.     
A sociological perspective 
As its name suggests, sociology is primarily concerned with the study of society, rather than 
culture per se. Society comprises myriad cultural elements such as norms, values, customs, 
institutions and, of course, language and, by developing ‘a sociology of culture’,78  it was 
these variables that were analysed by early sociologists such as Émile Durkheim, Georg 
Simmel and Max Weber.  
In 1895, Durkheim introduced the concept of the ‘social fact’ in order to distinguish between 
sociological phenomena that do and those that do not merit academic attention. He defined 
it as consisting ‘of ways of acting, thinking, and feeling, external to the individual, and 
endowed with a power of coercion…’ 79 This implies that a set of social rules exist prior to 
the existence of the individual and that we, as members of a society, are subconsciously 
compelled to abide by its norms. As the British sociologist David J. Lee puts it, ‘social 
constraint operates by establishing moral and cognitive boundaries [to behaviour].’80 Thus, 
just as gravity exerts an influence on the behaviour of objects without us being cognisant of 
its presence, so too do ‘social currents’ compel certain culturally-guided modes of thought 
and action. Given its inherently cultural nature, we might consider strategy as a ‘social fact’ 
since strategy makers will be constrained by the cultural forces under which they operate.    
Like Durkheim, the influential German sociologist, Georg Simmel also believed that the 
normative environment, which is formed through past experiences, exerted a degree of 
control over the behaviour of the individual. His thinking on culture was heavily influenced 
by the concept of ‘cultivation’81 and how ‘forms’ may influence the individual. These 
concepts are evident in his definition of culture which he saw as ‘the cultivation of 
78 Alexander, Jeffrey C.  The Meanings of Social Life: A Cultural Sociology. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2003), pp. 3-10 
79 Durkheim, Emile. The Rules of the Sociological Method. (New York, The Free Press, 1895/1964), p. 3 
80 Lee, David J. ‘Class as a Social Fact’, Sociology, May 1994, vol. 28, no. 2, p. 402  
81 An idea that derives from Cicero’s Tusculanae Disputationes where he writes of the cultura animi; meaning 
the cultivation of the soul. See: Cicero, Marcus Tullius. Tuscun Disputations II. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1966) V. 
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individuals through the agency of external forms which have been objectified in the course 
of history.’82 
Simmel’s main theory contended that humans will challenge the social world in which they 
find themselves, questioning its rules and attempting to overcome its norms. However, at 
the same time that humankind is attempting to incite change, society pushes back limiting 
(although not eliminating) the potential for change. Simmel referred to this phenomenon as 
‘Wechselwirkung’ or ‘reciprocity’.83 It was this eternal and interdependent relationship that 
Simmel saw as the essence of culture. In short, if we adopt a Simmelian view of strategic 
culture, then we understand that it will naturally evolve over time. There is nothing 
immutable about it given that individuals will constantly attempt to exert their own influence 
on the external forms of, in this case, strategy. Of course, with Simmel’s framework, change 
will occur slowly and there is less scope for rapid shifts.   
Simmel’s contemporary, Max Weber also wrote about the constraining effect of culture 
through what he referred to as the stahlhartes Gehäuse (‘Iron cage’)84 of society that we are 
born into, that constrains our thoughts and actions, and which we eventually perpetuate. 
However, Weber’s theories were more focused on the idea that norms will change over time. 
Indeed, he addressed a problem that is familiar to us today, asking why given similar 
capitalist values, modern societies have exhibited such different characteristics. Specifically, 
he asked why ‘the Occident has developed … a very different form of capitalism which has 
appeared nowhere else.’85 In order to explain this phenomenon, Weber devised a typology 
of social action which he divided into four categories: Value Rational, Rational goal-
oriented, Affective, and Traditional. Rational goal-oriented can be best understood as 
acultural ‘means to an end’ thinking which is a key component of modern realist and 
neorealist thinking.86 While traditional behaviour is action ‘carried out under the influence 
of custom or habit’ and is ‘a virtually automatic reaction in unconscious obedience to 
82 Simmel, Georg; Donald N. Levine ed. On Individuality and Social Forms. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1971), p. xix  
83 This idea of the dialectic between structure and agency is particularly pertinent to France which has often 
been described as a country characterized by division. See Robert Elgie’s assertion that the France ‘has always 
been internally divided.’. This point will be developed later in the thesis. See: Elgie, Robert. Political 
Institutions in Contemporary France. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 80  
84 Weber’s original term translates as ‘casing as hard as steel’, iron cage is the term that was popularized by 
Talcott Parsons in his translation of Weber’s work: ‘But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron 
cage.’ See: Weber, Max; Talcott Parsons trans. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. (London: 
Unwin University Books, 1905/1967), p. 181 
85 Weber, Max; Talcott Parsons trans. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. (London: Unwin 
University Books, 1905/1967), p. 21  
86 Waltz, Kenneth N. Structural Realism after the Cold War, International Security, Summer, 2000, vol. 25, 
no. 1, pp. 5-41 
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tradition.’87 In the context of strategic behaviour, Beatrice Heuser writes similarly that ‘what 
scholars … may identify as strategic concepts may just be traditions, passed on almost as if 
by osmosis rather than articulated principle.’88 
Weber argued that behaviour (either individual or societal) is likely to be a combination of 
two or more of these forms. Thus, while some societies may be more guided by history and 
tradition, others may be more goal oriented, but all will exhibit some characteristics of all 
four forms. As a result, it is abundantly clear if we follow Weber’s argument, that although 
culture, history, and tradition are not the sole explanations for behaviour, they will always 
play some kind of role.  
An anthropological perspective 
Much of the strategic culture literature, although cursorily aware of its academic roots in 
sociology, have tended instead to derive most of their lessons from anthropology. The 
influential anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, defined the purpose of the discipline as 
aimed at capturing ‘the native’s point of view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of his 
world.’89 In this sense, anthropologists will often view culture as ‘a kind of perception’.90 
For example, Matthew Engelke explains that culture is an inherited or learned set of ideas 
about the world that shapes the way we interact with it.91 Similarly, the German 
anthropologist Franz Boas, put it simply, but eloquently when he referred to the Kulturbrille 
(the cultural glasses) through which we view and interpret the world.92 This is central to 
understanding where culture sits in the relationship between historical experience and 
behaviour; not only does it suggest that our views of appropriate or necessary behaviour will 
be refracted through these lenses, but it also implies that there is no objective meaning to 
historical events as each will be tinted by our perception.  
87 Lee, David and Newby, Howard. The Problem of Sociology. (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1983), p. 176 
88 Heuser, Beatrice. The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 490 
89 Malinowski, Bronislaw. Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An account of native enterprise and adventure in 
the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea, 1961 edition. (New York: Dutton ,1922), p. 25 
90 Engelke, Matthew. Think Like an Anthropologist. (London: Penguin, Random House, 2017), p. 33  
91 Ibid. 
92 Although the phrase is readily attributed to Boas, in fact, as Boas himself writes, he borrowed the ‘apt term’ 
from one of his students, Von den Steinen. See: Boas, Franz. The History of Anthropology, Science, October 
1904, vol. 20, no. 512, p. 517 
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The idea that culture is constructed was adopted by one of Boas’ students, Clifford Geertz. 
In his seminal 1973 book, The Interpretation of Cultures, he explores the concept of culture 
as a social construct through a series of empirical studies in order to try and identify the 
effect that culture has on the so-called ‘real world’. Like this thesis, he does not treat culture 
as a variable per se, arguing that the study of culture’s effects is ‘not an experimental science 
in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.’ Geertz stated, rather 
poetically, that ‘man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun.’93 
In other words, not only is culture is a social construct, but also action is constrained by the 
webs of culture, which comprises myriad connected threads. Thus, like Boas’ Kulturbrille, 
it is impossible to disentangle behaviour from the influences of culture. 
These works illustrate how one is shaped by one’s environment, how culture is both learned 
and passively received, how it is shared across a group and, crucially, how culture may affect 
how we perceive and interact with both the material world and the past. In the context of this 
thesis, this would certainly suggest that cultural preferences should be exacting a 
constraining influence on Britain and France’s use of the armed forces domestically. 
Furthermore, the receipt of norms through factors such as ‘word of mouth’ or ‘observation’ 
implies that these preferences may not necessarily be overtly articulated, but rather 
transmitted across time passively, generating an ambient sense of how things should be done 
with respect to the use of force.   
The question, then, is where do these received sets of ideas originate? For the nineteenth 
century anthropologist Edward Tylor, the answer was historical experience. Tylor provided 
one of the more famous definitions of culture which he described as ‘that complex whole 
which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and 
habits acquired by man as a member of society.’94 Here we see once more the idea of 
‘acquisition’ of certain ideas about the world. Crucially, for Tylor, one could only understand 
current features of culture by examining the past and the survival or expiration of norms. 
The lesson from Tylor’s work in the context of this thesis was his argument that by 
examining past experiences one could trace the received ideas and patterned responses of a 
given group facilitating the analysis of the relationship between history, culture, and 
behaviour. In short, the past holds the answers to present behaviour.  
93 Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures. (New York: Basic Books, 1973) p.5 
94 Tylor, Edward. Primitive Culture: Research into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, 
and Custom. (London: John Murray, 1871), vol. 1, p. 1 
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2.3. Anthropology meets ‘national styles’ 
The above point on the relevance of understanding the past and the potential significance of 
culture as one of the determinants of behaviour was picked up by American strategists after 
their experiences fighting the Japanese in the Pacific theatre during the Second World War. 
The US encountered a shocking Japanese approach to conflict that was characterised by 
kamikaze attacks on their ships, and a will to fight to the last man. As the historian James B. 
Wood writes, the Shimpu (Japanese programme of suicide missions) was born of 
‘incorrigible elements of the higher command who were willing to bring their country to 
utter ruin rather than concede defeat’.95 Wood writes that the United States Strategic 
Bombing Survey (USSBS) concluded that the Japanese approach was ‘macabre, effective, 
supremely practical under the circumstances…’96.  
The US recognised that its understanding of the Kamikaze attacks and, indeed, the Japanese 
mindset in general terms, was limited. Thus, in order to occupy the country effectively after 
the Japanese surrender, there was a recognition that the US would have to take steps to 
improve their understanding of ‘the most alien enemy the United States had ever fought.’97 
In consequence, the US Office of War Information commissioned the anthropologist Ruth 
Benedict to research Japanese culture so that might be better able to predict its behaviour in 
the future. Benedict’s resultant 1946 book The Chrysanthemum and the Sword analysed 
historical patterns of behaviour in Japanese culture from the feudal clans and the domination 
of the Samurai caste to the Japanese mentality since VJ Day. She identified ‘deeply 
entrenched attitudes of thought and behaviour’ characterised by dialectical relationships 
such as simultaneous aggression (‘the sword’) and timidity (‘the chrysanthemum’).98 The 
focus was not explicitly focused on the Japanese ‘way of war’ or its strategy, but more 
broadly on how past experiences shape cultural norms which, in turn, influence or constrain 
shape behaviour. Nevertheless, it was one of the first works that connected the domain of 
culture with politics and strategy.  
The book was accused of perpetuating stereotypes and for being overly deterministic, 
however, the notion of distinct political cultures was influential. In 1963, Gabriel Almond 
and Sidney Verba assessed the distinct political cultures of five nations arguing that ‘the 
95 James B. Wood. Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: Was Defeat Inevitable? (Plymouth: Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, 2007), p. 96 
96 Ibid. 
97 Benedict, Ruth. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 2005 edition, 1946) p.1 
98 Ibid. p.16 
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force of shared social values and attitudes… permeate all aspects of society.’99 In a similar 
vein, in 1986, Ann Swidler referred to the ‘symbolic vehicles of meaning, including beliefs, 
ritual practices, art forms, and ceremonies, as well as informal cultural practices such as 
language, gossip, stories, and rituals of daily life.’ Although Swidler’s definition is broad, 
she also argued that ‘interest-driven, cultural ‘strategies of action’ were important mediating 
conditions on state behaviour.100 It is these political culture and anthropological concepts 
that were adapted into frameworks in the 1970s by scholars of an emerging school of thought 
that became known as strategic culture.   
2.4. Strategic Culture 
2.4.1. First Generation 
The academic attention that strategic culture now receives can be attributed to the American 
political scientist Jack L. Snyder who coined the phrase in a 1977 essay for the RAND 
corporation. Snyder rejected the assumption made by the US strategic community that there 
was such a thing as a ‘generic rational man’ that could be integrated into mathematical game 
theory models for predicting Soviet nuclear strategy.101 Instead, Snyder posited that ‘Soviet 
strategy has been influenced by a number of factors unique to the Soviet historical 
experience.’ These unique experiences formed equally unique strategic cultures, which he 
defined as ‘the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual 
behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction 
or imitation’.102  
Before Snyder’s essay, strategic thinking in the West had almost entirely neglected the 
potential for national styles.103 However, his idea that ‘individuals are socialized into a 
[distinct] […] mode of strategic thinking’104 as a result of formative past experiences proved 
99 Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five 
Nations. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 243 
100 Swidler, Ann. ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies’, American Sociological Review, April 1986, vol. 
51, no. 2, p. 273 
101 See discussion of game theory in Harding, Rebecca and Harding, Jack. Gaming Trade, Win-Win Strategies 
for the Digital Era, London: London Publishing Partnership, 2019, pp.41 – 65. See also: Flood, Merrill M. 
‘Some Experimental Games’, Research Memorandum RM-789, SantaMonica: The RAND Corporation, 1952; 
Schelling, Thomas C. ‘The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack, SantaMonica: The RAND Corporation, 1958 
102 Snyder, Jack L. ‘The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations’, RAND 
Corporation, September 1977, p. 8 
103 Poore, Stuart. ‘What is the context? A reply to the Gray-Johnston debate on strategic culture’. Review of 
International Studies, 2003, vol. 29, no. 2, p. 280 
104 Snyder, Jack L. ‘The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations’, RAND 
Corporation, September 1977, p. v 
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to be highly influential. In 1979 Ken Booth contributed to the ‘cultural turn’ arguing that 
‘men … create the social universe in their own images’ leading to ‘the problem of 
ethnocentrism’ in strategy making.105 Accordingly, Booth advocated for an approach that 
embraced ‘cultural relativism’106 in order to substitute the idea of the ‘rational’ man with 
that of the ‘national’ man.107 While Anglo-American scholar, Colin S. Gray, focused on the 
US national style in strategy arguing that culture ‘referring to modes of thought and action 
with respect to force, derives from perception of the national historical experience.’108  
Further, Gray wrote that ‘the significantly unique American historical experience’ had 
influenced its strategic preferences despite the national security community having ‘a poor 
sense of the value of history.’109  
This idea of perception is key to understanding the first generation’s approach; it pertains 
not just to how we address certain strategic challenges, but also how we construct lessons 
based on our interpretation of the meaning of past events. This is important as it suggests 
that there are no objective lessons to be drawn from the past,110 only the lessons that we, as 
‘encultured’111 individuals, choose to learn based on our ‘perceptual lens provided by the 
strategic culture.’112 Furthermore, it suggests as John Shy wrote, that a ‘long historical 
experience’ of carrying out actions in a particular way has a ‘conditioning effect’113 over 
time. Consequently, just like the US policymakers in Gray’s analysis who are constrained 
by history while also being ignorant of it, we may find that specific historical events are not 
explicitly articulated in strategic, political, or even public discourse. Instead, certain 
preferences may be received passively, becoming embedded in the national psyche through 
repetition. Accordingly, in the context of this thesis, it may be possible for a state to exhibit 
residual acceptance or rejection of the idea of deploying the armed forces domestically, 
without being fully cognisant of from where these attitudes originate.  
105 Booth, Ken. Strategy and Ethnocentrism. (London: Croon Helm ltd., 1979), p.13, p. 21  
106 Ibid. p. 16 
107 Booth, Ken quoted in Alan Macmillan, Ken Booth, and Russell Trood eds. Strategic Culture in the Asian-
Pacific Region. (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999), p. 5 
108 Gray, Colin S. ‘National Style in Strategy, The American Example’, International Security, Fall 1981, vol. 
6, no. 2, p. 22 
109 Ibid. p.45 
110 See” Beatrice Heuser’s discussion of the ‘selective reading and interpretation of history’ in ‘Historical 
Lessons and Discourse on Defence in France and Germany, 1945-90’, Rethinking History, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 
199-237
111 Gray, Colin S. ‘Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back’, Review of
International Studies, 1999, vol. 25, p. 52
112 Snyder, Jack L. ‘The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations’, RAND
Corporation, September 1977, p. v
113 Shy, John. ‘The American Military Experience: History and Learning’, Journal of Interdisciplinary
History,1971, vol. 1, p. 220
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2.4.2. Second Generation 
Towards the end of the Cold War, a ‘second generation’ of thought emerged in the literature, 
beginning with the American scholar Bradley Klein. Its primary purpose was less about 
exploring the relationships between history, culture and behaviour and more related to 
‘critically unmasking the manipulation of strategic cultures by élites’.114 Klein’s framework 
attempted to examine the relationship between policymakers and the general public arguing 
that ‘if the modern state is to secure and reproduce its way of life it will have to find some 
means of legitimizing its military activities’.115 This approach could be classified as critical 
in nature as he argued that the language used by policymakers will not always reflect their 
intentions. Although Klein’s work is useful in terms of challenging the assumption that 
policymakers will always tell the truth, it fails to take into account that policy decisions do 
not occur in a cultural vacuum;116 that strategy may differ between nations;117 and that 
historical experience is a crucial determinant of state behaviour.  
The latter point on the role of history is something that was rectified by other scholars in the 
1990s. For example, Beatrice Heuser’s 1998, book Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and 
Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG argues that the three case studies exhibited 
‘remarkable differences’ in their nuclear strategies in spite of comparable resources. She 
concluded that the differences in approach to nuclear issues were a function of their distinct 
‘political cultures’ and ‘collective mentalities’.118 The concept of the ‘mentality’ in this 
context derives from the works of French scholars of the Annales school of thought writing 
at the turn of the nineteenth century such as Lucien Lefebvre and Marc Bloch.119 They 
presented an anti-positivist view of history arguing that studies should examine the longue 
durée; a longer-term perspective, usually encompassing several centuries. This allows for a 
more nuanced understanding of continuity and change in the way phenomena are 
represented, as well as any shifts in mindsets, traditions and values. This notion was adopted 
by scholars such as Robert Mandrou, Michel Vovelle and Georges Duby in their later studies 
114 Poore, Stuart ‘What is the context? A reply to the Gray-Johnston debate on strategic culture’, Review of 
International Studies, 2003, vol.29, no. 2, p. 284 
115 Klein, Bradley S. “Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American power projection and alliance defence 
politics”, Review of International Studies, 1988, vol.14, issue 2, p. 135 
116 Stone, Elizabeth. ‘Comparative Strategic Cultures Literature Review, (Part 1)’, Prepared for: Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 2006, p. 1 
117 Johnston, Alastair Iain. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p.40 
118 Heuser, Beatrice. Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG. (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press Limited, 1998), pp. 2-4 
119 Bloch, Marc. Les caractéres originaux de l'histoire rurale francaise. (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1931)  
45 
on the ‘history of mentalities’.120 Heuser’s historical approach to the study of mentalities 
effectively illustrates how historically-received norms provoke divergent strategic 
behaviour. As the methodology chapter discusses, this theory of the mentalité partially 
informs the approach taken in this thesis.  
2.4.3. Third Generation 
In the mid-1990s, a so-called third generation of strategic culture emerged with the work of 
Alastair Iain Johnston. If the first generation could be seen as exploratory, and the second as 
critical (with the exception of Heuser’s work), then the third generation could be termed 
methodological.121 Like previous generations, Johnston argued that strategic preferences are 
rooted ‘in history and culture’ rather than ‘system structure.’122 Arguably, this is where the 
similarities end. He began by critiquing the broad and cumbersome definitions of the works 
of the first two generations which he felt left little ‘conceptual space for a non-strategic 
culture explanation of strategic choice.’123 He argued that the ‘kitchen sink’ approach that 
previous generations had adopted had resulted in a concept that has little utility as an 
analytical tool.  
Johnston attempted to demonstrate a causal relationship between culture and behaviour by 
defining strategic culture as ‘a limited, ranked set of grand-strategic preferences that is 
consistent across the objects of analysis … and persistent across time.’124 His definition-
cum-framework saw strategic culture as ‘an independent variable that determines a specific 
actor’s foreign and security behaviour.’125   
The merit in Johnston’s work lies in his empirical process through: 1) identifying of objects 
of analysis that are representative of a formative period in a state’s past (such as texts, 
doctrine, or even discourse); 2) demonstrating that a significant proportion of policymakers 
held similar views at the time; 3) tracing consistency of thought over time. Indeed, this thesis 
120 Vovelle, Michel. Idéologies et mentalités. (Paris: Maspéro, 1982); Duby, Georges and Mandrou, Robert. A 
History of French Civilization (New York: Random House, 1964)  
121 A similar point in made by Colin Gray in Modern Strategy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 
129 (footnote 1) 
122 Johnston, Alastair Iain. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p. 3 
123 Johnston, Alastair Iain. ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security, vol. 19, no.4. (Spring 
1995) p. 37 
124 Ibid. p. 48 
125 Biehl, Heiko; Bastian Giegerich; Alexandra Jones, eds. Strategic Cultures in Europe – Security and Defence 
Policies across the Continent. (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2013), p. 10 
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draws some inspiration from Johnson’s approach in that it analyses political speeches over 
time. Nevertheless, there are limitations to his approach related to assumptions of 
demonstrable causality, such as:  
First, Johnston’s definition of strategic culture assumes that it is ‘persistent across time’. In 
fact, Johnston needs it to be persistent as he treats it as an independent variable that 
influences his dependent variable: behaviour. However, there is strong evidence to suggest 
that strategic culture evolves slowly over time and, in certain cases, may even undergo rapid 
and long-lasting shifts.126 Instead, as first-generation theorists argue, strategic culture should 
perhaps be viewed either as dynamic or semi-permanent. This, of course, may undermine its 
explanatory power and, if we accept first generation thinking and the lessons from sociology 
and anthropology, culture perhaps cannot be considered as a variable at all. It varies by 
context (e.g. political culture, work culture, industrial culture, strategic culture, 
organisational culture) and is intrinsically normative.  
Second, culture both constitutes behaviour and is also ‘a constituent of that behaviour.’127 In 
other words, culture and behaviour are symbiotic leading to what we might term ‘the variable 
problem’. It seems that Johnston’s study adheres to a Humean idea of causality in that if we 
can show that the cause and effect are ‘contiguous in space and time’; that the cause precedes 
the effect; and that there is a ‘constant union’ between the two, then cause can be 
demonstrated.128 However, this falls apart somewhat if the study variables are inter-
dependent. Most crucially, it prevents us from establishing whether the cause precedes the 
effect meaning we can no longer conclude with any degree of certainty that a condition (X) 
has caused an outcome (Y). 
Third, Johnston does not address the potential for norms to be received informally. In other 
words, rather than being evident in the texts or debates of a particular era and consistent 
across time, certain norms may not be articulated at all, but rather unconsciously transmitted 
through passive socialisation such as observation or word of mouth. Any study on strategic 
culture must take into account the potential for individuals to have an innate sense of what 
is appropriate behaviour, without necessarily being conscious of the source for that 
126 See the rapid change in Germany’s strategic culture from an expansionist power pre-Second World War, to 
a pacific power post-War.  
127 Gray, Colin S. ‘Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back’, Review of 
International Studies, 1999, vol. 25, p. 50 
128 Hume, David. Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, The Understanding, online resource published 2004, part 
iii, pp. 89-90. Seet: http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/hume1739book1.pdf   
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behaviour. That is, culture can be used to understand even if it is intuitively limited in its 
explanatory powers. 
2.4.4. Towards a Fourth Generation? 
The ‘three generations’ debates are arguably still ongoing, but the literature has shifted 
towards establishing more normative frameworks for understanding the effects of strategic 
culture and improving its research utility as a mechanism for understanding differences that 
arise. European security scholar Christoph Meyer advanced the idea of distinguishing 
between contextual and tangible aspects of strategic culture. He argued that in contemporary 
literature, strategic culture is ‘increasingly invoked as shorthand to highlight that national 
security and defence policies rest on deep-seated norms, beliefs and ideas about the 
appropriate use of force’. His conceptual framework is based on ‘four main scalable 
norms’129 which allow assessments of how ‘normative components’ translate into policy. 
These four dimensions are: 1) goals for the use of force; 2) the way in which coercive means 
are used; 3) preferred mode of co-operation; and 4) international/domestic authorisation 
requirements.130 Meyer’s scale ranges from low to high activism in each of these categories. 
The framework is useful for identifying the manner in which states are likely to behave and 
similar, more recent frameworks have echoed his approach. For example, Biehl et al. in their 
work on European strategic cultures, outlined four similar policy areas that are attributable 
to strategic culture: 1) level of ambition in international security policy; 2) scope of action 
for the executive in decision-making; 3) foreign policy orientation; 4) willingness to use 
force.131  
These frameworks have added a layer of specificity that was previously lacking from the 
debate. However, the analysis on the historical roots of states’ strategic cultures is a little 
superficial. Indeed, Meyer’s analysis tends to be largely forward looking, asking if there is 
a trend towards a convergence in European strategic cultures and ‘what kind of European 
129 Meyer, Christoph O. The Quest for a European Strategic Culture; Changing Norms on Security and Defence 
in the European Union. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 22 
130 For the full framework see Meyer, Christoph O. The Quest for a European Strategic Culture; Changing 
Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 23  
131 Biehl, Heiko; Giegerich, Bastian; Jones, Alexandra eds. Strategic Cultures in Europe – Security and 
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defence policy is possible’.132 Furthermore, they not only tend to assume absolute continuity 
in strategic culture through fairly rigid frameworks, but they are also largely concerned with 
foreign policy. This, of course, leaves little room for an analysis of strategic culture in the 
context of domestic security. 
2.4.5. Deficiencies and enduring questions in the literature 
Although a great deal of progress has been made in clarifying the debate, in spite of over 
forty years of academic contributions to the subject, numerous questions still surround the 
theory; there is still no consensus on what it is, whether behaviour can be separated from 
culture, who ‘carries’ it, and how to ‘operationalise’ it.133 This raises a number of conceptual 
issues; for example, even if we accept that strategic culture is an important determinant of 
behaviour, if it varies so substantially from country to country then how can it be 
operationalised in any practical sense? Further, if we accept the notion that a strategic culture 
creates entrenched modes of thought and action, does this not also assume continuity in 
behaviour? If so, what accounts for obvious episodes of change in behaviour? What are the 
factors that affect rates of change? Are these changes permanent?  
There are a number of studies that have attempted to tackle many of these questions related 
to continuity and change. Snyder originated the debate by arguing that strategy would 
‘evolve only marginally over time’,134 while Johnston also assumes that strategic culture is 
broadly constant, changing only incrementally with the passage of time.135 Other works such 
as political scientist John S. Duffield’s study on German foreign policy, argued that culture 
had a deterministic effect by predisposing ‘societies in general and political elites in 
particular toward certain actions.’136 Indeed, there are a number of studies that examine the 
apparently consistent ‘culture of restraint’ that emerged in Germany following the Second 
World War.137 More recent works such as that of Dmitry Adamsky have analysed Russian 
132 Meyer, Christoph O. The Quest for a European Strategic Culture; Changing Norms on Security and Defence 
in the European Union. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 13 
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Corporation, R-2154-AF. (Santa Monica, September 1977), p. 9 
135 Johnston, Alastair Iain. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 1 
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strategic culture in the context of the war in Syria arguing that while change is evident, this 
is largely on the tactical and operational level, while the strategic level has remained 
generally consistent over time.138  
Conversely, other scholars have argued for the potential for change in strategic culture. 
Darryl Howlett argues, ‘strategic cultures can and do change, sometimes radically.’139 Other 
scholars such as Alister Miskimmon have argued that changes occur when elites exploit or 
manipulate culture to serve their own objectives.140 US scholar Harry Eckstein wrote that 
changes occur when the state harnesses military power to incite specific shifts. He uses the 
example of the French Revolution as evidence of this.141 More recently, in 2011, the political 
scientist Jeffrey Lantis wrote in an article specifically addressing continuity and change that 
structural shifts and the rise of new threats have created a corresponding change in 
Australia’s strategic culture that he expects to have a degree of permanence.142 
It is apparent, therefore, that the literature has failed to reach a consensus on whether 
strategic culture remains continuous across time or whether it may change. Indeed, even 
among those who suggest change is possible, there is clear disagreement as to what causes 
these shifts. Part of the problem is that much of the literature assumes mutual exclusivity. In 
other words that our choice must be either continuity or change, but not both. After all, if 
historical experiences guide cultural preferences which, in turn, constrain behaviour then 
this assumes general continuity in strategic behaviour. However, history is replete with 
examples of events that have generated strategic shifts: for example, the end of the Second 
World War, the end of the Cold War, the attack on 11 September 2001, even the attack in 
Paris in November 2015. In cases such as these, many scholars have argued that rapid and 
radical change can occur if a state (or group of states) is ‘battered by traumatic shock.’143  
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While this view is ostensibly correct, it does rather suggest that change occurs naturally and 
unconsciously following a shock. In reality is slightly more nuanced and requires an active, 
conscious effort to incite change. Adapting a framework introduced by Max Weber, this 
thesis suggests that change can occur as a function of powerful social structures, the presence 
of a bold leader that is willing to implement a change,  and a cultural climate that is receptive 
to a shift.144 However, the speed and permanence of a shift depends on the presence of all 
three of these factors. 
A powerful example of this in the context of this thesis would be a political institution (say, 
the police) who deem it necessary to involve the military on the national territory, the leader 
of the country is bold enough to push through the decision to mobilise the armed forces, 
despite a lack of precedent. Despite the lack of precedent, the public’s perception of a 
putative threat is sufficiently high (because of a traumatic shock) to be receptive to such an 
action. It is important to note that a state does not stop being an inherently cultural entity 
even in the event of a shift. Hence, core cultural values will likely be evident even in an 
environment that appears on the surface to have changed drastically. It is this understanding 
of continuity and change in strategic culture that is adopted in this thesis.  
2.6. Summary of the literature 
The literature on strategic culture has developed over the years from a general awareness 
that different states will adopt national styles to a keener focus on the role that culture plays 
in determining or, at least, influencing, behaviour. This was evident in the classical texts of 
Homer, Herodotus, and Thucydides as well as the great military philosophers Sun Tsu and 
Clausewitz.  
A number of sociological works were among the first to use culture as a framework, in their 
studies. Durkheim advanced the idea of culture as an externally constraining force, while 
Simmel argued that behaviour and culture are inseparable due to Wechselwirkung 
(reciprocity); a concept that Gray adopted (intentionally or otherwise) in his first generation 
thinking on strategic culture when he argued that culture both shapes behaviour and is shaped 
144 Weber, Max.; G. Roth & G. Wittich trans. Economy and Society – an Outline of Interpretative sociology. 
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by it. Weber also wrote about the ‘iron cage’ which constrains action, but built the potential 
for change into his thinking by outlining four forms of social action: Value Rational, 
Rational goal-oriented, Affective, and Traditional.   
Anthropological works in the twentieth century also established frameworks for 
understanding culture’s constraining effect on behaviour. Much of this literature argued that 
culture is a social construct that tethers the individual to a set of norms making it difficult, if 
not impossible, to behave aculturally. Crucially, many anthropologists advanced the idea 
that culture is a lens of perception that will influence how one views and interprets the world.  
It argued that this concept was developed in the early studies on strategic culture by Snyder, 
Booth and Gray, which attempted to challenge assumptions over the existence of a ‘generic 
rational man’. Instead, they argued, ‘encultured’ individuals would interpret the material 
realm culturally, again through a perceptual lens. From this first generation of thought, a 
series of debates emerged: from Klein’s second generation assertion that states may not do 
what they say, to Johnston’s third generation attempt to provide a falsifiable model for 
strategic culture by separating culture from behaviour; an impossible feat according to Gray 
given the symbiotic nature of the two variables.   
It was argued that some progress has been made on the subject of strategic culture, 
particularly regarding the introduction of useful normative frameworks, but that a number 
of enduring questions remain in the literature – particularly regarding the notion of 
continuity and change. Some studies argue strategic behaviour is more or less constant, 
others argue that it changes over time. Further, even among scholars who adopt a position 
that strategy will shift, there is still disagreement as to what causes shifts, how permanent 
they are, and what accounts for rates of change.  
To this enduring conundrum, it was suggested that we need not consider continuity and 
change as mutually exclusive. Instead, general continuity is afforded by the influence of 
historical experience and cultural preferences. Rapid and substantial shifts in strategy may 
occur, but only in the event of three essential criteria: powerful institutions; a bold political 
leader; and a ripe cultural climate. Crucially, even if a change does occur, it was argued that 




Ultimately, Michael Howard once wrote that ‘an understanding of the past is prerequisite to 
an understanding of the present.’145 This is absolutely correct; however, this thesis would 
also contend that any individual’s understanding of historical events will always be refracted 
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
The previous chapters raise three core research questions: first, are Britain and France’s 
cultural preferences for acceptance or rejection of domestic military forces domestically 
derived from the perception of the national historical experience? Second, do these cultural 
preferences have a constraining effect on strategic behaviour? And third, if evidence of 
historically-derived cultural constraint can be found, what accounts for episodes of change 
in strategy over time? These are complex questions and developing a methodology around 
them relies on how culture itself is treated in any analysis. For Johnson, cited previously, 
culture is an explanatory variable in its own right. It is measurable and finite and therefore 
should be causally linked to behaviours. However, as Gray argues, culture itself depends on 
historical as well as behavioural context and should be considered as both the cause and the 
effect. 
This thesis subscribes to the latter view. Culture should not, and arguably even cannot, be 
used as a variable as it is an amalgamation of myriad related, dynamic, and inter-dependent 
variables. As Simmel and Gray argued, this variable symbiosis is evident in the permanent 
dialectic between the individual and the objects of culture. If the two are inextricably linked, 
then we are confronted with a serious methodological hurdle: how can we disentangle the 
concept of culture to such an extent as to draw valid causal conclusions? Some studies have 
argued that this challenge is insurmountable,146 which of course seriously undermines any 
attempt to take the ‘explaining’147 approach to strategic culture. 
This was emphasised by Jeffrey S. Lantis and Darryl Howlett who argued that the ‘search 
for falsifiable theories’ when examining strategic culture is ‘unachievable’.148 As a result, 
the study of strategic culture should arguably be considered as the art of understanding, 
rather than the science of explaining.149 Gray argued similarly that ‘[s]trategy does not yield 
146 Wagner, Wolfgang & Yamori, Katsuya. Can culture be a variable? Dispositional Explanation and Cultural 
Metrics. In T. Sugiman, et al. Progress in Asian Social Psychology. Vol. 2. (Seoul: Kyoyook-Kwahak-Sa 
Publishers, 1999) 
147 See Martin Hollis and Steve Smith’s excellent and comprehensive discussion on the appropriate methods 
to use when conducting research, in particular their analysis on the respective approaches of positivist and 
interpretivist methodologies, of which this thesis is the latter. Hollis, Martin & Smith, Steve. Explaining and 
Understanding International Relations. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) 
148 Lantis, Jeffrey S. and Howlett, Darryl in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray eds. (2006) Strategy 
in the Contemporary World, 5th Edition 2016. (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 87-88 
149 Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve. Explaining and Understanding International Relations. (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1990), ch. 5, pp. 92-118  
54 
to the scientific method, and nor does the study of culture.’150 With this in mind, this thesis 
adopts a more inductive, interpretivist methodology based on a small number of case studies 
(small-n approach) and historical analysis. 
The challenge is to construct a methodological approach that elevates our understanding of 
historical and cultural constraint through precise analysis while still recognising the 
limitations of using ‘history’ and ‘culture’ as a central framework. This requires a framework 
around which to build the analysis; drawing on the lessons from Boas, Snyder, and Gray, 
this thesis considers culture as the lens of perception through which we view and interpret 
the world and our past experiences. In this sense, cultural preferences must be placed in the 
centre of the framework. Yet, although culture certainly influences the lessons we learn from 
the past as well as the behaviour that we deem appropriate, it can also be influenced by both 
of these factors. For Gray, a traumatic shock will usually lead to a change in approach while 
for Simmel, structure and agency are in a state of eternal tension as individuals attempt to 
overcome social and cultural norms. With this in mind, this thesis uses a framework which 
encompasses the potential for strategic continuity and change, as a guide to understanding 
the specific historical experience, cultural preference, behaviour nexus:151 
Framework 1: Historical experience, cultural preference, behaviour nexus 
There are three central elements to this framework. First, in order to identify the relevant 
historical experiences, over five hundred examples of military deployments on the national 
territory in Britain and France are charted and coded each according to their purpose. This 
reveals a series of formative moments in each state’s past that may have resulted either in an 
increase or a decrease in the number of deployments or in a shift in strategy. 
150 Gray, Colin S. Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture. Paper prepared for: Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, 31 
October 2006, p. 1 
151 To be clear, this is not a separation of culture and behaviour since the two are inextricably bound together. 
Rather it is an exploration of the constraining effect (rather than deterministic effect) that culture may exercise 










Second, in order to identify a set of cultural preferences, at each of these formative moments 
the language used by policymakers in relation to the use of the armed forces is analysed. 
This enables an understand what British or French policymakers were thinking at the time. 
Third, the cultural preferences of policymakers at each formative moment will be compared 
in order to find evidence of enduring themes and behaviours. This is because something 
must be ‘sufficiently established and enduring to merit description as cultural.’152 It applies 
the results of the linguistic analysis to tangible strategic decisions regarding domestic 
military deployments. It analyses how cultural preferences have affected representations of 
the military through recruitment campaigns before examining how enduring historically 
derived cultural norms have constrained the approaches of Britain and France in terms of the 
military’s role in counter-terrorism operations in the present. 
This approach enables the identification of any enduring patterns in the themes of the 
speeches and statements and combines with the evidence of historical constraint in the 
rhetoric through direct references to historical events. It expects to find limited recognition 
in the rhetoric as to the source of specific cultural preferences. In short, there will be residual 
acceptance or rejection of domestic military deployments, but not necessarily an awareness, 
readily apparent in the rhetoric, as to where this came from. It is to this that the discussion 
now turns. 
3.1. Case Selection 
This study charts over two hundred years of domestic military deployments in Britain and 
France and intends to go into some depth in terms of the historical analysis. Consequently, 
the desire to do justice to the historical analysis led to the decision to focus on two states: 
Britain and France. As the introduction indicated, these states were selected due to the 
similar preconditions such as budgets, GDPs, military sizes, and actual and perceived threats, 
but divergent responses to the threat of Islamist terrorism.153 Of course, other states would 
have been equally valid for inclusion. Germany would have been an obvious third choice 
152 Gray, Colin S. ‘British and American Strategic Cultures’, paper prepared for Jamestown symposium 2007: 
‘Democracies in Partnership: 400 Years of Transatlantic Engagement’, 18-19 April 2007), p. 37 
153 It should be noted that Islamist terrorism is not the focus of this thesis as this would have necessitated a 
different approach that examined respective attitudes to Islam, citizenship, immigration etc. Instead it simply 
uses the fact that the extraordinary threat presented by Islamist terrorism led to extraordinary responses. 
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given similar preconditions (see table 2), but different response. However, it was felt that 
the inclusion of a third case would restrict the depth of the analysis.  
Germany was excluded rather than France or Britain as there are more similarities in terms 
of relative size and strength between France and Britain than with Germany (See table 2). 
Furthermore, post-2001, Britain and France have experienced more ‘significant’ attacks 
(defined here as more than five fatalities) than Germany with seven attacks in both Britain 
and France compared with one in Germany. Lastly, both Britain and France and view their 
militaries with a degree of national pride. The German people, by contrast, are generally 
resistant to the Bundeswehr in general terms, let alone in a domestic capacity. Thus, in 
keeping with the need for cases with as many similar preconditions as possible, Germany 
was selected for exclusion. However, although it was omitted on this occasion, it will be 
included in future research projects (see discussion in conclusion) and, where relevant, 
occasional comparisons with Britain and France are included in this thesis.  
Table 2 – France, Britain and Germany, compared 
France United Kingdom Germany 
GDP per Capita – US $ (2019)
154
 49.4 thousand 48.7 thousand 56.1 thousand 
Population (2020)
155
 65.3 million 67.9 million 82.3 million 
Active Service Personnel (2016)
156





 $ 52.3 billion $ 54.8 billion $ 48.5 billion 




 (2017) 296 
Threat perception: ranking of Islamist 
terrorism in 2017 
1st 1st 1st 
Number of significant attacks (2001 – 
2018) 
7 7 1 
154 World Bank. ‘GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) - France, United Kingdom, Germany’. See: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=FR-GB-DE (accessed 12/08/2020) 
155 Countries in the World by Population: http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-
country/ (accessed 01 September 2020) 
156 Malcolm Chalmers, Decision Time: The National Security and Defence Capability Review 2017 – 2018, 
Whitehall Report 1 – 18, RUSI, p. 8 
157 Personalzahlen der Bundeswehr. Aktuelle Personalzahlen der Bundeswehr. Bundeswehr.de See: 
https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ueber-die-bundeswehr/zahlen-daten-fakten/personalzahlen-bundeswehr 
(accessed 21/07/2020) 
158 International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2020, Top 15 Defence Budgets 2019. 
See: https://bit.ly/3kDaR1x (accessed 12/08/2020) 
159 Key Figures on Europe, 2015 edition, Eurostat Statistical Books. (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2015), p. 43 
160 Hargreaves, Jodie; Husband, Hannah; Linehan, Chris. Police Workforce, England and Wales, 31 March 
2017, Statistical Bulletin 10/17, Home Office. See: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/630471/hosb1017-police-
workforce.pdf (accessed 13 July 2017) 
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Equally, Spain, or Italy could have been analysed. In 2004 until 2005, Spain deployed around 
20,000 troops and 3,000 military vehicles in response to the threat under Operation Romeo-
Mike. This would have been interesting to compare with the military response from France 
and the ad hoc civil-military response from Britain.161 Equally, Italy would have made for 
an interesting comparison due to the similarities between the French and Italian responses. 
Italy deployed 5,000 troops in February 2015, the month following the attacks on the Charlie 
Hebdo offices in Paris, to guard synagogues, Jewish schools, and tourist attractions.162 They 
also maintain a similar rural police force, the carabinieri that was modelled on the French 
gendarmerie and which also falls under the jurisdiction of the military. However, with the 
exception of the Madrid attack in 2004, neither Spain nor Italy have experienced significant 
attacks to the same degree as Britain or France in recent years and therefore would not have 
adhered to the necessary preconditions.  
3.3. Data gathering 
With the cases selected, it was then necessary to gather the relevant data that would allow 
us to answer the research question: do cultural preferences derived from the perception of 
the national historical experience constrain behaviour and, if so, what accounts for episodes 
of change in strategy?  Framework 1, outlined above, provided the three inter-related 
dimensions that this thesis seeks to explore: 1) Historical experience; 2) Cultural 
preferences; and 3) Behaviour. Each of these aspects required a distinct methodological 
approach; consequently, the following sections will explain each dimension and the methods 
used in turn.  
(1) Historical experience
Based on framework 1, the first step was to uncover the specific formative moments in each 
state’s past that may have affected their current policy outlook. The logical solution to this 
161 Reinares, Fernando. ‘After the Madrid Bombings: Internal Security Reforms and Prevention of Global 
Terrorism in Spain’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2009, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 367-388 




was to chart domestic military deployments in Britain and France across time. These 
deployments could be coded according to their purpose (e.g. riot and protest, 
counterterrorism, defence from invasion) allowing for an effective visualisation of the 
army’s domestic role over time. This approach would reveal different eras of deployment 
and, by focusing on the moment of change (for example a transition from an era of containing 
riot and protest to one of counterterrorism), would indicate a potential attitudinal shift.        
The French Annales literature on mentalités was used to structure the framework. Mandrou 
wrote that memory creates a ‘prison’ of history which restricts thought and action. As such, 
he argued that it was necessary to analyse the longue durée – that is, as long a period of time 
as possible in order to demonstrate the fixed nature of collective mentalities. Michel Vovelle, 
in contrast, argued this assertion was too deterministic and risked slipping into what he 
referred to as ‘histoire immobile;’163 it ignored the fact that changes can, and will, still occur, 
particularly following ‘revolutionary events.’164 As a result, he advocated for an approach 
which still included as long a period of time as possible, but that also factored in the boom 
and bust nature of social life.165 
Both Mandrou and Vovelle’s arguments have validity; examining a concept such as 
continuity and change in strategic culture necessitates a broad scope. As a result, 1800 was 
selected as the starting point for the project. Baldwin sees 1800 as the start of the era he calls 
‘old globalization’, when states began to experience rapid growth in industry, exports, and 
national incomes. He writes that France and Britain (along with Germany, Italy, Canada, 
Japan) were particular beneficiaries to this emergent globalisation as evidenced through their 
rapid colonial expansion. Thus, the nineteenth century marked the point at which Britain and 
France started to become global powers. From a domestic perspective, as philosopher Ernest 
Gellner argues, the 1800s marked the transition from agrarian societies to industrial ones. 
As a result of a more centralised economic and political system, populations became more 
culturally homogenous and, thus, this period can be considered as the birth of the nation 
state.166 2019 was selected as the end point to ensure the findings were as up to date as 
possible (for example, by allowing an analysis of the gilets jaunes protests) while still 
ensuring the accuracy of the data.  
163 ‘static history’ 
164 Vovelle, Michel. ‘Histoire des mentalités — Histoire des résistances ou les prisons de longue durée’, Le 
Monde alpin et rhodanien. Revue régionale d’ethnologie, 1980, no. 8-1-2, pp. 139-156 
165 Ibid, p. 141 
166 Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1983/2006), pp. 3 – 7 
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With the time period selected, the next step was to trace historical domestic deployments of 
the military in each state. Incidents were drawn from extensive research using a number of 
both primary and secondary sources. For example, the Archives Nationales in Paris, the 
National Archives at Kew, both historical and recent debates in the Assemblée Nationale and 
the Sénat for France and on Hansard for Britain as well as speeches and statements by 
policymakers and military personnel, the correspondence of certain influential political or 
military figures, the media, and, of course, from a wealth of secondary sources such as books 
and journal articles. In total, across the two cases, over 500 incidents were found (see table 
3).  
This thesis does not claim to represent an exhaustive list of domestic military deployments 
in Britain and France, but rather examines what are termed ‘significant’ deployments. In 
other words, deployments that have fulfilled some or all of the following criteria: it involved 
a substantial number of service personnel; it led to loss of life; it has been debated or 
mentioned in parliament; it has been mentioned in the correspondence of political or military 
personnel, it has had lasting historical impact through continued discussion in the media, 
academia, or military and political establishments.  
Each of the deployments was first coded according to whether it constituted either an ‘active’ 
or a ‘passive’ engagement. Here, active is understood as a significant, overt deployment with 
the aim of defusing a dangerous situation or imminent threat including riots, protests, 
terrorism, foreign invasion, or other disruptive political turmoil. Passive is understood as a 
significant, overt deployment with the aim of aiding the general public in their daily lives 
through disaster relief or the provision of service personnel in cases of civil service strikes.  
Here it is important to note the exclusion of two cases from the data on domestic 
deployments. For Britain, deployments to Northern Ireland under Operation Banner were 
not included and, equally, neither were France’s deployments to Algeria. This is not to say 
that these cases have not been formative to each state’s respective approach to domestic 
deployments, but rather because they do not reflect the same normative standards that were 
set for the homeland.  
For example, in spite of its proximity to the British mainland, Ireland has historically been 
treated as a colony. Principles of minimum force were not freely applied to Ireland to the 
extent that they were in England and, in the nineteenth century, when mainland Britain was 
wrestling with the ethical conundrum of using troops against the people, British 
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policymakers were exhibiting a certain ‘reluctance’ to withdraw troops from Ireland.167 
Instead, the standard approach by the British has been ‘imposition by force’.168 There were 
examples of absentee landlords, who often lived in England, calling in the local army units 
to enforce the eviction of the local impoverished Irish Catholic tenants at the point of a 
bayonet. A Lieutenant Colonel of the MoD interviewed for this thesis stated that ‘I doubt 
whether this use of the Army in civil land dispute would been considered acceptable within 
England, Scotland or Wales at this time.’169 Furthermore, the Irish were often dehumanised 
by the British state through ‘negative ethnic stereotypes’ and ‘openly hostile or … 
condescending’ rhetoric.170 This notion was emphasised by a British officer who served in 
Northern Ireland in the 1990s who was interviewed for this thesis. On the subject of how 
operations were conducted he stated: ‘Northern Ireland was run in an entirely different way. 
It was run like in the colonies. People [in England] turned a blind eye. It was like a game. 
Everyone knew what was going on.’171 In short, as S.J. Connolly argues, colonisation created 
modern Ireland.172 
The French invasion of Algeria began in July 1830. The British historian David Fieldhouse 
wrote that this provided the impetus for ‘a complete colonization’ which lasted until the 
country’s independence in 1962.173 Algeria’s treatment by the French state differed to that 
of their other colonies in that in 1841 it was annexed and, in 1848, it was formally integrated 
into the French state; the territories of Algiers, Constantine, and Oran were classified as 
départements and inhabitants of Algeria were all referred to as French citizens. However, 
although the French state claimed that the same laws applied in mainland France as Algeria, 
the reality was very different. As Sung Choi argues, ‘the legal framework in fact privileged 
167 Spiers, Edward M. ‘THE BRITISH ARMY 1856-1914: recent writing reviewed’, Journal of the Society for 
Army Historical Research, Winter 1985, vol. 63, no. 256, p. 198 
168 Connolly, S.J. Settler colonialism in Ireland from the English conquest to the nineteenth century. In Edward 
Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini eds. The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism. (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2017),  p. 49 
169 Simpson, Lieutenant Colonel Harold (UK Ministry of Defence), Semi-structured interview by Jack Harding, 
London, 15 December 2017 
170 Connolly, S.J. Settler colonialism in Ireland from the English conquest to the nineteenth century. In Edward 
Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini eds. The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism. (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2017), p.61 
171 Keil., Captain Duncan Former British army and NATO liaison officer, Semi-structured interview by Jack 
Harding, London, 1 August 2019
172 In Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini eds. The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler 
Colonialism (Oxon: Routledge, 2017) ; N.B. The British government’s recent Internal Market Bill could be 
interpreted as ignoring the will of the Northern Ireland Assembly (who voted to reject the Bill) in favour of 
treating Northern Ireland as an integral part of Britain. Recent post-Brexit developments, including an 
increased threat from dissident Republicans mean that my future research will prioritise integrating the 
Northern Irish case with a view to understanding how attitudes to the use of force have converged or diverged 
compared with the British mainland. See conclusion for further details.   
173 Fieldhouse, David K. The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Survey from the Eighteenth Century. (New 
York: Macmillan, 1982), p. 182 
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European rights over those of the majority Muslim population.’174 Algerian political and 
social structures were uprooted as a matter of policy and the indigenous people were seen as 
‘French subjects’ rather than citizens.175 Like the British case, this was exemplified by the 
use of pejorative terms such as ‘lazy, savage, and worthless.’176 Furthermore, rule in Algeria 
was maintained militarily rather than through a civil system like that seen in mainland 
France. Following the initial invasion, Algeria was controlled by ‘largely autonomous 
generals, who waged brutal warfare against the local Arab and Berber populations’177 and, 
further, a military officer served as Algeria’s gouverneur général until the 1880s.  
Uniformity was important for this study and, given that different rules seem to have been 
applied to both Northern Ireland and Algeria, they were omitted from the analysis here. Both 
cases are discussed as context in this thesis, but are excluded from the data analysis due to 
concerns that they would skew the findings. As discussed in the concluding chapter, further 
research will compare the cultural preferences for the use of force on mainland Britain and 
France with their respective approaches to Northern Ireland and Algeria.  
The following table provides a summary of the domestic military deployments that were 
found in the primary and secondary literature (table 3). It shows how France has deployed 
the army on the national territory four times as often as Britain over the same period and for 
a wider range of operations.  
174 Choi, Sung. French Algeria, 1830 – 1962 in In Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini eds. The Routledge 
Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism. (Oxon: Routledge, 2017), p. 201 
175 Gulley, Paige N. French Land, Algerian People: Nineteenth-Century French Discourse on Algeria and Its 
Consequences’, Voces Novae: Chapman University Historical Review, 2018, vol. 10, no. 1, p. 1 
176 Ibid.  
177 Davis, Stacey Renee. ‘Turning French Convicts into Colonists: The Second Empire's Prisoners in Algeria, 
1852-1858,’ in French Colonial History, Volume 2. (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 
2002), p. 95 
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Table 3: Summary of ‘significant’ domestic deployments in Britain and France, 
1800 - 2019 
Deployment Type Active / Passive Britain (number of 
deployments) 
France (number of 
deployments) 
Riot & Protest Active 53 151 
Defence from Invasion Active 0 160
178
 
Counterterrorism Active 11 44 
Coup d’état Active 0 2 
Striking civil service / 
personnel provision 
Passive 35 23 
Disaster relief Passive 6 40 
TOTAL - 105 420 
From these deployments, a number of formative moments were identified that seemed to 
usher in a new era of deployment. Table 4 provides a list of these deployments that will be 
analysed in this thesis. The charts presenting the findings for each state can be found in their 
respective chapters and a full list of the deployments is found in appendix 1 (Britain) and 
appendix 2 (France).   
Table 4: Summary of formative moments in Britain and France, 1800 – 2019 
BRITSH CASE FRENCH CASE 
1819 – St. Peter’s Field Massacre 
(‘Peterloo’) 
1871 – The Commune 
1926 - General Strike 1907 – Languedoc revolt 
1974 – Heathrow exercises 1914 – First World War 
1980 – Iranian Embassy siege 1950 – Défense en surface (DIT and 
DOT) 
2015 – 2017 – Operation Temperer 2015- 2019 – Operation Sentinelle 
178 N.B. This includes deployments on the national territory during the Cold War under the DOT doctrine. 
Thus, defence from invasion pre-1945 entails battles and war fought. Post-1945 deployments, while still for 
the purposes of defence, did not involve fighting.  
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From the formative moments that are identified in table 4, three areas arise that require 
further clarification. First, it is important to offer a brief explanation for the selection of one 
of the formative moments; namely, the First World War in the French case. This was selected 
for two reasons. First: the defence from invasion era can be split into two sub-categories; 1) 
battles and wars and 2) deterrence and protection. Given this distinction, it was important to 
include an example from both based on the assumption that the responses they foment may 
differ. Second, based purely on the domestic deployments data, the Second World War 
should be the formative moment for this section as it was the last war on French soil. 
However, as the former French ambassador to the US, Gérard Araud once stated, this period 
of time is ‘the black hole of French history’. The lack of data for speeches is evidence of 
this: for obvious reasons, between 1941 and 1947 there are no available records of debates 
in French parliament or the senate. Thus, while the impact of this period is discussed, the 
rhetoric could not be analysed. However, the First World War was also extremely formative 
and for similar reasons. There is a wealth of available source material for this period, thus 
this case is analysed instead. 
Second, it should also be noted that although the data used in this thesis begins in 1800, the 
respective British and French chapters also include a discussion of the War of the Three 
Kingdoms and French Revolution. These two moments in British and French history were 
enormously formative in terms of the development of modern preferences for the use of the 
armed forces on the national territory. However, if these moments were included in the core 
thesis, it would have necessitated tracing nearly four hundred years of deployments. This is 
far too broad a scope for a comparative project and would have diluted the findings too 
significantly. As a result, the War of the Three Kingdoms and the French Revolution are 
simply discussed in their respective chapters as essential historical context.  
The third area for clarification relates to the question of how do we know that the moments 
identified here were formative? And additionally, how can we tell that these incidents were 
of long-term significance? To the first question, this thesis adopted a two-pronged approach: 
first, given that this thesis is concerned with the question of continuity and also episodes of 
change, the data was examined to identify areas of transition in the nature of domestic 
deployments. In other words, moments that seemed to lead to a dramatic reduction or a 
dramatic increase in deployments for a particular purpose. An example of this is the selection 
of the 1871 Commune. Although subjective knowledge about France’s history indicated the 
importance of the 1848 revolution in France, this incident did not lead to an increase or 




deployments for the purposes of quelling civil unrest decreases dramatically. Equally, for 
the British case, the siege of Sidney Street in 1911 was arguably the first military deployment 
for the purposes of countering terrorism. However, there was not another deployment for 
this purpose for another sixty years and therefore it could not be classified as formative. To 
be clear, this thesis is not making the argument that the events identified here have been the 
most important in each state’s history. For example, the 1974 Heathrow incident was likely 
nothing but a flash in the pan. Instead, each of these incidents seemed to mark either the 
beginning or the end of a particular era of domestic deployment.  
 
This relates to the second question on how can we tell that these incidents were of long-term 
significance? Based on the deployment data alone, we will not be able to determine the long-
term significance of each formative moment or whether its impact entered into the collective 
conscience. As a result, it is necessary to analyse the language used by policymakers at each 
of these moments in order to try and identify themes that are common across all eras 
regardless of the nature of the deployment. 
 
 
(2) Cultural preferences 
 
With the formative historical moments identified for each state, the question now arises over 
how to examine the impact of these events on cultural preferences? As was noted previously, 
culture is a system of meaning that constitutes myriad interdependent variables rather than 
existing as a variable in its own right. Thus, while most reasonable people would probably 
agree that culture exerts a degree of influence on behaviour, this idea has been notoriously 
difficult to prove.   
 
This is an issue that has dogged the strategic culture literature for years; in 2000, the political 
scientist Kerry Longhurst suggested an ‘anatomy’ of strategic culture due to her conviction 
that breaking the notion down into its constituent parts would afford greater academic utility. 
Longhurst drew a distinction between the ‘unobservable’ and ‘observable’ components of 
strategic culture. She argued that the ‘unobservable’ components are the ‘core values’ that 
are based on historical experiences and the ‘observable’ are the ‘self-regulating practices 
and policies.’179 However, Longhurst also suggested that the relationship between these 
components could be illustrated by evaluating ‘official documentation […] elite level 
 
179 Longhurst, Kerry in Gerhard Kümmel and Andreas D. Prüfert eds. (2000) Military Sociology, the Richness 
of a Discipline. (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgessellschaft), p. 307 
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debates and media representations’.180 Colin Gray argued similarly that ‘I look for culture in 
a community’s ideals, in its ideas as revealed by its documents and other artefacts, and in its 
behaviour.’181 Johnston, too, outlined four steps for analysing strategic culture that can be 
summarised as follows:  
1 – find an object of analysis that is representative of a formative period; 
2 – demonstrate consistency of thought across a wide variety of policymakers; 
3 – Link these preferences to that state’s strategic culture; 
4 – examine impact on behaviour.182 
As a result of this overview, the language that is used by the policymakers of a given state 
in relation to particular strategic concepts has been chosen as a proxy to shed light on cultural 
preferences. The argument that language can be used to bridge the gaps between historical 
experience, culture, and behaviour has a great deal of merit. Indeed, a number of prominent 
scholars have explored the role of language as both a modifier and determinant of our 
perceptions about the world around us.183 In 1935, the linguist John Rupert Firth wrote about 
language in terms of social action. He described it as ‘a way of doing things, of getting things 
done, a way of behaving and getting others to behave’.184 The celebrated philosopher 
Michael Foucault also explored language’s practical effects by examining the relationship 
between language and knowledge production and, subsequently, how it relates to power.185 
Taking a hermeneutical perspective, the philosopher Jens Zimmerman wrote that ‘language 
guides our perception intrinsically.’186 Furthermore, the sociologist Anthony Cohen argued 
one must ‘learn to be social’ and that part of this process is learning language. This will 
include ‘what’ to say to communicate with others, but not ‘what’ to communicate.187 Thus, 
there is an inexorable connection between language, ideas and how we, as culturally bound 
animals, interpret the material world.  
180 Longhurst, Kerry in Kümmel, Gerhard and Prüfert, Andreas D. eds. (2000) Military Sociology, the Richness 
of a Discipline. (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgessellschaft), p. 308 
181 Gray, Colin S. Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture. Paper prepared for: Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, 31 
October 2006, p. 11 
182 Johnston, Alastair Iain. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p. x - xi 
183 Schleiermacher, Friedrich D.E.  quoted in the introduction to The Hermeneutics Reader, ed. Kurt Mueller-
Vollmer (New York: Continuum, 1997), p. 11 
184 Firth, John Rupert. Papers in Linguistics 1934-1951. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 35 
185 Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan. (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1995), pp. 29-30 
186 Zimmermann, Jens. Hermeneutics: A Very Short Introduction. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 
15 
187 Cohen, Anthony P. Symbolic Construction of Community. (London: Ellis Horwood Ltd., 1985), p. 15   
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To give a practical example, in a video recorded by Amedy Coulibaly, one of the île-de-
France attackers in January 2015 and an associate of brothers Saïd and Chérif Kouachi who 
attacked the Charlie Hebdo offices, he is heard saying that he would ‘sortir contre’ his 
enemies (‘I went out a little against the police’) – this directly translates as ‘go out against’, 
but does not convey his intended meaning in French. In fact, Coulibaly was referencing a 
Salafist expression ‘kharaja ‘ala’ (meaning to attack) which he had translated literally into 
French. As the French counter-terrorism scholar Gilles Kepel writes, this linguistic quirk 
alone unveiled his allegiance to Islamic State.188  
Furthermore, the absence, or lack of usage, of a particular word, phrase or idiom from a 
language can be equally important as it may imply it has no purpose for that culture. To give 
a brief example, on the subject of Germany taking a more active role internationally the 
former German ambassador to the UK, Thomas Matussek stated ‘[w]e don’t like the word 
leadership. We had a Führer and don’t want that again.’189 The German reluctance to use the 
word Führen in an overtly political context is a clear reflection of their historical 
experiences.190 Of course, there is no inherent meaning to words, just the meaning that we 
ascribe to those words. We see, then, how cultural norms are reflected in the language and, 
thus, rhetorical and discourse analysis should be at the forefront of any study of strategic 
culture.  
3.4. Content and Discourse Analysis 
This thesis blends both content and discourse analysis in order to not just examine what was 
said and with what frequency, but also to interpret the meaning behind what was said when 
placed within its cultural and historical context. This is a similar approach to the systemic-
functionalist method advocated by the British linguist Michael Halliday. Halliday’s 
approach focused on examining language in its socio-political context to discern the meaning 
that is encoded in language by the writer or speaker. The ‘systemic’ component refers to the 
forms that language takes. This is interpreted in this thesis as the different themes related to 
domestic military deployments that are identified in the rhetoric. ‘Functional’ is related to 
188 Kepel, Gilles. Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the West. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2017), p. 164 
189 Matussek, Thomas cited in Harding, Rebecca and Harding, Jack. The Weaponization of Trade: The Great 
Unbalancing of Politics and Economics. (London: London Publishing Partnership, 2017), p. 25 
190 Führen being the German verb, to lead 
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the assumption that language is cultural behaviour designed to serve an idiosyncratic 
function and will therefore reflect the cultural preferences of the state.191 For this thesis, this 
relates more to the discourse analysis component, by interpreting the meaning of a speech 
and trying to determine its effect on behaviour. 
This thesis will focus on elite-level statements and speeches, official documentation, and, 
where relevant, media articles in order to determine the impact of historical experiences on 
cultural preferences for domestic military deployments. The rhetoric used by policymakers 
is the primary focus of the analysis of this thesis; this is because policy elites are usually 
considered to be the carriers of strategic culture. Or, as Durkheim more eloquently put it, 
‘the state is the organ of social thought’. Hence it is among policymakers that ‘deliberation 
and reflection’ takes place in an organised manner in order to ‘prevent changes being made 
without due consideration.192  
Data for this analysis was gathered from parliamentary archives such as Hansard for the 
British case and the Sénat and Assemblée Nationale for France. Historical archives were also 
used; predominantly the National Archives at Kew and Les Archives Nationales in Paris. 
Official correspondence, media articles and, very occasionally, secondary literature were 
also used. Identifying relevant speeches involved using knowledge of when the specific 
formative moment occurred coupled with a keyword search. In some instances, this was 
obvious such as in the cases of operations Temperer and Sentinelle. Other search terms 
included specific events (e.g. ‘La Commune’, Peterloo / St Peter’s Field) or generic terms 
such as army, soldiers, troops, military. In some cases it was also possible to use country-
specific terms such as Military Aid to the Civil Authority (MACA), Military Aid to the Civil 
Power (MACP) and Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) for the British case or 
Vigipirate, Défense intérieure du territoire (DIT), or Défense opérationnelle du territoire 
(DOT) for France. Where no electronic version of a speech was available, it was necessary 
to read the whole document to obtain the relevant information. For the British case, 536 
speeches and statements were analysed and 556 for France. Tables 5 and 6 provide a more 
specific breakdown of the number of speeches for each formative moment (presented in 
chronological order):  
191 Halliday, Michael A.K. Language as Social Semiotic (1975) in Janet Maybin ed. Language and Literacy. 
(Clevedon, Open University Press, 1993), pp. 23-43 
192 Durkheim, Emile. Professional Ethics and Civic Morals. (London: Routledge, 1957), pp. 79-80  
68 
Table 5 – British case: formative moments and number of speeches analysed 
BRITSH CASE Number of speeches & statements 
1819 – St. Peter’s Field Massacre (‘Peterloo’) 146 
1926 - General Strike 129 
1974 – Heathrow exercises 53 
1980 – Iranian Embassy siege 32 
2011 – Tottenham riots193 50 
2015 – 2017 – Operation Temperer 126 
TOTAL 536 
Table 6 – French case: formative moments and number of speeches analysed 
FRENCH CASE Number of speeches & statements194 
1871 – The Commune 119 
1907 – Languedoc revolt 109 
1914 – The First World War 51 
2015- 2019 – Operation Sentinelle 217 
2019 – Gilets Jaunes 60 
TOTAL 556 
First, each speech was coded according to whether it strikes a negative, positive, or neutral 
tone (i.e. reporting a fact without a value judgement). This step was necessary to illustrate 
whether prevailing opinions about the appropriateness of domestic military deployments 
change over time. The next step was to classify each speech according to its central theme. 
It is important to note that categories for the speeches and statements were not predefined. 
Instead each was read thoroughly before a category was ascribed. To give a hypothetical 
example, after reading a speech it may have been apparent that it represented a positive 
statement regarding the use of the military. Next, it may have been felt that the content of 
the speech indicated the speaker believed the nature of the threat made it necessary to deploy 
the military; thus, a category for ‘necessary given threat’ was created. These categories were 
kept as generic as possible without losing the original meaning of the statement so that a 
193 N.B. The Tottenham riots were not a formative moment as the military were never deployed. However, the 
severity of the rioting prompted fierce debate in parliament as to whether the armed forces should have been 
called in, or should be called in if similar rioting were to occur in the future. It is included in this study as it 
provides an interesting comparison with the rhetoric used during Peterloo in the nineteenth century and the 
General strike in the twentieth.   
194 N.B. Défense en surface represents a formative moment for France. Unfortunately, due to insufficient source 
material on the subject through parliamentary debates it was decided that a forceful conclusion on the meaning 
of the rhetoric could not be reached. However, the transition in strategic thinking post -WW2 is still analysed 
as are key pieces of legislation relating to DIT and DOT.   
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more effective comparison could be made between eras and, as a result, continuity or change 
in cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces for domestic security could be traced. 
(3) Behaviour
With historical experiences identified through the data on domestic deployments and cultural 
preferences determined by an analysis of the common themes that occur in the rhetoric, the 
final step is to examine the potential effect this has had on behaviour. Specifically, whether 
events of the past seem to have cultivated an acceptance or aversion to the notion of 
deploying the army on the national territory and how this has informed deployment patterns. 
Consequently, the second half of each case is concerned with behaviour. In other words: 1) 
the effect that culture has had on modern representations of the military’s role through 
recruitment campaigns (i.e. do advertisements convey a certain expectation that the army 
should play an internal or external role in order to achieve the defence of the state?); and 2) 
how historical experiences and the resultant cultural preferences have affected deployment 
patterns in the modern era. This entails an analysis of the gradual integration of the military 
into Britain and France’s counter-terrorism architecture post Munich attack. First through, 
the development of dedicated counter-terrorist units such as the SAS and the GIGN, then 
through specific doctrine such as MACP for Britain or DOT and Vigipirate for France and 
finally through their respective approaches to the threat of Islamist terrorism in the modern 
era with Operations Temperer and Sentinelle.     
Summary of methodology 
The aim of this research is to shed light on the relationship between historical experience, 
cultural preferences and behaviours in the deployment of the armed forces for domestic 
purposes. The methodological framework reflects the fact that culture cannot be used as an 
explanatory variable in itself. Rather, culture is the lens through which we view the world. 
As a consequence, this thesis charts over two hundred years of domestic military 
deployments in order to identify the historical events that that left Britain and France either 
reluctant or in favour of seeing the armed forces used at home. It analyses the rhetoric of 
policymakers in relation to each of these deployments to ascertain how each event affected 
debates at the time. Brief examples from army recruitment campaigns will also be given to 
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reinforce the point that cultural preferences are also evident in how Britain and France’s 
militaries have represented themselves over time. 
The purpose of this thesis is also to illuminate how these historical experiences and 
concurrent cultural preferences have impacted current events, particularly regarding 
unprecedented responses to a threat of terrorism that is also relatively new in terms of its 
scale. The different nature of the threat necessitates a brief excursion through the institutional 
development of Britain and France’s counter-terrorism architecture from the 1970s with a 
particular focus on the role played by the army and the creation of special forces units that 
were developed, not necessarily due to cultural preferences, but as a direct response to the 
perception of a growing threat. Following this essential contextual deviation, the thesis will 
return to the debates on Temperer and Sentinelle in order to trace enduring cultural 
preferences for the military’s use, and, through examples of modern recruitment campaigns, 
to assess how the lessons of the past have affected more recent policies. 
3.5. Limitations to the study 
This thesis does not attempt to identify a causal link between culture and behaviours. Such 
an approach is fraught with methodological challenges and represents the first limitation of 
the research presented here. Rather, culture is used as part of a methodological framework 
that aids an understanding of the link between historical experiences which seem to influence 
cultural preferences and accordingly may constrain behaviour. Nevertheless, the evidence 
gathered in this thesis provides a unique perspective on the relationship between Britain and 
France’s respective strategic cultures and their behaviour. 
Second, the concept of strategic culture is itself a limitation of this research therefore. It can 
be accused of attempting to explain too much and therefore oversimplifying reality. This is 
acknowledged here and thus, no claim is made that strategic culture alone can explain why 
Britain and France have followed their own distinctive strategic paths. It is simply the case 
that it is one important factor. As, Heiko Biehl et al. argued in 2013, there is ‘no blueprint 
for the analysis of strategic culture.’195 As highlighted in the literature review there are stark 
methodological divides among proponents of the strategic culture theory. However, in this 
195 Biehl, Heiko; Giegerich, Bastian; Jones, Alexandra eds. (2013) Strategic Cultures in Europe – Security and 
Defence Policies across the Continent. (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien), p. 11 
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case the lack of a formal ‘blueprint’ on how to assess strategic culture works in favour of 
this thesis. In essence, it can be considered tabula rasa with how best to approach the subject 
left to the researcher’s discretion, albeit guided by decades of in-depth academic discourse 
drawing on expertise from myriad disciplines. In this respect, the lack of methodological 
confines allows the thesis to plough a fresh furrow in terms of its approach while 
acknowledging that the results are confined to Britain and France. 
Third, the ‘plurality or uniqueness’ of history196 suggests that historical events are one of a 
kind and the way they are interpreted and the reaction they provoke may also be unique. 
Furthermore, historical memory is constructed and policymakers often select the events 
which are deemed to be most formative. In other words, a polity ‘chooses to learn’ particular 
lessons from the past.197  
In short, norms may not be overtly articulated, but rather received passively. In consequence, 
many of the themes are expected to appear in certain eras, but not in others, particularly 
given that the domestic duty of the troops in both Britain and France seems to have changed 
significantly over the years. This is mitigated by including a large number of speeches and 
statements from a wide range of policymakers. This means the odds of finding common 
themes are increased. Overall, this thesis excepts to find episodes of both practical and 
rhetorical change. However, it also expects to find evidence of continuity; if a number of 
themes are evident in the rhetoric across the whole time period, it will be possible to conclude 
that these represent the ‘core values’ of the state (i.e. should the military be used? If so, under 
what conditions and with what restrictions?). This will allow us to determine whether 
strategic culture is constraining behaviour.    
Fourth this thesis will examine just two case studies and, therefore, any conclusions that are 
drawn will only be applicable to Britain and France. While the thesis should provide strong 
evidence of the role that history could play in determining or influencing cultural preferences 
for the use of the armed forces domestically in any given state, it will not be possible to state 
with any certainty that this is the case. As a consequence, any attempt to generalise beyond 
these two case studies will remain in the realm of speculation. This also means that the study 
tends to focus on differences rather than similarities. The inclusion of additional cases would 
196 Vovelle. Histoire des mentalités, p. 155 
197 Heuser, Beatrice and Shamir, Eitan eds. Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and 
Strategic Cultures. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 1 
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represent a useful extension to the research and is discussed in more detail in the concluding 
chapter.  
A fifth limitation is with using language as a proxy for culture. As argued previously, 
language channels cultural preferences to such an extent that it must be considered as a core 
element of culture, but is not the sum total of culture itself.  For example, an analysis of 
symbols or rituals over time would also have been a valid approach. In order to mitigate this 
potential weakness, both the British and French cases include a section on military 
recruitment campaigns over time; media representations are akin to cultural symbols in that 
they will also reflect certain preferences or expectations for how the armed forces should be 
deployed. While these recruitment campaigns are not the focus of this thesis, they add 
essential context to the hypothesis.  
At first glance, a final limitation may appear to be the apparently broad scope of this project. 
As detailed earlier, it takes over two hundred years of domestic deployments into account in 
both Britain and France. The risk, therefore, would be that the thesis becomes overly 
descriptive or, equally, far too vague.  However, in reality this thesis is not assessing two 
hundred years of history in totality, but only the formative moments which seem to have had 
the greatest tangible effect on how each state has approached the domestic use of the armed 
forces and the effect that this has had on modern deployment preferences.  
Despite the limitations highlighted above, the weakness in many other studies on strategic 
culture is their failure empirically to examine or trace continuity and change in historical 
cases across a longer period of time, opting instead to simply declare that ‘history and culture 
matter’. It is hoped that this thesis rectifies this gap and contributes significantly to the 
literature through an original and comprehensive study that analyses the nature of the 
relationship between historical experience, culture, and behaviour with respect to 
preferences on whether or not to use the armed forces domestically.  
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Chapter 4 – The historical origins of Britain’s preferences for 
domestic military deployments. 
‘The trouble with eternal truths is that they keep on changing’ 
Dick Green  
Comment to the author at the Deterrence and Assurance Academic Alliance Conference, King’s 
College London,  
14 February, 2018 
4.1. Introduction 
After Al-Qaeda’s shocking attack in the United States on 11 September 2001, the western 
world was forced to completely re-evaluate their approach to terrorism. In Britain, Tony 
Blair’s government took steps to recalibrate the military’s mandate on the national territory 
to allow for a more direct counter-terrorism role.198 In spite of a recognition among Britain’s 
security and defence experts of the specialist capabilities that the military possessed and the 
potential contribution to national security that they could make, in July 2002 a Select 
Committee on Defence argued that, in Britain, ‘the use of the Armed Forces for domestic 
purposes is potentially controversial, and strict limitations are placed on their domestic 
employment.’199  
The comment made in the Select Committee is a typical British reaction when the thorny 
issue of domestic military deployments is raised with most people exhibiting a certain 
squeamishness towards the idea. This almost innate resistance to the use of the military on 
the national territory is not a function of any inherent, deeply-engrained anti-military 
sentiment. As Richard Dannatt, author of Boots on the Ground, argues, in the modern era, 
‘the Armed Forces enjoy unprecedented public approval’.200 The validity of his statement is 
supported by an annual poll conducted in 2017 by the MoD which found that 88% of 
respondents hold a ‘very favourable’ or ‘mainly favourable’ view of the armed forces while 
just 4% hold a negative view.201  
198 Stevenson, Jonathan. ‘The Role of the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom in Securing the State Against 
Terrorism’ Connections, Fall 2005, vol. 4, no. 3, p. 122 
199 The New Chapter of the Strategic Defence Review, Select Committee on Defence, Second Report, July 
2002, par. 121 
200 Dannatt, Richard. Boots on the Ground: Britain and Her Army since 1945. (London: Profile Books Ltd., 
2016), p. 5 
201 MOD and Armed Forces Reputational Polling, Summer 2017 Survey Topline Findings (27-07-17), ICM 
Unlimited on behalf of the Ministry of Defence, Q.2, p. 3. See: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/684573/ 
Public_Opinon_Survey_-_Summer_2017.pdf (accessed 06 May 2018) 
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Instead, as the British scholar Geraint Hughes argues, the aversion to the use of armed forces 
in an active capacity on the national territory is because in Britain ‘[t]he sight of troops on 
the streets is instinctively unsettling.’202 Hughes’ reference to instinct is apt in this context; 
it implies that the British tend to have a knee-jerk reaction to the idea of boots on British 
ground that is not so much born of rational thought as it is of deeply affective and traditional 
action. 
Nevertheless, a growing threat from Islamist terrorism post-2015 again forced British 
policymakers to put aside their cultural reservations and consider the role that the armed 
forces may be able to play in national resilience. As highlighted in earlier chapters, after the 
attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris, British policymakers had put in place a 
contingency plan known as Operation Temperer that would be implemented in the event of 
an elevation of the threat level to ‘Critical’.  Amid acute awareness of the rising threat from 
Islamist terrorism, on 22 April 2015, members of the National Police Chief’s Council 
(NPCC) met at the Marriott hotel in Leicester to discuss contingency plans. The ‘roaming’ 
or ‘marauding’ attack method the Kouachi brothers had used had been of particular concern 
to the British security services since the group Lashkar-e-Taiba attacked a hotel and 
shopping complex in Mumbai using grenades and assault rifles in 2008.203 The group was 
able to carry out twelve separate, co-ordinated strikes across four days with limited 
resistance from the Indian security forces who had been unprepared for such an attack.204 
However, western states were also forced to admit that if a similar incident had occurred in 
one of their cities, they too would have been ill-equipped to nullify the threat.205 Several 
years later in Paris this proved to be the case. The British government was forced to conclude 
that ‘[r]ecent attacks in Paris and Orlando have indicated that this type of marauding firearms 
attack is the new normal, particularly for attacks inspired by the so-called Islamic State.’206  
202 Hughes, Geraint. The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal 
Democracies. (Carlisle, PA: The Letort Papers, U.S. Army War College, May 2011), p.90 
203 Finseraas, Henning and Listhaug, Ola. ‘It can happen here: the impact of the Mumbai terror attacks on 
public opinion in Western Europe’, Public Choice, July 2013, vol. 156, no. 1/2, pp. 213-228 
204 Machold, Rhys. ‘Militarising Mumbai? The ‘Politics’ of Response’, Contexto Internacional, vol. 39, no. 3, 
Sep/Dec 2017, pp. 477-498 
205 Harris, Toby. ‘An Independent review of London’s Preparedness to Respond to a Major Terrorist Incident’, 
October 2016, pp. 9-10; See also the discussion in the US senate on lessons from Mumbai. ‘Lessons From The 
Mumbai Terrorist Attacks—Parts I and II’, Hearings before the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate of the One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, January 8 
and 28, 2009 
206 Harris, Toby. ‘An Independent review of London’s Preparedness to Respond to a Major Terrorist Incident’, 
October 2016, p. 6 
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Policy makers in Britain were aware of the level of public scrutiny that would be attached to 
an extended domestic military operation, and in particular any comparison that might be 
drawn with ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland. After all, Operation Banner, which at its 
height had seen 21,000 troops on the streets of Northern Ireland, had only formally ended in 
July 2007; a reason that former prime minister, David Cameron had been reluctant to give 
his approval to suggestions for a greater domestic military role. Further, in 2005 the British 
public had shown themselves to be uneasy with the excessive use of force by armed police 
during the ill-fated Operation Kratos – often described as the Metropolitan police’s ‘shoot-
to-kill’ policy – which led to the tragic death of Jean Charles de Menezes, a Brazilian 
national living in London. Thus, the purpose of the meeting in Leicester was to discuss and 
explore the potential domestic role that the military could play in dealing with a terrorist 
attack given their specialist capabilities, while also ensuring any measures that were adopted 
would adhere to British norms and values. 
In attendance at the meeting were police representatives from all of the home counties as 
well as Brigadier Bill Warren of the Royal Military Police, Phil Gormley of the National 
Crime Agency (NCA), Alfred Hitchcock of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Paul Crowther 
of the British Transport Police, along with four representatives of the Home Office.207 Item 
nine on the agenda was entitled ‘COUNTER TERRORISM POST PARIS LARGE SCALE 
MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE POLICE’ (sic).208 At the time of writing, the full minutes 
of this closed session have still not been released for reasons of sensitivity, but it was during 
this meeting that Operation Temperer was devised.209 This fact was confirmed when, owing 
to an accidental leak of the document in July 2015, the Daily Mail published a story on the 
subject under the headline: ‘Revealed: Secret plan to put 5,000 heavily-armed troops on 
streets of Britain to fight Jihadis in a terror attack’. The leak stated that ‘Chiefs recognised 
that the army played an important role in national resilience and supported the work going 
forward.’210 It also emphasised that the military ‘could be used’,211 the conditional tense here 
is indicative of the strategic thinking at the time; that Temperer constituted a contingency 
207 Chief Constables’ Council Minutes, National Police Chief’s Council, 22 April 2015 (minutes published on 
25/04/2015), pp. 1-2 
208 Chief Constables’ Council Minutes, National Police Chief’s Council, 22 April 2015 (minutes published on 
25/04/2015), p. 5 
209 Although heavily redacted minutes are available. See Ministry of Defence’s response to a Freedom of 
Information request, 21 January 2019, Ref: FOI2018/15238 
210 Beckford, Martin. ‘Revealed: Secret plan to put 5,000 heavily-armed troops on streets of Britain to fight 
jihadis in event of a terror attack’, Daily Mail, 25 July 2015. See: 
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3174590/Secret-plan-5-000-heavily-armed-troops-streets-Britain-
fight-jihadis-event-terror-attack.html (accessed 03/09/2017) 
211 Ibid. Italics added for emphasis. 
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plan that, given public sensitivities over the use of the armed forces in a domestic context, 
would hopefully never be necessary.  
Unfortunately, this was not the case. On 22 May 2017, a British national by the name of 
Salman Ramadan Abedi detonated a suicide vest in the lobby of the Manchester Arena at 
the end of an Ariana Grande concert, killing twenty-two people.212 The sophistication of the 
device (and other graphic evidence discovered at scene)213 led counter-terrorism 
investigators to conclude that Abedi may not be operating alone, but as part of a cell. Based 
on the recommendation of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), an independent 
research and analysis body established in 2003 and responsible for determining and 
classifying the severity of the threat faced by the UK, the national threat level was raised to 
‘Critical’; this is JTAC’s highest ranking and indicates that another attack should be 
expected ‘Imminently’.214 
Following the attack and JTAC’s elevation of the threat level to critical, Temperer was 
implemented for the first time. Around 950 troops were drawn from various regiments such 
as the Foot Guards, the Parachute Regiment, and the Royal Artillery (with support from the 
Royal Marines), in order to ‘replace police officers on guard at certain protected sites which 
are not accessible to the public.’215 These troops were deployed for around a week, but, by 
27 May, JTAC had reduced the threat level from Critical to Severe and, on 29 May, the 
troops were withdrawn. This was in keeping with Amber Rudd’s statement that any 
deployment would be ‘absolutely temporary’.216  
212 “Manchester Arena attack: How events unfolded”, BBC, 23 May 2017. See: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/video_and_audio/headlines/40021882/manchester-arena-attack-how-events-
unfolded (accessed 17/10/2017) 
213 The severed head of Abedi was discovered – a gory detail that is commonly seen among suicide bombers. 
A capable bomb-maker will direct most of the force of the blast outwards, inwards, but not upwards. This has 
the effect of destroying the body, but preserving the head. This is a sign of respect to the perpetrator for their 
sacrifice. This discovery led investigators to consider that Abedi had not made the bomb himself and multiple 
persons were involved. Thus, the terror threat was raised to critical. Blair, Anthony. ‘Manchester bomb so 
powerful Salman Abedi's head found '100s of feet from body'’, Daily Star, 4 February 2020.  See: 
https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/manchester-bomb-powerful-salman-abedis-21431887 
(accessed 06/07/2020)
214 Threat rankings are as follows: Low (an attack is unlikely), Moderate (an attack is possible, but not likely), 
Substantial (an attack is strong possibility), Severe (an attack is highly likely), Critical (an attack is expected 
imminently)  
215 Press release, PM statement following London terror attack: 15 September 2017. See: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-statement-following-london-terror-attack-15-september-2017 
(accessed 06/07/2019) 




Temperer would be implemented again just four months later when, on 15 September 2017, 
an eighteen-year old Iraqi refugee named Ahmed Hassan detonated a crude, homemade 
bomb on the District Line at Parsons Green station. The device only partially exploded, 
leaving 27 people requiring treatment for burns, but JTAC deemed it necessary to increase 
the threat level to ‘critical’ once again amid fears that Hassan may belong to a cell. The 
threat level was reduced to ‘severe’ again on 17 September and the troops were withdrawn. 
Since these incidents, the potential future scope of the operation has been expanded; the most 
recent iteration (June 2018) of Britain’s counter-terror strategy (CONTEST) states that 
10,000 troops could be deployed ‘within 12 to 96 hours’ of an incident.217 The National 
Security Capability Review (NSCR) in March 2018 similarly states that ‘up to 10,000 
service personnel remain at staggered readiness for Operation Temperer’ and ‘[f]urther 
forces are available to augment armed police with a large strategic reserve of service 
personnel.’218 Further, the NSCR’s statement that the objective of Temperer is ‘deterring, 
disrupting and preventing terrorist activity and providing public reassurance’ indicates that 
future military involvement may involve more than the relatively static guarding role that 
was seen during 2017. 
This presents something of a conundrum for policy makers who have been wrestling with 
the trade-off between the military’s specialist capabilities and the general public’s aversion 
to the use of the military for domestic security. In a 2007 report on ‘Operations in the UK, 
the MoD’s Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) characterised the issue of 
domestic deployments as follows: ‘The use of Service personnel in aid of the Civil Power is 
a particularly sensitive subject’.219 Typically, the British exhibit a squeamishness towards 
the merits of using the armed forces in an active domestic capacity that is not just limited to 
the general public, but also permeates the political and military establishments.  
The most recent examples of this were seen in the responses to Operation Temperer: in July 
2015, after the details of the contingency plan were leaked to the public by the Daily Mail, 
the Guardian released an article on the subject which cited a feeling of ‘reluctance’ in the 
British army to the idea of committing troops to Britain’s streets in the event of a terrorist 
attack. Listed as reasons for the military’s trepidation were potential morale problems, fears 
217 CONTEST – The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, June 2018, HM Government, p. 
67
218 National Security Capability Review, March 2018, Cabinet office, p. 17 
219 Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience, Joint Doctrine Publication 02, Second 
Edition, September 2007, ch. 4, sec. 1, par. 405. See: 
http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/jdp02ed2.pdf (accessed 22/08/2017) 
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of overstretch, and concerns that once the army have been deployed it is difficult withdraw 
them.220 Temperer also prompted Baroness Jenny Jones, a member of the Police and Crime 
Committee at the time, to call the contingency operation ‘provocative’ and ‘absolutely 
shocking.’221 Furthermore, in May 2017, after the Manchester Arena bombing and the first 
occasion that Temperer had been activated, a Sky News reporter, standing in front of 
Downing Street and watching a patrol of eight troops in full battle dress march past, 
commented that it was ‘not a scene we expected to see … in this country.’222  
There also evidence that the general public exhibit a residual resistance to domestic military 
deployments despite a perception of an elevated threat from Islamist terrorism and the 
implementation of Operation Temperer. For example, a survey of a thousand people carried 
out by the author in January 2020 to gauge perceptions of what national security means to 
the general public found that 73.6% considered national security to mean ‘defence against 
terrorism’. In spite of this, just 39.6% answered that they would like to see ‘Greater 
involvement by the military in protecting against terror threats.’223 This  distaste for the idea 
of using the army in a domestic role is also interesting given the views of some experts that, 
from a rational perspective, the army would be ‘the most obvious port of call’ in the event 
of  an attack.224 This chapter’s purpose is to examine the origins of this aversion on the basis 
of an analysis of domestic deployments in Britain from 1800 to 2019. In line with the core 
research questions of this thesis, it concludes that the perception of the national historical 
experience has cultivated an enduring set of preferences for internal military operations 
which combines with the expectation that the army is an expeditionary force. This illustrates 
a significant degree of continuity in Britain’s strategic culture.   
220 MacAskill, Ewen. ‘British army reluctant to post troops on UK streets after terror attack’, The 
Guardian, 26 July 2015. See: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jul/26/british-army-reluctant-
post-troops-uk-terror-attack (accessed 22/09/2017) 
221 Austin, Henry. ‘Secret plans to deploy soldiers on UK streets in the aftermath of a terror attack are 'shocking' 
and 'provocative', says peer’, The Independent, 26 July 2015. See: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/secret-plans-to-deploy-soldiers-on-uk-streets-in-the-aftermath-
of-a-terror-attack-are-shocking-and-10417364.html (accessed 22/09/2017) 
222 Sky News report embedded into Daily Express article. Campbell, Chris. ‘Soldiers deployed to Downing 
Street and Buckingham Palace amid 'critical' terror threat.’ Daily Express, 24 May 2017. See: 
https://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/808744/Manchester-bombing-Operation-Temperer-Westminster-
Downing-Street-Buckingham-Palace-Ariana (accessed 24/05/2017)
223 A poll carried out by the author while working for Coriolis Technologies. Results used with their permission. 
1000 people were surveyed using a representative sample of age, income, location, and gender.  
224 Austin, Henry. ‘Secret plans to deploy soldiers on UK streets in the aftermath of a terror attack are 'shocking' 
and 'provocative', says peer’, The Independent, 26 July 2015. See: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/secret-plans-to-deploy-soldiers-on-uk-streets-in-the-aftermath-
of-a-terror-attack-are-shocking-and-10417364.html (accessed 22/09/2017) 
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4.1.1 Historical experience: Three eras of domestic deployments 
Despite the assumption that the British military have seldom been used on British soil, there 
is strong evidence to suggest an enduring historical precedent for the (relatively frequent) 
use of the armed forces internally. During the eighteenth century, and a significant portion 
of the nineteenth, law and order was maintained by the military, principally through localised 
yeomanry cavalry units. Although the army was frequently engaged in wars abroad, as late 
as 1891, the Secretary of State for War, Edward Stanhope, still listed ‘the effective support 
of the civil power in all parts of the United Kingdom’ as ‘the principal duty of the British 
army’.225 
The data on domestic deployments in Britain reflects Stanhope’s assertion. Chart 1 lists 
‘significant’ deployments of the army on the national territory between 1800 and 2019 
finding at least 105 examples.226  
225 Stanhope, Edward. ‘Mr. Stanhope's Statement (1891) of the General Objects of the Army Establishment.’ 
HC Debate, 23 July 1901, vol. 97 cc. 1326-7
226 The author does not claim that this is an exhaustive list. For example, A parliamentary select committee in 
1908 was told that during the previous 30 years, the military had been called out on 24 separate occasions in 
England and Wales. However, many of these deployments do not seem to have been mentioned in debates or 
correspondence of the time. The author found evidence of nine significant deployments during this period. 
See methodology for how this thesis defines a significant deployment. 
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Chart 1: Significant domestic military deployments, 1800 – 2019 
Source: Author’s analysis based on primary and secondary literature research. See 
Appendix 1 for the detailed list of deployments. See Appendix 1 for the detailed list of 
deployments. 
In order better to visualise the data, the time period 1800-2019 has been divided into blocks 
of twenty-five years (with the exception of the final period which looks at twenty years). 
The data is drawn from Hansard, the National Archives, the Home Office Disturbances 
Papers and extensive secondary literature research. It should also be noted that the chart 
excludes four types of deployment:  
1) The periods 1800-1824 and 1825-1849 exclude nearly ninety deployments of
regional yeomanry units to quell unrest in lieu of a rural police force that were found
in the secondary literature. Data for these deployments is often sparse as the
yeomanry were called out so frequently that they ceased to be a subject of interest
for debate in parliament. Thus, there is little available information about them in
order to fact check. However, significant instances of yeomanry deployments are still
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yeomanry deployments have been included in the Riot and Protest chapter which 
examines the impact of Peterloo. 
2) Instances when the military has been called upon for their specific expertise in bomb
disposal, for example (under Military Aid to other Government Departments –
MAGD) this is due to the fact that, according to the MoD, the military were called
out on 180 occasions during 2017/18 alone.227 These did not meet the criteria for
significant deployments and would skew the findings. Furthermore, many of these
incidents are impossible to find evidence for.
3) Training exercises that have involved both civilian and military personnel (Training
and Logistic Assistance to the Civil Power – TLACP). These were excluded for the
same reason as MAGD.
4) Cases involving Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland will be discussed in later
sections, however there is strong evidence to suggest that it was not governed
according to the same laws as mainland Britain and was instead treated as a de facto
colony, thus English authorities were far less squeamish about deploying the
military. This is not to argue that the British experience in Northern Ireland against
the IRA has not had an effect on Britain’s approach, but rather that significant
cultural, religious, and political differences coupled with long-term violent resistance
to the idea of a ‘united’ kingdom have meant that, in the eyes of policymakers on
mainland Britain, different rules seem to have been applied regarding military
deployment.
Each individual deployment that was discovered was then classified according to its purpose. 
It was discovered that deployments can be grouped into four distinct categories. 1) Riot and 
Protest – this entails the use of troops to quell civil unrest, for example during the Peterloo 
massacre. 2) Counter-terrorism – i.e. troops called either out to deal with an active situation 
(e.g. the Iranian Embassy siege), or for the purposes of deterrence or assurance (Operation 
Temperer). 3) Disaster relief – this includes the use of the armed forces to help alleviate the 
pressure on the emergency services, such as during the foot and mouth epidemic in 2001. 4) 
Striking civil service (for example when the troops manned the Green Goddesses under 
operation Fresco in 2002) and Personnel Provision, for example the deployment of 12,000 
227 Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2017-2018, HC 21, July 2018, p. 11 
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troops to help with security during the 2012 London Olympics. Of these four categories, 
Riot and Protest and Counter-terrorism can be considered ‘active’ duties in that they 
involved containing or countering a human threat and are coded in red and orange, 
respectively. Disaster relief and Striking Civil Service / Personnel Provision are considered 
as ‘passive’ duties in that they involved assistance and are coded in light blue and dark blue, 
respectively.  
Chart 1 highlights the fact that during the nineteenth century and into the early stages of the 
twentieth century, the military’s primary domestic role was the pacification of riots and 
protests. However, since 1819 (when the Peterloo massacre occurred) a notable decline in 
quantity of deployments occurred. Although there were still instances of the army being used 
to quell protests in the early twentieth century, the last time that the army was called for a 
direct confrontation with a mob of civilians was in 1919 for the so-called ‘forty-hours strike’ 
and the Battle of George Square in Glasgow. Since then, there have not been any instances 
of the army being deployed to counter protests. The events of Peterloo seem to have led to a 
gradual erosion of political will to deploy the military against the country’s own citizens, 
coupled with growing public backlash, improved literacy and modes of communication that 
led to greater public outrage, and, from 1829, a civil police force that was steadily proving 
itself to be capable of dealing with threats of this nature. 
The effectiveness of the civil power became particularly evident during the General Strike 
in of 1926 and from that point until the 1970s there were no active military deployments on 
mainland Britain.228 Instead, under MACC, the army took up duties as firemen, bin men, 
lorry drivers and dock workers. For example, under Clement Atlee’s post-Second World 
War Labour government, he deployed the army on at least five occasions to replace dock 
workers, striking lorry drivers and during the Power Stations Crisis of 1950. During the Cold 
War, the army’s active commitments were seen as external with the threat of Soviet invasion 
only a ‘subsidiary concern.’229 With an army that was operating almost exclusively abroad, 
the idea of turning the armed forces on civilians came to be considered as barbaric and, as a 
result of an effective police force, quite unnecessary. 
228 N.B. the 1974 Heathrow exercises have been included in the chart as an active deployment. Most of the 
literature, including Keith Jeffrey’s work, argues that the 1980 Iranian Embassy Siege was the first active 
deployment. Certainly, it was the most publicised invocation of MACP. However, intelligence reports had 
suggested that an airliner may be downed at Heathrow and thus 150 troops were deployed for two weeks to 
Heathrow. The evidence suggests that assistance in this matter was covertly requested by the police. Thus, this 
thesis considers 1974 to be the first active deployment since the General Strike, rather than 1980.
229 Stevenson, Jonathan. ‘The Role of the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom in Securing the State Against 
Terrorism’ Connections, vol. 4, no. 3 (Fall 2005), p. 122 
83 
A growing threat from terrorism in the 1970s, particularly following the attack at the 1972 
Munich Olympics, forced a recalibration of the army’s role in matters of internal security. 
The elite unit known as the Special Air Service (SAS) began shifting the focus of their 
training towards counter-terrorism under the Special Projects Team and were deployed for 
the first time on the national territory under MACP for the 1980 Iranian embassy siege. 
British Special Forces have since remained an integral part of counter-terrorism contingency 
plans and were even deployed in 2017 to deal with the London Bridge attack. 1972 marked 
the point at which the army’s role in countering terrorism became apparent and when the 
British altered their security strategy to incorporate the armed forces under MACP.  
Of course, maintaining the ad hoc availability of the Special Forces is a very different 
concept to deploying the military in a prolonged and overt capacity. After the 9/11 attack, 
the existing security architecture in western states needed an almost total revision and, in 
February 2003, Tony Blair took the unpopular step of deploying 450 troops to Heathrow 
Airport after intelligence suggested an imminent attack on an airliner. Subsequent 
governments proved reluctant to follow Blair’s lead, but from that point the army’s potential 
utility as guards in key strategic locations, either for deterrence and assurance purposes or 
to free up police to carry out other duties, became a perennial part of counter-terrorism 
contingency discussions.  
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the chart (other than the evidence it presents to contradict 
assumptions over the rarity of domestic deployments in Britain) is that it clearly shows how 
the domestic role of the army has changed over the years to the extent that three distinct eras 
are identifiable:  
1) Riot and protest that stretched between 1800 and 1919
2) Personnel Provision that began in 1911 with the National Rail Strike but became
entrenched by the 1926 General Strike and has continued to the present day,
3) Counter-terrorism which formally began with the Heathrow exercises in 1974 and
became engrained by the SAS’s resolution of the Iranian Embassy Siege in 1980 and
has also continued this day, culminating with the implementation of Operation
Temperer.
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The fact that three eras of domestic military deployments exist raises an interesting question 
concerning the nature of continuity in Britain’s strategic culture.  
To return to our research question, if culture acts as an externally constraining force to the 
actions undertaken by policymakers, what accounts for such different domestic roles for the 
military over time? Has the perception of the national historical experience influenced 
cultural preferences for the use of armed forces on the national territory? And have these 
cultural preferences constrained expectations for the role of the British army and, by 
extension, modern domestic deployment patterns?  
4.1.2. Structure of the case 
The remainder of this chapter will be structured as follows: 
Section 4.2 examines the essential historical context related to the War of the Three 
Kingdoms and the interregnum. Although the rhetoric during this period is not analysed, this 
period had a significant and enduring effect on Britain’s attitudes towards the armed forces 
and the modern army even traces its origins to the seventeenth century. It is argued that many 
of the modern principles of civil control and the view that army is an external force, rather 
than one for internal duties, can be traced to this period of time.  
Section 4.3 looks at the first era of domestic deployments for the purposes of quelling riots 
and protests. It analyses the responses of British policymakers towards the use of the army 
at Peterloo arguing that the trauma of this incident created an enduring aversion to the use 
of the armed forces internally. It reviews the formation of the Metropolitan Police force in 
1829 and the birth of the British ethos of ‘minimum force’. It compares and contrasts the 
rhetoric following Peterloo with that of policymakers after the General Strike in 1926 and 
the Tottenham riots in 2011 to argue that the responses highlight an enduring reluctance to 
use the armed forces domestically. Finally it looks at some army recruitment campaigns 
from 1919 (the last time the army was used against the people) comparing this with 
advertisements from the 1950s, 60s and 70s to argue that negative perceptions of incidents 
such as Peterloo have cultivated an entrenched sense of the army as an expeditionary force.   
Chapter 5 continues with the British case with a specific focus on counter-terrorism. It will 
be structured as follows: 
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Chapter 5.1 focuses on the counter-terrorism era that began in the 1970s. It argues that 
despite a cultural aversion to use the military internally and an expectation that the army is 
an expeditionary force, the rising threat of transnational terrorism challenged these 
assumptions. Due to a recognition of the armed forces’ specialist capabilities, this led to their 
gradual integration into Britain’s counter-terrorism architecture MACP and the formation of 
the Special Projects Team (the counter-terrorist wing of the SAS). It examines the rhetoric 
used in parliament in the aftermath of the SAS’s raid on the embassy to demonstrate that 
was general acceptance of the use of armed force in this context since it was deemed to be a 
last resort, proportionate to the threat, and subordinate to the civil power. It draws a brief 
comparison with the uproar that was caused as a result of the 1974 Heathrow exercises 
(Operation MARMION) when due process was not seen to have been followed. 
Chapter 5.2 examines the use of the armed forces for the purposes of counter-terrorism in 
an overt capacity under Operation Temperer. It will provide some context by examining the 
effect of the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks on the Britain’s ‘minimum force’ policing ethos before 
analysing the escalating nature of the threat post-2015. It will assess the specifics of 
Operation Temperer before focusing on the rhetoric used by policy makers either as 
justification for the operation in speeches or statements to the public or during parliamentary 
debates. It compares the tone of the responses to Temperer to those seen during and after the 
Peterloo massacre and the Iranian Embassy Siege to argue: first, that there is remarkable 
continuity in Britain’s response to perceived threats that transcends the idea of reactive 
strategy and instead belongs in the realm of an historically derived and culturally-guided 
response. Principally, there is only acceptance of the use of the armed forces provided it 
meets all of the following criteria: it is short term, proportionate to the threat, a last resort, 
and always subordinate to the civil power. Second, it argues that Temperer represented a 
strategic shift in certain regards. Finally, by examining the tone of some modern recruitment 
campaigns which seem to have omitted any potential domestic counter-terrorism duty, it 
concludes that the despite apparent shifts in approach there is still cultural continuity in 
Britain’s preferences for the army to serve as an external, rather than an internal force.   
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4.2. Historical Context – The War of the Three Kingdoms, 1640-1660 and its impact 
on modern Britain
‘The organisational culture of the MoD is that of a civil service, not a military one. And 
deliberately so. This might look odd next to the French or the US, but it is consistent with over 300 
years of British history.’ 
Lieutenant Colonel Harold Simpson of the Ministry of Defence to the author, 
London, 15 December 2017 
Any analysis of modern British preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically 
must necessarily begin with an examination of the events during the English Civil Wars 
(1640 – 1660). It is not the intention of this thesis to dwell on this period, nor is its purpose 
to argue that events of the 17th Century frequently enter into the thinking of modern-day 
politicians.230 However, any omission of the subject would be a serious error since, as the 
noted historian of Cromwellian England, Blair Worden, writes: no period of upheaval in 
British history ‘has been so far-reaching, or has disrupted so many lives for so long, or has 
so imprinted itself on the nation’s memory’.231  
According to Charles Charlton, an historian who has examined the impact of the fighting, 
635 separate violent incidents occurred; from small skirmishes or assassinations to large 
pitched battles such as the war’s deadliest clash at Marston Moor. Charlton provides an 
estimated total of 185,538 casualties during the war; this was roughly 3.6% of England’s 
population at the time. In contrast, he writes, 2.6% of the population died as a result of the 
First World War.232 However, it was not just the scale of the destruction that left an indelible 
mark on Britain; arguably it was the events immediately after the war which had an even 
more profound impact on the political orientation of the country. This was a period that saw 
the creation of the country’s first professional fighting force (the New Model Army), years 
of unprecedented political engagement from the military following the imposition of a de 
facto dictatorship and, ultimately, regicide. Further, through the Putney Debates in 1647 the 
230 Having said this, a recent debate (March 2018) took place in the House of Lords on the subject of the 
Armed Forces Act 2006. Lords Menzies Campbell, Denis Tunnicliffe, and Digby Jones all made reference to 
the role of the New Model Army either under Cromwell, during the Civil War, or the impact of the events on 
the creation of the 1689 Bill of Rights. See: Hansard Archives: Armed Forces Act (Continuation) Order 2018, 
20 March 2018, vol. 790, clumns 14GC – 17GC 
231 Worden, Blair. The English Civil Wars, 1640-1660. (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2009), p. 1 
232 Charlton, Charles in John Morrill ed. The Impact of the English Civil War. (London: Collins & Brown Ltd., 
1991), p. 20 
87 
army played a defining role in laying the foundations for the Britain’s modern democratic 
system.  
Finally, after the restoration of the monarchy, Charles II founded a professional standing 
army to which many modern regiments trace their existence. This period of history also saw 
a dramatic shift in public attitudes towards the military and, arguably, was the point at which 
the English aversion to the use of force domestically was forged. Before and during the First 
Civil War, the military were largely seen as representatives of the will of the people. 
However, in the aftermath of the conflict, military interference in politics bled into the daily 
lives of ordinary citizens, for example through the occupation of London in 1647 or the 
restriction of daily social activities under the deeply unpopular rule of the Major-Generals, 
and the soldiers quickly became pariahs in the eyes of the public. What follows is a brief 
discussion of the role played by the army during this period. 
4.2.1. The Formation of the New Model Army 
The causes and outcome of the conflict are well-known and well-documented and a 
narrative of events will not be provided here. Suffice it to say that although the 
Parliamentarian forces eventually emerged victorious from the conflict, they faced some 
serious challenges during the campaign that could have resulted in them losing the war. The 
Parliamentarian victory at Marston Moor in the summer of 1644 had been a decisive victory 
and a turning point for their fortunes. However, their forces had suffered serious defeats 
elsewhere at the hands of the Royalists and the mood was beginning to turn. Just weeks 
before Marston Moor, Sir William Walter had suffered a heavy defeat at the Battle of 
Cropredy Bridge, his second major defeat of the war after his forces were crushed at 
Roundway Down just one year earlier. Ultimately, one month after Marston Moor, the Earl 
of Essex’s army was all but destroyed at the battle of Lostwithiel. 
There were also deep divisions both among the commanders and the soldiers. There were 
rumours that many of the Parliamentarian generals, most notably the Earl of Manchester – 
William Montagu, had lost the taste for war and were more inclined to push for peace with 
Charles. Meanwhile, many of the foot soldiers were refusing to join campaigns that were too 
far away from their homes meaning the army had lost the dynamism and manoeuvrability 
necessary to fight effectively. Sir William Waller, a Major-General in the Parliamentarian 
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army, had been frustrated by this when in 1644 he commanded the London Trained Bands.233 
The troops had refused to move too far outside of London leading Waller to write the 
following: 
An army compounded of these men will never go through with your service, and till you 
have an army merely your own that you may command, it is in a manner impossible to do 
anything of importance.
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Something clearly had to change if they were to be victorious and the solution was to follow 
through on what had been suggested by Waller: the creation of an army with a more 
centralised command structure that was free of any influence from both houses of parliament 
until after the war. Oliver Cromwell and Zouch Tate championed the proposal in parliament 
and introduced the Self-Denying Ordinance; an agreement that ‘during the time of this war, 
no member of either House shall have or execute any office or command, military or civil, 
granted or conferred by both or either of the Houses of Parliament.’235 Despite fierce 
resistance, particularly in the House of Lords where the Earls of Essex and Manchester had 
been accused of failing to prosecute the war, were strongly opposed to the idea of being 
excluded from the campaign. However, on 3 April 1645, four months after it had been 
introduced into Parliament, the Self-Denying Ordinance was passed triggering the creation 
of what became known as the New Model Army.236 
Table 7 provides a breakdown of how the main army was structured, although by 1648 its 
size had doubled. Two additional armies, the Western and Northern, were also attached to 
it. Sir Thomas Fairfax, who had distinguished himself during campaigns in the north of 
England, was named the commander-in-chief and held sole authority for the campaign. 
Importantly, the New Model Army was the foundation of the concept of a professional 
military. The rank and file would be willing recruits, not serfs dragged from their towns and 
villages by a feudal lord. Promotion would be based on merit, not social standing and the 
troops would be provided with a wage and would reside in barracks. According to the Select 
233 Trained Bands were militia forces who fought part-time. They numbered roughly 18,000 men in total. 
See: Ian Gentles in John Morrill ed. The Impact of the English Civil War. (London, Collins & Brown Ltd., 
1991), p. 86
234 Marshall, Alan. Oliver Cromwell, Soldier: The Military Life of a Revolutionary at War. (London: Brassey’s, 
2004), p. 289 
235 Wheeler, James Scott. The Irish and British Wars, 1637-1654: Triumph, Tragedy, and Failure. 
(London, Routledge, 2002), p. 127
236 The earliest references to a ‘New Model Army’ are actually found in the 19th Century. The Scottish 
historian, Thomas Carlyle is thought to have been the first to use the term in 1845. 17th Century records show 
that the term most frequently used was ‘new-modelled’ (as in, ‘an army new-modelled’) which, according to 
the editor of the Oxford English Dictionary, was an idiom used at the time to refer to novel concepts.
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Committee on Defence’s eight report from 1998, the initial assessment of existing force 
structures, followed by a proposal for change and the subsequent creation of a new body of 
troops, is the first ‘identifiable review’ in Britain’s history and inspired a new approach to 
military doctrine where the strategic priorities of the armed forces would be determined by 
the civil power.237 
Table 7: Structure of the New Model Army 
Cavalry Dragoons Infantry TOTAL 
6,600 1,000 14,400 22,000 
4.2.2. From Interregnum to Restoration 
Following the First Civil war, the army’s role in England’s domestic political scene began 
to grow. James Reece writes that the incidents over the summer of 1647 were particularly 
tumultuous and ‘crystallized within the army a sense of itself as a separate institution, 
governed by its own laws, with its own honour and unity to preserve.’238 This was 
particularly evident during the Putney Debates from late October to November 1647. 
Through ‘The case of the armie truly stated’, it was members of the military, rather than 
politicians, that argued over the settlement of the country and introduced many of the values 
that Britain cherishes today. 
The army’s interference in almost all areas of public and political life continued following 
the Second English Civil War. This war was the result of a last desperate attempt by Charles 
to re-gain control, but was quickly crushed by the Army. As a result, Charles’ only remaining 
option was to try negotiating again. Parliament held a vote on whether they should continue 
negotiating on 5 December and the motion was passed by a majority of 129 to 83. However, 
Cromwell and the Army were deeply sceptical of Charles’ intentions and viewed him as ‘a 
man of blood’.239 As such, the New Model Army once again marched on Westminster with 
237 Select Committee on Defence, Eight Report, 3 September 1998, ‘The Historical Context: The Prehistory 
of Reviews’, par. 15
238 Reece, Henry. The Army in Cromwellian England, 1649-1660. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 
48
239 A phrase that derives from the bible: ‘…behold, thou art taken in thy mischief, because thou art a bloody 
man.’  King James Bible, 2 Samuel, 16:7,8 
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an army headed by Colonel Thomas Pride and arrested or expelled MPs who were 
unsympathetic to their cause. The incident, known as Pride’s Purge, was essentially a coup 
d’état, and following Charles I’s execution in Whitehall on 30 January 1649, paved the way 
for military rule under Cromwell’s protectorate. 
Cromwell consolidated his control in 1653 when he used the military to dissolve the Rump 
Parliament and shortly thereafter imposed the Rule of the Major Generals. During this time, 
England was divided into eleven districts each controlled by close allies of Cromwell. 
Troops were used as enforcers to counter perceived domestic and foreign threats to his 
regime and a number of strict, religiously-derived rules were imposed such as banning or 
censoring stage plays, limiting the consumption of alcohol and, famously, outlawing 
Christmas. Troops were garrisoned in or close to city centres, for example, in London, they 
were based in locations such as Saffron Walden, Newmarket, St. Albans, Reading, Triploe, 
Heath, Ware, and Putney. Not only did this allow the army to respond rapidly to any threats, 
political or public, but also served as a permanent and visible signal of the military’s 
presence and power to the disaffected or rebellious members of society.240
The level of the military’s political interference coupled with regular episodes of public 
repression led to widespread resentment to the extent that soldiers on the street were often 
‘hooted with derision’.241 One direct confrontation between troops and the public was 
documented in the diary of Thomas Rugg, a local barber. Civilians were increasingly 
disaffected by the military rule of Colonel John Hewson and turned their frustrations on his 
troops who were marching towards the Old Exchange. Hewson had been employed as a 
cobbler before he was a soldier and, as Rugg writes, the crowd ‘…did throw ould shewes 
and old slipers and turnapes topes, brick battes and stones and tiles att him and his 
souldiers’.242 Growing frustrated, the troops fired on the crowd killing a number (between 
four and seven according to different reports) of civilians. Civil dissatisfaction with military 
rule reached such a point that after Cromwell’s death the monarchy was, in effect, invited 
back.  
240 Reece. The Army in Cromwellian England, p. 51 
241 Worden. The English Civil Wars, p. 149
242 The Diurnall of Thomas Rugg, 1659–1661, ed. William Sachse, Camden Third Series, XCI. 
(London, 1961), pp.13-14
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4.2.3. The Army reconfigured: the impact on modern force structure 
Charles II’s reign began on the 23rd April 1661 and he sought immediately to disentangle 
the military’s influence from politics by disbanding the Cromwellian army which had been 
responsible for the execution of his father. He imposed the militia acts of 1661 and 1662 to 
prevent local leaders from raising forces of their own and ordered the creation of a small 
number of regiments (four infantry and four cavalry regiments) commanded by trusted and 
loyal friends of his. Each commander would only be allowed to raise one regiment to avoid 
the possibility of a coup; these became known as ‘Household Divisions’. The infantry 
divisions were John Russel’s Regiment of Guards and Lord Wentworth’s Regiment which 
became the Grenadier Guards in 1665, the Coldstream Guards, the Royal Scots, and the 
Second Queen’s Regiment. All of these units exist in some form today and trace their 
existence back to the 17th Century. Table 8 provides a list of some of the oldest British 
regiments all of which date their foundation to the mid-17th century. 
Table 8: Oldest British Regiments 
Original Regiment Modern Name Date Founded 
Marquis of Argyll’s Royal Regiment Scots Guards 1642 
Monck’s Regiment of Foot Coldstream 
Guards 
1650 
Lord Wentworth’s Regiment Grenadier 
Guards 
1656 
Monck’s Life Guards Life Guards 1659 





Duke of York and Albany’s Maritime 
Regiment of Foot 
Royal Marines 1665 
Of particular note in Table 8 is the modern name of the Duke of York and Albany’s Maritime 
Regiment of Foot: The Royal Marines. In fact, the titles of various military bodies have a 
direct association with the events of the 17th century; the Royal Air Force, which of course 
did not exist at the time, has retained its ‘Royal’ title as has the Royal Navy as it played no 
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role in the war. However, the national army’s role in repressing ordinary civilians, dictating 
politics and executing a king led to deep-seated scepticism over sovereign control of an 
armed body and thus has no royal association in its title. These grievances coupled with the 
will to prevent further civil conflict in the future led to a disbandment, albeit short lived, of 
the army via the imposition of the Bill of Rights in 1689. The relevant clause reads: ‘the 
raising or keeping a standing Army within the Kingdome in time of Peace unlesse it be with 
Consent of Parlyament is against Law’.243 In essence, parliament wanted to remove 
centralised control over the military and transition to a system based on civil control and 
oversight of the army. 
It is within the context of the unprecedented political upheaval of the twenty years between 
1640 and 1660 that modern British preferences for the use of force must be seen. Indeed, in 
the British Defence Doctrine of 2001, the MoD wrote that  
The relationship between the Armed Forces and civil authorities in the U.K. is the subject of 
aspects of constitutional and administrative law and there has developed, over three hundred 
years, a legal doctrine governing the domestic use of military personnel.
244
  
Clearly, the struggle between the Monarchy, Parliament, and the people for control over the 
military during this era marks the point at which Britain’s expectation and preference for 
external operations and military subordination to the civil power was formed.245 The 
following section will build on the historical context by examining the military’s role in 
dealing with civil unrest. It will focus on what is arguably one of the most important 
formative moments in Britain’s modern history: the Peterloo massacre of 1819. It will 
analyse the reactions of policymakers to this incident before examining the enduring impact 
it has had on Britain’s cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces at home.  
243 Bill of Rights [1688], 1688 CHAPTER 2 1 Will and Mar Sess 2
244 UK Ministry of Defence, British Defence Doctrine, 2nd edition, October 2001, pp.6-9. 
245 Select Committee on Defence, Eight Report, 3 September 1998, ‘The Historical Context: The Prehistory 
of Reviews’, par. 16 
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4.3. Protests, Pariahs and Police – The impact of ‘Peterloo’  
Though enrag’d by the strokes from the radical sticks, 
And the thick-flying missiles, the stones and the bricks, 
The Soldiers and Yeomen set bounds to their wrath, 
And only kept onwards in stern Duty’s path! 
And ’tis wonder, no more, in the scene of confusion, 
Then found their life’s day brought to sudden conclusion; 
For though Opposition cried ‘Murder!’ from hearsay, 
The work of dispersion was done quite in mercy. 
Extract of poem on the ‘Peterloo’ massacre published in Aston’s Exchange Herald, 
17
th
 September 1822 
The Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries saw rapid 
technological advancements in key industries across the country. Innovations in the textile 
and iron industries in the late eighteenth century established Britain as one the most powerful 
global economies through major innovations that reduced the need for manual skilled 
labour.246 For example, the rapid industrialisation of the craft and textile industries meant 
that skilled weavers found themselves unable to compete with machines such as the power 
loom; these required relatively little training to operate and, as a result, companies began 
laying off their employees.  
The result was to provoke resentment among the manual labouring classes which culminated 
in violent backlash. In Nottingham, lace and hosiery workers vented their fury at the loss of 
their jobs by smashing machines and factories. The sporadic episodes of violence gained 
momentum until it became a political movement with the folklore figure Ned Ludd as the 
leader. Ned Ludd’s followers became known as Luddites and their movement quickly spread 
across the country. The Home Secretary, Richard Ryder spoke to Parliament about the 
severity of the problem on 14 February 1812 stating: 
Nottingham, where near 1,000 frames had been broken, and an immense quantity of property 
had been destroyed, were actually subversive of the public peace, and constituted that state 
of things which called for legislative interference.
247
246 In 1788, Britain had roughly 50,000 mule spindles in operation. By 1821 this number had increased to over 
seven million. See: Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (2014, Penguin Random House LLC, 
New York), p. 67 
247 Mr. Secretary Ryder, Frame Breaking and Nottingham Peace Bills, 14 February 1812, vol. 21 
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In the eyes of the Tory government of the time, there was an urgent need to protect the new 
machines and factories that had become so essential to Britain’s economy. Therefore, their 
response was to sanction the deployment of troops and militia units to areas of the country 
that were seen to be the most vulnerable to Luddite attacks. The perceived severity of the 
threat posed by the Luddite movement was so great that the early nineteenth century saw 
thousands of British soldiers committed to countering the Luddites and, at one stage, in May 
1812, 14,400 troops were dispatched from London.248 At the time, the forces used were six 
times larger than any used to quell previous incidences of unrest. Just seven years later, 
economic grievances were once more the cause of unrest at a gathering in St. Peter’s Field 
in Manchester; the conduct of the Yeomanry cavalry in dispersing those gathered would 
permanently alter how the British would approach domestic security and the maintenance of 
order on the national territory. 
4.3.1. 1819: The Peterloo Massacre 
The year 1819 was marked by serious political and social tensions across Britain. Discontent 
was mounting over the perceived persecution of the working classes by politicians and 
wealthy business owners. Wages for agricultural workers had fallen to a ten-year low and 
the introduction of the Corn Laws in 1815 prevented the import of cheap grains from abroad 
thereby dramatically increasing the price of basic foodstuffs such as bread. Anger among the 
public grew at the imposition of the Corn Laws which were seen to be ‘in opposition to the 
express will of the people’.249 Meanwhile, the imposition of duties on foreign wool in spite 
of the poor state of the wool industry were seen as evidence that the ruling classes did not 
have the interests of the workers at heart.250 This was particularly the case in the north of the 
country where firebrand speakers questioning the authority of the House of Commons would 
draw crowds in the thousands. In Birmingham, one such crowd was estimated to consist of 
around 10,000 people by Lord Ayelesford and Isaac Spooner, who, as a result of growing 
248 An often-quoted ‘fact’ is that more troops were deployed to counter the threat from the Luddites than were 
deployed to the Iberian Peninsula to fight Napoleon I. For example, in Perry Anderson’s book English 
Questions, he writes ‘more troops [were] mobilized to supress the Luddites than to fight the concurrent 
Peninsular War’. See: Perry Anderson, English Questions, (London: Verso: 1992), p. 22; Eric Hobsbawm, 
Labouring Men, p. 8. However, this is simply false. According to Kevin Linch, in 1812, at the height of the 
Luddite movement, there were roughly 12,000 troops deployed domestically compared with around 50,000 
committed to fighting Napoleon. See: Kevin Linch, Britain and Wellington’s Army: Recruitment Society and 
Tradition, 1807-15. (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 1988), p. 4
249 No. 8 Resolution passed at the Meeting on Hunslet Moor, near Leeds, 19 July 1819  
250 RESOLUTIONS passed at the Meeting held on Hunslet Moor, near Leeds, 19 July 1819.
95 
nervousness in Parliament, had been charged with conducting reconnaissance on the 
gathering.251  
During a gathering on Hunslet Moor, near Leeds, those pushing for reform introduced a 
series of resolutions that summed up the grievances of the people and outlined their vision 
of the future. Among these were listed: universal suffrage, an end to the ‘alienation of the 
rich from the poor’ and ‘radical reform in the system of representation’.252 The extent of the 
anger led five magistrates of Lancashire to write to the Home Secretary Lord Sidmouth to 
express their concern that a failure to respond to the growing sense of anger could lead to 
serious unrest. They wrote: 
Although we cannot but applaud the hitherto peaceable demeanour of many of the labouring 
classes, yet we do not calculate upon their remaining unmoved. Urged on by the harangues 
of a few desperate demagogues, we anticipate at no distant period, a general rising; and 
possessing no power to prevent the meetings which are weekly held, we, as magistrates, are 
at a loss how to stem the influence of the dangerous and seditious doctrines which are 
continually disseminated.
253
The Manchester Patriotic Union had been responsible for the publication and dissemination 
of many of these doctrines; it was a group of agitators that had formed in March 1819 with 
the principal objective of pushing for parliamentary reform – an objective that did not sit 
well with the policymakers in London who saw the working class movement as a serious 
threat to their position. Since its formation the Union had managed to develop a considerable 
amount of public support and arranged for a gathering in St. Peter’s Field in Manchester on 
16 August 1819 which they believed would be the most effective way of getting the attention 
of parliament. In the words of Samuel Bamford, a radical writer who led a group from 
Middleton to Manchester for the gathering, it was to be ‘the most important meeting that had 
ever been held for Parliamentary reform’.254  
Sources for the size of the crowd at Manchester differ wildly; the Manchester Observer 
claimed that 153,000 people had turned up, the estimation of the renowned speaker Henry 
Hunt, who was scheduled to speak at the gathering, was similar at 150,000; however, 
251 LETTER from Mr. Spooner to Lord Sidmouth; dated Birmingham, 13 July 1819 
252 RESOLUTIONS passed at the Meeting held on Hunslet Moor, near Leeds, 19 July 1819 
253 EXTRACT of a Letter from five Magistrates of Lancashire to Lord Sidmouth; dated, New Bailey Court 
House, Salford, 1st July 1819. Signed J. Silvester, R. Wright, W. Marriot, C. W. Ethelston, J. Norris.
254 Bamford, Samuel. Passages in the Life of a Radical, Volume I. (London: Simkin, Marshall & co., 1844), p. 
198
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magistrates for Manchester such as Tatton put the number at a far more conservative 
30,000.255 Whatever its actual size, it was enough to concern the local magistrates that the 
meeting could end in a riot or act as the start for a full rebellion or revolution. Their letter, 
cited above, went on: ‘we anticipate at no distant period, a general rising.’ Indeed, the tone 
of the whole letter betrays more than a hint of desperation, almost imploring parliament to 
take extraordinary steps to prevent the meeting. Further fuel was added to the fire by several 
reports that had reached Parliament that agitators were conducting military drills. Magistrate 
Norris wrote to the Home Secretary, Lord Sidmouth on 15 August to express his concerns: 
We have been much occupied in taking depositions from various parts of the country; and 
although the magistrates, as at present advised, do not think of preventing the meeting, yet 
all the accounts tend to show that the worst possible spirit pervades the country; and that 
considerable numbers have been drilling to-day at distances of four, six and ten miles from 
Manchester; and that considerable numbers are expected to attend the meeting.
256
Colonel Thomas Horton wrote his own letter to Lord Sidmouth and was far more blunt in 
his assessment; he wrote, ‘It is quite certain the object is absolute revolution’.257 The so-
called ‘White Moss’ incident may have been the final straw for the magistrates; two 
government spies, John Shawcross and James Murray infiltrated what the latter would 
describe in the trial of Henry Hunt in 1820 as a military ‘camp’ in White Moss. Murray 
describes how they were discovered and set upon by the radicals.258 News of this attack was 
seen by the magistrates as further confirmation of the violent intent of the gathering. 
Despite the burgeoning fears of the magistrates and politicians of imminent rebellion, in fact 
the object of the gathering was entirely peaceful; Samuel Bamford, a radical writer and 
witness to the massacre in Manchester, wrote that coverage in the press had described the 
movement as disorganised and aggressive. Thus, they had settled on the idea of the 
Manchester gathering adhering to the values of ‘SOBRIETY’, ‘CLEANLINESS’, 
‘ORDER’, and ‘PEACE’. In Bamford’s words ‘order in our movements was obtained by 
drilling; and peace, on our parts, was secured by a prohibition of all weapons of offence or 
255 See: The Peterloo Masscare, 1819, National Archives, MPI 1/134, no. 18, 1819, Manchester Observer, 
21 August 1819
256 No. 32.—LETTER from Mr. Norris to Lord Sidmouth; dated Manchester, 15 August 1819. Papers 
Relative to the Internal State of the Country
257 Hansard Archives, No. 53.—LETTER from Colonel Horton inclosed therein; Halifax, 27 August 1819. 
258 Giving evidence at the trial of Henry Hunt in 1820, James Murray would declare that a column of ‘5,000 
and 6,000 men’ armed with sticks and marching in line made up the core of the gathering. See: The Annual 
Register, or a view of the History, Politics, and Literature, of the Year 1820, Part II. (London: T.C. Hansard: 
1822), p. 854
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defence.’259 In fact, even one of parliament’s most trusted spies, William Chippendale of 
Oldham, reported that the purpose of the meeting was peaceful. On the morning of 16 
August, the day of the massacre, he wrote that ‘They [the radicals] are enjoined not to bring 
any Weapons of any Kind whatever, and to keep their Flags furled till they receive orders 
from the Committee to display them.’260
As a result of the sheer number of people that were gathering, coupled with the reports of 
military drills being conducted, and the assault of Shawcross and Murray only served to 
confirm to the increasingly agitated magistrates that something more sinister was afoot. As 
such, they arranged for troops to be stationed in Manchester. These troops included 600 
members of the 15th Regiment of Dragoons (Hussars), 400 soldiers of the Cheshire 
Yeomanry, 120 soldiers of the Manchester and Salford Yeomanry, a unit of the Royal Horse 
Artillery, as well as around 400 members of the local militia. According to the historian 
Donald Read, it was not the fact that the troops were there on standby that caused the 
problem as the troops were still under the guidance of the civil power through local law 
officers. It was once the meeting had begun that ‘the magistrates were left to their own 
discretion rather than bound by the advice of the Law Officers, and the restraint hitherto 
forced upon them by the Home Office quickly disappeared.’261  
The magistrates began by gathering local inhabitants who were opposed to the meeting to 
sign a document declaring that they believed Manchester to be in imminent danger. One of 
the signatories was Richard Owen and the document read: ‘Richard Owen hath this day 
made oath before us, His Majesty’s Justices of the Peace … that an immense mob is 
collected, and that he considers the town to be in danger.’262 It was this disingenuous 
declaration that provided the justification for the magistrates to try to arrest Hunt and his 
colleagues. 
As the police force, headed by Jonathan Andrews, the Deputy Constable of Manchester, 
attempted to arrest Hunt the crowd began to lock arms to prevent them from getting through. 
Andrews realised that arresting Hunt would be impossible and requested that magistrate 
259 Bamford, Samuel. Passages in the Life of a Radical, Volume I. (London: Simkin, Marshall & co., 1844), 
pp. 176-177
260 HO 42/192 f. 343. William Chippendale, Oldham, to John Byng, Pontefract 16 Aug. 1819. Endorsed: ‘In 
Sir J. Byng’s 18 Aug. 1819’
261 Read, Donald. Peterloo: The ‘Massacre’ and its Background. (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1958), p. 132
262 Manchester Observer, 28 August 1819 
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Hulton contact the heads of the military units that in the vicinity.263 Hulton sent two letters, 
one to Major Thomas Trafford commander of the Manchester and Salford Yeomanry, the 
other to Lieutenant Colonel Guy L’Estrange, the commander of the military forces in 
Manchester. His letter to L’Estrange read: ‘Sir, as chairman of the select committee of 
magistrates, I request you to proceed immediately to no. 6 Mount Street, where the 
magistrates are assembled. They consider the Civil Power wholly inadequate to preserve the 
peace.’264 Trafford’s Manchester Yeomanry were the first to arrive and charged at the crowd 
with their sabres drawn. In total eighteen people were killed, including women and children, 
and over 400 were injured.265 Manchester was gripped by a sense of profound shock and 
anger and rioting broke out over the next few days in Manchester and surrounding towns. 
The local newspaper, the Manchester Observer, coined the phrase the 'Peterloo Massacre' to 
describe the event in ironic reference to the Battle of Waterloo in 1815266: 
PETERLOO MASSACRE 
Just published – No. 1 – price twopence – of PETERLOO MASSACRE containing a full, true and 
faithful account of the inhuman murders, woundings and other monstrous Cruelties exercised by a 
set of INFERNALS (miscalled Soldiers) upon unarmed and distressed People.
267
What followed over the coming months was something of a battle for influence between 
newspapers loyal to the radicals and the government who tried desperately to suppress the 
contrarian version of events. The Home Office’s response to the article in the Observer was: 
‘As the “Peterloo Massacre” cannot be other than grossly libellous, you will probably deem 
it right to proceed by arresting the publishers.’268 The version presented in Parliament was 
similar; magistrates wrote to the Home Secretary to argue that the actions of the troops had 
prevented the onset of great upheaval. For example, Mr. Hay, a Magistrate of Lancashire, 
sent a letter to the Home Secretary, Lord Sidmouth stating: 
263 Dowling, J.A. The Whole Proceedings before the Coroner’s inquest at Oldham, on the body of John 
Lees, 1820, p. 459
264 Reid, Robert. The Peterloo Massacre. (Portsmouth: William Heinemann, 1989), p. 167 
265 Trevelyan, G. M. ‘The Number of Casualties at Peterloo’, History, Vol. VII, 1922-23
266 One of the victims, John Lees, is said to have remarked on his deathbed that ‘At Waterloo it was man to 
man, but there [in Manchester] it was murder’. The Manchester Observer used this idea in their headline and 
the name stuck.
267 Manchester Observer, 28 August 1819 
268 Letter from the Home Office to Magistrate Norris, 25 August 1819, cited in Joyce Marlow. The 
Peterloo Massacre. (London: Rapp & Whiting, 1969), p. 6
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We cannot but deeply regret all this serious attendant on this transaction; but we have the 
satisfaction of witnessing the very grateful and cheering countenances of the whole town; 
infact (sic), they consider themselves as saved by our exertions.
269
However, ultimately in the case of Peterloo, it was the people that prevailed. The so-called 
‘Radical Press’ won the battle for the hearts and minds through some innovative strategies 
for conveying their version of the events. John Wroe, who was the editor of the Observer, 
published an in-depth report of the incident entitled Peterloo Massacre: A Faithful 
Narrative of the Events – the pamphlet was circulated across the country (an unprecedented 
occurrence at the time) and was made available for just twopence in order to be affordable 
for as many people as possible.270 It sold out on every print run for fourteen weeks. The 
event was also commemorated on plates, medals and jugs through the newly-developed 
process of printwear. These items could be mass-produced and sold incredibly cheaply so 
that even the poorer members of society could afford them. By exploiting these avenues of 
communication, the radicals managed to ensure that Peterloo would not be suppressed by 
the government or forgotten by history. It was arguably these communication strategies that 
have given Peterloo such an enduring cultural legacy; for example, although the episodes 
of military interference after the War of the Three Kingdoms were immeasurably worse, 
literacy levels were low, and the print press was very under-developed. Hence, Peterloo 
marked the point that the will of the people began to exert more influence over policy and 
from this moment that the concepts of proportionality, last resort, and civil control over the 
use of force became mandatory facets of Britain’s internal strategic culture. 
4.3.2. Peterloo in the political rhetoric 
Chart 2 provides a summary of around 150 speeches, statements and pieces of 
correspondence from politicians and members of the military regarding the Peterloo 
massacre and the use of the armed forces. Each statement was read, analysed, and 
categorised according to its central theme. Using a traffic light system, the positive 
responses are presented in green on the left of the chart, the neutral responses in orange in 
the middle, and the negative responses in red on the right.  
269 Letter from Mr. Hay, a Magistrate of Lancashire, to the Home Secretary, Lord Sidmouth; dated 
Manchester, 16 August 1819; (quarter past nine).
270 Anon. Peterloo Massacre, containing A Faithful Narrative of the Events which preceded, 
accompanied, and followed the fatal Sixteenth August, 1819. (Manchester: John Wroe, Observer 
Office, 1819), p. 146
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Chart 2 – The tone of the responses to the use of the military at Peterloo 
Sources: Home Office Disturbance Papers, The National Archives, Hansard.271 
The first most striking aspect of the chart is the number of justifications for the use of the 
armed forces due to the perceived severity of the threat (‘necessary given threat’). This was 
the most frequently referenced theme with 36 mentions. Some members of parliament 
referenced the ‘violent speeches’ that were being delivered on Hunslet moor;272 or the ‘evil’, 
‘wicked’, or ‘disturbed’ individuals that were gathering in Manchester. This kind of 
religiously coloured rhetoric sought to construct a divide between the righteous politicians 
who would call in the military in defence of British values and the criminally-minded 
radicals who, by virtue of their actions, had forfeited their right to protection under the law. 
One of the clearest examples of this was in a letter sent by five magistrates of Lancashire to 
Lord Sidmouth. They referred to the ‘evil’ radicals before mentioning that they, the 
271 Full sources listed in bibliography 























































































































































































































































































magistrates, are ‘unarmed’.273 This was an implicit request for military assistance over a 
month before the Peterloo massacre was to occur.  
 
Indeed, much of the rhetoric cited the illegal, insurrectionary, or revolutionary character of 
the radicals’ movement. Both insurrection and revolution are directly mentioned in ten 
separate speeches; for example, Lord Norris’s statement that ‘[T]he magistrates had felt a 
decided conviction that the whole bore the appearance of insurrection; that the array was 
such as to terrify all the king's subjects, and was such as no legitimate purpose could 
justify.’274 Many others hint at the general threat the radicals posed to the security of the 
nation. For example, the Earl of Derby wrote to Lord Sidmouth: ‘I am sorry to add, there is 
still too much cause to believe, that in some parts of this county, there are assemblies of 
men, who meet in considerable numbers, with the object of training and exercising 
themselves for illegal and seditious purposes.’275  
 
Indeed, the apparent military drills that were occurring were the subject of more than a 
dozen reports from informants.276 One policymaker, J. Norris, even went so far as to state 
that ‘The drilling parties increase very extensively, and unless some mode be devised of 
putting this system down, it promises to become a most formidable engine of rebellion.’277 
Norris’ reference to an ‘engine’ implies that Manchester could become the driving force for 
a nationwide revolution if immediate steps were not taken. Thomas Horton echoed this 
sentiment when he stated that ‘it is quite certain the object is absolute revolution’ and it 
would be ‘necessary to society’ to quell the unrest with force.278 This is an interesting turn 
of phrase, like other comments that made a clear delineation between the ‘bad’ radicals and 
the ‘good’ politicians, Horton is implicitly calling for all radicals to be considered outside 
of society. It is a putative dismissal of their political objectives in favour of treating them 
like the enemy.    
 
 
273 No. 1.—EXTRACT of a Letter from five Magistrates of Lancashire to Lord Sidmouth; dated, New Bailey 
Court House, Salford, 1 July 1819. 
274 No. 34.—LETTER from Mr. Hay, a Magistrate of Lancashire, to lord Sidmouth; dated Manchester, 
16 August 1819 
275 No. 30.—LETTER from the Earl of Derby to Lord Sidmouth; dated Knowsley, August 15, 1819 
276 See: ‘Papers Relative To The Internal State Of The Country’, Hansard Archives, 24 November 1819, vol. 
41 
277 Norris, J. No. 13.—EXTRACT of a Letter from Mr. Norris, a Magistrate of Lancashire, to Lord Sidmouth, 
dated Manchester, 5 August 1819 
278 No. 53.—LETTER from Colonel Horton inclosed therein; Halifax, 27 August 1819. Papers relative. 
Hansard, col. 274 
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Many of the fears of a revolution derived from observations of what had occurred in France 
just twenty years earlier when the disaffected and alienated working classes had overthrown 
the ancien régime. Indeed, in reference to the French Revolution, one peer, the Tory 
politician George Canning, implored his colleagues to consider that there were ‘lessons to 
be learned’ from the French.279  The point being that although France’s revolution had been 
political rather than industrial, there was a similar underlying class conflict in both countries. 
This gave rise to a perception that the power of the ruling classes was under threat. The 
solution, according to dozens of magistrates, policymakers, and military officers, was to 
deploy the troops.  
The correspondence between northern English magistrates and the Home Secretary Lord 
Sidmouth prior to the events at Manchester almost unanimously declared that there was a 
serious and imminent threat to the country. However, there is significant evidence to suggest 
that this correspondence was managed by policymakers as a post hoc justification for the 
use of force. An examination of some of the correspondence between the permanent 
undersecretary to the Home Office, Henry Hobhouse and the magistrate James Norris found 
in the Home Office disturbance papers, an excellent resource for information related to 
Peterloo, illustrates that the use of force may have been premeditated. While Norris writes 
of the ‘the inexpediency of attempting forcibly to prevent the meeting’, and that ‘it will be 
the wisest course to abstain from any endeavour to disperse the mob, unless they should 
proceed to acts of felony or riot’, it also states that they have ‘the strongest reason to believe 
that Hunt means to preside and to deprecate disorder.’280  
The obvious paradox here is that they state force will absolutely not be used unless there 
acts of criminality, acts which they fully expect to occur. In a previous letter, Hobhouse had 
all but told Norris to seek out evidence of illegality in order to justify the use of the troops: 
The power to disperse the men by force will depend on the legality or illegality of their 
meeting…. The magistrates must not ascribe to it that character which he suspects to belong 
to it, but that which he can establish by evidence.
281
 
279 Canning. Address On The Prince Regent's Speech At The Opening Of The Session, Hansard Archives, 24 
November 1819, vol. 41, col. 215 
280 HO 41/4 f.434 
281 HO 79/3, pp. 457-459 
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This incongruity was also highlighted by the historian E.P. Thompson who writes that ‘the 
Manchester authorities certainly intended to employ force, and … Sidmouth knew.’282 This 
gives an interesting, but concerning character to the ‘reports’ of military drilling sent by 
Manchester’s magistrates to the Home Office; were they fabricated or exaggerated in order 
to justify the eventual use of force? This may be the case given some statements delivered 
in parliament after Peterloo that stated the yeomanry cavalry units had all had their swords 
sharpened days prior to the meeting.283  
Unsurprisingly, once the troops had been deployed, much of the rhetoric spoke of the 
excellent conduct of the troops. Statements referred to duties carried out with ‘great 
moderation’,284 as the ‘saviours’285 of Manchester, as acting with the ‘greatest alacrity’;286 
one of the most cynical statements came from Colonel Thomas Horton who declared, ‘I 
have great reason to believe, that the lower orders in this part of the country are very much 
irritated by the laudable conduct of the civil and military authorities at Manchester,’287. This 
is a particularly divisive statement as, like the comments examined earlier which attempted 
to draw a rhetorical distinction between the radicals and the law abiders with terms such as 
evil or wicked, here Horton is also constructing a divide between the working classes and 
‘the rest’. This is in spite of the evidence that the military’s conduct was far from ‘laudable’. 
In fact, the poor conduct of the troops is the most commonly referenced negative theme 
(eight mentions). It is now known that eighteen people died, but at the time these reports 
were just filtering in. One such report found that eight people had died with ‘three individuals 
… cut down by the yeomanry as they advanced. A woman with a child in her arms was also 
wounded.’288 Parliament also heard statements that up to 400 people had been charged and 
trampled by horses while troops also ‘rode into the yard of the Quakers meeting house, 
cutting and hacking the people, whose blood now lay on the stones and rails.’289  
282 Thompson, Edward Palmer. The Making of the English Working Class. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1963), 
p. 683
283 Brougham. Address on the Prince Regent's Speech At The Opening Of The Session, Hansard Archives, 24
November 1819, vol. 41, col. 218
284 Reddie, James. No. 57.—LETTER; from the Sheriff Depute of Renfrewshire, inclosed therein; dated
Paisley, Tuesday 14 September 1819
285 Hay, William. No. 34.—LETTER from Mr. Hay, a Magistrate of Lancashire, to lord Sidmouth; dated
Manchester, 16 August 1819
286 Byng, Major General John. No. 35—LETTER from Major-General Sir John Byng to Lord Sidmouth, dated,
Head Quarters. Pontefract, 17 August 1819
287 No. 53.—LETTER from Colonel Horton inclosed therein; Halifax, 27 August 1819
288 Bennet, Henry. Address on the Prince Regent's Speech at the Opening of the Session, Hansard Archives,
24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 144
289 Bennet, Henry. Address on the Prince Regent's Speech at the Opening of the Session, Hansard Archives,
24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 146
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The poor conduct of the troops was exacerbated by claims from several reputable sources 
that the people gathered in Manchester did not in fact constitute the severe threat to national 
security that had been assumed. For example, Wentworth Fitzwilliam wrote that ‘the peace, 
tranquillity, and good order of the realm will not be disturbed by these people’.290 Instead, 
he argued, that they were simply poor, hungry, and politically alienated and were simply 
expressing their right to protest. Lord George Nugent, a prominent and extreme Whig voice, 
stated that the people were ‘legally assembled to discuss those objects [i.e. their grievances]’ 
but that the meeting ‘was dispersed by the sword [with] helpless men, women, and children 
mixed in indiscriminate carnage.’291 The fact that the victims were innocent, also prompted 
angry criticisms that the deployment of the yeomanry was provocative, dangerous, 
repressive or despotic and even contravened Britain’s values: ‘To what a situation had such 
a policy reduced the kingdom!’ declared the radical Scottish MP Joseph Hume, ‘military 
recruitings were to be seen every where, as if the  government were preparing for an arduous 
contest! And against whom? Against our fellow-subjects! (sic)’292 Here we see the crux of 
the issue; the government had called on the military, comprised, of course, of British citizens, 
to use force to disperse a gathering of their compatriots.  
The British government was well aware of this ethical conundrum. As Thompson writes, 
‘[i]f any ‘Peterloo decision’ was reached by Sidmouth [the Home Secretary]and the 
magistrates it is likely to have been reached privately in the week before the meeting.’ 
Furthermore, the sensitivity of the subject would mean that it is ‘highly unlikely that any 
record would have been left in the official Home Office papers for subsequent inspection.’293 
In spite of this, the analysis in chart 2 clearly shows the attempt by the British state to follow, 
or create the illusion of having followed, protocol.  
The second most frequently referenced theme was that of subordination to the civil power 
with thirty-two mentions. For example, Major-General John Byng wrote ‘I most sincerely 
regret that the employment of military in aid of the civil power should have been 
necessary’.294 Here, Byng is careful to include the phrase ‘in aid of the civil power’ to record 
290 Fitzwilliam, Wentworth. No. 10.—LETTER from Earl Fitzwilliam, Lord Lieutenant of the West Riding of 
Yorkshire, to Lord Sidmouth; dated Wentworth, 21 July 1819 
291 Nugent, George. Address On The Prince Regent's Speech At The Opening Of The Session, Hansard 
Archives, 24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 154 
292 Hume, Joseph. Address On The Prince Regent's Speech At The Opening Of The Session, Hansard Archives, 
24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 138 
293 Thompson. The Making of the English Working Class, p. 683 
294 No. 35—LETTER from Major-General Sir John Byng to Lord Sidmouth, dated, Head Quarters. Pontefract, 
17 August 1819, nine, A. M.
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the fact that the military were not acting unilaterally, but in accordance with their duty and 
due process as defined by the state. Lord Castlereagh argued similarly in his statement that 
‘The 15th dragoons and the Cheshire Cavalry advanced to the rescue of the Manchester 
yeomanry; and in so doing, acted distinctly under the authority of the magistrate, who, on a 
fair view of the case, felt himself bound to give the necessary order.’295  
One particularly interesting speech was delivered by Lieutenant Colonel George 
l'Estrange. His statement is worth quoting in full:  
The magistrates assembled here in consequence of the disturbed state of the district, directed 
me to have the troops in readiness to assist the civil power in case of necessity, at the time 
of the meeting proposed for this day. In concurrence with their wishes, and after consultation 
with them, the military were prepared and arrangements made, such as then seemed 




The rhetoric here is worth noting; L’Estrange states that the magistrates directed him, to 
‘assist the civil power’ if necessary. Thus, ‘in concurrence with their wishes’ and only after 
consulting with them, he agreed. He even mentions later in the speech that he kept a 
magistrate with the troops to provide a degree of civil oversight. This is redolent of Theresa 
May’s speech following the first implementation of Operation Temperer where she stated 
that ‘[t]he police have asked for authorisation from the Secretary of State for Defence to 
deploy a number of military personnel in support of their armed officers’.297  
In fact, there are a lot of commonalities in the themes of the rhetoric in 1819 and the modern 
day. One of the most striking was the statement by the Marquis of Lansdowne, Henry Petty-
Fitzmaurice. He first noted his objection to the use of force at Manchester before listing the 
three criteria that he believed should have been adhered to before the decision to use force 
was taken. In his words, if violence was to be employed: 
295 Italics added for emphasis. Lord Castlereagh. Address on the Prince Regent's Speech at the Opening of the 
Session, Hansard Archives, 24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 142 
296 No. 36.—REPORT from Lieutenant Colonel l'Estrange, inclosed in the foregoing. Dated Manchester, 16 
August 1819. 
297 Italics added for emphasis. PM statement following second COBR meeting on Manchester attack, Prime 
Minister’s Office, 23 May 2017. See: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-following-
second-cobr-meeting-on-manchester-attack-23-may-2017 (accessed 24th May 2017) 
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1) it should commence on the part of the populace, and not on the part of the constituted
authorities.
2) notice of such intention should have been given before hand, that the people might
have been aware of their danger.
3) that punishment should have fallen on the leaders of the meeting, and not on those
who were aware of no offence, and who perhaps attended out of curiosity, and from
no participation in the views or objects of those leaders.298
These three points made by Petty-Fitzmaurice are essential to understanding the element of 
continuity in Britain’s strategic culture across time. They established three crucial criteria of 
proportionality (point 1), last resort and restraint (point 2) and targeted action (point 3) which 
have also become cornerstones of Britain’s internal strategic culture and which became 
enshrined in Britain’s ‘minimum force’ approach to internal security.  
It is fascinating to note that even two hundred years ago, these were still prominent themes 
in the ethics of using armed force domestically. For example, for last resort John Norris 
remarked that ‘Soldiers are placed [in position], and bodies of special constables, with orders 
in the first instance for the constables to act, and afterwards, in case of need, the military to 
disperse the mob.299 L’Estrange had also commented that ‘the committee, now sitting, 
consider it necessary to keep all the troops ready, though every means will be adopted to 
prevent the necessity of their acting.’300 Further, the Solicitor General, Lord Mansfield noted 
that ‘the civil power was called out, and a military force stationed to aid them if necessary’ 
but that the magistrates had ‘acted with a caution approaching to timidity.’301 
There was still a great deal of tension in the country two months after Peterloo, particularly 
in the north. In Newcastle, the Earl of Darlington, a moderate, received news that the mayor 
had been attacked and wrote to Lord Sidmouth that ‘I have judged it expedient to order out 
the South Tyne yeomanry cavalry’. However, he explains that they have been placed ‘under 
298 Marquis of Lansdowne, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice. State of the Country, Hansard Archives, 30 November 
1819, vol. 41, col. 431 
299 Norris, John. No. 37.—EXTRACT of a letter from Mr. Norris to Lord Sidmouth; dated Manchester, 17 
August 1819 
300 Papers Relative to the Internal State of the Country, Hansard Archives, 24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 
263 
301 Solicitor General, Lord Mansfield. Address on the Prince Regent's Speech at the Opening of the Session, 
Hansard Archives, 24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 172 
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the authority of the magistrates, who must be responsible if they order the military to act, 
and I have urged them strongly not to do so unless the civil power is overcome or 
incompetent.’302  
It is interesting to see that there are fairly frequent references, even in 1819, to many of the 
norms that Britain applies today before the use of force is sanctioned, most notably the 
primacy of the civil power and the idea that deploying the military is a last resort if the civil 
power finds it is unable to deal with the threat. Even in the case of Peterloo, we find some 
evidence that the Deputy Police Constable Jonathan Andrews had first attempted to arrest 
Hunt without the assistance of the military. According to his testimony, it was only when he 
assessed the situation and found that neither he, nor his constables could achieve the task 
allocated to them that he requested the aid of the yeomanry.  
Clearly one could question whether all of the possible avenues had been exhausted before 
resorting to such an extreme measure and, as Robert Reid writes, it may have been magistrate 
Hulton who was under pressure and over-zealous.303 However, initially the military were 
only in Manchester as a contingency and were only deployed once the civil power had 
granted them the authority. 
Nevertheless, it is still the case that although the military should in theory have only been 
deployed as a last resort, in reality it does not appear to be the case that other avenues were 
explored first. Indeed, in a powerful statement, Joseph Hume lamented ‘the light and trifling 
manner’ in which the decision to deploy the troops had been taken.304 This is perhaps the 
most significant point in terms of the impact of Peterloo. As chart 1 indicated, there were 
dozens of domestic deployments that occurred in Britain post-1819. The difference is that 
the decision to deploy them was rarely taken in a ‘light and trifling manner’ again. In fact, 
the core values of subordination to the civil power, proportionality and last resort, which the 
authorities appear to have only paid lip service to in the case of Peterloo, became enshrined 
in Britain’s internal strategic culture.  
302 No. 64.—LETTER from the Earl of Darlington to Lord Sidmouth; dated Raby Castle, 15 October 15 1819.
303 Reid, Robert. The Peterloo Massacre, (Portsmouth: William Heinemann, 1989), p. 167
304 Hume, Joseph. Address on the Prince Regent's Speech at the Opening Of The Session, 24 November 1819, 
Hansard Archives, vol. 41, col. 138 
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4.3.3. The Impact of Peterloo on Britain’s approach to civil unrest 
The Peterloo massacre had a profound impact on how Britain approached the concept of 
domestic security.305 As chart three shows, there were at least twenty-two yeomanry 
deployments in 1819 alone and only slightly fewer (nineteen) the following year. However, 
the extreme public backlash and the growing sense of shock over the incident in 
parliamentary circles meant the military were never relied upon for the quelling of public 
unrest to quite the same extent. Of course there were still active military deployments; for 
example the Newport Rising of 1839 saw twenty two deaths as a result of a cavalry charge.306 
Nevertheless, Peterloo had the effect of putting Britain on the road towards developing the 
world’s first modern police force when, in 1829, Sir Robert Peel pushed through the 
Metropolitan Police Act. 
The use of the yeomanry after the establishment of the Metropolitan Police Force in 1829 
remained the standard practice in the un-urbanised areas of Britain where cavalry units were 
‘well suited to controlling an un-policed and hierarchical rural society’.307 However, their 
heavy-handed responses to certain public disturbances coupled with criticisms of slow 
response times and failure to respond in manner that may be expected of a military unit led 
to questions over their suitability for maintaining public order. Even General Sir Charles 
James Napier, captain of the Yeomanry cavalry, voiced his reluctance to deploy his troops 
to quell the Chartist uprising. He famously stated ‘If the Chartists want a fight, they can be 
indulged without Yeoman, who are over-zealous for cutting and slashing’.308 In fact, in 1819, 
the politician and former member of the 1st Foot Guards, Henry Bennet had argued similarly 
after Peterloo. He stated that the Yeomanry had entered a house where they began ‘cutting 
and hacking the people’.309 Napier’s point, it seems, was not just hyperbole. 
Mr. H. Berkeley also called the efficiency and character of the yeomanry into question in 
Parliament on 26 July 1850 further undermining the role they had hitherto played: 
305 ‘There are historical precedents after incidents such as the Peterloo riots for the House deciding to change 
public policy because of what has happened.’ Mr Simon Hughes, Commons Debate on firearms, 12 
November 1996, vol. 285
306 Chase, Malcolm. Chartism: A New History. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), pp. 110-117 
307 Hay, George. The Yeomanry Cavalry and Military Identities in Rural Britain, 1815–1914. (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan), p. 155
308 Napier, William Francis Patrick. The Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles James Napier, 2. 
(London: Woodfall & Kinder Printers, 1857), p. 73
309 Bennet, Henry. Address On The Prince Regent's Speech At The Opening Of The Session, Hansard Archives, 
24 November 1819, vol. 41, col. 146 
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unless certain public measures were carried, the yeomanry meant, to use their own 
expression, to fight for it; and that they would draw their swords when they pleased, and 
upon whom they placed, and when ordered to draw their swords they would keep them in 
their scabbards as long as they pleased. 
He concluded that they were ‘…insubordinate and useless. At the present moment they 
claimed for themselves the distinction of being disobedient and dangerous.’310 While Fox 
Maule stated similarly that ‘he had shown that this force (Yeomanry) had for a long series 
of years been insubordinate and unamenable to discipline, and that it possessed every quality 
which would make it unfit and inefficient as a military force.’311 The feeling at the time was 
that the yeomanry were increasingly unsuited to a duty of maintaining internal order and, 
following the implementation of (non-mandatory) 1839 the Rural Borough Police Act which 
allowed Justices of the Peace in counties outside of London to establish their own police 
forces, another decline in the number of yeomanry deployments is apparent (see chart 3). 
By 1856, the County and Borough Police Act, which was mandatory, had been established. 
This made it compulsory for any county which had not created a police force since 1839 to 
do so thereby negating the need for the yeomanry cavalry units as tools of law and order. 
This effectively laid the foundations for separating out the role of the maintenance of law 
and order from the role of defence. This is reflected in chart 3 which shows no military 
deployments between 1856 and 1865. Clearly, the creation of a permanent police force in 
1829 and the legislation for rural policing that followed fundamentally altered how Britain 
approached matters of internal security. 
310 Mr. H. Berkeley, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 26 July 1850, vol. 113, par. 379 
311 Mr. Fox Maule, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 26 July 1850, vol. 113, par. 380
110 
Chart 3: The impact of ‘Peterloo’ – number of yeomanry deployments: 1815-1865 
Sources: The National Archives, Hansard, Secondary Literature.312 
The idea of establishing a permanent civil police force had first been proposed in 1785 when 
the Solicitor-General, Sir Archibald Macdonald, placed the London and Westminster Police 
Bill before Parliament in an effort to curb rampant criminality and avoid ‘that dangerous 
refuge of the weak’ – the use of the armed forces.313 The bill was withdrawn after 
condemnation from magistrates who termed the idea ‘inexpedient and unnecessary’.314 
However, in the febrile atmosphere post-Peterloo, it was readily apparent to the more 
rationally-minded and progressive members of the government that it was in fact the use of 
the bayonet and the musket for crowd control that was inexpedient. 
312 Full sources listed in bibliography 
313 Babington, Anthony. Military Intervention in Britain, From the Gordon Riots to the Gibraltar 
Incident. (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 32
314 Ibid. 
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Sir Robert Peel had assumed the position of Home Secretary in 1822, one year after another 
fatal incident involving the use of excessive force during Queen Caroline’s funeral. Crowds 
had gathered to watch the funeral procession, but the presence of the military (Oxford Blues 
under the command of Captain Bouverie) nearby agitated the crowd and they began to shout 
at the troops and hurl stones. A magistrate, alarmed at the prospect of riot, then sanctioned 
the troops ‘in firing their pistols and carbines at the unarmed crowd.’ As the Manchester 
Guardian reported at the time, ‘The number of shots fired was not less than forty or fifty. So 
completely did the soldiery appear at this period to have lost the good temper and 
forbearance they previously evinced, that they fired shots in the direction in which the 
procession was moving.’315 For Peel, these incidents of reactive violence against unarmed 
crowds were becoming far too frequent and so he took the initiative to establish a new kind 
of police force that would control crime, not the public. This was epitomised by his famous 
quote: ‘The police are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members 
of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every 
citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.’316
Crucially, Peel wanted to avoid any association with the military and therefore insisted that 
his recruits wore a blue uniform rather than the vibrant red of the military. They would also 
be unarmed, carrying a truncheon, a rattle (which was soon replaced with a whistle), and a 
pair of handcuffs. There was initial resistance from the public to the idea who were still 
sceptical about the idea of an organised body; The British army had been given the 
derogatory nickname ‘the lobsters’ as a result of their red uniforms and the Peelers were 
initially given the (additional) nickname ‘the raw lobsters’.317 Indeed, the police were not an 
immediate success and the impact on controlling crime was minimal in the early years of the 
Metropolitan police. Despite these early setbacks, Peel had created a force for the 
maintenance of domestic security that was distinct from the military and would dictate 
Britain’s approach to internal security for the next two hundred years. The notion of 
‘policing by consent’ that Britain operates by today derived from what became known as 
Peel’s nine principles of policing.318 The British government still references Peel in its 
315 Manchester Guardian, ‘The Funeral Procession;, 14 August 1821, Guardian Archive 
316 Sir Robert Peel 's Principles of Law Enforcement 1829, point seven
317 ‘Peel’s Police, Raw Lobsters, Blue Devils, Or by whatever other appropriate Name they may be known.’ 
HO 44/21, f. 326, Anti-police handbill, 1830.  
318 In fact, there is limited evidence that Peel devised these principals. It is more likely that the first 
Commissioners of Police of the Metropolis, Charles Rowan and Richard Mayne were responsible for 
creating these core tenets.
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discussion of the subject and defines it as ‘the power of the police coming from the common 
consent of the public, as opposed to the power of the state’.319
The Metropolitan Police Act also introduced a core tenet of British policing that permeated 
the approach taken by the civil power in all matters regarding internal security; the 
application of minimum force. The sixth point of Peel’s ‘nine principles’ illustrates this fact, 
it states: 
The police should use physical force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law 
or to restore order only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to 
insufficient to achieve police objectives; and police should use only the minimum degree of 
physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police 
objective.
320
Modern British police forces are still instructed to apply this standard of minimum force. 
The College of Policing’s guidelines for new recruits asks police officers to consider three 
‘core questions’ before resorting to the use of force: 
1) ‘Would the use of force have a lawful objective (…) and, if so, how immediate and
grave is the threat posed?
2) Are there any means, short of the use of force, capable of attaining the lawful
objective identified?
3) …what is the minimum level of force required to attain the objective identified, and
would the use of that level of force be proportionate or excessive?’321
Here, we clearly see the principle of restraint that has guided Britain’s approach to internal 
threats for so long. However, Keith Jeffrey questioned the efficacy of this approach in face 
of more unconventional threats such as terrorism. He wrote that Britain will often find itself 
caught between ‘Scylla and Charybdis’; thus, while Britain’s principle of minimum force 
may be more in line with the norms and values of the state, it may also be insufficient for 
dealing with more insidious threats. Meanwhile, maximum force (i.e. the use of the military) 
is deemed to be too far in the other direction by almost all echelons of society. It is seen to 
319 Home Office, FOI release, 10 December 2012, Definition of policing by consent. See: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/policing-by-constent/definition-of-policing-by-
consent (accessed 30/01/2019)
320 Italics in original, underlined by author for added emphasis. See: Sir Robert Peel 's Principles of 
Law Enforcement 1829, point six




be provocative and, given the national historical experience, contrary to Britain’s abidance 
by the public’s right to freedom from repression. 
 
In 2005, it was this strategic paradox that led to trouble for the Metropolitan Police. In the 
wake of the 9/11 attack, Britain had decided that a contingency strategy for dealing with 
suicide bombers needed to be devised. Sir David Veness, Head of Scotland Yard’s Special 
Operations branch, and Barbara Wilding, Deputy Assistant Commissioner of Specialist 
Operations, visited Israel and Sri Lanka to gather some advice on how best to respond when 
confronted with a threat of that nature. The outcome was the creation of new armed police 
tactics in 2002, codenamed (somewhat ironically given the earlier reference to Scylla and 
Charybdis) Operation Kratos – Kratos being a Greek demi-god and the personification of 
strength. One of the most controversial aspects of Kratos was the authorisation of the use of 
deadly force. Report 13 of the 27 October 2002 meeting of the Metropolitan Police Authority 
(MPA) served as an update to members on the Metropolitan police’s new tactical response 
to suicide terrorism. Although it denies that it is a ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy, it recognises that 
‘the extreme nature of the risk to the public’ may necessitate using ‘such force as is 
reasonable in the circumstances’ and that there is ‘no legal requirement for an officer to give 
a verbal challenge before firing.’322 
 
After the London bombings of 7 July 2005, the firearms officers of the Metropolitan police 
were reminded of the guidelines under Kratos. The atmosphere in the country was tense and 
Report 13 states that ‘from 12 midday on the 21 July 2005 to midnight on the 4 August 2005’ 
763 calls were made by members of the public about suspected suicide bombers. Six of these 
resulted in the use of the Armed Response Unit.323 Tragically, one of these occasions resulted 
in the killing of Jean Charles de Menezes, a Brazilian national living in London. At the 
inquest following the shooting, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) 
heard that a man identified only as ‘Colin’, who was acting as the night duty surveillance 
officer for SO12,324 had informed armed units that ‘unusual tactics’ may be required 
‘because of the environment they were in’.325 Colin clarified this remark by stating if ‘the 
subject was not-compliant a critical shot could be taken.’326 The level of public scrutiny that 
 
322 Detective Superintendent Steve Swain, Report 13 of the 27 October meeting of the Metropolitan Police 
Authority (MPA), ‘Suicide Terrorism’. See sections 10 and 11, respectively. 
323 Ibid. sec. 14 
324 SO12 was known as Special Branch, it merged with SO13, the ‘Anti-Terrorism Branch’ to form 
Counter-Terrorism Command in October 2006 
325 Independent Police Complaints Commission. ‘Stockwell One, Investigation into the shooting of Jean 
Charles de Menezes at Stockwell underground station on 22 July 2005’, sec. 11, ‘Briefings’, par. 11.9, p. 51 
326 Ibid. 
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the Metropolitan police faced after this incident emphasised the strength of feeling among 
members of the public that the use of force domestically is deemed to be extremely sensitive 
and, furthermore, that proportionality is of paramount importance. Thus, even with the use 
of force by the civil forces, the same enduring principles apply.    
4.3.4. Cultural preferences compared: Peterloo, The General Strike, and the 
Tottenham Riots 
The evidence presented suggests the negative perception of Peterloo certainly influenced 
Britain’s cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically. It catalysed a shift 
in how Britain dealt with riot and protest. If we recall the criteria for strategic change 
dicussed previously, it requires strong institutions, a bold leader and a receptive normative 
climate. In terms of the climate, the public backlash to the heavy-handed approach of the 
military was so severe that abiding by that method of maintaining civil order was out of the 
question. Several years later, this prompted a ‘bold leader’, in Robert Peel to create the 
Metropolitan police force, a ‘strong institution’ which would serve as the country’s populace 
and reflect the will of the people. Although relatively ineffective at first, over time it became 
highly efficient at controlling crime and ensuring internal security to the extent that the 
military were rarely called upon to deal with incidents of civil unrest with 1919 being the 
last time it occurred.  
In 1926 there were concerns that the military may once again be needed when the General 
Council of the Trades Union Congress declared a general strike. The strike was in opposition 
to wage cuts and the poor conditions that miners were forced to work under and lasted for 
nine days. During this time the government implemented the Emergency Powers Act 1920 
which outlined that it is incumbent on the government to ensure that ‘essentials of life to the 
community’ are provided.327  
The strike did lead to the deployment of the army, but in a passive, rather than active 
capacity. As a report by the Security Service (MI5) noted, the regular army’s role was limited 
to escorting flour trucks.328 Meanwhile, the government formed the Civil Constabulary 
Reserve, which comprised mostly members of the Territorial Army (TA) and veterans of the 
military to carry out ‘emergency work’ such as ‘the maintenance of order’ and ‘the 
327 Emergency Powers Act 1920, 29/10/1920. 10 & 11 Geo 5, ch. 55  
328 WO 30/143, War Office intelligence summary no. 12, 11 May 1926 
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protection of essential services.’329 This was important as, in lieu of ‘middle tranche’ forces 
such as the French gendarmerie, the British government did not have a strategic option that 
would avoid the Scylla and Charybdis problem of too much versus not enough force. The 
TA, by virtue of its civilian contingent, effectively bridged the gap between the police, the 
troops, and the people in this context.330   
In a debate in the House of Commons a year on from the strikes, Labour politician, George 
Hall stated, ‘the experience of last year proved conclusively that the civil authorities are 
quite competent to deal with any matter arising in the course of an industrial dispute.’ He 
continued that ‘last year we had eight months of industrial strife, and on no single occasion 
was it necessary for the civil authorities to apply-to the War Office to send troops to engage 
or interfere in the trouble at all.’331 Indeed, Hall’s statement was reflective of a wider trend 
in the rhetoric that rejected the need for any military involvement in domestic affairs. For 
example, the Labour MP Ellen Wilkinson stated at the time that ‘when the average man joins 
the Army, he does so in order to fight the foreign enemies of his country’ and that although 
a soldier is cognisant of a potential domestic duty, including possibly ‘firing on his fellow 
workmen’, this is not the reason that they signed up.332 F.A. Broad argued similarly by 
stating that he was ‘sure none of these young men ever contemplated that they would be 
used to fire on their fellow workers, possibly their fathers, or their brothers, or their 
friends’.333 Labour MP Phillip Snowden struck a similar note stating 
The police are a civil force, and for their efficiency it is necessary that they should have the 
confidence of the public, that they should have the confidence of all law-abiding citizens. It 
is important that the police and the public should co-operate. Now in the Army it is quite 
different. The Army is something apart from the public. The functions of the Army are to 
exercise effective force which I might describe as violence.
334
 
Simply put, the prevailing opinion among British policymakers at the time was that the 
belligerent mindset of the soldier is simply incompatible with the internal duties related to 
riot and protest. In almost all cases it will be provocative, dangerous, and if the soldiers 
refuse to fire against their countrymen, potentially totally ineffective.  
329 J 86/37. Emergency arrangements for Civil Constabulary Reserve during the General Strike, 10 May 1926  
330 Thank you to the staff at DCDC for their helpful comments on this point.   
331 Hall, George. Commons Chamber, Hansard Archives, 29 March 1927, vol. 204, col. 1140 
332 Wilkinson, Ellen. Commons Chamber, Hansard Archives, 29 March 1927, vol. 204, col. 1140 
333 Broad, Frank.A. New Clause—(Use Of Military In Connection With Trade Disputes) Commons Chamber, 
Hansard, 29 March 1927, vol. 204, col. 1137 
334 Snowden, Phillip. Police, England And Wales. Hansard Archives, 11 July 1928, vol. 219, col. 2265 
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These examples typify the rhetorical reaction to the presence of army at the General Strike. 
The almost universal rejection of the use of the military to counter riots and protests is clearly 
reflected in chart 4. It compares the rhetorical response of policymakers during the time of 
Peterloo to more modern examples of the 1926 General Strike and, for interest rather than 
as a formative moment, the 2011 Tottenham riots in order to demonstrate the clear attitudinal 
shift over time. The methodology is the same as was outlined in the section dedicated to 
Peterloo. 
Chart 4: Preferences for the use of force compared: Peterloo, The General Strike, 
and the Tottenham Riots 
Sources: The National Archives, Hansard.335 
Clearly, there is a marked change in the attitudes of the policymakers towards the use of the 
armed forces between 1819 and 1926 from general acceptance, to almost total rejection. This 
is all the more interesting given that the causes of the two incidents were similar; i.e. 
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disaffected workers, job losses, and economic hardships perceived to have come about 
through the policies of the ruling classes. While there were a significant number of positive 
statements related to Peterloo, by the time of the General Strike there are just three 
statements that extoll the benefits of using the army against the people. Instead, the majority 
of the statements are negative. We might speculate that the reason for this is likely due to 
the deep-seated tension between the working and ruling classes in Britain that boiled over at 
Peterloo. This ‘us versus them’ mentality would become further entrenched through the 
employment of the armed forces against the people by the ruling class. Consequently, a 
desire for national unity meant that, post-Peterloo, the use of armed forces internally for the 
purposes of quelling civil disorder came to be perceived as entirely unacceptable in Britain. 
Given that the General Strike did not see an active deployment of the troops, the negative 
statements are limited to what an active deployment would have been rather than was. In 
consequence, there are no references to protocols not being followed or other options not 
being explored. Instead, statements overwhelmingly refer to the provocative or dangerous 
nature of a putative deployment, how it would be repressive, inappropriate given that the 
‘enemy’ in this context would be the British public, and in opposition to a soldier’s principle 
duties. Clearly, there had been a cultural shift away from the idea that the army should be 
used as a tool for maintaining order.  
Further evidence of this notion is found through a brief comparison with the Tottenham riots 
in 2011. Although the military were not called upon, the idea was debated heavily in 
Parliament as the suggestion had been circulating that perhaps the army could play a limited 
role in resolving the situation. The patterns in the rhetoric reflect the debates and statements 
from 1926 in that they are overwhelmingly negative. For example, the Liberal Democrat 
politician, and former minister for the armed forces, Nick Harvey, stated ‘Those who are 
trained in the use of lethal force … should not be regularly used as an instrument of force 
against the citizens of that same country.’336 Then Labour leader Ed Miliband stated ‘this is 
a job for the police’,337 his colleague Diane Abbott argued that ‘the further militarisation of 
the situation we face will not help and might bring things to an even worse level.’338 Overall, 
what the responses to the General Strike and the Tottenham riots indicate is that there has 
336 Harvey, Nick. Supporting civilian authority: what role for the Military? Ministry of Defence, 14 October 
2011. See: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/2011-10-14-supporting-civilian-authority-what-role-
for-the-military--2 (accessed 04/01/2018) 
337 HC Debate. Public Disorder, 11 August 2011, vol. 531, col. 1056 
338 HC Debate. Public Disorder, 11 August 2011, vol. 531, col. 1069 
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been a clear shift in cultural preferences, from approval of the use of the armed forces at 
home in 1819 to an almost unanimous rejection in 1926 which has endured to this day.  
Despite this shift, there is also remarkable continuity in the rhetoric across nearly two 
hundred years of British history. The middle column of chart 4 relates to more ‘neutral’ 
language. That is to say, statements that indicate caveated acceptance of the use of the 
military. For example, that if the military must be used, they should always be either 
subordinate or accountable to the Civil Power; that all other options must have been 
exhausted; that a deployment was necessary given the high level of threat, but it was still 
unfortunate that such measures had to be resorted to and that any deployment, if and when 
it occurs, should be short term and proportionate to the threat. We see that regardless of the 
century, the rhetorical response of policy makers has adhered to these core, seemingly 
immutable principles.  
For example, reflecting the idea of subordination to the civil power, in 1926, Labour MP 
Frank Broad stated that ‘if ever, the forces are to be used in aid of the civil authority, the 
Minister who will be responsible will be the Home Secretary.’339 And discussing the issue 
of proportionality he continued that only ‘a great emergency’ should lead the government to 
resort to the armed forces. His colleague Mr. Rhys referred to last resort when he commented 
that ‘there never could be any question, of using troops in any industrial disturbance of any 
sort or kind unless the situation became such that there was grave danger, not only to life, 
but to the very property.’340  
The same principles of subordination to the civil power and last resort are apparent in the 
rhetoric in 2011. For example, then prime minister David Cameron stated  
Some people have raised the issue of the Army. The acting Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan police said to me that he would be the last man left in Scotland Yard with all 
his management team out on the streets before he asked for Army support.
341
 
He continued that his cabinet’s discussions for using the military in this context ‘is not for 
today, or even for tomorrow; it is just so that there are contingency plans should they become 
339 Broad, Frank. A. New Clause—(Use Of Military In Connection With Trade Disputes) Commons Chamber, 
Hansard, 29 March 1927, vol. 204, col. 1134 
340  Rhys. Commons Chamber, Hansard Archives, volume 204, 29 March 1927, Column 1145 
341 Riots: David Cameron's Commons statement in full. BBC, 11 August 2011. See: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14492789 (accessed 09/04/208) 
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necessary.’342 Nick Harvey also directly referred to the fact the deployment of the troops 
‘should only happen as a last resort.’343 These common themes provide strong evidence of a 
guiding cultural thread that seems to constrain the behaviour and strategic orientation of 
Britain. In summary, it seems from this analysis that Britain is opposed to the use of the 
army in the case of dealing with riot and protest due to the negative perception of historical 
experience (although necessarily a fixed point in time). However, if the decision is taken 
that the military must be deployed, the guiding normative principles of subordination to the 
civil power, last resort, and proportionality must be abided by. 
Continuity and change are therefore evident in the responses of British policymakers to the 
idea of deploying the military on the national territory for the purposes of maintaining civil 
order. A significant change in cultural preferences occurred post-Peterloo, but all three 
examples illustrated in chart 4 also indicate a great deal of continuity through a series of 
abiding norms. This is highly suggestive of the fact that historical experiences do indeed 
cultivate entrenched normative preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically. The 
question that arises is whether the same historical experiences are referred to in the rhetoric 
(which would indicate objective points in time have a constraining effect), or, if different 
points in history are mentioned, it would suggest that policymakers are constrained by 
history in a general sense, but are perhaps less aware of precisely from where their 
preferences originate.  
In 1926 there were six references to negative historical experiences; a fairly low number 
which may imply constraint has occurred passively over time. In terms of the specific 
examples, Peterloo was mentioned just three time: First, Frank Broad referred to ‘the time 
of Peterloo’;344 Second, Scottish MP James Barr, in reference to the expansion of the powers 
of the state to prevent public meetings, spoke of ‘acts of repression’ during the ‘Peterloo 
massacre’;345 third, discussing precedents for MACP, Viscount Haldane spoke of ‘the 
occasion of the Peterloo riots.’346  Other historical experiences that were invoked included 
George Hall’s reference to industrial disputes in 1898 in Wales when ‘two cavalry regiments 
342 Ibid. 
343 Harvey, Nick. Supporting civilian authority: what role for the Military? Ministry of Defence, 14 October 
2011. See: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/2011-10-14-supporting-civilian-authority-what-role-
for-the-military--2 (accessed 04/01/2018) 
344 Broad, Frank. A. New Clause—(Use Of Military In Connection With Trade Disputes) Commons Chamber, 
Hansard, 29 March 1927, vol. 204, col. 1135 
345 Barr, James. Emergency Powers, Commons Chamber, Hansard, 6 May 1926, vol. 195, col. 521 
346 Haldane, Viscount, Army And Air Force (Annual) Bill, Lords Chamber, Hansard, 27 April 1926, vol. 63, 
col. 954 
120 
were sent to that area.’347 Interestingly, in 2011 there are seven references to historical 
experiences, but Peterloo is not mentioned at all. Instead, the historical references are to 
Northern Ireland and Tonypandy.348  
It is interesting that Peterloo was not the only experience that was mentioned. As the 
evidence presented in this chapter thus far suggests, Peterloo was the most formative 
moment for Britain’s preferences for the use of the armed forces. So why were there not 
more references to it? And why were some arguably less formative moments mentioned 
instead? As the previous chapters implied, norms may be transmitted passively across time 
without clear articulation. This may lead to an entrenched, in this case, rejection of the armed 
forces domestically without a clear idea as to the origin of this belief. A comparison of 
Peterloo, the General Strike, and the Tottenham riot certainly seems to indicate that this is 
the case; negative historical experiences are invoked as a reason not to use the troops, but 
there is not a fixed, objective point in the past that policymakers will always refer back to, 
if indeed they refer back to historical experiences at all. In short, historical experiences lead 
to enduring cultural preferences, but the specific causes of these enduring values seem to 
have been partially forgotten. 
4.3.5. At home or abroad? The impact of cultural preferences on representations 
of the army’s role 
The analysis above suggested that negative historical experience of Peterloo led to 
significant public backlash against the army’s use for quelling episodes of public disorder. 
This resulted in a new institution, the Metropolitan police force who would maintain primacy 
for maintaining order on the national territory. Consequently, the rhetoric of policymakers 
in 1926 reflects the idea that facing protesters is not the duty of the armed forces. Instead, 
post-Peterloo, the notion that the British army was an expeditionary force began to develop. 
For example, Frank Broad mentioned in 1926 that it was ‘unfair’349 to expect a soldier to 
carry out internal duties, Lieutenant Commander Kennworthy stated that the guarding duties 
347 Hall, George. Commons Chamber, Hansard, 29 March 1927, vol. 204, col. 1139 
348 ‘when the troops were sent into Tonypandy by a Liberal Home Secretary 100 years ago to try to deal with 
the riots there they made the situation worse rather than better.’ Bryant, Chris. HC Debate. Public Disorder, 11 
August 2011,  vol. 531, col. 1095; ‘the Prime Minister will be aware that Sir Hugh Orde, who has ordered the 
firing of baton rounds and the use of water cannon in Northern Ireland, is against the use of such things in the 
current situation.’ Abbott, Diane. HC Debate. Public Disorder, 11 August 2011, vol. 531. col. 1069 
349 Broad, Frank. A. Commons Chamber, Hansard Archives, 29 March 1927, vol. 204, col. 1138 
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that were required of soldiers during the General Strike were out of sync with the 
expectations of action and adventure that many young recruits would sign up for. He stated 
that these recruits ‘may not know what they are landing themselves in for,’350 and Lord 
Henry Horne, an experienced military officer who had fought during World War One, stated 
that ‘History will tell us that we never have defended and never will defend the British Isles 
by fighting on our own soil. Our defence lies in fighting elsewhere.’351  
There is clear evidence of the perception of the British army as a predominantly external 
force, not just among policymakers, but also from the military itself through the recruitment 
campaigns post-First World War. During the Great War, the Military Service Act, 
introduced in January 1916, had ensured a steady stream of recruits in support of the war 
effort. However, by mid-1919, conscription had been abandoned and, after taking control of 
various former Ottoman and German colonies under the League of Nations mandates, the 
British Empire had reached its territorial peak. Recruitment campaigns thus attempted to 
appeal to the public’s sense of adventure and yearning for foreign travel. It was in 1919 that 
variations on the often-quoted phrase ‘join the army, see the world’ began to emerge. (see 
posters one and two). In fact, of ten inter-war recruitment posters examined, eight explicitly 
referenced travel abroad and one referenced it implicitly by showing a drawing of two 
soldiers leaning over the side of a boat as they pass a sunny mountain range (according to 
the Imperial War Museum, possibly in India or the Middle East).
(Posters One and Two: c. 1919, The Advertising Archives) 
350 Kennworthy, Lieutentant Colonel. Commons Chamber, Hansard Archives, 29 March 1927, vol. 204, col. 
1147 
351 Lord Horne, House of Lords Debate, The Territorial Army, 24 March 1927, vol. 66, col. 784
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The trinity of travel, action, and adventure has remained the core of Britain’s approach to 
recruitment for over a century. Of course, during the Second World War the approach was 
dominated by the threat from Nazi Germany and recruitment campaigns focused on the idea 
of the country’s duty to ‘do their bit’. But after 1945 adverts struck the tone of recruitment 
campaigns reverted to that seen during the inter-war period. Recruitment posters from the 
1950s offered the chance to ‘travel gratis and for nothing to glamourous names on the map. 
Hamburg. Singapore. The sunny Caribbean.’ While campaigns targeting more female 
recruits through the Women’s Royal Army Corps offered ‘the opportunity to travel’ or the 
fact that there are ‘few other jobs that offer a girl the chance of foreign travel.’ The 1950s 
also saw the rise of mass-market visual technology and in an early recruitment film entitled 
They Stand Ready, the narrator states that it is ‘no new thing for Britain this sending of men 
to the far corners of the earth’ before referencing Britain’s military commitments in Malaya, 
Malta, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, North Africa ‘and a host of others which must be guarded for 
the defence of Britain and the Commonwealth.’352 Here we see one of the clearest examples 
of the British notion that the defence of the realm is achieved through external engagements. 
‘I can afford to go abroad all right!’ – WRAC advert, c. 1950 
(Poster Three: The Advertising Archives) 
352 National Archives, They Stand Ready, 1955, Film available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U3aerP7GyWE, Transcript available at: 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/fifties-britain/stand-ready/ n.b. transcript differs 




This theme continued in the 1960s with campaigns boasting that the army offers ‘a varied 
and exciting life’ and will ‘help you see more of the world’.353 A short recruitment film from 
1964 follows the soldier ‘Bill Dowling’ and states that by the age of twenty-one he has 
already been to ‘the Middle East, Berlin, and Kenya with the army. “Ah”, you’ll say, “that 
was when the army was travelling!” – they’ve never stopped.’354 By the 1970s, as one would 
expect, the threat emanating from Northern Ireland also began to factor into the recruitment 
campaigns. Operation Banner had been in force since 14 August 1969 and reached its peak 
in the seventies with roughly 21,000 troops deployed. One particular poster featured a street 
in Belfast with the caption ‘Northern Ireland can be tough, tiring and dangerous. You need 
backbone, patience and eyes in the back of your head.’355 One recruitment video referenced 
the ‘massive task of internal security in Northern Ireland’.356 Nevertheless, even during this 
period, operations further abroad were still heavily emphasised. For example, a poster for 
the Women’s Royal Army Corps (WRAC) stated categorically that ‘You’ll have to travel.’ 
While one advert for the regular army stated ‘there’s not much of the world the army doesn’t 
reach in one way or another; it could be India, Canada, the Andes, Central America, or the 
Arctic’. In fact, out of nine recruitment adverts seen from the 1970s, seven referenced travel 
abroad and only one mentioned a possible domestic (i.e. English) duty. In short, historical 
experiences had forged an ingrained cultural preference for the army to act as an external 






In the context of the research questions for this thesis, the discussion thus far has highlighted 
the interdependency between historical experiences and cultural preferences in the British 
case, demonstrating that there seems to be an enduring rejection of the idea of deploying the 
military for the purposes of maintaining public order. However, these attitudes have to be 
seen against the backdrop of changing threats in the modern era if we are to understand fully 
modern British preferences for the acceptance or rejection of the armed forces on the national 
territory.  
 
353 ‘New Army Pay Rise!’, C.1960, Advertising Archives 
354 Public Information Films 1964 to 1979 Army Recruitment. See: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SUnlx40W6v8 (accessed 21/07/2017) 
355 ‘If you’ve got it in you, the Army will bring it out’, recruitment poster, c.1970, The Advertising Archives 
356 ‘The Army Role’, Army Department. c.1975. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HYoZXlnK-
y4&ab_channel=smp220700 (accessed 15/06/2018) 
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This shift dates back to the 1970s when the perception of a new type of threat began to 
emerge, challenging British policymakers’ assumptions that army is, or should be, an 
external force. Fears of transnational terrorism, through external groups potentially carrying 
out hijackings or taking hostages on British soil, forced a strategic rethink about the army’s 
internal role. The crux of the issue was that terrorism was a very different threat to that posed 
by unruly citizens. Thus, in the face of a militarised threat from foreign terrorist 
organisations operating within Britain, was the cultural aversion to the military acting 
internally still applicable?     
The next chapter is focused on the British response to the threat from terrorism in order to 
examine this interplay between cultural preferences and strategic behaviours in more detail. 
It examines the institutional development of Britain’s approach to counter-terrorism through 
the use of the special forces and the formalisation of the army’s role under MACP. As noted, 
terrorism constitutes a very different threat to riot and protest and has led to the creation of 
different structures. The chapter examines this by looking at rhetorical responses to 
significant events such as Operation Marmion at Heathrow in 1974 and the Iranian embassy 
siege in 1980. This approach helps ascertain whether a new and substantively different threat 
has prompted a new response that was less guided by Britain’s historically received cultural 
preferences for the use of the armed forces internally. Finally, Islamist terrorism post-2001 
constituted a different type of threat that was more destructive and larger in scale. The British 
approach, between 2001 and 2005 is reviewed before turning to the responses of 
policymakers to Operation Temperer. The core question: is there still evidence of enduring 
cultural constraint, or does Temperer seem to represent a fundamental strategic shift in the 
face of a substantively different threat?  It then analyses modern army recruitment campaigns 
to reinforce the findings in the rhetoric.  
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Chapter 5 – The British Army and domestic counter-terrorism 
operations 
‘Yes, go in.’ 
The words spoken by Margaret Thatcher to William Whitelaw authorising the use of the SAS in 
the Iranian Embassy Siege, 5
th
 May 1980 
5.1. The impact of the 1972 Munich Olympics attack 
The British preference for the army to fulfil predominantly external duties was a reflection 
of the fact that for most of the twentieth century, the army was engaged in operations and 
conflicts abroad rather than on active duty at home. Indeed, as chart 1 illustrated, there were 
no active domestic duties for the British army for fifty-five years between 1919 and 1974 
while, over the same period, the British army fought abroad in around thirty-five conflicts 
and wars of varying scales and intensities.357 This, coupled with the absence of serious 
domestic threats and the extreme reluctance, derived from past experiences such as Peterloo, 
to use the military against rioters and protesters entrenched the expectation that the army is 
an external force.     
However, during the 1970s, a serious threat from transnational terrorism began to develop. 
In Munich, on 5 September 1972, members of the terrorist organisation Black September, a 
faction associated with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, broke into the athlete’s 
village armed with assault rifles, pistols, and grenades. They entered the Israeli apartments 
and, after some resistance during which two of the Israeli team were shot and killed, exited 
the apartment with nine hostages. During negotiations, Black September demanded the 
release of 234 Palestinians who were being held captive in Israel as well as the release of the 
founders of the far-left German terrorist organisation the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), 
Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhoff. 
Authorities were quickly alerted to the hostage situation as several Israeli athletes had 
managed to escape the apartments (one by jumping from the second-story balcony). Hours 
of tense negotiations between the German authorities and the hostage takers began, but it 
357 Operation Banner in Northern Ireland is included in this total. 
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quickly became apparent that the German police were woefully inexperienced in dealing 
with a terrorist threat of this nature. The first armed response unit to attend the scene were 
members of the border police rather than regular police. They took up positions on the roof 
after devising a plan to descend through the ventilation shaft. However, an ineffective cordon 
around the building with the hostages inside meant that television crews had been filming 
the whole incident and the team on the roof was exposed immediately. Eventually, 
negotiators were pressured into moving the hostage takers to the airport where a Boeing 727 
was waiting to fly them to Cairo. The police had devised a plan to plant sixteen of their men 
on the aircraft dressed as stewards, however, just a few minutes before the hostage takers 
were due to arrive, undercover police decided to abandon what they believed would be a 
suicide mission and left the plane without informing their central command. It was at the 
airport that chaos ensued after another botched attempt to rescue the hostages; five snipers 
had been positioned at the airport; they had been selected for this duty based on the fact that 
they shot competitively at weekends and, at the inquest after the event, one of the snipers 
identified as No.2, stated that ‘In my opinion, I am not a sharpshooter.’358 Furthermore, their 
rifles were not even fixed with scopes or night sights and the lighting on the tarmac was 
poor. As firing broke out, a German police officer and two of the kidnappers were killed. 
Less than an hour later, with the arrival of armoured vehicles, the hostage-takers opened fire 
on the hostages. In total seventeen people lost their lives as a result of the attack: six of the 
Israeli coaches, five of the athletes, one policeman, and five Black September members. 
The 1960s had seen a rise in the number of hijackings of commercial flights, but most of 
these were for monetary gain. According to J. Paul de B. Tailon, the hijacking of El Al flight 
426 from London to Tel Aviv by three armed pro-Palestinians marked the point at which 
‘the character of the hijacking phenomenon took a dramatic and qualitative change’. 
According to Tailon this is when politically-motivated hijackings became the norm.359 
Similar incidents such as the Dawson’s Fields hijackings in 1970 when the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked four flights bound for London and New York on the 
same day should have been a warning sign as to the potential nature of the threat. 
Nevertheless, the audacity of carrying out such an attack on western soil and the debacle that 
was the attempted rescue mission exposed a serious weakness in the western approach to 
terrorism. Former Munich police chief Manfred Schreiber summarised the German 
358 Gracie, Francie. Munich Massacre Remembered, CBS News, 5 September 2002. See: 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/munich-massacre-remembered/ (accessed 01/09/2018) 
359 Tailon, J. Paul de B.. Hijacking and Hostages, Government Responses to Terrorism. (Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), pp. 17-18
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authorities’ unpreparedness in an interview in 1996, stating that ‘[w]e were trained for 
everyday offenses, to be close to the people, unarmed - but not for an action against 
paramilitary-trained terrorists.’360 After the massacre, the complacency of this passive 
approach was exposed and policy makers were awakened, not just in Germany, but also in 
Britain and France, to the need for dedicated counter-terrorist units that were able to operate 
domestically and respond effectively to any attacks of this nature that may occur on their 
soil. 
5.1.2. Western Responses 
In Germany, the response was the formation of Europe’s first counter-terrorist unit 
Grenzschutzgruppe 9, commonly referred to as GSG9, by Colonel Ulrich Wegener.361 
Wegener had been the Bundesgrenzschutz’s liaison officer to the German Interior Minister, 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, at the time. He had witnessed first-hand the events of Munich and 
had expressed his extreme dissatisfaction with the planning and execution of the failed 
rescue operation.362 Wegener began by visiting the West German archives to research 
Germany’s historical experience of special operations during the Second World War and 
drew his inspiration from raids such as the capture of fort Eben Emael in May 1940 and the 
rescue of Benito Mussolini in September 1943.363 The lack of security at the games was a 
choice made by German authorities based on historical experience, but the massacre exposed 
quite clearly the weakness in the Germany’s culture of restraint. GSG9’s formation was a 
response to that, however, the fact that control is federal and police-based is illustrative of 
Germany’s strategic culture: if force is to be used domestically, it should not be military 
force and must be under the control of the civil power; thus, GSG9 operate under the 
jurisdiction of the Bundespolizei (Federal police). Perhaps their most famous operation 
occurred in Somalia in October 1977 when they freed 86 passengers that had been held 
hostage by four Palestinians on Lufthansa flight 181. 
360 1972 Munich Olympics massacre - an avoidable catastrophe? Deutsche Welle, 7 September 2017. See: 
https://www.dw.com/en/1972-munich-olympics-massacre-an-avoidable-catastrophe/a-40405813  
(accessed 04/01/2018) 
361 Germany already had eight Grenzschutzgruppen, Wegener decided that GSG “9” would be the logical 
continuation.
362 Reeve, Simon. One Day in September. (New York: Faber & Faber, 2000), p. 112 
363 Tailon, J. Paul de B. Hijacking and Hostages, Government Responses to Terrorism (Westport, 




In 1973, France followed suit by creating the Groupe d’intervention de la Gendarmerie 
nationale, or GIGN. It was initially named Équipe commando régionale d’intervention, the 
‘regional’ component of the original name was intended to reflect its domestic counter-
terrorist duties. Lieutenant Christian Prouteau, the hardened commando who at that stage 
was employed as an instructor for Gendarmes, was selected as the leader of this new unit. It 
became fully operational in March 1974 and carried out its first mission on French soil just 
ten days later when they were called to a flat to deal with an armed man who had shot and 
killed his family. Unlike their German counterparts, the GIGN were placed under the control 
of the military meaning they could be used in external as well as internal operations. In fact, 
other than their liberation of over two hundred passengers onboard an Air France aircraft in 
1995, some of the GIGN’s most famous missions have be abroad rather than on the national 
territory; for example, in Somalia in 1976, in Saudi Arabia in 1979, and several missions 
that were carried out in Bosnia during the 1990s. The GIGN are particularly specialised in 
missions relating to aircraft or ship hijacking, chemical, biological, or nuclear attack, or the 
hostage-taking of French nationals abroad. They will also be called in for instances of 
domestic terrorism that occur in rural areas (RAID are their urban counterparts and will deal 
with attacks in cities). Most recently, the GIGN were involved in the operation to raid a 
printing house where the brothers responsible for the Charlie Hebdo attacks had barricaded 
themselves. 
 
In Britain, the response was to formalise the state’s response to a potential attack and order 
a shift in the training and operational focus of the Special Air Service (SAS), the country’s 
elite forces, towards counter-terrorism.364 Prior to 1972, a potential role in contributing to 
domestic counter-terrorism operations was not on the radar of the special forces; the Land 
Operations Manual of 1969 outlines the duties that were expected of the SAS, but none 
mention supporting the civil power in dealing with terrorist incidents. Instead, its focus is 
external duties given that ‘SAS squadrons are particularly suited, trained and equipped for 
counter-revolutionary operations’.365 Security strategies in the 1960s also reflect the 
emphasis on more conventional threats while terrorism barely features as even a peripheral 
concern. For example, the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966 (also known as the 
Healey Review) states that it is a priority to ‘decide in broad terms what sort of role Britain 
 
364 The Special Boat Service (SBS) were also requested to adapt their training. The SAS shot to 
international fame after the Iranian Embassy Siege and therefore there is volumes of material on their 
history and operational procedures. By contrast, the SBS has remained largely in the shadows. Due to a 
lack of source material, this section focuses on the role of the SAS. 
365 British Army Field Manuals and Doctrine Publications, GB 0099 KCLMA British Army Field Manuals, 




should play in the world in ten years’ time, and what part its military forces should play in 
supporting that role.’ It envisages that Britain’s long-term military strategy will encompass 
strengthening Britain’s contribution to the United Nations and its peacekeeping operations 
in countries such as Cyprus, building military cooperation with allies through NATO for the 
defence of Europe, and potential overseas operations in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, 
the Far East and South East Asia. However, it makes no mention of terrorism and states 
‘Outside Europe a direct threat to our survival at first sight seems less likely.’366 Thus, it 
recommended directing resources towards countering conventional threats such as the USSR 
and developing nuclear deterrence capabilities through NATO. 
 
In the early 1970s, but before the attack on Munich, some of the more astute members of 
government began to make suggestions that terrorism should be, if not prioritised, then 
certainly mentioned in the government’s security strategy. Lieutenant Colonel Colin 
Mitchell, who briefly served as a Member of Parliament for Aberdeenshire, stated that he 
was ‘surprised, and disquieted, that the subject of urban terrorism is not even mentioned in 
the White Paper. Nor is it included in the list of higher defence studies to which the White 
Paper draws attention in its penultimate chapter.’367 However, it was not until the next major 
national security assessment, the Statement on the Defence Estimates in March 1975 (also 
referred to as the Mason Review of 1974-75) that a clear shift in emphasis is evident. 
Terrorism is listed here for the first time as a key strategic concern and, furthermore, the 
Defence Estimates refer to the growing role that the army is playing in the maintenance of 
internal security. It states: ‘Army units have been deployed from time to time to Heathrow 
Airport, to support the Metropolitan Police in counter-terrorist preventive operations. In 
November 1974, the Army practised similar procedures for Gatwick Airport, with the Surrey 
and Sussex Police Forces.’368 The Mason Review indicates that by the mid-1970s an overt 
military contribution to counter-terrorism had been built into the British security 
architecture. These developments were all in public eye, however, behind the scenes on 
Whitehall, the attack in Munich had kick-started the process of devising a strategy that would 




366 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966: Part I The Defence Review, Cm 2901, February 1966 
367 Lieutenant Colonel Colin Mitchell, Hansard Archives, “Defence”, 01 March 1971, Volume 812, Column 
1276 
368 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, Cm 5976, March 1975, BRITISH FORCES: OPERATIONS 
AND EXERCISES COUNTER-TERRORIST OPERATIONS, Chapter III, p.19 ; N.B. the incidents mentioned 
here are not coded in chart 1 as they were for training purposes rather than active CT deployments. 
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5.1.3. The SAS and Counter-terrorism 
The SAS are an elite unit of the British armed forces that was formed during the Second 
World War by ‘the Phantom Major’,369 David Stirling. Stirling believed there could be great 
utility in deploying a small, highly-skilled unit behind enemy lines to conduct covert 
operations such as intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, assassination, and sabotage. The 
SAS distinguished itself on multiple occasions during campaigns in North Africa and in 
Europe, famously executing sabotage raids on seven airfields simultaneously from Benghazi 
to Crete destroying dozens of Luftwaffe fighters and bombers.370 After the war, the relevant 
military authorities decided there was no longer a role for a unit of this nature and it was 
disbanded on 8 October 1945. However, the unit’s absence from Britain’s formal military 
roster was short-lived and by 1 January 1947 the SAS had been reinstated as part of Britain’s 
Territorial Army. The elite group known as the Artists (sic) Rifles (formed in 1890) were re-
branded as 21 SAS Squadron and went on to play a major role in the Malayan Emergency 
the following year. 
Before the attack at the Munich Olympics, the SAS’s role was solely external; they were 
active in operations in Malaya, Borneo, Aden, and the ongoing campaign in Northern 
Ireland.371 Although they had a great deal of experience in dealing with counter-insurgency, 
there was no formal counter-terrorism wing of the regiment as policymakers and military 
personnel perceived the threat posed to mainland Britain by terrorists to be minimal.372 
However, members of the regiment had watched the attack in Munich unfold with a more 
critical eye; Lt. Colonel Peter de la Billière, the Commanding Officer of the SAS, had 
commissioned one of his trusted colleagues, Captain Andrew Massey to draft a proposal for 
the establishment of a counter-terrorist unit within the SAS.373 It therefore came as no 
surprise when, on 8 September 1972, he received a phone call from the Director of Military 
Operations, Major-General Bill Scotter who had been asked by Edward Heath whether there 
369 A nickname given to Stirling by Erwin Rommel 
370 Macintyre, Ben. SAS: Rogue Heroes, the authorized wartime history. (London: Penguin Random House, 
2016), pp. 116-129
371 Their role in ‘The Troubles’ continues to this day to be a great source of controversy. See the ‘Stakeknife’ 
scandal: Stakeknife: Top British spy 'helped SAS kill IRA men', BBC, 01/10/2019. See: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-49895529 (accessed 01/10/2019) 
372 Stevenson, Jonathan. ‘The Role of the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom in Securing the State Against 
Terrorism’ Connections, Fall 2005, vol. 4, no. 3, p. 122 
373 GEN129(73)7, Counter-Terrorist Tactics, 20 Feb. 1973, CAB130/636(NAUK). Massey, Munich 
Massacre, CAB130/616(NAUK).
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was any room for a counter-terrorist unit with the SAS. De la Billière replied that he could 
have the unit up and running in just five weeks.374
In 1971 a member of parliament Lt. Colonel Colin Mitchell had pressed in Parliament for 
the creation of ‘permanent forces for counter-revolutionary warfare within the United 
Kingdom.’375 As a former military man, he may have had insider knowledge of the fact that 
the SAS had already set up such a unit which, by strange coincidence, it named the Counter-
Revolutionary Warfare (CRW) wing. It was the CRW that was to form the foundation of the 
SAS’s counter-terrorist unit. Under the codename Pagoda, the Special Projects Team was 
formed. Massey selected twenty suitable candidates who were to be garrisoned in a separate 
wing on Bradbury Lines and would be kept on a constant state of alert. The focus of this 
team would be on honing their ability to deal with hostage-taking, hijacking, and other 
unconventional threats. One of the key focuses of training would be forceful entry into a 
building (grimly referred to as the ‘Killing House’) during a hostage situation using live 
ammunition. In De la Billière’s words, the idea was to ‘instil so much precision and drill 
into them that in emergencies the chances of emotion and fear influencing their judgement 
was reduced to a minimum.’376
It was essential to policy makers in Whitehall that Britain would not be caught unawares to 
the same extent that Germany had been. They provided the Special Projects team with an 
open-ended budget for training and commissioned scientists and researchers at Porton Down 
(The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory – DSTL) to develop the technology to 
give the SAS the edge in a fight. DSTL set to work on developing a special calibre of 
ammunition that would provide the same stopping power as a regular round, but would not 
compromise the safety of any hostages. They also created the famous ‘flashbang’, a mainstay 
of the arsenal of the SAS and many other special forces units around the world. It combines 
magnesium or aluminium filings with potassium nitrate to create a non-lethal, but blindingly 
bright blast to temporarily disorient the enemy.377
The unit was ready and in Whitehall policy makers were busy formalising the doctrine for 
control mechanisms that would allow for the use of the SAS in the event of an act of 
terrorism on British soil. In October 1972, one month after the attack in Munich, the British 
374 Asher, Michael. The Regiment: The real story of the SAS. (London: Penguin Books, 2008), pp. 420-421 
375 Mitchell, Lieutenant Colonel Colin. ‘Defence’, Hansard Archives, 1 March 1971, vol. 812, col. 1276
376 Asher, Michael. The Regiment: The real story of the SAS. (London: Penguin Books, 2008), pp. 420-421 
377 Semi-structured interview with Nicholas Taylor, Principal Analyst at the MoD’s DSTL. London: 18 
February 2017
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government formed the Cabinet Working Group on Terrorist Activities. The Home Office 
chaired the Working Group which included representatives from government departments 
such as MI5, the MoD, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Metropolitan Police 
force. Its purpose was to  
assess the threat of terrorist activities in Great Britain; indicate the precautions that can be 
taken; describe existing contingency plans and the ways in which they might be expanded; 
and make suggestions on the machinery for consultation in the event of a terrorist incident.
378
 
The Working Group formalised what the British government considered to be an appropriate 
procedural response to a potential attack. First, a Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) 
meeting would be convened. A specific room of the Cabinet Office was converted into a 
dedicated control centre to allow senior civil and military authorities to communicate and 
plan during a time of national emergency.379 During a COBR meeting, if requested by the 
relevant civil authority (Police Commissioner, Home Secretary) Military Aid to the Civil 
Power (MACP) could be invoked allowing for the deployment of the armed forces including, 
if necessary, the use of the special forces. 
5.1.4. Precedents for MACP 
Military Aid to the Civil Authority 
Since 1829 and the implementation of Robert Peel’s Metropolitan Police Act, the police 
have held prime jurisdiction for matters of internal security. The concept of minimum force 
is a cornerstone of the Britain’s internal strategic culture in order to prevent the recurrence 
of incidents such as the Peterloo massacre. However, throughout history there have been 
times when the civil power has been unable to contain or manage a threat; this is not 
necessarily just violent threats (such as terrorism), but also encompasses the threat of natural 
disaster, strikes or assistance in ‘maintaining supplies and services essential to the life, 
health and safety of the community’.380 In cases such as these, the civil authority may 
378 Draft report by the Cabinet Working Group on Terrorist Activities, CAB 130/616, Public Records 
Office (PRO), London, p.17
379 The 2015 film Eye in the Sky is an interesting example of the nature of interoperability and civil control 
in Britain’s emergency decision making. It takes place during a COBR meeting where a Lieutenant General, 
the District Attorney, two MPs and an under-secretary discuss the legality of carrying out a drone strike in 
Kenya. 
380 Defence Contribution to UK National Security and Resilience. House of Commons. Defence Committee. 




request assistance from the military. In Britain, requests of this nature fall under the blanket 
term Military Aid to the Civil Authority (MACA). In all instances, in order for the use of 
the military to be approved, all of the following four criteria must be met: 
 
1. ‘There is a definite need to act and the tasks the armed forces are being asked to 
perform are clear. 
 
2. other options, including mutual aid and commercial alternatives, have been 
discounted; and either 
 
3. the civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task and it is 
unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one; or 
 
4. the civil authority has all or some capability, but it may not be available immediately, 




MACA is then subdivided into four categories: 1) Military Aid to other Government 
Departments (MAGD); this includes the use of the military in the event of striking civil 
service personnel or stretched resources that may endanger the lives of people in the 
community. 2) Training and Logistic Assistance to the Civil Power (TLAC); this 
encompasses joint exercises between police and military or, given the specialist capabilities 
of the military, specific training or support. 3) Military Aid to the Civil Community 
(MACC); this is an unarmed duty that often involves military assistance in disaster relief. 4) 
Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP); this is by far the most ‘active’ of the provisions 
under MACA and involves the use of the military to restore law and order or public safety. 
It was defined in 2005 by the Ministry of Defence as ‘the provision of military assistance 
(armed if appropriate) to the Civil Power in its maintenance of law, order and public safety, 
using specialist capabilities or equipment, in situations beyond the capability of the Civil 
Power.’382 It is MACP that was invoked prior to the Iranian Embassy Siege by the SAS in 
1980. 
 
It should be noted that although MACP was formally developed in the 1970s, there is 
considerable historical precedent for the use of the military in aid of the civil power arguably 
 
381 2015 to 2020 government policy: Military Aid to the Civil Authorities for activities in the UK, 
Ministry of Defence, Policy Paper, 4 August 2016, Section entitled “Military Aid to the Civil Authorities” 
382 Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience, Joint Doctrine Publication 02, Second 
Edition, September 2007. See: http://www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/jdp02ed2.pdf (accessed 
22/08/2017) 
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since the events of the English Civil War.383 However, the concept can be more formally 
traced to the nineteenth century. A parliamentary select committee in 1908 believed its 
origins to be from 13 June 1867 when the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Colonel 
the Earl of Longford, issued Volunteer Circular 31. This stipulated that ‘the Civil Power may 
require His Majesty’s ‘subjects generally, including members of the Volunteers (Territorial 
Force) to arm themselves with and use other weapons suitable to the occasion’.384 However, 
there is evidence of a system of subordination to the civil power before this point as 
demonstrated during the riot and protest chapter. To give a brief example, Fox Maule stated 
in 1850 that ‘If the Yeomanry are wanted in aid of the civil power, the Secretary of State is 
the sole judge by whom they should be called out.’385
Arguably the first time it was invoked in a counter-terrorist context was in 1911 during the 
Siege of Sidney Street. Here, two members of a Latvian anarchist gang had barricaded 
themselves inside a room at 100 Sidney Street in Stepney armed with two 1896 (C96) 
Mauser pistols and a 7.65mm Browning pistol.386 By contrast, the police force that had 
gathered outside were armed with Webley .450 revolvers that had been supplied to the force 
in 1884. Mike Waldren of the Police Firearms Officers Association writes that ‘By 1911 
there were two revolvers kept at each police station although reports in 1909 and again in 
1910 had suggested that they were no longer fit for purpose’.387 This meant that the police 
found themselves totally outgunned and resorted to requesting the assistance of the Scots 
Guards who were stationed at the Tower of London. The Home Secretary at the time was 
Winston Churchill and, in a remarkable video of the event captured by British Pathé, can be 
seen watching the events unfold.388 It was not to be the first time that Churchill would be 
involved in the use of military force domestically and in August of 1911 he was questioned 
in Parliament on the subject of the employment of the military. His response was in keeping 
with the principal of MACP: ‘the rule undoubtedly which we have usually followed has been 
that soldiers should be sent in aid of the civil power when they have been advised by the 
local authority.’389
383 Wigg, George. ‘Heathrow Exercise: Use Of Armed Forces’, Hansard Archives, 16 January 1974, vol. 
348, col. 1037
384 (EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCES: Aid to Civil Power (Code 53(B)): Use of Territorial Force 
in aid of civil power – 1908), National Archives at Kew
385 Saville, John. 1848: The British States and the Chartist Movement. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), p. 239
386 Waldren, Mike. ‘The Siege of Sidney Street’, Police Firearms Officers Association, July 2013, p. 9 
387 Ibid.  p. 4
388 London – Sidney Street Siege (1911), British Pathé, See: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v0wPKpAVDGE  
(accessed 14/01/2018) 
389 Churchill, Winston. Employment Of Military, Hansard Archives, 22 August 1911, vol. 29, col. 2285 
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MACP was also invoked for the campaign in Northern Ireland for the use of the armed forces 
in support of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (Operation Banner). However, the attack in 
Munich was a different beast to the insurgency campaigns that Britain was used to. Hostage 
taking was not the modus operandi of the IRA and sieges or hostage situations were usually 
the result of a last act of desperation rather than an intentional strategy by the perpetrators. 
For example, the Balcombe street siege involving members of the Provisional IRA in 1975 
(which was effectively dealt with by the civil power) came about as the result of a chase 
through London.390
The potential nature of an act of transnational terrorism on British soil necessitated a slightly 
unconventional approach and, as a result, from the early 1970s, the British special forces 
were integrated into the provisions of MACP. However, the crucial aspect of MACP is to 
retain ultimate civil control over the military so as not to contravene Britain’s norms and 
values. As the ex-SAS trooper Michael Asher writes, ‘the police would retain primacy in 
any terrorist situation, and the SAS couldn’t be called in unless the chief police officer on 
the ground requested their assistance directly from the Home Secretary.’391
These mechanisms still form the basis of Britain’s contemporary response to an emergency 
situation and would be followed on 5 May 1980 when terrorists inside the Iranian Embassy 
executed one of the hostages, Abbas Lavasani. The Police Commissioner at the time, David 
McNee was resigned to the fact that was no longer a peaceable solution to the situation and, 
recognising that his police officers did not possess the requisite capabilities to resolve the 
siege, requested military assistance from the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw. 
5.1.5. The rhetorical response to the Iranian Embassy Siege 
Whitelaw had been chairing a COBR meeting when the message from McNee came through 
and he immediately telephoned the prime minster, Margaret Thatcher. Whitelaw outlined 
the situation and that the assistance of the SAS had been requested; Thatcher’s response was 
simply, ‘Yes, go in.’ An initial scenario plan presented by the Cabinet Minister Robert 
390 The Balcombe Street Siege was the first time that the COBR command control system was used. See: 
Omand, David. Securing the State. (London: Hurst & Co., 2010), p. 61
391 Asher, Michael. The Regiment: The real story of the SAS. (London: Penguin Books, 2008), p. 423 
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Wade-Grey had estimated that ‘casualties may be very heavy’392 if the SAS were to assault 
the Embassy while the SAS’s own estimates presented on 2 May indicated a 60% chance of 
getting the hostages out alive.393 Despite these pessimistic assessments, the operation 
(codenamed Operation NIMROD) was a resounding success; just one hostage was killed 
during the assault and five of the six terrorists were killed. 
The success of the assault on the Iranian Embassy propelled the once-shadowy SAS to 
international fame. Over the coming weeks, debriefs and debates in the Houses of Parliament 
saw myriad jingoistic declarations that the assault had restored the pride in being British 
again. Margaret Thatcher’s aim was to send a strong signal to the world that Britain’s 
response to acts of terrorism would be decisive and forceful. It was imperative that a situation 
like that seen in Munich did not occur on British soil. However, it was seen to be equally 
important that British values were not contravened. This is reflected in the language used by 
those politicians involved in organising the assault. For example, extracts from William 
Whitelaw’s statement post-SAS assault revealed the primacy of the civil power in the initial 
stages of the operation and in authorising the eventual use of the special forces. He stated 
that: 
From the start of the siege, the gunmen regularly threatened to kill hostages if demands were 
not met. As soon as it became clear that they had begun to carry out those threats, I 
authorised, at the [Police] Commissioner's request, the commitment of the SAS … What 
pleases me about this operation is that we brought it to a successful conclusion while, at the 
same time, preserving the highest standards of the British police service and demonstrating 
that we have a community police service in this country.
394
Whitelaw’s statement illustrates how important the norms and values of the state are even 
when resorting to the use of force. He also reveals in his statement another core component 
of Britain’s approach to the use of the armed forces domestically: that it should only be 
employed as a last resort. He states: ‘I regret that it proved necessary to resort to the use of 
force, but there was in the end no alternative.’ This adherence to civil control was lauded in 
Parliament. In a rare cross-party agreement, Merlyn Rees of the Labour Party declared ‘we 
[the Labour Party] believe that he was right to bring in the SAS at an early stage, just in case 
392 SECURITY. Seizure of Iranian Embassy in South Kensington and the taking of hostages, ‘Incident 
at the Iranian Embassy’, National Archives, Ref. PREM 19/1137
393 SECURITY. Seizure of Iranian Embassy in South Kensington and the taking of hostages, ‘Home 
Secretary’, National Archives, Ref. PREM 19/1137, BO5946
394 Home Secretary William Whitelaw, Hansard Archives, Iranian Embassy, London, 6 May 1980, vol. 984, 
col. 28
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they needed to be used.’395 Indeed, evidence from the National Archives even reveals that 
the British government took every measure to try and prevent the use of force. Their ‘best 
outcome’ to the situation was ‘terrorists surrender’ while ‘emergency shoot-out’ involving 
the SAS was listed as the worst outcome. Furthermore, there was the suggestion in a secret 
memo, dated 2 May 1980, that two hostage fatalities could be the threshold for the use of 
the SAS rather than one.396  
Chart 5: Reactions to the use of the SAS during the Iranian Embassy Siege 
Sources: National Archives, Hansard397 
Chart 5 is a collation of the responses to the assault from 6 May 1980 to the same date in 
1981 in order to allow twelve months for the dust to settle. It shows that the overwhelming 
response to Operation NIMROD was positive with most people declaring that the operation 
was necessary given the nature of the threat and the specialist capabilities that the SAS 
possess. No references to positive historical precedent were found, but neither were any 
expected to be since this was the first overt invocation of MACP in the era since the First 
World War and had involved a unit that most policymakers had no prior knowledge of. 
395 Rees, Merlyn. Hansard Archives, Iranian Embassy, London, 6 May 1980, vol. 984, col. 29 
396 SECURITY. Seizure of Iranian Embassy in South Kensington and the taking of hostages, ‘Incident 
at the Iranian Embassy’, National Archives, Ref. PREM 19/1137








































































































































































Neither were any references to a reassuring presence found. Again, this is unsurprising. The 
SAS had in fact been preparing for an assault since the first day of the siege, but no members 
of the public were aware of their presence. Thus, no-one could be re-assured. Just one 
negative response was found that seemed to indicate it constituted an inappropriate use of 
force: this was the Labour politician Dennis Canavan’s question to the Attorney-General 
asking if ‘immunity from prosecution, or any order for summary execution, [was] approved 
by either the Attorney-General or the Home Secretary in the case of the SAS raid on the 
Iranian embassy.’398 This question was answered by Sir Hugh Fraser, a former member of 
the SAS who was decorated for his role in the Second World War. Fraser’s response extolled 
the conduct of the civil power in these matters declaring that the government ‘shows 
amazing scrupulosity in the discharge of the function of the State investigating all events 
pertaining to disaster or tragedy such as that which occurred at the Iranian embassy.’399
Here is it worth investigating why there seemed to be such widespread approval for the use 
of the army, despite the fact that it was the first time an active operation had taken place on 
the British mainland for over sixty years and what the rhetoric from the riot and protest 
revealed about general cultural aversion to the idea. Peterloo created a sense that the army 
should not be used on the national territory to counter a perceived threat posed by British 
citizens. The rhetoric post-General Strike and into the modern era with the Tottenham riots 
indicated how entrenched that view has become. However, post-Munich attack there 
emerged a new type of threat from foreign terrorist groups operating within Britain’s 
territory. In a sense, it abrogated Lord Henry Horne’s statement (quoted earlier) that ‘we… 
never will defend the British Isles by fighting on our own soil.’ The use of the armed forces 
was met with approval, and even pride, as it constituted an extension of the traditional role 
of the army: fighting external enemies.  
Despite the widespread approval of Operation NIMROD, there are the same recurring 
themes in the ‘neutral’ columns in the middle that were seen in the riot and protest era and 
which indicate continuity in cultural preferences and also that any acceptance of the military 
on the national territory will usually come with caveats; notably the idea of subordination 
to the civil power and contingency or last resort. The SAS understood that they were not to 
interfere with developments and to allow the police negotiators to try and find a peaceful 
398 Canavan, Dennis. Armed Forces (Criminal Proceedings), Hansard Archives, 9 February 1981, vol. 998, 
col. 599
399 Hugh Fraser, Armed Forces (Criminal Proceedings), Hansard Archives, 09 February 1981, vol. 998, 
col. 599
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solution. Their role would only commence upon approval from the relevant civil authorities 
(see the extracts from Whitelaw’s statement above). Frequent references were made to the 
fact that the use of force was unfortunate, but necessary. For example, the British 
Conservative John Ganzoni expressed his belief that the operation had been an unfortunate 
necessity. He said to his peers in the House of Lords: 
I should like from these Benches to express our congratulations to Her Majesty's 
Government and to all who have been concerned in this incident. Obviously we deplore—
as do all Members of your Lordships' House—the fact that lives had to be lost. Nevertheless, 
that was a price which had to be paid.
400
One of the most common themes in the statements was that of the use of force being last 
resort. As was explained in the explanation of MACP, this is one of the essential criteria for 
the approval for the deployment of the military. During a discussion in the House of Lords 
on the role of the army over six weeks after the siege, Lord Hayhoe stated: 
It was the first time that troops had been used in that way, and the decision to deploy them 
was taken only after one of the hostages had been murdered in cold blood and his body 
thrown out of the embassy. Once that had happened, it was regrettably clear that the hoped-
for peaceful resolution of the siege was not possible. The SAS had to be used as the only 
means of bringing the incident to an end with the minimum loss of life.
401
Unsurprisingly, given the astonishing and unexpected success of the mission, praise for the 
courage and skill of the SAS was also commonly seen in the rhetoric and there were frequent 
references to the fact that the operation had restored a sense of pride in being British. For 
example, John Chilcot, then Under-Secretary for the Police Department, wrote to the Home 
Secretary declaring ‘This is a proud moment for the country’402 and Lord Chalfont wrote to 
the prime minister to say that ‘it again means something to be a British citizen.’403 
Overwhelmingly, then, the response to the SAS’s mission was positive.  
One could make the argument that the role of the SAS is evidence of the fact that states 
respond according to the nature of the threat; the rising threat from pro-Palestinian terrorists 
400 Gaznoni, John (Lord Belstead). ‘The Iranian Embassy: Conclusion Of Incident’, Hansard Archives,06 
May 1980, vol. 408, col. 1536
401 Lord Hayhoe. ‘The Army’, Hansard Archives, 26 June 1980, vol. 987, col. 798 
402 Chilcot, John. Iranian Embassy Siege, National Archives, PREM 19/1137





necessitated the creation of a dedicated counter terrorist organisation which was then used 
in a military operation on British soil. However, although a stimulus did indeed provoke a 
response, the nature of the response was determined by historically-derived cultural factors; 
the use of force is always as a last resort, proportionate to the threat and subordinate to the 
civil power (see the columns in the middle section of the chart). These values were even 
evident in the responses to Peterloo, an incident that happened 161 years before the embassy 
siege and for a completely different purpose. Thus, cultural preferences seem to have 
endured over time regardless of the threat faced with general acceptance of a putative 
deployment predicated on the adherence to the values of subordination to the civil power, 
last resort, and proportionality.  
 
To illustrate this point, a comparison can be made between the response to Operation 
NIMROD and the rhetoric used by members of the House of Lords during a debate relating 
to a military deployment that had taken place at Heathrow airport in 1974 known as 
Operation MARMION. On 5 January 1974, 150 heavily-armed troops were deployed to 
Heathrow airport for a period of two weeks.404 The event came as a shock to both members 
of the public and a number of people in government who had not been warned that a 
deployment was imminent. The operation led to some rather alarmist reporting in the 
national press. For example, the Daily Telegraph reported that ‘An Army machinegunner, 
lying concealed in a position on the western side, was asked what would happen if cars did 
not stop at the control point he was overlooking. The soldier, a veteran of Northern Ireland, 
replied grimly, “They'd stop”’.405 The incident was even the subject of speculation that there 
was an imminent coup; this was the focus of a BBC documentary released in 2006 entitled 
The Plot Against Harold Wilson.406  
 
The truth was that the British government had growing concerns over a number of attacks at 
airports such as the Pan AM Boeing flight 707 at Rome which left thirty people dead. Thus, 
they had covertly devised a contingency plan codenamed Operation MARMION for the use 
of the armed forces at airports. On this occasion, there were reports circulating in NATO 
intelligence that a number of SA-7 surface-to-air missiles had been stolen from Soviet stocks 
and might be used to take down a commercial airliner in a western country. This was 
 
404 They were also deployed on three other occasions in 1974: in June, July and September. See: Hughes, 
Geraint. The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal Democracies. 
(Carlisle, PA: The Letort Papers, U.S. Army War College,  May 2011), p. 91 
405 Daily Telegraph cited in House of Lords during debate on HEATHROW EXERCISE: USE OF ARMED 
FORCES, HL Deb 16 January 1974, vol. 348, col. 1039 
406 The Plot Against Harold Wilson. BBC Two England, 16 March 2006 
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obliquely confirmed in 1974 in the House of Lords when Viscount Mark Colville of Culross, 
a former Grenadier Guard, stated ‘the Government obtained some general information which 
… indicated an increased threat to Heathrow which could not be ignored.’407 
At the time, the information on the nature of this threat was deemed to be ‘on a need to know 
basis.’ The public and many politicians were in the dark over what was occurring. The 
British public were unaccustomed to the idea of seeing fully armed military forces deployed 
internally (see the lack of active deployments for over 50 years previously illustrated in chart 
1) and so the presence of troops at Heathrow sparked a great deal of justifiable confusion
and concern. Most of the alarm stemmed from the fact that the process of civil control over
the use of the military appeared to have been bypassed since no public proclamation of a
transfer of control to the military had occurred. This sense of unease is reflected in chart 5.
It shows how the majority of the statements regarding the use of the armed forces at
Heathrow are negative with peers raising their concerns that the act was provocative, in
opposition to the values held dear by the state, an inappropriate use of force, and that lessons
should have been learned from past experiences. Most of the responses related to the British
system of military subordination to the civil power and that these protocols should have been
followed.
407 Viscount Colville of Culross. ‘Heathrow Exercise: Use Of Armed Forces’, Hansard Archives, 16 January 
1974, vol. 348, col. 1049
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Chart 6: Iranian Embassy Siege (1980) and Heathrow Deployment (1974), rhetoric 
compared 
Sources: National Archives, Hansard 
It transpired that police had in fact requested assistance from the military. Viscount Colville 
stated: 
…the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis…sought the Government's authority to put 
into operation the contingency plan for the use of police and troops to defend Heathrow 
against terrorist attack. This plan, which is one of a number of contingency plans against 
terrorism and which was drawn up by the police and the military with the Government's 
approval, has been in existence for some time.
408
The question which presents itself based on the evidence in the chart is why is there such a 
difference in response given that both were military deployments under MACP for the 
408 Viscount Colville of Culross. ‘Heathrow Exercise: Use Of Armed Forces’, Hansard Archives, 16 January 
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purposes of countering a threat from terrorism? The answer lies in the very first column of 
the chart; the Iranian Embassy Siege was deemed to be a justifiable and proportionate use of 
force, the use of troops at Heathrow was not. Furthermore, covert operations involving 
special forces are usually temporary or one-off. Therefore, as long as the civil control criteria 
are met, the general public are less averse to the idea. 
The strength of feeling that the 1974 episode invoked was a clear indication of the deep-
seated cultural aversion to the deployment of the military if the terms are not well 
established. In 2003, Tony Blair was to incur the wrath of the public in similar circumstances 
when, acting on intelligence provided by Sir David Omand, head of GCHQ at the time, that 
a surface-to-air missile could be used imminently against an airliner,409 he took the decision 
to deploy 450 troops and several armoured vehicles to Heathrow. The Telegraph reported 
that ‘the decision to surround Heathrow with tanks was less to do with an imminent threat, 
and more about encouraging the growing number who are opposed to war with Iraq to 
support the Government's line.’410 
Arguably, the events of 1974 laid the foundations for this kind of role for the military. I.e. 
in static guarding positions in order to free-up the police such as that seen during Operation 
Temperer. However, the lesson to be learned is to inform the public first if an operation of 
this nature is deemed necessary. The strength of feeling among the general public in 
opposition to the use of the armed forces en masse if cultural values are seemingly 
circumvented makes this a necessity. 
5.1.6. Summary 
This chapter has demonstrated how formative the growing threat of foreign terrorist 
organisations penetrating Britain’s borders was to changing Britain’s approach to the use of 
the armed forces internally. The attack in Munich demonstrated how under-prepared the 
west was for a brand of transnational terrorism that involved hijacking and hostage taking. 
As a result, terrorism began to feature more frequently in the security strategies of Britain 
and the SAS was tasked with creation of a dedicated counter-terrorist unit, the Special 
409 Semi-structured interview with Sir David Omand (Former Director of GCHQ, 1996-1997) 
London, 12 December 2016
410 Bamber, David; Craig, Olga; Elliott, Francis. ‘Blair sent in tanks after 'chilling' threat’, The Telegraph, 16 
February 2003. See: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1422243/Blair-sent-in-tanks-after-chilling-




Projects Team which would train extensively in dealing with acts of terrorism. Interestingly, 
the responses of Germany, France and Britain all appear to have derived from their cultural 
preferences for the use of force; Germany’s creation of GSG9, a police unit under the 
exclusive control of the civil power reflects its aversion to the use of the military 
domestically - a legacy of the Second World War; France’s creation of GIGN, a military 
unit, reflects its historically flexible distinction between external and internal security and 
the use of the armed forces. Meanwhile, the British decision to maintain a military special 
forces unit that would be available on an ad hoc basis provided the civil power authorises its 
involvement reflects the British cultural preference for last resort and civil control. Although 
each state did respond to the nature of the threat (in keeping with the realist perspective that 
states will behave rationally when faced with a threat), the nature of their response was 
directed by their strategic preferences for the use of force and this derives from their 
respective strategic cultures. 
 
It was also during this era that the mechanisms for civil control over the armed forces were 
formalised through the creation of the COBR meeting and clarification of the terms of 
MACP. This era also saw the creation of contingency plans for the use of the armed forces 
in an overt, guarding capacity at key strategic locations; a plan that would be form the basis 
of Operation Temperer in 2015. 
 
The chapter also examined the attitudes of policy makers to two key counter-terrorist 
operations; the Iranian Embassy Siege by the SAS (and the first formal invocation of MACP) 
in 1980 and the 1974 troop deployment to Heathrow. It found that the rhetoric demonstrated 
a general approval of the SAS mission in 1980 as a result of the strict adherence to Britain’s 
concept of subordination to the civil power, proportionality, and last resort. Although there 
were no mentions of the short-term nature of the mission, this is another factor that is crucial 
to Britain’s strategic culture; covert, counter-terrorist operations are usually temporary 
affairs (Operation NIMROD lasted just seventeen minutes), thus the potential to infringe 
upon the general public’s civil liberties – a concern that is a legacy of the English Civil War 
that was also expressed in the responses to Peterloo, the General Strike, and the Tottenham 
riots – is limited. 
 
It then drew a comparison with the rhetoric used during and after an operation to deter 
potential terrorists at Heathrow in 1974. It found that the response to this operation was 
overwhelmingly negative due to the fact that the process of subordination to the civil power 
and proportionality seemed to have been circumvented. The fears of fear of the public could 
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have been allayed through the provision of a little information and, as is argued in the 
following chapter, speeches prior to the implementation of Operation Temperer were 
carefully crafted to avoid any apprehension or misunderstanding from the public. 
The rhetoric provides further evidence (following on from the findings from the riot and 
protest chapter) that British strategic culture displays both continuity and change. 
Subordination to the civil power, last resort and proportionality continue to be the 
cornerstone of the country’s strategic response in spite of the fact that the threat of terrorism 
is entirely different to that of popular unrest. Here, historical experiences and cultural 
preferences regarding the use of force seem to be guiding the response rather than a more 
rational cost-benefit analysis approach. This is firmly in line with the hypothesis that 
Britain’s strategic culture constrains its behaviour.  
However, there is also change; cultural proclivities derived from the riot and protest era are 
certainly transferred to the counter-terrorism era, but they are not identical. 1980 saw the 
first active deployment of a military unit under MACP since the early twentieth century. If 
we refer back to the criteria for change, all of the conditions for lasting strategic change are 
met: there were strong institutions to implement a change (SAS), a leader willing to make 
the change (Thatcher), and through a growing threat of transnational terrorism and a type of 
operation that adhered to enduring cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces, a 
climate that was receptive to the shift. Once again, then, we observe the inter-related nature 
of the relationship between historical experiences, culture, and behaviour.  
The next section is a continuation of the counter-terrorism era, but arguably represents a 
different phase in that it has seen overt deployments of regular troops en masse to counter a 
threat that is not just transnational in nature, but is also larger and more destructive in scale 
compared with the limited hijackings and hostage situations of the 1970s and into the 80s. 
Furthermore, the modern threat of Islamist terrorism includes a homegrown element. Thus, 
in a sense it is a hybrid of the riot and protest and 1970s counterterrorism eras;  it connects 
the dots between the rejection of the use of the armed forces against British citizens that 
developed after Peterloo and the caveated acceptance of the use of specialist troops to 
counter a transnational terrorist threat from foreign groups. It builds on the arguments that 
have been presented in previous chapters by arguing that both continuity and change are still 
observable in Britain’s response to the threat of radical Islamist terrorism post-2001. It will 
provide some of the context relating to effect of the 9/11 attack and 7/7 London bombings 




force within the Police community. It will then move on to the escalating threat post-2015 
and the decision to deploy troops under Operation Temperer. It will focus on the rhetoric 
used by policy makers and politicians to try and ascertain whether Temperer has adhered to 
same historically-received cultural values that have been examined in previous chapters, or 
whether the severity and nature of the threat has forced a more aberrant response. It will 
conclude by analysing modern British army recruitment campaigns to establish whether the 
broad cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces in Britain have also filtered into 



































5.2. Britain’s response to the threat of terrorism post-2001
‘Let no-one be in any doubt. The rules of the game are changing’  
Tony Blair, “Prime minister’s statement on anti-terror measures” delivered after 7/7 
bombings 5th August 2005 
After the collapse of the USSR, there seemed to be a shift in how policymakers within states 
perceived threats; globalisation facilitated the free movement of people, capital, technology 
and ideas. Through the development of cross-border technology such as the internet and 
aerial networks traditional ‘spheres of influence’, and therefore threats, were completely 
restructured.  There was a sense that ‘old’ large-scale wars, which were a function of the 
military–industrial complex of the Cold War era and before, had given way to ‘new’ or 
‘fourth-generation’ conflicts characterized by small-scale local conflicts, war among the 
people, insurgency and counter- insurgency. Crucially, the prevailing belief was that states 
had lost their ‘monopoly on the use of armed violence’411 as non-state actors operating 
among the people began to dominate conflicts and concerns grew that threats emanating 
from abroad could infiltrate a state’s borders and disrupt the internal security of the state.412 
For example, in March 1996 during a debate in the House of Commons on the prevention 
and suppression of terrorism, the Conservative MP Sir Ivan Lawrence voiced his concern 
that ‘[a]s new nation states emerge and states become unstable, international terrorism may 
grow.’413 Further, in eerily prescient fashion, his colleague, Andrew Hunter, spoke of how 
‘the jumbo jet is the most vulnerable element in modern society’ and that ‘international 
terrorism will be a permanent affliction.’414 Thus, the idea of a transnational threat began to 
permeate political debate and security agendas.  
411 Weber, Max. Politics as a Vocation in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Translated and edited) Max Weber: 
Essays in Sociology. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 77 
412 See for example: Kaldor, Mary. New and Old Wars. (Polity Press, 1999); Ignatieff, Michael. Virtual War. 
Kosovo and Beyond. (London: Random House, 2000); Creveld, Martin van. The Transformation of War (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force. The Art of War in the Modern World. 
(London: Penguin Books, 2006) 
413 Lawrence, Ivan. ‘Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism’, House of Commons, Hansard, 14 March 1996, 
col. 1153 
414 Hunter, Andrew. ‘Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism’, House of Commons, Hansard, 14 March 1996, 
col. 1154 
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The fears of policymakers generally (and Andrew Hunter specifically) were realised on 11 
September 2001 (‘9/11’) when nineteen hijackers took control of four American Airlines 
flights; two were flown into the two towers of the World Trade Centre, one into the Pentagon 
(headquarters of the CIA), and one (which was presumed to be intended for the White 
House) into a field in Pennsylvania after passengers managed to overpower the hijackers. 
Of the nineteen hijackers involved in the attack, fifteen were Saudi Arabian, two were 
Emirati, one was Lebanese, and one was Egyptian. Three of them had operated as part of the 
so-called Hamburg Cell in Germany and conspired, successfully, to attack the United States. 
The attacks created a sense among security experts and policymakers alike that a new threat 
was emerging – that of transnational radical Islam.415 It was perceived to be substantively 
different to the waves of terrorism that had been endured in the past which wanted ‘a lot of 
people watching, not a lot of people dead.’416 However, Islamist terrorism was apparently 
fanatical, irrational, even suicidal in nature.417  
In the United Kingdom, former Prime Minister Tony Blair gave a speech to the House of 
Commons which reflected this perception. He stated: ‘Terrorism has taken on a new and 
frightening aspect. The people perpetrating it wear the ultimate badge of the fanatic: they 
are prepared to commit suicide in pursuit of their beliefs.’418 Across the Atlantic, in the US, 
then President, George Bush Jr. outlined a similar message in his speech to Congress that 
would be a prelude to the militarisation of the threat via the infamous ‘war on terror’:  
There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are recruited from 
their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where 
they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in 
countries around the world to plot evil and destruction.
419
 
415 Chin, Warren. Britain and the War on Terror: Policy, Strategy, and Operations. (Oxon: Routledge, 2016), 
p. 26
416 Jenkins, Brian. ‘Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?’ (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1975), p. 4
417 Here we should draw a distinction between rationality and reason. Suicide terrorism is arguably rational
from the perspective of the collective terrorist organization attempting to achieve their overall strategic aim.
Rational too if the individual believes wholeheartedly in their cause and the promise of paradise in the afterlife.
Instead, it is unreasonable in that those on the receiving end of the attack are less likely to understand the
perspective of the terrorist and are unable to deter them. See Robert Pape’s excellent discussion on this issue
in: Pape, Robert A. ‘The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism’, American Political Science Review, August
2003, vol. 97, no. 3, pp. 343-361
418 Blair, Tony. Full text of Blair’s speech to the Commons, 14 September 2001. See:
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/sep/14/houseofcommons.uk1 (accessed 23/10/2017)
419 Text of George Bush’s Speech, State of the Union Address, The Guardian, 21 September 2001. See:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13 (accessed 4/11/2016)
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5.2.1. Terrorism: Crime or Conflict? 2001-2005 
Sir David Omand, the ex-Director of GCHQ, writes that despite the justified criticism of the 
term ‘war on terror’, its use did bring substantial gains through ‘disrupting terrorist training 
and infrastructure, capturing or killing leading AQ [Al Qaeda] figures, and gaining 
significant intelligence on AQ’s terrorist networks.’420 The militarisation of the threat 
created a concerted western response that involved the coordination of both civil and military 
resources as well as unprecedented intelligence cooperation.421   
Despite rallying around the term ‘war on terror’, from Britain’s perspective, terrorism was 
still firmly seen as a crime and therefore a problem for the police and intelligence services 
rather than the military. This was outlined in the Britain’s first counter-terrorism strategy 
after 9/11; in 2003, the Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) was implemented.422 It 
outlined the severity of the threat as ‘serious and sustained’ and ‘not likely to diminish 
significantly for some years.’ It also introduced the four pillars that have remained central 
to the country’s approach to terrorism for the last fifteen years: ‘Pursue’ (reducing the 
terrorist threat to Britain and to Britain interests overseas by disrupting terrorists and their 
operations.); ‘Prevent’ (tackling the radicalisation of individuals); ‘Protect’ (reducing the 
vulnerability of Britain and British interests overseas.); ‘Prepare’ (ensuring that Britain is as 
ready as it can be for the consequences of a terrorist attack). It also outlined the primacy of 
the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS / MI6), the Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and the Police in matters related to countering the 
threat of terrorism.423
As was outlined in the previous section, through MACP, Britain maintains the capability to 
deploy the armed forces in an active capacity for the purposes of counter-terrorism and this 
early iteration of CONTEST does make a minor reference to this fact. It states: ‘The British 
Armed Forces contribute to UK’s counter-terrorism strategy, predominantly in PREVENT 
and PURSUE activities overseas and in specialised elements of PROTECT at home, in 
particular hostage recovery, maritime counter-terrorism, bomb disposal and the interception 
420 Omand, David. Securing the State. (London: Hurst & co., 2010), p. 90 
421 See Snowden’s leaks. Particularly his assessment that NSA was ‘in bed with’ the German BND.  
422 The first publicly available version of CONTEST was released in 2006. It is therefore the 2006 version 
that will be referred to in this section.
423 HM Government, Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy, July 2006, Cm 
6888, pp. 1-16
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of renegade aircraft.’424 At this stage, the military’s role in domestic counter-terrorism could 
be classified as minimal and ad hoc.; for example, ‘hostage recovery’ is a role reserved for 
the SAS or Special Boat Service (SBS) who would be deployed only when the situation 
required it, rather than the round-the-clock police and intelligence-led PURSUE operations. 
Despite the army’s limited role in domestic operations, in February 2003, Blair received 
intelligence from the National Intelligence and Security Coordinator, Sir David Omand, that 
there was an imminent threat at Heathrow.425 A captured Al Qaeda operative had revealed a 
plot to bring down an airliner with a surface-to-air missile. Omand told Blair that they had 
three options: do nothing, close Heathrow or ‘trigger a full-scale security alert’;426 they both 
agreed that the only feasible option was the latter and, following a COBR meeting, Blair 
sanctioned the deployment of 450 troops of the Grenadier Guards and a number of Scimitar 
reconnaissance vehicles mounted with 30-mm cannons and 7.62-mm machine-guns to the 
airport. For some, it conjured up memories of the similar 1974 deployment and the backlash 
was equally as intense.  
Geraint Hughes, a military historian and former member of the Territorial Army, makes the 
astute point that deterrence is the absence of an event and it is therefore often impossible to 
measure whether it works. At Heathrow, the public only saw heavily armed soldiers and no 
attack took place. It was therefore impossible to know if the would-be attackers had be 
deterred or whether the measures taken were disproportionate.427 Thus, Blair faced fierce 
criticism for unnecessary scare-mongering and attempting to justify the decision to go to war 
in Iraq.428 The militarisation of the threat was seen to be disproportionate and out of step 
with the principles of minimum force and last resort and, as such, unacceptable for a liberal 
democracy such as Britain. The backlash faced by Blair is strong evidence of the 
constraining effect that can be exerted by culture. Britain’s norms of proportionality and last 
424 HM Government, Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy, July 2006, Cm 
6888, p. 28
425 Omand, David. Semi-structured interview by Jack Harding, London, 1 July 2017 
426 Gardner, Frank. Blood and Sand: Life, Death and Survival in an Age of Global Terror. (London: Bantam 
Books, 2006), pp. 303-304
427 Geraint Hughes, The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal 
Democracies (Carlisle: US Army War College, The LeTort Papers, 2011) p.90 See also: Michael Howard’s 
assertion that ‘we have become rather expert at deterrence’: Michael Howard, “Lessons of the Cold War”, 
Survival, 36, no. 4, (Winter 1994-95) p. 161 and Colin Gray’s response to that ‘unprovable assertion’ in Gray, 
Colin S. Maintaining Effective Deterrence, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, August 2003, 
p.2 
428 See: ‘I think probably the authorities feel that they should build up emotions – what I call the ‘war spirit’’,
Dr. Zaki Badawi, The Muslim College
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resort have been ingrained through the interpretation of past experiences and attempts to 
contravene those norms are soon corrected by the strength of public feeling.429  
This is not to say that Blair or Omand were incorrect about the severity of the threat; 
tragically, events the following year underscored how serious the threat from radical Islam 
truly was. In 2004, Madrid was rocked by a series of explosions on four commuter trains 
killing 192 individuals for which Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility. Then, in July 2005, 
Britain experienced the deadliest terrorist attack on its soil to date.430 Four British nationals 
loyal to Al-Qaeda (Mohammad Sidique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer, Jermaine Lindsay, and 
Hasib Hussain) carried out a series of suicide bombings in central London. Their intended 
targets were civilians using the London underground during the morning rush hour. At 08:50 
Khan, Tanweer and Lindsay detonated their bombs within sixty seconds of each other on 
three separate trains on the London Underground. Hussain’s train was delayed and he 
decided instead to exit the Underground and find a double-decker bus. At 09:47 he boarded 
a bus in Tavistock Square and detonated his bomb on the top deck. As well as the suicide 
bombers, fifty-six people were killed and around 700 more were injured.431
After the attack, the former Prime Minister Tony Blair stated of the threat from terrorism: 
‘Let no-one be in any doubt. The rules of the game are changing’.432 Yet, Blair stopped short 
of making comparisons with overt military conflict as his American counterpart George 
Bush Jr. had done and, ten years later after the November 2015 Paris attacks, as Valls and 
Hollande would do (‘nous sommes en guere’). Public discussions for the deployment of the 
military did not take place, although the possibility of putting armed marshals on trains was 
mooted. Instead, following a COBR briefing, it was decided that the civil power, specifically 
the police and intelligence services, had the capabilities to deal with the aftermath. The 
military did contribute through Training and Logistic Assistance to the Civil Power 
429 See Durkheim’s argument about the externally constraining force of culture that ‘corrects’ deviations from 
a norm. Durkheim, Emile. The Rules of the Sociological Method. (New York, The Free Press, 1895/1964), p. 
3 
430 Technically, 9/11 was the deadliest attack in terms of the number of British lives lost. 
431 Hewitt, Steven. The British War on Terror: Terrorism and Counter-terrorism on the Home Front Since 
9/11. (London: Continuum Books, 2008), p. 50
432 Tony Blair, “Full text: Prime minister’s statement on anti-terror measures”, 5th August 2005: 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/aug/05/uksecurity.terrorism1 Blair’s full statement was the 
precursor to the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 which introduced a number of measures for countering the 
threat such as ‘new grounds for deportation and exclusion’ including control orders for the deportation of 
British citizens. The following year, the Terrorism Act 2006 was implemented; this introduced a number of 
new offences that constituted terrorism such as Acts Preparatory to Terrorism, Encouragement to Terrorism, 
Dissemination of Terrorist Publications, and Terrorist training offences. It also extended the stop and search 




(TLACP), but no overt deployment such as that seen in 2003 occurred.433 As was discussed 
in the riot and protest section, the nature of the threat prompted a shift in tactics in Britain’s 
police force towards a more ‘forceful set of operational tactics’.434 Suicide terrorism had 
revealed itself to be the preferred means for transnational radical Islamist groups such as Al 
Qaeda and Detective Superintendent Swain concluded in a 2005 report that 
 
The most prevalent type of explosive used by suicide terrorists in the Middle East is 
extremely sensitive to impact, shock and electrostatic discharge. HM Government scientists 
state that the use of baton guns, Taser, or firearms that impact on this material will cause it 
to detonate. These materials are so sensitive that the heat from a camera flash bulb or torch 




It was thus deemed expedient to pursue a policy where the potential use of lethal force was 
authorised (Operation Kratos). However, the fatal shooting of de Menezes exposed the 
operational weakness of the policy; according to the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission, may have created a mindset whereby the police ‘are always going to be dealing 
with a suicide bomber’.436 Meanwhile, for members of the public it conjured up memories 
of the alleged SAS shoot-to-kill policy that had been authorised in Northern Ireland. While 
Kratos had been a police, rather than a military operation, civil society deemed it to be out 
of sync with their preferences regarding the use of force. The following year, in 2006, likely 
as a legacy of the Menezes shooting, a survey of over 47,000 members of the Metropolitan 
Police Federation were surveyed on their preferences for carrying firearms; 82% were 
against the idea in spite of the fact that most also responded that their lives were often at 
risk.437 As Frank Foley writes, ‘the government’s strong defence of the police’s actions, 
when set against the high level of scrutiny of the police … provided a further indication of 
norm competition in the UK between the concepts of security and individual rights.’438 
 
433 Brooke-Holland, Louisa. House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, Number 08074, 18 August 
2017, ‘Military aid to the civil authorities’, p. 2 
434 Deborah Glass, cited in Casiani, ‘Shoot-to-kill policy under debate’ in Frank Foley, Countering 
Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), p. 264 
435 Detective Superintendent Steve Swain, Report 13 of the 27 October meeting of the Metropolitan 
Police Authority (MPA), “Suicide Terrorism”. See sections 10 and 11, respectively. 
436 Foley, Frank. Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of 
the Past. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 264 
437 Kelley, Jon. ‘Why British Police don’t have guns’, BBC, 19 September 2012. See: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19641398 (accessed 07/04/2017) 
438 Foley, Frank. Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of 
the Past. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 265 
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Fundamentally, this episode demonstrated the power that the people of Britain hold over the 
strategic orientation of the state and the constraint that cultural preferences can exact over 
strategic behaviour.  
Behind the scenes, one of the operational changes that the de Menezes shooting fomented 
was closer cooperation between the police and the special forces who are more experienced 
in the use of force than their police counterparts.439 On 21 July, just two weeks after the 
London Bridge attack and the day before de Menezes was killed, three radical Islamist 
terrorists, Ramzi Mohammed, Yassin Omar and Muktar Said Ibrahim, attempted to replicate 
the 7/7 attack by planting bombs on a bus and three London Underground trains. Fortunately, 
all four homemade bombs failed to detonate properly and all of the perpetrators were 
arrested. Acting on intelligence, at the end of the month, the police carried out a series of 
raids to arrest associates of the 7/7 bombers and the failed 21/7 bombings. It was reported in 
the Telegraph that the SAS had taken part in these raids. Their role in these raids was to blast 
small holes in the walls or doors of the flats so that the Special Firearms Officers (SFOs) of 
SO19 (Specialist Firearms Command) could storm the flats. The SAS did not actively take 
part in entering the flats since according to the report, this would have required ‘a ‘transfer 
of authority’ signed by the police officer in charge of the operation to put the SAS in 
control’440 – again highlighting the importance of Britain’s adherence to last resort and 
subordination to the civil power. Nevertheless, the closer cooperation was indicative of the 
growing role that the military was beginning to play in the fight against terrorism.441 
In fact, since 2005, the special forces have maintained a close relationship with their civil 
SFO counterparts and interoperability is still seen as the linchpin of Britain’s resilience 
strategy.442 Most recently, on 3 June 2017 after two attackers rammed a van into a crowd of 
people on London Bridge before attacking others with knives, the SAS were deployed in the 
439 For example, Special Firearms Officers (SFOs) are not routinely trained in the use of explosives or 
explosive entry.
440 Rayment, Sean. ‘SAS joined police for terror raids’, Daily Telegraph, 31 July 2005. See: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1495164/SAS-joined-police-for-terror-raids.html 
(accessed 04/01/2019)
441 See for example Operation Wooden Pride in 2008. This was a live-fire exercise carried out between 
SFOs, the SAS and the SBS to improve their ability to respond effectively in the event of a similar attack. 
See: Frank Gardner, “Nairobi attack: Could it happen in Britain?” BBC, 26 September 2013; HMIC Review 
into MPS Implementation of Stockwell 1B, Recommendation 8: “Evidence”
442 Ministry of Defence. UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience and Security, Joint Doctrine 
Publication 02, (JDP 02) (3rd Edition), Defence, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, February 2017, pp. 19-21 
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so-called ‘Blue Thunder’ helicopters.443 SFOs managed to resolve the situation in just eight 
minutes and therefore the SAS had little to do. The specialist capabilities of the elite forces 
necessitates their involvement in counter-terrorism operations in some capacity, however, 
compared with the unilateral SAS mission in 1980, there seems to be a trend towards civil 
control through greater interoperability. This combination of civil and military units in the 
fight against terrorism is emblematic of the general approach taken by Britain regarding 
matters of security. For example, even within the MoD, at least half of the staff are civilian 
personnel, compared with France which has around a 9:1 ratio in favour of military staff.444 
In the years following the 7/7 bombings there was a lull in the level of the threat; just four 
attacks took place with two deaths between 2006 and 2014.445 Meanwhile, JTAC only raised 
the threat level to critical on two occasions – once in 2006 following the plot to detonate 
liquid explosives on an airborne flight and once following the attack on Glasgow airport on 
30 June 2007.446 However, the perception of a low to moderate threat from Islamist terrorism 
changed on 13 November 2015 with the attacks in Paris. 
5.2.2. Operation Temperer – the end of history? 
In June 2018, in the foreword to the June 2018 iteration of the UK’s counter-terrorism 
strategy (CONTEST), then British Home Secretary Sajid Javid stated that the threat faced 
from terrorism ‘is multifaceted, diverse and evolving.’447 Indeed, the CONTEST document 
is replete with references to a shift in the nature of the threat, often linking the domestic 
threat to external factors such as territorial gains by IS in Syria and Iraq or overseas training 
camps for British extremists.448 CONTEST also highlights the number of foiled attacks and 
arrests for terror-related offences: declaring that 25 attacks have been foiled since June 2013, 
with almost half (12) of these plots occurring since March 2017. In fact, since 2010, 2,029 
443 A reference to film from the 1980s of the same name about a shadowy special forces unit that uses a similar 
model of helicopter. The nickname was attributed to the unit by the Red Banner press.
444 Ministère des Armées, Secrétariat général pour l'administration. See: 
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/sga (accessed 06/07/2017) 
445 Source: Global Terrorism Database 
446 MI5, ‘Threat Levels’, ‘Threat Level History’. See: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels (accessed 
22/12/2018)
447 Javid, Sajid. Foreword by the Home Secretary, CONTEST – The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering 
Terrorism, June 2018, HM Government, p. 5 
448 CONTEST – The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, June 2018, HM Government, p. 
19 
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terrorism-related arrests have been made with 412 arrests made between January and 
December 2017 – ‘the highest annual number since data collection began’.449 
Evidence from the Global Terrorism Database, an international organisation dedicated to the 
collection of detailed terrorism data, supports the claim that, in Britain, the level of threat is 
higher than in previous years (see table 9). In the years 2001 to 2005, Britain experienced 
just two Islamist terrorist attacks; the first, the 7 July bombings on London’s transport 
network at the hands of the Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe, the second two 
weeks later on 21 July when Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades attempted, unsuccessfully, to once 
again attack London’s transportation system.450 In the ten years after, between 2006 and 
2015, six attacks occurred. However, all were either low casualty (zero to one death) or 
unsuccessful (no deaths, no injuries). More recently, in just three years (2016 to 2018) 
Britain one more attack than the fifteen years combined at the hands of jihadi-inspired 
extremists with 36 people losing their lives.451 
Table 9: Islamist attacks in Britain, 2001-2018452 






In May 2017, days after Salman Ramadan Abedi carried out a suicide attack at the Ariana 
Grande concert in Manchester, it was reported by a number of prominent British news 
agencies that as many as 23,000 individuals have, at some stage, been on the radar of the 
449 National Counter-Terrorism Police Operations Centre (NCTPOC) and Crown Prosecution Service 
Counter-Terrorism Division cited in CONTEST – The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, 
June 2018, HM Government, p. 19  
450 N.B. The 07/07/2005 attack in London perpetrated by the Secret organization of al-Qaida in Europe has 
been classified as one attack rather than separate incidents as it was intended as a coordinated attack. The same 
is true for the failed plot in London by the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades on 21/07/2005. 
451 Global Terrorism Database’s terminology, N.B. these statistics exclude right-wing terrorist incidents 
such as the van attack outside Finsbury mosque. 
452 Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism. See: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/access/  
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United Kingdom’s security services.453 Of this estimated number, roughly 3,000 are 
‘worrying’ for MI5 and 500 are ‘under constant and special attention’.454 This has been part 
of wider trend across Europe; Gilles de Kerchove, the EU’s Counter-terrorism Coordinator, 
stated in September 2017 that around 50,000 extremists were active in Europe and many 
states have declared the level of threat to be unprecedented.455 As discussed previously, in 
Britain, it was from 2015 that the severity of the threat was deemed to be so great that 
contingency plans were put in place for the mass deployment of the armed forces under 
Temperer. It was also the point at which the armed forces became more deeply integrated 
into the security architecture of the state through strategic doctrine. The 2015 Strategic 
Defence and Security Review (SDSR) stated: 
Our Armed Forces are also ready to provide support, if needed, in the event of a terrorist 
attack. We have 10,000 military personnel available on standby to assist the civil authorities 
for significant terrorist incidents at short notice, supported by a wide range of niche military 
experts and equipment, such as bomb disposal specialists.
456
The former prime minister, David Cameron, fielded questions on the SDSR in the House of 
Commons and, in response to a comment that the British general public would be 
sympathetic to the idea of thousands of troops patrolling the streets, stated ‘…until now there 
have been some rather arcane and old-fashioned barriers to stop this [domestic troop 
deployments] happening, for all sorts of very good historical reasons, but I think we are 
rather over that now.457 Shockingly, throughout the entire debate no-one, regardless of 
political allegiance, questioned the idea. Had the perceived severity of the threat from 
Islamist terrorism reached such a stage that historical experience and culturally-derived 
453 23,000 people have been ‘subjects of interest’ as scale of terror threat emerges after Manchester attack, 
The Telegraph, 27 May 2017. See: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/27/23000-people-have-
subjects-interest-scale-terror-threat-emerges/  (accessed 15/10/2015)
454 Kerchove, Gilles de quoted in ‘Britain is ‘home to 35,000 Islamist fanatics’, more than any other country 
in Europe, top official warns’, The Telegraph, 31 August 2017. See: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/31/britain-home-35000-islamist-fanatics-country-europe-top-
official/ (accessed 01/09/2017)
455 Boni, Marc de, ‘Manuel Valls: ‘La menace terroriste est d’une ampleur inégalée’’, Le Figaro, 23 March 
2016. See: http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/le-scan/citations/2016/03/23/25002-20160323ARTFIG00088-
manuel-valls-la-menace-terroriste-est-d-une-ampleur-inegalee.php (accessed 15/10/2017)
Alex Younger (MI6 chief) quoted by Emily Tamkin in Foreign Policy: 8 December 2016, New MI6 Chief: 
Terrorism Threat to U.K. ‘Unprecedented’. See: http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/08/new-mi6-chief-
terrorism-threat-to-u-k-unprecedented/ (accessed 15/10/2017) 
456 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and 
Prosperous United Kingdom, Cm 9161, November 2015, ch. III, sec. 4.98, p. 39
457 Cameron, David. National Security and Defence, Hansard Archives, 23 November 2015, vol.602, col. 
1065
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modes of thought and action were no longer relevant? To appropriate Francis Fukuyama’s 
term, was this ‘the end of history’? 
In fact, it was reported in a number of newspapers that Cameron was extremely reluctant to 
resort to the use of troops precisely because of those ‘good historical reasons’; specifically 
during ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland. Although on British mainland, Northern Ireland 
has historically been treated as a colony; troops were often called upon to impose civil order 
and in 1880s were tasked with the eviction of peasants who could not afford to pay rent. The 
Catholic Irish in particular felt as though they were under occupation and the rebellion in 
1916 was a reaction against what was perceived as a foreign enemy. This sentiment had not 
changed drastically by the 1960s; Operation Banner began in 1969 and lasted until 2007. At 
its height in the 1970s, 25,000 troops were sent to Northern Ireland to assist the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary in the fight against dissident Republicans. One former British army officer 
interviewed for this thesis who had been stationed in Northern Ireland highlighted the ‘shoot 
first, ask questions later’ nature of the campaign:  
We didn’t have too much trouble with it [the use of force] in Northern Ireland. We knew 
who the players were, but didn’t have the intel that we knew we could push through in the 
courts, so we tended to just go for it.
458
 
He continued by stating that while the operations were technically conducted under the 
auspices of MACP and the principle of subordination to the civil power, this often became 
muted by necessity. He stated that instead 
A military leader would just carry out the job and won’t be too interested in confirming with 
the police or some politician. There is absolutely subordination in terms of some kind of 
pecking order. But once [the troops] are let off the leash, they’ll ignore that.
459
 
This approach was made abundantly clear on Bogside in Derry on 30 January 1972. Here, 
members of the 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment opened fire on a group of protestors who 
were marching against internment under Operation Demetrius. The Paras had barricaded 
themselves behind concrete barriers and, as protestors began to throw stones, they fired at 
458 Keil, Captain Duncan. Former British army and NATO liaison officer, Semi-structured interview by Jack 
Harding, London, 1 August 2019 
459 Ibid.  
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the crowd killing 14. After what became known as ‘Bloody Sunday’, the British government 
began to reduce the number of troops and transition authority away from the military (which 
was proving to be counter-productive) and towards the police and intelligence services. 
The nature of the threat posed by radical Islamist terrorists is vastly different to that of the 
IRA and its derivatives, however. Peter Clarke, the former head of Counter Terrorism 
Command addressed these differences in a speech in April 2007. One particular extract is 
worth quoting in full: 
Colleagues from around the world often say to me that the long experience that we have in 
the United Kingdom of combating a terrorist threat must have stood us in good stead. That 
the experience gained during some thirty years of an Irish terrorist campaign would have 
equipped us for the new challenges presented by al-Qaeda and its associated groups. To an 
extent that is true – but only to an extent. The fact is that the Irish campaign actually operated 
within a set of parameters that helped shape our response to it. 
It was essentially a domestic campaign using conventional weaponry, carried out by 
terrorists in tightly knit networks who were desperate to avoid capture and certainly had no 
wish to die. The use of warnings restricted the scale of the carnage, dreadful though it was. 
The warnings were cynical and often misleading, but by restricting casualties, were a factor 
in enabling the political process to move forward, however haltingly. I believe that if you 
take the reverse of many of these characteristics, you are not far away from describing the 
threat we face today.
460
The ‘new’ threat of Islamist terrorism seemed to warrant an alternative response and, in the 
wake of the attacks in Manchester in 2017, Operation Temperer was implemented for the 
first time. In total, 950 troops were deployed for period of around one week; despite the 
seemingly low number of troops deployed, it still marked the largest deployment of the 
armed forces in an active capacity for domestic security for over a century. However, if the 
government and the opposing parties were all in agreement that there was the need for 
measures like this to be taken, was the press also in agreement?  
460 Clarke, Peter. ‘Learning from experience Counter Terrorism in the UK since 9/11’, The Inaugural Colin. 
Cramphorn Memorial Lecture, Policy Exchange 
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While the views of the press are not the focus of this thesis, it is nevertheless important to 
provide a brief account of how Temperer was represented. This will simply provide a more 
complete view of norm transmission and cultural constraint. Thus, the following section 
presents the findings from a collection of every article that has mentioned Operation 
Temperer for the top fifteen British newspapers by circulation. It looks at the articles that 
were published on four separate events: 
1) the leak of the plans for Operation Temperer in July 2015; 2) the attack in Manchester; 3)
the attack at London Bridge; 4) the bombing at Parsons Green. It follows the frequency of
the articles for two weeks after that event and codes each article according to tone: positive
(i.e. most of the article is in favour of Operation Temperer), negative (most of the article is
opposed to Operation Temperer) and Neutral (it is impossible to tell or it relies on quoting
third parties rather than original opinion).461
The first aspect of note is the relatively low number of articles that mention Operation 
Temperer. Apart from one day after the attack in Manchester which saw 75 articles dedicated 
to the operation, the subject struggles to get into double figures. Perhaps the most shocking 
example of this is in July 2015 when the Daily Mail leaked the plans. The next day, five 
news agencies picked up on the story, but after that there were no mentions for a fortnight 
when the Daily Mail published two articles in the same day. Furthermore, in terms of tone, 
only one was obviously negative (the Guardian), the others were all coded as neutral. Even 
post-Manchester, of the 75 articles that were published, a staggering 62 were coded as 
neutral. This was largely due to the fact that they simply reported the details of Temperer 
and quoted members of government rather than making judgments themselves. What 
accounts for this apparent apathy to the idea of deploying the military? Was Cameron correct 
in his assessment in Parliament that ‘we are rather over’ the significance of historical 
experience in determining the response to a threat? The next section examines the political 
rhetoric surrounding Operation Temperer in greater depth with a view to assessing whether 
this is indeed the case or, instead, whether there a set of abiding cultural preferences across 
time that have constrained the approach taken by policymakers today.  
461 ‘Reassuring’, ‘free-up’, ‘contingency’, and ‘unprecedented’ were the most commonly referenced words. 
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5.2.3. Operation Temperer rhetoric: continuity or change? 
Chart 10 employs the same methodology as for the analysis in previous sections. It finds that 
the response to Operation Temperer from politicians was overwhelmingly positive with most 
statements conveying the belief that it was necessary given the nature of the threat. For 
example, Mark Rowley referred to the ‘significant step up in pace’ in the threat of terrorism 
that led to the development of ‘plans for large-scale mobilisation of the military to help boost 
our armed policing capacity in the event of an ongoing imminent threat to the UK’462 The 
Conservative peer, Lord Selkirk of Douglas also highlighted the ‘urgent need to build up 
and modernise the Armed Forces who protect our national security.’463 
As well as generally praising the conduct of the military, there were also frequent references 
to the reassuring presence that army would afford to the public. For example, Theresa May 
called Temperer ‘a proportionate and sensible step which will provide extra reassurance and 
protection while the investigation progresses.’464 Then Assistant Commissioner for 
Specialist Operations, Mark Rowley stated that its purpose was ‘to free up more armed 
police on the streets to reassure the public and deter further attacks.’465 While Commissioner 
of the Metropolitan Police Service, Cressida Dick stated her belief that ‘the vast majority of 
the public will be utterly reassured to know that we … have the ability to call upon and have 
called upon the military in this way.’466 
Interestingly, there were only eleven negative statements in total. Negative historical 
experiences such as Northern Ireland were the reason for scepticism while some 
policymakers such as the Green MP Baroness Jenny Jones argued that deploying the military 
462 ACSO Mark Rowley speaks to the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, National Police Chief’s 
Council, 11 September 2017. See: https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/acso-mark-rowley-speaks-to-the-
international-institute-for-counter-terrorism (accessed 06/07/2018) 
463 Douglas-Hamilton, James Alexander. UK Defence Forces, vol. 787, Hansard Archives, 23 November 2017, 
col. 298 
464 Press release, PM statement following London terror attack, 15 September 2017. See: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-statement-following-london-terror-attack-15-september-2017 
(accessed 07/07/2018) 
465 ACSO Mark Rowley speaks to the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, National Police Chief’s 
Council, 11 September 2017. See: https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/acso-mark-rowley-speaks-to-the-
international-institute-for-counter-terrorism (accessed 06/07/2018) 
466 Morrison, Sean. ‘Manchester attack: ‘London remains open' as terror threat raised to critical after bombing, 




would be ‘absolutely shocking … Putting troops on the streets would be very controversial... 
I think it would be very provocative and cause more problems than it would solve.’467 
The most interesting responses can be found in the ‘neutral’ category. Here there are a 
plethora of examples of statements that outline Britain’s core normative principles of 
subordination to the civil power, last resort, and proportionality. For example, Chief 
Constable Martin Evans stated that Temperer constituted ‘the deployment of military 
personnel alongside and in support of police firearms officers… and, where they are 
deployed, military personnel will remain under the command and control of the police 
service.’468 Earl Howe, speaking on behalf of the MoD stated that ‘well-established 
procedures for providing military assistance to civil authorities, with the military working in 
support of the police.469 Even the NSCR writes that ‘We have 10,000 military personnel 
available on standby to assist the civil authorities for significant terrorist incidents at short 
notice’470 However, deploying the troops would only occur ‘if needed’471 by the civil power 
and would always be ‘proportionate’472 to threat.  
467 Austin, Henry. ‘Secret plans to deploy soldiers on UK streets in the aftermath of a terror attack are 'shocking' 
and 'provocative', says peer’, The Independent, 26 July 2015. See: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/secret-plans-to-deploy-soldiers-on-uk-streets-in-the-aftermath-
of-a-terror-attack-are-shocking-and-10417364.html (accessed 22/09/2017) 
468 UPDATE: Warwickshire man arrested in connection with Manchester terrorist attack, 25 May 2017. See: 
https://www.stratford-herald.com/70986-update-warwickshire-man-arrested-in-connection-with-manchester-
terrorist-attack.html (accessed 06/07/2018) 
469 Howe, Earl. ‘Strategic Defence and Security Review’, vol. 767. Hansard, 3 December 2015, col. 1294 
470 National Security Capability Review, March 2018, Cabinet office, p. 17
471 Ibid. 




Chart 7: Rhetorical response to Operation Temperer 
Sources: Hansard, Government Press Releases, Media Articles473 
The high level of threat has arguably altered the character of Britain’s strategic response. 
Given the military’s specialist capabilities and experience in warfighting they are the 
obvious choice to undertake operations that may require the use of armed force. It is even 
likely that Britain will see the military deployed on the streets more frequently in the future 
if the threat increases to a sufficient level. However, as the neutral statements indicate, the 
nature of the response remains enduring. Any deployment that takes place will always be 
proportionate to the threat, subordinate to the civil power and as a last resort - not an 
extended and largely autonomous military operation such as Sentinelle in France.  
The fact that Operation Temperer was carefully messaged by Theresa May and her 
colleagues, for example by emphasising the point that the police had asked for the assistance, 
that the troops would not be patrolling, but would be in static guarding positions and that the 









































































































































































operation would be short-term, meant that the level of public backlash was minimised – as 
exemplified by the high level of neutral media articles and the overwhelmingly positive 
responses by policymakers. It did not mean, as Cameron seemed to suggest, that the British 
have broken free from the historical fetters that had constrained cultural preferences to that 
point. For example, if we compare the positive responses to domestic military deployments 
throughout history (see chart 8, figures converted to a percentage to allow for easier 
comparison), we are able to see very clearly the strategic norms and values that have guided 
Britain’s approach to domestic deployments over time. Fundamentally, these are 1) the 
troops are subordinate to the civil power; 2) used as a last resort; 3) proportionate to the 
threat and; 4) if possible, short term.  There is even a recognition that using the military is 
often necessary when facing a serious threat and that the military possess specialist 
capabilities that make them suitable for certain internal roles.   
Chart 8: Domestic military deployments - Summary of positive reactions 
Sources: National Archives, Hansard, Government Press Releases, Media Articles474 
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Of course, as well as remarkable continuity in Britain’s cultural preferences across time, 
there has also clearly been an evolution in Britain’s internal strategic culture. As this section 
demonstrated, by analysing the nature of Britain’s military deployments on the mainland, a 
series of formative moments were identified that demonstrate this gradual evolution: 1819-
1919 was the era of countering riot and protest. However, the ramifications of the Peterloo 
massacre were so far-reaching that there was a steep decline in the use of the military against 
rioting mobs thereafter and in 1919 in Glasgow and Liverpool, the army was used in an 
active capacity against rioters for the last time.  
Post-1926 saw an era of MACC when the army provided personnel in cases of strikes and, 
for nearly fifty years thereafter, there were no active military deployments. Across this 
period, the notion that the army was fundamentally an expeditionary force became 
entrenched as the analysis of recruitment campaigns illustrated. However, the rise of 
transnational terrorism and the perception of a higher threat of foreign terrorist organisations 
operating on the British mainland challenged assumptions that a strict delineation between 
internal and external security should be maintained. Accordingly, in 1980, MACP was 
formally invoked for the first time leading to the SAS assault of the Iranian embassy. This 
marked the beginning of the counter-terrorism era which has arguably culminated with the 
implementation of Operation Temperer in 2017.  
165 
Chart 9: Domestic military deployments – summary of negative reactions 
Sources: National Archives, Hansard, Government Press Releases, Media Articles475 
As well as strategic shifts, an assessment of the negative reactions to domestic deployments 
reveals how attitudes have changed slowly over time as well. This is in keeping with the 
hypothesis that strategic shifts are incremental. Peterloo had a tangible effect on how Britain 
conceives of the use of force on the national territory and this perpetuated a sense that the 
armed forces should be used as an external, rather than an internal force. Since Peterloo, the 
military has been used sparingly on mainland Britain and always with assurances that a 
putative deployment would adhere to the core principles listed above lending a significant 
amount of weight to the hypothesis that ‘culture constrains.’ Indeed, if we also examine the 
effect that historically derived cultural constraint has on the army’s behaviour through how 
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it has represented its role via modern army recruitment campaigns, we see further compelling 
evidence of continuity across time despite changing threats and, perhaps more surprisingly, 
even changing policy.  
5.2.4. Modern recruitment campaigns 
The collapse of the bipolar world order in the 1990s meant the strategic rationale that 
previously necessitated the maintenance of large standing armies seemed to be outdated. 
Small-scale local conflicts, insurgency and counter-insurgency seemed to be the new norm. 
This thinking permeated not only the academic literature at the time, but was also reflected 
in recruitment trends across a number of western states which realised unwieldly Cold War 
force structures would be ineffective against growing asymmetric threats. Trends in British 
army recruitment show that Britain maintained an average regular force of 162,000 troops.476 
However, by 2000 this number had dropped to 110,100 and by 2016 to 78,000; the lowest 
number of troops since 1800.477 
Despite the trend towards insurgency warfare abroad, Britain was still wrestling with a 
severe threat from Irish Republican terrorism. During the 1990s, there was a growing threat 
to the British mainland from the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Throughout the 1990s, the 
IRA carried out at least 138 attacks (both successful and unsuccessful) on British mainland, 
compared with 37 in the 1980s.478 One may have expected this growing threat to be reflected 
in the army’s recruitment campaigns, and yet most still tend to focus on the far abroad, 
neglecting operations in Northern Ireland.  
Campaigns in the 1990s focused on the idea of fulfilling your potential and adopted the 
famous slogan ‘Be the Best’ in 1994. There was an emphasis on the idea of excitement and 
adventure that was also evident in the posters from the inter-war period,479 as demonstrated 
476 Author’s calculation based on data drawn from Statista. ‘Number of personnel in the armed forces of the 
United Kingdom (UK) from 1900 to 2020’. See: https://www.statista.com/statistics/579773/number-of-
personnel-in-uk-armed-forces/ (accessed 07/01/2017) 
477 Summers, Chris. The time when the British army was really stretched. BBC, 23 July 2011. See: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-14218909 (accessed 07/01/2017); Statista. ‘Number of personnel in the 
armed forces of the United Kingdom (UK) from 1900 to 2020’. See: 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/579773/number-of-personnel-in-uk-armed-forces/ (accessed 07/01/2017) 
478 Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism. See: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/access/ 
479 See section 4.3.5 
167 
by Poster Four which shows two soldiers armed with the standard SA80 assault rifle during 
a night operation. As the National Army Museum states, the advert ‘focuses on drama and 
tension.’480 One famous television advert from 1992 showed two bored-looking people 
sitting in a drab café. One states, ‘I see Frank joined the army then’, the other states ‘I don’t 
know why he did it.’ The scene then cuts to ‘Frank’ skiing, sailing, walking on sunny 
beaches, mountain climbing, and taking part in military exercises.481 The emphasis, which 
is highly reminiscent of inter-war recruitment adverts, is clearly on the idea of adventure and 
travel, while domestic duties (and even duties in Northern Ireland) do not feature.   
(Poster Four, 1996, National Army Museum) 
5.2.5 Recruitment post-2001 – continuity and change 
After the attacks of 2001, there was a growing sense that the traditional distinction between 
internal and external security had become less relevant. In 2015 Baroness Angela Smith 
pointed out this blurring of the lines when she stated in the House of Lords: 
Here [with the threat of Islamist terrorism] we see the nexus between the domestic and the 
global. … The source might be predominantly from the Middle East, but much of it 
480 National Army Museum, British Army Recruitment Poster, 1996. See: 
https://collection.nam.ac.uk/detail.php?acc=1996-08-291-1 (accessed 
23/01/2019) 
481 Army Advert, 1992, ‘Frank’. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g479wtPBCW0 (accessed 
23/01/2019) 
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potentially will feed back to the United Kingdom as well, and therefore the global nature of 
terrorism links back strongly to the threats we are dealing with.
482
In 2008, British parliament had suggested it was considering restructuring the British armed 
forces to adapt to this perception of a changing threat environment and, in 2010, Army 2020 
Refine was adopted. This is an ongoing project (at the time of writing) to re-configure the 
army by reducing it to 23 units. Speaking at a review of Army 2020 before a Commons 
Defence Committee in June 2016, The UK’s Chief of Defence General Nick Carter reiterated 
this notion of a closer relationship between internal and external security when he stated  
Army 2020 foresaw a character of conflict that would be significantly different to the one 
we had about ten years ago. And it highlighted that the connection between home and away, 
what happens abroad and what happens at home, would be much more networked than 
perhaps it was in the past.
483
  
Devising appropriate responses to the a threat environment characterised by a closer internal-
external security nexus has been a strategic priority for the British military since 9/11; the 
1998 Strategic Defence Review was deemed to be defunct in the face of a transnational 
terrorists threat and therefore a new review, known as the New Chapter, was commissioned 
in 2002 to investigate the potential role that the British armed forces could play in countering 
terrorism. The New Chapter concluded: 
Whilst the 1998 Strategic Defence Review recognised the existence of asymmetric threats, 
it did not fully cater for threats on the scale which materialised on 11 September… The 
Armed Forces can play a role as part of a cross-Government and international effort to 
counter the threat from international terrorism at home and to engage it overseas.
484
Given this obvious transition in the thinking of key policymakers, one may have expected 
to see a change in the recruitment campaigns to reflect this perception of a continuum 
between internal and external security and the potential for a greater role for the military in 
domestic counter-terrorism operations. Yet, this was not the case; instead, as John Gearson 
482 Baroness Smith of Newnham, House of Lords debate, Role and Capabilities of the UK Armed Forces, 
in the Light of Global and Domestic Threats to Stability and Security, 15 September 2015, vol. 764, col. 
208 
483 Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 and the Army 




writes, at this point in time ‘the focus was on what MoD termed “away” tasks, with “home” 
missions left to others.’485 
 
This notion of ‘away tasks’ was clearly reflected in the recruitment campaigns. 
Unsurprisingly, after 2001 advertisements were dominated by the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. For example, in 2007 the MoD targeted the Black Country where recruitment 
figures were low. The campaign used the tagline ‘I was born in Dudley, but I grew up in 
Iraq’.486 Indeed, most of the taglines used in the recruitment adverts have tended to 
emphasise the enduring idea of action, adventure and travel. For example, the campaign in 
2006 saw four separate adverts which outlined the reasons one should enlist; one advert 
states ‘For the teamwork. For the training. For the challenge. Against enemies. Against the 
elements. Against the odds. For the travel. For the action. For adventure.’487 While another, 
states ‘For your mates. For your family. For each other. To train. To learn. To better yourself. 
To travel. (It then transitions to a combat situation in a dusty town that appears to be in the 
Middle East). For the action. For adventure.’488 All four adverts that were broadcast in 2006 
referenced combat situations with weaponry visible and shots being fired in three. Further, 
each advert clearly illustrates that travelling and fighting abroad is part of the duty of the 
soldier. Any scenes that reference Britain in these adverts are only in relation to training on 
the base or spending time with friends at the pub. There is no indication that ‘active’ 
domestic duties are part of the job. 
 
The 2011 campaign referenced ‘extensive travel’ and showed troops fighting in an Afghan 
village, while a series of adverts in 2013 took the interesting approach of broadcasting live 
from bases in Afghanistan with soldiers giving viewers a virtual tour of the base. Adverts in 
2014 and 2015 also showed combat situations, visible weaponry and shots being fired with 
the tagline in 2015 of ‘restoring normal days from Africa, to Europe, to Asia.’ In all cases, 
the adverts showed that anyone joining the army should expect to fight or, more specifically, 
fight abroad. 
 
485 Gearson, John & Rosemont, Hugo. ‘CONTEST as Strategy: Reassessing Britain's Counterterrorism 
Approach’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 38, no. 12, p. 1046 
486 “I was born in Dudley, I grew up in Iraq”, BBC, 6 November 2007. See: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blackcountry/content/articles/2007/11/06/army_poster_feature.shtml (accessed 
22/07/2017) 
487 British Army Advert - Light Infantry, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BvgZU6UwoWY&ab_channel=strongmike (accessed 22/07/2017) 
488 British Army Advert - Mechanised Infantry. See: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jUxYXX7pFp4&ab_channel=strongmike (accessed 22/07/2017) 
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The tone that the adverts struck in from 2016 was very different; a highly unpopular war in 
Iraq had been followed by a protracted campaign in Afghanistan that saw 455 service 
personnel lose their lives.489 In 2015 the dust was beginning to settle after the last combat 
troops under Operation Herrick were withdrawn in October 2014. However, the public will 
for military interventions overseas had been seriously undermined leaving the army with 
something of a recruitment crisis. While some academics, such as Hew Strachan, have 
argued that the British Army has always struggled to attract enough recruits,490 the personnel 
deficit in the army hit a worrying 7.5% in December 2018.491 The lower-than-expected 
numbers of new recruits prompted the MoD to take a slightly different tact. Sir Nicholas 
Carter, the former Chief of the General Staff, stated before the House of Commons Defence 
Select Committee stated that  
Our traditional recruiting grounds, here I am talking about white Caucasian 16 to 25-year-
olds, have shrunk by about 25% over the past 10 years. We are therefore having to adjust 




There is clear evidence of this shift in approach in the recruitment campaigns post-2016. For 
the purposes of this analysis, nine adverts were analysed. Out of this nine, only one showed 
a potential combat situation and none showed shots being fired (although weaponry was 
visible in six of the nine). The tagline of ‘This is belonging’493 stresses the bonds of 
friendship that are forged in the military rather than the more aggressive taglines used in 
489 icasualties, Charts, Afghanistan Fatalities by Country. See: 
http://icasualties.org/chart/Chart (accessed 23/01/2019)
490 Strachan, Hew. Select Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence. Examination of Witnesses, 25 March 
2008. Questions 1-19
491 Cree, Alice. ‘The Current Recruitment Crisis in the British Armed Forces’, Military Research at 
Newcastle, 11 December 2018. See: https://blogs.ncl.ac.uk/militaryresearchatnewcastle/2018/12/11/the-
current-recruitment-crisis-in-the-british-armed-forces/ (retrieved 26/01/2019)
492 Carter, Gen. Sir Nicholas in Alice Cree, ‘The Current Recruitment Crisis in the British Armed Forces’, 
Military Research at Newcastle, 11 December 2018. See: 
https://blogs.ncl.ac.uk/militaryresearchatnewcastle/2018/12/11/the-current-recruitment-crisis-in-the-british-
armed-forces/ (retrieved 26/01/2019)
493 ‘Army TV advert 2017 - This Is Belonging Part 1’, ARMYJobs, 7 January 2017. See: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lMd4RrT7SS4&ab_channel=ARMYjobs (accessed 08 August 2018) 
‘Army TV advert 2017 - This Is Belonging Part 2’, ARMYJobs, 7 January 2017. See: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_cpPzYFlJXI&ab_channel=ARMYjobs (accessed 08 August 2018) 
‘Army TV advert 2017 - This Is Belonging Part 2’, ARMYJobs, 7 January 2017. See:  




earlier adverts such as ‘For the action. For the excitement. For the adventure.’ Or the mobile 
infantry’s tagline of ‘Forward as one’.494  
 
The shift in tone is indicative of the army trying to cast a wider net; adverts from 2018 and 
2019 have followed this theme with taglines such as ‘Find where you belong’ which aims at 
promoting diversity and dispelling myths about the army that may be preventing potential 
female, LGBT, or Muslim candidates from joining.495 While the pre-2016 adverts still 
emphasise the idea of camaraderie, the combat element is given a far heavier emphasis; 
something which has mostly disappeared in the adverts in 2017(see table 10 which compares 
the tone of thirty-nine adverts pre and post-2016). The transition away from displaying actual 
or potential combat and, as a result, possibly glorifying the idea fighting is interesting. It 
may be indicative of a shift in attitudes among the general population towards questioning 
the role that Britain should play in managing global threats. The army, in order to stay 
relevant to a younger generation, has had to adapt its approach. 
 
 
Table 10: A shift in tone 













91.7 100 75 100 91.7 0 
2016 – 
2019 (%) 
6 63 0 75 44 0 
 
 
Despite this shift in tone, analysis of all the modern (i.e. 2009 – 2019) advertisements shows 
that the abroad is always a prevalent theme with twenty-five references out of the thirty-nine 
advertisements that were analysed. The foreign locations include deserts, savannahs, 
jungles, tropical coastlines, mountain ranges, woodland, and urban settings in the Middle 
East. Thus, in spite of the less belligerent tone of the recent adverts, the common theme that 
the British army is an expeditionary force is still apparent. By comparison, out of thirty-nine 
 
494 British Army Infantry “Forward as One”. See: https://vimeo.com/143242541 (accessed 06/07/2018) 
495 See for example: Keeping my Faith - This is Belonging - Army Jobs, ARMYJobs, 13 January 2018. See: 
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OQ4OoPNY_YM&ab_channel=ARMYjobs (accessed 06/07/2018);  
Expressing my Emotions- This is Belonging - Army Jobs. ARMYJobs, 13 January 2018. See: 
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gTqqS5OrLGU&ab_channel=ARMYjobs (accessed 06/07/2018) 
172 
advertisements, none illustrate internal duties other than to show training or obstacle courses. 
This is despite the fact that after 2001, the army was called out on dozens of occasions under 
Military Aid to the Civil Authority; a well-established component of Britain’s political and 
military strategy with roots that can be formally traced back to the mid-nineteenth century.496 
More surprisingly perhaps, despite Operation Temperer having been implemented twice in 
2015 marking the largest overt deployment of troops in an active capacity in peacetime on 
the British mainland for a hundred years, none of the adverts from 2016 onwards reference 
a possible domestic counter-terror duty. Instead, cultural preferences for the armed forces as 
a force that fights abroad are still emphasised as they have been since the inter-war period. 
Table 11. Summary of Modern Adverts, 2009 - 2019 











% 48 72 36 80 72 0 
Analysis of 39 British recruitment adverts, 2009 - 2019 
In order to demonstrate that cultural preferences and expectations are playing a defining role 
in the British army’s approach to recruitment, it is helpful at this stage to draw a brief 
comparison with army adverts in France and Germany.497 France’s more active strategic 
culture translates in its adverts which adopt a similar tone to those in Britain between 2009 
and 2015. There are frequent references to combat abroad, particularly in African states and 
Afghanistan. However, a crucial difference is that France has traditionally seen its defence 
in terms of a nexus between internal and external security.498 Thus, adverts also regularly 
reference domestic duties; this will be explored in depth in the French chapter.  
Germany’s strategic culture borders on pacifism; epitomised by Willy Brandt’s assertion 
that war ‘can never again spring from German soil’499 and historically the German public’s 
496 EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCES: Aid to Civil Power (Code 53(B)): Use of Territorial Force 
in aid of civil power – 1908), National Archives at Kew
497 France’s approach to recruitment will be discussed in greater detail in the French chapter. 
498 Publicité armé Avril 2015. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uQyzYbBzxHM (accessed 08 August 
2018)
499 Cooper, Alice Holmes. Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movements since 1945. (Michigan: University 
of Michigan Press, 1996), p. 154 
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relationship with its army has been troubled. This was exemplified by the approach taken in 
a recent poster: it read ‘Wir kämpfen auch dafür, dass du gegen uns sein kannst’ – we are 
also fighting for your right to oppose us. However, a photo online of this poster that had 
been put up in a bus stop showed how someone had spray-painted over the top: ‘Wir bleiben 
Feinde’ – We’re still enemies. Thus, Bundeswehr advertisements have tended to adopt a 
tone that aligns with the preferences of the public. In 2010, the Bundeswehr’s main 
recruitment campaign showed a series of quick cuts between eight different scenarios 
outlining what to expect from a career in the military. Out of the eight short scenes, a military 
uniform is visible in two (one of the uniforms being a medic). None of the scenes show 
visible weaponry or references to a potential combat situation and one even shows the 
potential domestic duty of escorting a motorcade. There is no indication in the advert that 
combat will be part of the job. This is in spite of Germany’s role in Afghanistan at the time, 
losing eight soldiers in 2010 and seven in 2009. 
Ultimately, we see both continuity and change in the approach the army has taken to 
recruitment. As the hypothesis suggested, strategic culture will evolve incrementally over 
time as both internal and external factors alter the normative environment. Change is 
certainly evident in the campaigns: one of the most recent examples is the growth of social 
media, which has led to the rise of a theory of a distinct ‘cyberculture’ that exists outside of 
national normative constraints. In the context of military recruitment, adverts have been 
adapted to take these shifts in attitude or the relevant threat of the time into account. We also 
see adverts adapting to the nature of the threat faced at the time; for example, Northern 
Ireland in campaigns of the 1970s or, more recently, scenes of troops in Iraq or Afghanistan. 
Despite these changes, across nearly one hundred years of army recruitment drives, there is 
still remarkable continuity in the approach adopted by the British military insofar as they 
reflect the idea of the army as an external rather than internal force with defence of the state 
achieved by fighting abroad. This is all the more interesting when placed within the context 
of the modern counter-terrorist era when potential domestic duties for the armed forces have 
been a formal part of national security strategies for nearly twenty years. To return to the 
responses to Operation Temperer, it appears as though despite a general recognition that the 
army can, and perhaps even should, play a role in countering the threat from Islamist 




Fundamentally, the British still view the army as an expeditionary force; an entrenched 
cultural preference that has derived from over two hundred years of history.  
 
Contrary to Cameron’s assertion that the British are ‘rather over’ history, as this chapter has 
illustrated, in fact historical experiences cannot be disentangled from Britain’s cultural 
preferences or its strategic behaviour. Although, Cameron’s perceptual lens may have 
regarded certain experiences as less relevant in the modern day (for example there were no 
references to Peterloo in the responses to Operation Temperer), this does not negate the fact 
that the past has still undeniably shaped the present.    
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5.3. Conclusions 
‘I went into a public ‘ouse to get a pint o’ beer, 
The publican ‘e up an’ sez, “We serve no red-coats here.”  
The girls be’ind the bar they laughed an’ giggled fit to die,  
I outs into the street again an’ to myself sez I: 
O it’s Tommy this, an’ Tommy that, an’ “Tommy, go away”; 
But it’s “Thank you, Mister Atkins”, when the band begins to play’ 
‘Tommy’ – Rudyard Kipling, 1890 
Rudyard Kipling’s 1890 poem ‘Tommy’ provides an important insight into the British 
public’s attitudes towards the military, not just in the nineteenth century, but also today. The 
poem is written from the perspective of a low-ranking member of the army, ‘Tommy 
Atkins’,500 who laments the treatment he receives from the general public. He unsuccessfully 
attempts to purchase a pint of beer at a pub, is laughed at by ladies and, later in the poem, is 
refused entry to a theatre. However, when he and his comrades are called away to war, he 
finds that he has the full support of the public: ‘But it’s “Thank you, Mr. Atkins”, when the 
band begins to play’. While one suspects that Kipling is attempting to expose the hypocrisy 
of the British general public in relation to their attitude towards, and treatment of, soldiers, 
it is nevertheless indicative of the prevailing attitudes held by the public: first: extreme 
resistance to the presence of troops on the national territory, particularly in times of (relative) 
peace. Second, acceptance, even pride, of the British military’s role in managing global 
threats. 
While the nature of the British public’s dichotomous relationship with the army may seem 
counterintuitive, even paradoxical, at first, in fact the roots of Britain’s attitudes lie in the 
national historical experience. As the previous chapters highlighted, these attitudes 
developed during the Civil War and became entrenched through the use of Yeomanry 
cavalry units to quell riots and protests in the 18th century and culminated with the 1819 
massacre at St Peter’s Field or ‘Peterloo’. The use of excessive force at Peterloo transformed 
the image of the army for the worse; ordinary soldiers became pariahs in the eyes of the 
public and paved the way for the introduction of the Metropolitan Police Act by the Home 
500 ‘Tommy’ being the nickname for British troops. The term was frequently used in World War One and is 
less prevalent today, but members of the Parachute Regiment are still known as ‘Toms’.
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Secretary Sir Robert Peel in 1829 which institutionalised the civil power as the first 
responders on matters of internal unrest.  
By 1926 (post-General Strike) the prevailing opinion was that the army should no longer be 
the first port of call in matters of domestic security. Thus, over time, the need to maintain an 
armed force to deal with domestic threats gradually diminished and the British public 
became accustomed to this fact. In short, the sense grew in the minds of British policymakers 
that ‘the growth of civil society negates the need for a strong military. A strong civil police 
force will help you deal with domestic threats while the army can be more outward.’501 
Again, historical experience plays a defining role in determining this prevailing belief in the 
military as an external force and is largely a function of the nature of the threats that Britain 
has faced in its recent history. The last major pitched battle on British soil was the Battle of 
Culloden in 1746 when Jacobite forces led by Charles Edward Stuart (funded and equipped 
by the French) were crushed by the forces of the Duke of Cumberland, William Augustus. 
Since then, there have been only three substantial threats of foreign invasion on the British 
mainland: the first and second emanated from France under the Ancien Régime, initially in 
1759 when the French foreign minister, the Duc de Choiseul devised a plan to transport 
100,000 French troops across the Channel. The second came decades later when forces led 
by Napoleon began to gather on the French coast in 1796. Napoleon’s focus on his Egyptian 
and Austrian campaigns spared Britain from invasion on that occasion and by 1805 the plans 
had been shelved. The third threat occurred in 1940 when the armies of Nazi Germany, 
having rapidly swept across France and the low countries and gained control of the Channel 
coast, began plans for invasion under Unternehmen Seelöwe (Operation Sea Lion). The 
German High Command were eventually deterred by the increasing losses suffered by the 
Luftwaffe at the hands of the Royal Air Force. Furthermore, the country’s geographical 
position has meant the fear of encirclement has never been a strategic priority to the same 
extent as seen in France, for example in the run up to the Franco-Prussian war, or Germany, 
for example under Kaiser Wilhelm II who was famously ‘paranoid’ about encirclement.502 
Fundamentally, the British people view the army as an expeditionary force, not one that 
deals with threats domestically. As Keith Jeffrey writes, in eyes of the public and the political 
501 Lieutenant Colonel Harold Simpson (UK Ministry of Defence), Semi-structured interview by Jack 
Harding, London, 15 December 2017
502 Hull, Isabel V. The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1888-1918. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), p. 129 
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and military establishments, the responsibilities of the British army ‘are quite evidently not 
domestic’.503 The passage of time does not seem to have eroded this sentiment within the 
military; on 25 May 2017, soon after the initial implementation of Operation Temperer, 
General Sir Richard Barrons, who served as Joint Forces Command between April 2013 and 
April 2016 and as a Brigadier during the Troubles, stated ‘we [the British] see our armed 
forces as being essential for our security from threats emanating from abroad, not at 
home.’504  
Furthermore, between 14 June and 26 July, the MoD conducted their annual poll for charting 
public attitudes towards the British armed forces. The results showed that 68% of 
respondents believe the army’s role is defending the state. However, just 11% responded 
that their duties include supporting the police in the event of a national emergency and only 
6% believe that the army plays a role in countering terrorism.505 This is interesting given 
that the poll was conducted just two months after the Manchester Bombing and the first time 
that Operation Temperer was employed. Thus, the British public’s perception of the 
appropriate role of the British army, even in the face of a serious terrorist threat, was 
summarised succinctly by the British historian Keith Jeffrey, who wrote in 1985 that ‘the 
British army, when it fights, fights abroad’.506 
The evidence of Operation Temperer and the provisions now enshrined in CONTEST for 
large-scale domestic deployments of the military in the event of serious crises indicate that 
in the future the British army may well be required to fight at home. However, as the 
evidence for Britain’s cultural preferences for domestic military deployments uncovered in 
this thesis indicates, we might extend Jeffrey’s assertion to ‘the British army, if it fights at 
home, must adhere to proportionality, last resort, and most crucially, subordination to the 
civil power.’ 
503 Keith Jeffrey in Peter J. Rowe and Christopher J. Whelan eds.; Military Intervention in Democratic 
Societies; Chapter 2; Military aid to the Civil Power in the United Kingdom – an historical perspective 
(Kent: Croon Helm, 1985), p. 51
504 General Sir Richard Barrons, The Evening Standard, ‘It’s right to have soldiers on the streets but not in 
the long term’, 25 May 2017
505 MOD and Armed Forces Reputational Polling, Summer 2017 Survey Topline Findings (27-07-17), ICM 
Unlimited on behalf of the Ministry of Defence. Q.3a, ‘What do you think the armed forces actually do?’ p.4 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/684573/ 
Public_Opinon_Survey_-_Summer_2017.pdf (accessed 02 September 2018)
506 Keith Jeffrey in Peter J. Rowe and Christopher J. Whelan eds.; Military Intervention in Democratic 
Societies; Chapter 2; Military aid to the Civil Power in the United Kingdom – an historical perspective 
(Kent: Croon Helm, 1985), p. 51
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The evidence presented in this chapter certainly seems to confirm the hypothesis that 
historical experiences have influenced cultural preferences for the use of the army in a 
domestic context, which has constrained the behaviour of policymakers. Changes in attitudes 
have occurred slowly over time as evidenced by the praise for the military at Peterloo, and 
the rejection of a military role against protesters thereafter. Further, where more rapid shifts 
have occurred, they have been as a result of strong institutions, bold leaders and usually a 
sufficiently high threat perception that creates a climate that is receptive to a change being 
made; for example in 1980 with the Embassy siege and, most recently, with Operation 
Temperer. 
Overall, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the findings is that regardless of the era, the 
nature of the deployment, and even the nature of the threat all of the responses indicate that 
any use of the military on the national territory must always remain in line with Britain’s 
core cultural preferences, and any attempts to contravene these preferences leads to the 
societal rejection of a putative deployment. While the evidence presented in this chapter has 
provided compelling evidence of the veracity of the hypothesis, a comparative case will 
strengthen the argument. Accordingly, we turn now to France’s experiences with domestic 
military deployments.  
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Chapter 6 – The historical origins of France’s preferences for 
domestic military deployments. 
‘La justice sans la force est impuissante ; la force sans la justice est tyrannique.’  
Blaise Pascal, Pensées, 1670507 
6.1.: The November attacks and a strategic shift 
On 13 November 2015 in Paris, at 21:00 in the evening, a televised international football 
match between France and Germany took place at the Stade de France. Seventy-nine 
thousand people, including the then President of France, François Hollande, and German 
Bundeskanzlerin, Angela Merkel, were in attendance. During the first half, at the sixteen and 
nineteen-minute mark, two explosions, audible on the live footage, were heard around the 
stadium.508 The crowd, at that stage oblivious to what was happening, can even be heard to 
cheer the second explosion, perhaps mistaking it for a flare or firework. The game was 
played to its conclusion with the players and French commentators unaware of what had 
happened just outside the stadium, the football on display providing an eerie juxtaposition 
to the events that were unfolding across Paris; a sophisticated, coordinated attack perpetrated 
by individuals loyal to the Salafist extremist organisation that calls itself Islamic State (IS).  
The first explosion heard at the stadium had been a suicide bombing carried out by a man 
known as Ahmad al-Mohammad.509 He detonated his vest at 21:17 outside Gate D of the 
stadium killing himself and the first innocent victim of the night, the Portuguese chauffeur 
Manuel Colaço Dias.510 The second explosion occurred three minutes later when a man who 
remains unidentified detonated his vest outside Gate H.511 The intention of the attackers had 
been to enter the stadium to detonate their vests, but both had been blocked from entering 
507 Pascal, Blaise. Pensées de Blaise Pascal, Tome Premier. (Paris: Ant. Aug. Renouard, 1812/1670), p. 241 
508 France Allemagne avec l‘explosions au Stade de France, Explosions are audible at 26:02 and 29:14 of the 
video. See:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nVIeyG9ocVg (accessed 15/10/2016) 
509 A Syrian passport with the name “Ahmad al-Mohammad” was found with his body. However, the document 
was later proved to be a forgery. His true identity is yet to be revealed to the public.  
510 Dominic Fifield, Euro 2016 and the forgotten victims of Saint-Denis, The Guardian, 3 June 2016. See: 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/jun/03/france-forgotten-victims-traumas-security-euro-2016-
paris-attacks (accessed 21/10/2016) 




by security guards who discovered the explosives during routine security checks. A third 
explosion, not audible on the footage of the game, occurred just before 22:00 at a 
McDonald’s restaurant in the vicinity of the stadium when a twenty-year old French national 
named Bilal Hadfi detonated his vest.512  
At almost exactly the same time as the attacks at the Stade de France, at 21:24, a second 
group of two individuals (Ibrahim Abdeslam and Chakib Akrouh) armed with Kalashnikov 
assault rifles carried out a series of shootings at several restaurants and bars in the 10th and 
11th arrondissements before Ibrahim Abdeslam walked into the Comptoir Voltaire café and 
detonated his suicide vest.513 A soldier of the rank Chief Marshal of Lodgings (Maréchal 
des logis-chef), referred to only by the initials G.A., revealed how he happened to be out for 
a drink with colleagues on Rue de Charonne, just a two-minute walk from the bar La Belle 
Équipe where one of the shootings took place. He spoke of how a crowd came running past 
in a panic and he picked out the word ‘attentat’.514 According to G.A., he immediately picked 
up the phone to his commanding officer and offered to mobilise a number of soldiers whom 
he knew to be nearby.515  
His commander, identified only as Capitaine P-M. A., who was also giving his account of 
events in this session, stated that he gave his agreement ‘immediately’ since the nature of 
the situation meant ‘we should not ask too many questions’. Shortly after Capitaine P-M. A. 
had given his approval for the use of the armed forces, a ‘group of eight soldiers arrived at 
a run, equipped with bullet-proof vests, helmets and long guns’ and secured the area.516 Their 
presence, according to Capitaine P-M. A. had ‘the immediate effect of reassuring those 
512 It transpired that Hadfi had also attempted to enter the stadium, but had been turned away as he did not have 
a ticket. See: Fournier, Catherine. ‘Attentats de Paris : Bilal Hadfi, le jeune jihadiste du Stade de France, 
amateur de jeux vidéo et de taekwondo’, Franceinfo, 21 December 2015. See: https://bit.ly/2xfkr6H (accessed 
28/04/2017) 
513 Miraculously, in spite of the proximity of those in the café to the explosion, no-one other than Abdeslam 
was killed in the explosion. Akrouh escaped the area on that night, but was killed in a counter-terror operation 
in Saint-Denis on 18 November. 
514 ‘attack’ 
515 G.A., Maréchal des logis-chef cited in ‘Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête, relative aux 
moyens mis en œuvre par l’État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015’, tome 2: COMPTES 
RENDUS DES AUDITIONS, Assemblée Nationale, no. 3922, p. 250 
516 “Long weapons” or “long guns” is a term often used to refer to sniper and assault rifles. In this case, it refers 
to the standard issue FAMAS rifle which has been used by the French armed forces since 1970.  For quote see: 
‘Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête, relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l’État pour lutter 
contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015’, tome 2 : COMPTES RENDUS DES AUDITIONS, Assemblée 
Nationale, no. 3922, p. 250 
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present, including the police, [who were] poorly equipped to deal with a situation of this 
nature.’517  
At around 21:25, the Commissioner of the police unit Brigade anti-criminalité (BAC), which 
usually deals with serious crimes such as gang violence and drug trafficking, received a call 
from the information and command centre that an explosion had occurred at the Stade de 
France.518 He ordered one of his colleagues to gather his equipment and drive him to the 
stadium immediately. While they were on their way, a general alert about an incident at the 
Bataclan theatre came through on the radio. At 21:40, the same time that Abdeslam had 
detonated his vest in the Comptoir Voltaire, a third group of assailants comprising three 
French nationals (Ismaël Omar Mostefaï, Samy Amimour, and Foued Mohamed-Aggad) had 
entered the Bataclan theatre in the 11th arrondissement where the American rock group The 
Eagles of Death Metal were performing. They opened fire with assault rifles and threw 
grenades before taking hostages. 519
Coincidentally, when the radio alert came through, the commissioner of the BAC and his 
driver were just 500 metres away from the Bataclan. They pulled up outside and exited their 
vehicle. Upon hearing bursts of fire from inside they switched off their radios and entered 
the building with their sidearms drawn. Progressing slowly through the lobby and into the 
main hall they found themselves in close proximity to Samy Amimour who, unaware of their 
presence, was threatening a man with his weapon. Fearing for the safety of the individual, 
the commissioner and his colleague opened fire, wounding Amimour, who then detonated 
his vest. According to the commissioner, they were unaware that it was a suicide vest and 
had assumed someone had thrown a grenade towards them.  He therefore decided that they 
had too little firepower and a lack of information to deal with the remaining threat effectively 
and so he and his colleague then exited the theatre where his BAC colleagues had begun to 
517 G.A., Maréchal des logis-chef cited in ‘Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête, relative aux 
moyens mis en œuvre par l’État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015’, tome 2 : COMPTES 
RENDUS DES AUDITIONS, Assemblée Nationale, no. 3922, p. 250 
518 See pages 246 -247 for a full discussion of BAC’s role. 
519 ‘Unravelling the Connections Between the Paris Attackers’, New York Times, 18 March 2016. See: 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/15/world/europe/manhunt-for-paris-attackers.html (accessed 
21/10/2016); What we know about the Paris attacks and the hunt for the attackers, Washington Post, 18 March 
2016. See: https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/paris-attacks/ (accessed 21st October 2016); 




gather along with a few military personnel who had been on patrol as part of Vigipirate.520 
In an attempt to take advantage of the firepower these troops had at their disposal, one of the 
BAC personnel radioed to his superior to request the assistance of the armed forces that were 
on the scene. However, the response was ‘Negative. Do not engage the military. We are not 
in a war zone.’ According to the BAC officer, one of the soldiers echoed this sentiment by 
stating that he did not have orders to engage and would therefore be unable to offer his 
support.521  
At 22:20, members of the Brigade de Recherche et d’Intervention (BRI), a judicial police 
unit operating in Paris, and Recherche, Assistance, Intervention, Dissuassion (RAID), a 
national police unit specialised in counter-terrorism, also arrived at the scene and the elite 
counter-terrorist military unit, the Groupe d'intervention de la Gendarmerie nationale 
(GIGN) had been placed on standby at the nearby Célestins barracks. After spending some 
time devising a plan, they formed a joint assault column and stormed the Bataclan at 
00:18.522 Members of RAID swept through the downstairs of the concert hall and BRI took 
the upstairs. In an assault lasting just three minutes, the two remaining terrorists, who had 
barricaded themselves in a room upstairs with a small group of hostages, were killed and the 
hostages were evacuated.523  
The events of that night were the single deadliest terrorist attack in France’s history claiming 
the lives of 130 people and injuring more than 400.524 Less than twenty-four hours later, 
France’s then Prime Minister Manuel Valls appeared on the popular French television 
channel, TF1, to announce the imposition of an État d’urgence; the first time such a state 
had been used since the 2005 riots and for only the sixth time since 1955. The language Valls 
520 Vigipirate is France’s national security alert system. It was created in 1978 and takes its name from the 
following:  
vigilance et protection des installations contre les risques d'attentats terroristes à l'explosif. It will be discussed 
in depth in later chapters. 
521 Testimony of ‘M. T. P., brigadier-chef.’ Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête, relative aux 
moyens mis en œuvre par l’État pour lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015.’ TOME 2 : COMPTES 
RENDUS DES AUDITIONS, Assemblée Nationale, no. 3922, p. 358 
522 Various accounts are given in the hearing in the Assemblée Nationale. Times for the final assault carried 
out by BRI vary, but the most common time given is 00:18.  
See: Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête, relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l’État pour lutter 
contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015. Tome 2: COMPTES RENDUS DES AUDITIONS, Assemblée 
Nationale, no. 3922, pp. 25-27 
523 Piel, Simon. ‘Au Bataclan, deux heures d’intervention policière sans négociation’, Le Monde, 16 November 
2015. See: https://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/16/au-bataclan-deux-heures-d-
intervention-policiere-dans-l-enfer-de-dante_4811065_4809495.html (accessed 07/06/2017) 
524 Closed session. Testimony of Maréchal des logis R. D., p. 252. See: http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/14/pdf/rap-enq/r3922-t2.pdf 
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used during the interview seemed to be a departure from the typical French view of terrorism 
as a crime.525 For example, he stated: ‘What I want to say to the French people is that we are 
at war. Yes, we are at war. What happened was an act of war methodically organised by a 
terrorist army.’526 In fact, Valls used the word ‘guerre’ thirteen times in a twelve-minute 
interview leading the French newspaper Libération to report that he had ‘but one word on 
his mind’.527 This more belligerent rhetoric was echoed by President Hollande a few days 
later who declared before French parliament – ‘La France est en guerre’. This was not a 
formal declaration of war, which under Article 35 of the French constitution requires 
parliamentary approval and also only concerns  ‘interven[ing] abroad’, not on the national 
territory.528 Instead, this was a figurative militarisation of the threat by France’s top 
policymakers and a way of preparing the citizens of France for the sight of increased 
numbers of heavily armed troops on their streets.529  
Interestingly, and in keeping with this rhetorical militarisation of the threat, in the wake of 
the attacks much of the scrutiny into existing security arrangements among policy-makers 
and in the media was not focused on how to expand the powers of, or better equip the civil 
forces, but rather whether the military should have played a greater role in the events. For 
example, why had the civil forces of intervention, RAID and BRI been deployed rather than 
the GIGN despite the latter’s counter-terrorist expertise and the fact they were stationed at 
barracks just a six-minute drive from the Bataclan?530 Should requests for assistance from 
the military have been granted? What is the point of the military’s presence if they cannot 
525 Foley, Frank. Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the Past, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 44: ‘Both British and French policy makers perceive 
terrorism as a crime.’  
526 Manuel Valls, “Il n’y aura un moment de répit pour ceux qui s’attaquent aux valuers de la République”, 14 
November 2015. See: http://www.gouvernement.fr/partage/5846-manuel-valls-au-20h-de-tf1 (accessed 19 
October /2016) : “Ce que je veux dire aux Français, c’est que nous sommes en guerre ... Oui nous sommes en 
guerre. Ce qui s’est passé était un acte de guerre organisé méthodiquement par une armée terroriste”. 
527 ‘qu’un mot à la bouche” - Lilian Alemagna, Laure Bretton; Manuel Valls: ‘Nous sommes en guerre’, 
Libération, 14 November 2015. See: http://www.liberation.fr/france/2015/11/14/manuel-valls-nous-sommes-
en-guerre_1413503 (accessed 17/05/2017)  
528 Constitution de la République française. Constitution du 4 octobre 1958, Article 35: ‘La déclaration de 
guerre est autorisée par le Parlement.’ ;  ‘Le Gouvernement informe le Parlement de sa décision de faire 
intervenir les forces armées à l’étranger, au plus tard trois jours après le début de l’intervention.’ 
529 Manuel Valls had made a similar impassioned speech to the Assemblée nationale on 13 January 2015 after 
the Charlie Hebdo attacks. He stated: ‘Sommes-nous en guerre ? La question a en réalité peu d’importance, car 
les terroristes djihadistes, en nous frappant trois jours consécutifs, y ont apporté une nouvelle fois la plus cruelle 
des réponses. Il faut toujours dire les choses clairement : oui, la France est en guerre contre le terrorisme, le 
djihadisme, et l’islamisme radical.’ See: Assemblée nationale. XIVe legislature. Session ordinaire de 2014-
2015. Compte rendu Integral. Première séance du mardi 13 janvier 2015. See: http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/14/cri/2014-2015/20150106.asp#P409364 (accessed 02/02/2017) 
530 Le Parisien, ‘Attentats de Paris : des gendarmes du GIGN s'en prennent à leur chef’, 13/07/2016. See: 
http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/attentats-de-paris-des-gendarmes-du-gign-s-en-prennent-a-leur-chef-
dans-une-lettre-anonyme-13-07-2016-5962707.php  (accessed 02/02/2017)  
184 
engage threats?531 Should the rules of engagement on the national territory be adapted to 
allow more autonomous and spontaneous military decision-making when facing threats in 
the future?532  
The shift in the tone of the language from policy-makers and the calls for a greater role for 
the military on the national territory quickly led to an expansion of the remit of Opération 
Sentinelle, an operation that had first been implemented in January 2015 after two brothers, 
Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, inspired by Al-Qaeda, had attacked the offices of the controversial 
satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo killing twelve individuals - ten journalists and two 
policemen. At that stage, the Ministère des Armées, the French Ministry of Defence (MoD), 
integrated into their ‘operational contract’ the need ‘to deploy up to 10,000 soldiers’ on the 
national territory in order to augment ‘the permanent posture of security and deterrence.’533 
In practical terms, Sentinelle provides for the mass deployment of the army on the French 
national territory in order,  as the French MoD, explains, to ‘defend and protect the 
French.’534 It allows for up to 10,500 troops (10% of the French army’s total effective force) 
to be stationed across the country at any one point in time at locations deemed to be at high 
risk of attack – this includes ‘airports, train stations, Jewish schools, kosher restaurants, and 
531 See for example: Le Point. ‘Attaque du Bataclan: l'échange sidérant entre un militaire et un policier’, 24 
March 2016. See: https://www.lepoint.fr/societe/attaque-du-bataclan-l-echange-siderant-entre-un-militaire-et-
un-policier-24-03-2016-2027759_23.php  (accessed 02/02/2017); RTL, ‘Attentats à Paris : l'armée n'a pas pu 
aider la police lors de l'attaque du Bataclan’, 9 May 2016. See: https://www.rtl.fr/actu/debats-societe/attentats-
a-paris-l-armee-n-a-pas-pu-aider-la-police-lors-de-l-attaque-du-bataclan-7783159761  (accessed 02/02/2017); 
BFM.TV. ‘Attaque du Bataclan: l’incroyable conversation entre un policier et un militaire’, 24 March 2016. 
See: https://www.bfmtv.com/societe/attaque-du-bataclan-l-incroyable-conversation-entre-un-policier-et-un-
militaire-961689.html#xtor=AL-68  (accessed 02/02/2017); Thomasset, Flore. ‘Attentats du 13 novembre : une 
nouvelle plainte sur l’intervention au Bataclan.’ La Croix. 04/07/2018. See: https://www.la-
croix.com/France/Securite/Attentats-13-novembre-nouvelle-plainte-lintervention-Bataclan-2018-06-08-
1200945562 (accessed 21/02/2019) 
532 See question from Georges Fenech to Lieutenant-Colonel D.D.: considérez-vous qu’une attaque terroriste 
d’une intensité supérieure à celles que nous avons connues l’année dernière pourrait justifier que vous soyez 
sollicités pour intervenir prioritairement, en mettant à profit votre expérience militaire, et non comme force 
d’appui ? Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête, relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l’État pour 
lutter contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015.’ Tome 2: COMPTES RENDUS DES AUDITIONS, 
Assemblée Nationale, no. 3922, p. 257 
533 Conégéro, Col, and Facchin, Ltn. Ministère des Armées. ‘Contrat opérationnel - Trois hypothèses 
d’engagement des forces terrestres’. 09/03/2015. See: 
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/communaute-defense/trois-hypotheses-d-engagement-des-forces-
terrestres (accessed 02/02/2017) 
534 ‘…pour défendre et protéger les Français.’ - Ministère des Armées. Opération Sentinelle. See: 
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/france/operation-sentinelle?page=4 (accessed 17/05/2017) 
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synagogues.’535 In addition to the permanent deployment of these troops, the army also 
maintains a strategic reserve of 3,000 troops for cases of an ‘exceptionally urgent nature.’536 
Despite the unprecedented scope of Sentinelle,537 there was almost no resistance from 
policy-makers across the political spectrum, the media or from the general public to the idea 
of a mass deployment of the armed forces.538 Indeed, in 2015, ‘rassurantes’ (‘reassuring’) 
was the adjective that the public believed best described the army.539 Furthermore, in 2018, 
the Public Opinion Research Institute (Institut français d'opinion publique – IFOP) found 
that Sentinelle was supported by 78% of French people and, furthermore, that 81% of French 
people trust the armies to intervene on national territory in the event of a terrorist attack.540  
Viewed in a certain light, France’s recent response to the threat of Islamist terrorism could 
be considered a departure from previous approaches; an unprecedented threat from Islamist 
terrorism necessitated an unprecedented response. Indeed, the scale of Sentinelle has 
certainly represented a conceptual and operational shift for the French armed forces, while 
the public perception of a serious threat may have rendered people more amenable to the 
need for extreme measures. However, the high level of support in France may still come as 
a surprise due to an extensive and historically turbulent relationship with the army in a 
domestic context which seems incongruous with the French people’s inherent spirit of 
résistance and the cherished value of liberté.  
Some significant examples of France’s negative experiences with domestic deployments 
include the uprisings in Lyon and Paris in 1831 and 1832, the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, 
the Commune in 1871, in Fourmies in 1891, the Languedoc revolt in 1907 and the PCF 
strikes in 1947/48. Furthermore, throughout the centuries the army has played a direct role 
in shaping the political landscape of the country. For example, Napoléon Bonaparte’s 
535 Shurkin, Michael. “The Abilities of the British, French, and German Armies to Generate and Sustain 
Armored Brigades in the Baltics”, RAND Corporation, 2017, p. 5 
536 Bollier, Séverine. ‘Sentinelle: Un dispositif optimise’, Armées d’aujourd’hui, November 2017, no. 420, p. 
37 
537 Valls, Manuel speech before Assemblée nationale. XIVe legislature. Session ordinaire de 2014-2015. 
Compte rendu Integral. Première séance du mardi 13 janvier 2015. See: http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/14/cri/2014-2015/20150106.asp#P409364 (accessed 02/02/2017): ‘Les renforts de soldats affectés 
– en tout près de 10 000, c’est sans précédent et j’en remercie M. le ministre de la défense.’
538 Chéron, Bénédicte. Le soldat méconnu: Les Français et leurs armées : état des lieux. (Paris: Armand Colin,
2018), p. 15
539 DICoD. ‘Les chiffres clés des sondages de la Défense 2015’. 07/01/2016. See:
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/les-chiffres-cles-des-sondages-de-la-defense-2015 (accessed
27/09/2018)
540IFOP-DICoD, mars 2018. ‘Les chiffres clés de sondages de la Défense’, 14 juillet 2018
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accession to power following the Coup of 18 Brumaire in 1799 when Napoleon entered the 
chambers of the Council of the Five Hundred with his Grenadier guards in ‘a massive show 
of military strength.’541 The coup was a powerful representation of the politico-military 
nexus and the role that the army has played in influencing political order in France.542 
This is something that would raise its head once again during the May 1958 crisis that saw 
the collapse of the Fourth Republic and pushed the country to the brink of civil war.543 The 
military’s loyalty to de Gaulle led dissenting officers to devise a secret plan (Opération 
Résurrection) which would see them deploy 1,500 paratroopers in Paris and march down 
the Champs-Élysée to the Assemblée Nationale. Despite de Gaulle’s protestations to the 
journalist Maurice Duverger (‘Do you think that at sixty-seven I am going to begin a career 
as a dictator!?’),544 the military’s deep involvement in shaping the Fifth Republic was plain 
for all to see – de Gaulle even arranged to meet Pierre Pflimlin, the short-lived Prime 
Minister of the Fourth Republic, at the Chateau Saint Cloud where the Coup of 18 Brumaire 
had taken place to discuss a handover of power.545 However, the army’s influence over 
French politics at the time was perhaps best summarised by the French general Jacques 
Massu’s ominously succinct statement in an interview in 1960: ‘The Army has the power.’546  
Given experiences such as these, what, then, accounts for the French acceptance of the 
widespread domestic military deployments under Sentinelle? In relation to the research 
question of this thesis, does it represent a significant attitudinal shift? Or, perhaps closer 
analysis of Sentinelle and patterns in the rhetoric relating to past military deployments will 
unveil evidence of common and enduring themes?  
541 Doyle, William. The Oxford History of the French Revolution, 2 ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990), p. 375 
542 This event was depicted in François Bouchot’s famous 1840 painting which shows a chaotic scene in 
Orangerie of the Chateau Saint Cloud with members of the Directorate gesturing and shouting towards 
Napoléon who stands calmly in the foreground in full military dress. In the background are the bayonets and 
distinctive Bonnet à poils of the Grenadiers with whom Napoléon would later storm the Council of the Five 
Hundred. 
543 Fenby, Jonathan. The History of Modern France: From the Revolution to the War with Terror. (London: 
Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 349 
544 Jackson, Julian T. A Certain Idea of France: The Life of Charles de Gaulle (London: Penguin Books, 2018), 
p. 214
545 A number of comparisons have been drawn between de Gaulle and Napoleon. See, for example, the French
historian Patrice Gueniffey who writes: ‘Les deux histoires de l'Empereur et du Général se rejoignent à un
moment et à un seul de leurs carrières respectives: le 18 brumaire et le 13 mai et les quelques années qui
suivirent.’ Gueniffey, Patrice. Napoléon et De Gaulle, deux héros français.
546 Massu, Jacques interview with Hans Ulrich Kempski. ‘MASSU-INTERVIEW, Die letzte Kugel.’ Der
Spiegel.  03/02/1960. See: https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-43063185.html (accessed 18/02/2017)
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6.1.1 Historical experience: Three eras of deployment 
The first step in determining continuity and/or change in France’s preferences for the use of 
the armed forces must begin with an examination of historical precedents for the army’s 
usage internally. Chart 10 traces and then charts these precedents between 1800 and 2019. 
The data for this section of the thesis is drawn from extensive research using a number of 
sources. For example, the Archives Nationales, both historical and recent debates in the 
Assemblée Nationale and the Sénat, speeches and statements by policymakers and military 
personnel, the correspondence or memoires of certain influential political or military figures, 
the media, and, of course, from a wealth of secondary sources such as books and journal 
articles. As with the British case, it is not necessarily an exhaustive list, but examines what 
are termed ‘significant’ deployments.  
The chart predominantly displays armée de terre engagements. However, an exception is 
made for the gendarmerie deployments in the early nineteenth century under the reign of 
Napoleon I. Like the yeomanry units that were used during the same period in Britain, the 
Gendarmerie were originally heavy cavalry units,547 thus a direct comparison is possible. 
They were also included due to the crucial role that Napoleon saw them playing in the 
maintenance of France’s security. He described the gendarmerie as an ‘exceptional’ unit and 
deploying them as ‘the most effective way to maintain the tranquillity of a country…’548 
Furthermore, although their role was predominantly to preserve internal order, Napoleon 
often deployed them to supplement regular troops in campaigns abroad or to guard the rear 
of advancing armies. In fact, it was arguably not until 1921 and the formation of the 
Gendarmerie Mobile that the unit began to fulfil more of a civil, rather than military, duty. 
Hence the exclusion of the Gendarmerie from the data beyond 1921.  
Using the same method as in the British case, each deployment that was identified was coded 
according to its purpose: first, was it ‘active’ (i.e. involving armed troops to counter a 
specific threat)? or ‘passive’ (i.e. unarmed troops deployed to assist the civil power in some 
capacity)? Within these broad categorisations, each deployment was then grouped according 
to its specific purpose; for example, to counter a terrorist threat, to quell civil disorder, or to 
provide disaster relief. In France, six different types of domestic deployment were identified 
(compared with four in Britain): 1) Riot, protest, and insurrection; 2) Defence from 
547 Britt, Albert Sidney III. The Wars of Napoleon. (New York: Square One Publishers, 1972), p.174 
548 Napoleon. Correspondance. XII, No. 10 243. Lettre au roi de Naples, 16 May 1806  
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Invasion.549 3) Coup d’état.550 4) Striking Civil Service / Personnel Provision; 5) Disaster 
relief. 6) Counter-terrorism.551  
Chart 10: 'Significant' domestic military deployments in France: 1800 – 2019 
Source: author’s calculation based on evidence from Archives Nationales, Assemblée 
Nationale, Sénat, and secondary literature. See Appendix 2 for full list of deployments. 
549 This category only includes examples where French troops have taken part (rather than battles in the First 
or Second World Wars that occurred on French territory, but only involved American or British troops, for 
example). It includes the major battles fought by the Forces françaises libres (Free French Forces) army led 
by Charles de Gaulle in the Second World War. 
550 Although only two examples of a coup d’état were identified, it was important to include them due to their 
impact on France’s political environment as well as the impact these events have had on the French psyche. 
551 Generally, this category focuses on the use of the armée de terre rather than other divisions such as l’armée 
de l’air or the marine nationale. However, the list does include special forces operations conducted 
domestically by the GIGN for counter-terror purposes. It was important to include GIGN deployments in the 
examples since: 1) the unit was created in 1973 as a direct response to the Munich Olympics attack and 
therefore marked the beginning of the integration of the armed forces into France’s counter-terrorism strategy; 
and 2) its inclusion facilitates a direct comparison with the British equivalent, the SAS, in order to contrast the 
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The first, and most striking, aspect of chart10 is the sheer number of domestic military 
deployments that have taken place on French national territory over the last two hundred 
years.552 It was hypothesised that historical experiences influence cultural acceptance or 
rejection of the use of military forces internally; chart 10 certainly demonstrates a strong 
historical precedent that may be guiding France’s general acceptance of the army’s use on 
the national territory. After all, the consistent reliance on the armed forces domestically over 
time implies, to repeat Gray’s quote, that an action that is ‘sufficiently established and 
enduring’553 can be described as a cultural preference. For comparison, in the British case 
102 ‘significant’ instances were identified – itself not a small number by any stretch of the 
imagination. However, in France there have been at least 420 occasions when the armed 
forces have conducted significant internal operations. This averages nearly two deployment 
every year over the study.  
The second aspect to note from chart 10 is that, unlike the British case, which exhibited a 
clear delineation between the different eras of domestic deployment, in France there is 
significant overlap between the purpose of each deployment. For example, the 1851 – 1875 
column shows that troops were deployed to fulfil three distinct objectives: to quell civil 
unrest, to defend against foreign invasion, and to carry out a coup d’état. Further, one 
hundred years later in the 1976 – 2000 column, the army was called on to counter-terrorism, 
defend against invasion, to provide cover for striking civil service personnel and to provide 
disaster relief. This is demonstrative of the reliance that the French state has historically had 
on the armed forces to fulfil a multitude of domestic duties. It is also further evidence of the 
connection the French make between internal and external security since, on many 
occasions, the threat of invasion by a foreign power was complemented by an internal threat 
of subversion through fifth columns or other groups that were perceived to be a threat to 
stability. For example, in the wake of the Second World Wars, when the threat posed by 
Nazi Germany had dissipated, the USSR began to present itself as a new threat. France 
structured its armed forces based on the potential for another massive inter-state conflict but, 
in terms of domestic politics, the French Communist party became a serious cause for 
concern and the term ‘ennemi de l’intérieur’ entered into political discourse again for the 
552 See appendix two for the full list of these deployments.  
553 Gray, Colin S. ‘British and American Strategic Cultures’, paper prepared for Jamestown symposium 2007: 




first time since the French Revolution.554 It was for this reason that the armed forces were 
called to deal with the Parti communiste français (PCF) strikes in 1947/48 which had taken 
on an ‘insurrectional character’.555  
 
With such a long history of domestic deployments and at least 420 significant incidents, the 
question arises as to which specific experiences seem to have cultivated modern French 
preferences for the use of the armed forces on the national territory? Here it is helpful to 
refer to the changes in the nature of each deployment. Chart 10 clearly demonstrates not only 
continuity in terms of a reliance on the army domestically, but also change through how the 
role of the armée has shifted over the years. We could even use the same example as that 
highlighted above; in the column 1851 – 1875, the army was required to quell civil unrest, 
to defend against foreign invasion, and to carry out a coup d’état. Just over a hundred years 
later, between 1976 and 2000, the only consistent domestic duty is that of defence against 
invasion and even this category is slightly different in that during the Cold War the duty was 
one of protection and deterrence while between 1851 and 1875 it involved active conflict 
against an enemy.   
 
In fact, what chart 10 tells us is that three clear eras of domestic deployment are identifiable:  
 
Riot, protest and insurrection: 1800 - 1921. This has been the most common purpose for 
deploying the military in France’s history with 151 separate events over the time period. 
Indeed, from the French Revolution until the early twentieth century, the army were the first 
resort for the maintenance of public order.556 However, there is a sharp downward trend in 
the number of deployments that begins in the 1870s following the events of la semaine 
sanglante which saw as many as 25,000 deaths in a bloody confrontation between troops of 
the Third Republic and the rebellious communist government of the Commune of Paris.  
 
Of course, there were still some serious instances of the armed forces being used after that 
event. For example, the Fusillade de Fourmies in 1891 that saw soldiers open fire on textile 
 
554 This term has been used throughout France’s history to describe revolutionaries, perceived traitors, heretics, 
communists; in effect any individuals or groups who were seen to be a threat to the stability of the government 
of the time and has often been the justification for the use of force against these groups.  
555 Vivens, Jean-Louis. ‘Conflit social ou affrontement politique ? La grève des mineurs en France en 1948 
sous les angles de la solidarité et de la répression’ Histoire. 2015. ffdumas-01256750f. p.7 
556 Brown, Howard. ‘Domestic State Violence: Repression From The Croquants To The Commune’, The 
Historical Journal, 42:3 (I999), pp. 597-62 
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workers killing nine and injuring 35. It was perhaps this event that marked the beginning of 
the end for troop deployments conducted against the people. For example, in 1906 Georges 
Clémenceau called in around 40,000 troops during the Miner’s strike, the decision was not 
a popular one and, the following year, during the so-called Revolt of the Languedoc 
Winegrowers, there was the almost unprecedented event of an army munity when the 17th 
line infantry regiment refused to follow orders to open fire on a crowd. It was the growing 
distaste for using the armed forces in this capacity that eventually led to the formation of the 
Gendarmerie Mobile in 1921 and, despite the aberration of the 1947/48 PCF strike, the end 
of the era of using regular troops for the maintenance of public order.  
Defence against Invasion: 1800 - 1984. Unlike Britain, whose historically powerful navy 
and favourable geographical location has ensured it has remained largely immune from 
invasion, France has faced multiple threats from foreign adversaries. Indeed, over the time 
period, France has fought in six wars that have involved at least 132 battles on their national 
territory and have been occupied on five of those occasions: under the Sixth Coalition in 
1814, under the Seventh Coalition between 1815 and 1818, by the Prussians in the North of 
the country between 1870 and 1871, by Imperial Germany in the North-East of the country 
between 1914 and 1918 and, of course, by Nazi Germany and Italy in the Second World War 
between 1940 and 1944. This persistent threat of invasion has necessitated the maintenance 
of large standing armies through conscription and fomented an inescapable internal 
component to France’s defence mentality.  
Although no battles or wars have occurred on French national territory since the end of the 
Second World War the French government still took very seriously the threat posed by state 
actors (notably the USSR). September 1950 saw the creation of the organisation territoriale 
interarmées de défense (OTIAD) which established a strategy of national defence across 
four areas: national, defence zone, military region and department. This was updated to 
défense intérieure du territoire (DIT) in December 1956 and Défense Opérationnelle du 
Territoire (DOT) in 1959 which had the objective of ‘annihilating the enemy elements which 
would succeed in establishing themselves on the national territory.’557 Under DOT, the 
military maintained a presence on the national territory to protect France’s strategic nuclear 
557 Messmer, Pierre. ‘Notre politique militaire’, Revue de Défense Nationale, May 1963, p. 761 
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forces and deter both internal and external enemies until 1984 when responsibility for these 
functions was ceded to the Gendarmerie.  
3) Counter terrorism: 1972 - present. In some senses, this era can be seen as a continuation
of the defence from invasion era. The need to respond to the perceived threat from subversive
elements has been a recurring theme in France’s domestic security strategy against both
conventional and unconventional threats across time. For example, France’s war in Algeria
between 1954 and 1962 brought with it the threat of terrorism on the mainland and, in 1958,
three Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) attackers opened fire on the French Information
Minister, Jacques Soustelle’s car, who escaped unharmed. The country also suffered a series
of attacks throughout the 1960s perpetrated by the pro-colonialism, right-wing group the
Organisation Armée Secrète. However, none of these incidents prompted a military
response. In fact, it was not until the high-profile attack at the Munich Olympics in 1972 that
the French policymakers felt it necessary to create a dedicated counter-terrorist unit. The
attack led to the formation of the GIGN in 1973 and, gradually, the armée de terre became
closer integrated into France’s domestic security architecture through the plan Vigipirate
(originally named Pirate).
With the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s, the threat of large-scale industrial war 
dissipated. As the size of France’s standing army was cut back in response to the new threat 
environment, the army also began to play a much greater role in countering a growing threat 
from terrorism in the 1990s. A series of bombings in the 1990s led to the deployment of a 
small number of troops in static guarding positions at vulnerable locations such as train 
stations and it is this model which paved the way for the eventual implementation of 
Sentinelle in 2015.   
For France, then, we are presented with evidence of significant change in how the armed 
forces have been used domestically over time. The next step is to assess whether these shifts 
in strategy have also led to shifts in attitudes. Of course, it is not the purpose of this thesis to 
provide a narrative of two hundred years of French history. Instead, the objective is to try 
and trace the cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically as expressed 
through rhetoric and discourse at formative moments in France’s history. As such, the 
remainder of this thesis will examine formative moments in each of the three eras identified 
above and then analyse the language used by policymakers and military personnel before 
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during and after each event to try and identify continuity or change in attitudes in order to 
establish what impact, if any, historical experience and culture have on France’s strategic 
approach.  
6.1.2. Structure of the French case 
The remainder of this chapter will focus on historical precedents for using the army to 
quell civil unrest. It will proceed as follows: 
Section 6.2. This section will examine the essential historical context through the French 
Revolution. It will argue that it was during this time that many enduring norms were forged 
such as the French view of the inseparability of internal and external theatres and the close 
bond between the nation and the army through the levée en masse. It will briefly discuss 
Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert’s distinction between a force de dedans and 
a force du dehors before examining the early days of the Gendarmerie.   
Section 6.3. This section will analyse the deployments associated with riot and protest. It 
will focus on the events of the Commune of Paris in 1871, which according to the data 
marked the most formative moment for France given the steady decline in the use of the 
armed forces domestically thereafter. It will examine parliamentary debates related to the 
use of the army against the Commune drawing out themes such as the internal-external 
security nexus and the rhetorical dehumanisation of the adversary (in this case the 
Communards). It will compare these responses to those of policymakers after Clemenceau’s 
use of the troops during the Revolt of the Languedoc Winegrowers in 1907; given the mutiny 
of the 17th line infantry regiment this appeared to be the final nail in the coffin for active 
military deployments against the people and led, like 1829 in Britain, to a fundamental 
institutional shift in how France approaches public disorder.  
Chapter 7, Section 7.1 focuses on the defence against invasion era. It starts with an analysis 
of the First World War when the deaths of over a million Frenchmen on French soil forged 
a closer bond between the army, the nation, and its people. Following on from the events of 
Languedoc, it no longer seemed appropriate to use soldiers against one’s own compatriots 
and, in 1921 the gendarmerie mobile was formed.  It will examine some inter-war 
recruitment campaigns to highlight the point that while a domestic duty was still portrayed 
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as being an essential component of life in the army, the nature of domestic deployments 
seemed to be depicted as far more passive. 
It will then focus on the post-Second World War environment, the PCF strikes, and the return 
of the concept of the ennemi de l’intérieur. It will argue that the perception of a high threat 
from subversive elements led to a closer integration of the military into Cold War domestic 
security architecture through doctrine such as DIT and DOT in the 1950s. It examines the 
coup d’état in 1958 and the suspicion of the army this generated from policymakers resulting 
in a predominantly protective internal duty for the army, rather than one of intervention 
which would be left to civil forces.  
Section 7.2 examines the counter-terrorism era. It argues that the growing threat from 
transnational terrorism in the 1970s was an extension of the previous era and the notion of 
an ennemi de l’intérieur. It will discuss the gradual integration of the army into France’s 
counter-terrorism responses with the formation of the GIGN in 1973 and the development 
of the Pirate plan, which became vigipirate in 1991. It will then analyse the responses to 
Sentinelle from 2015 arguing that although Sentinelle appears on the surface to represent a 
significant strategic shift, a comparison of the cultural preferences across time indicates that 
the character of the operation is in keeping with at least a hundred and fifty years of French 
historical precedents for the use of the army domestically lending weight to the hypothesis 
that historically-derived cultural preferences have constrained France’s strategic culture.  
Section 7.3 concludes by summarising the findings in the context of the French mindset, 
focusing on how dialectical perspectives form an essential part of the French psyche by 
valuing equally psychological and practical dimensions of strategy, internal and external 
security, and, crucially, continuity and change. 
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6.2. Historical context. The French Revolution 
Of all the events in France’s past, none has arguably been more impactful or created more 
significant political, social or economic reverberations than the French Revolution of 1789 
- 1798. Indeed, it was even during the French Revolution that the term idéologie, a concept
so important to the French psyche, was coined.558 While it is not the purpose of this thesis
to dwell on this already well-documented period of France’s history, it is necessary to
mention briefly the enduring impact of the Revolution as it is often seen as the bookmark in
France’s story that divides the ancient from the modern. For example, for theorists such as
Michel Vovelle, it is the most significant moment in terms of the formation of the French
mentalité and constitutes the birth of the nation’s enduring dialectic between left and right
politics, religion and secularism, ideology and reason, internal and external security, the
nation and its army.559
The immediate cause of the Revolution had its root in the Great Fear of 1789. The Third 
Estate (the peasantry), which comprised roughly 90% of France’s population at the time had 
endured years of poor harvests and, in July, rumours began circulating in rural France about 
a plot by the aristocracy to starve them to death. In Paris, these fears were exacerbated by 
Louis XVI’s decision to dismiss the minster for Finance, Jacques Necker and deploy around 
25,000 troops around the city. For the Parisians, this was seen as the start of the plot against 
them. One man, the journalist and close friend of Georges Danton, Camille Desmoulins is 
said to have delivered an impassioned speech at the news of Necker’s dismissal, exclaiming: 
‘one resource is left; to take arms!’560 
A spirit of popular resistance was typical of the period and Revolutionary France was marked 
by ‘an almost continuous succession of conflicts’561 as the various factions vying for control 
recognised that power lay at the point of the bayonet. 1792 proved to be a year of particular 
558 De Tracy, Destutt. Projet d'élément s d'idéologie: A l'usage des écoles' centrals de la republique française 
(Paris: Pierre Didot, Year IX). ‘ideology (idéologie) can be divided into normative standards, cognitive beliefs, 
and moral judgements. The political and social context to de Tracy’s theory of ideology lends it greater 
significance and helps further elucidate the tension between what should be done (ideology) and what can be 
done (pragmatism) that characterises the French mentalité. 
559 Vovelle, Michel. La Révolution française: 1789-1799, 3eme ed. (Paris: Armand Colin, 2015/1992) 
560 Mignet, François-Auguste. History of the French Revolution from 1789 to 1814. (Library of Alexandria, 
1856), p. 14 
561 Rothenberg, Gunther E. ‘Soldiers and the Revolution: The French Army, Society, and the State, 1788–99’ 




turmoil; Louis XVI had been allowed to continue to rule, but under a constitutional 
monarchy established by the first constitution of 1791. Yet his continued vetoes of decrees 
issued by the Legislative Assembly coupled with fears of an Austrian and Prussian invasion 
in defence of the monarchy, increased tensions between Republicans and Royalists. These 
tensions came to a head in August when armed revolutionaries clashed with Swiss Guards 
on the streets of Paris. The August insurrection culminated with an assault on the Tuileries 
Palace, the arrest of Louis XVI and the ultimate abolition of the Monarchy.  
 
This was a ‘sink or swim’ moment for the Revolution. The Legislative Assembly had 
declared war with Austria on 20 April 1792 after troops of the Habsburg monarchy began to 
amass on France’s border. Later in the Spring, war was also declared with Prussia. As well 
as external threats on France’s borders, there were also significant fears of internal counter-
revolutionary movements leading to the emergence of the term l’ennemi de l’intérieur. 
These fears provoked the Jacobin leader, Maximilien de Robespierre, to state that the 
‘French people must now rise up and arm themselves completely, whether to fight abroad, 
or to keep a lookout for despotism at home.’562 As Robespierre’s statement demonstrates, at 
this crucial moment in time, security in France was seen as a simultaneously internal and 
external endeavour.  
 
The trouble was that France was in no shape to wage war. If they failed to defeat the Austrian 
and Prussian coalition the monarchy would be restored, but in 1791 the French army totalled 
around 130,000 men compared with around 500,000 troops that the Austrians were capable 
of fielding and around 200,000 that Prussians had at their disposal. The notion that France 
faced multiple threats, both internal and external, but lacked the means to overcome them, 
was reflected in the Legislative Assembly’s famous declaration on 11 July 1792 that ‘la 
Patrie est en danger.’563 The text makes direct reference to the ‘internal agitation’ that had 
disrupted the security of the nation and appeals to them to ‘keep watch with untiring activity 
over the enemies within’. It also makes clear appeals to the revolutionary ideals of liberty, 
security, justice, and courage as well the more practical sense of duty to defend the nation. 
Thus, the declaration encouraged the people to fight 'with the general enthusiasm of freedom 
 
562 Robespierre cited in Davidson, Ian. The French Revolution: From Enlightenment to Tyranny. (Profile Books 
Ltd, 2016), p. 86 
563 Citoyens. Le Patrie est en danger. Proclamations et loix rendus a cette occasion. (Paris: Journal Vedette, 
1792)  
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and the deep feeling of the duties of citizen-soldiers’.564 This crucial point connected the 
duty of defence to each citizen, harnessing their martial spirit and forging an enduring 
association between the nation, the people, and the military.565  
The survival not just of the Revolution, but France herself was dependent on her ability to 
mobilise all of the nation’s resources. Thus, militarily this period also created significant 
changes in France’s approach to warfare and defence. The levée en masse, which attempted 
to capitalise on the French people’s revolutionary spirit, mobilised all of France’s ‘industry, 
all her building works, all her engineering works’566 and also placed French citizens in 
‘permanent requisition for army service’.567 It was formally implemented in 1793 due to a 
dire need for a greater number of troops to fight in the French Revolutionary Wars. In 1792, 
the standing army stood at around 220,000 troops, but by 1794 the French ranks had swelled 
to an enormous 750,000 troops.568 To paraphrase Robert Peel, in France the army were the 
public, and the public were the army.569 
The idea of a citizen army arguably derived from the influential writing of the French general 
and military philosopher, Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert who published his 
celebrated work Essai général de tactique in 1770.570 Much of Essai is concerned with the 
tactical side of warfare, addressing, for example, marching formations or the benefits of 
doubling ranks to deal with cavalry attacks, however, it is his more philosophical musings 
on the concept of a citizen army that catch the attention. In one passage that demonstrates 
an uncanny level of foresight, Guibert warned that ‘weak’ or ‘poorly-constituted’ states 
would forever be victims of circumstance fearing ‘agitation from within, and attack from 
without’.571 
564 Citoyens. Le Patrie est en danger. Proclamations et loix rendus a cette occasion. (Paris: Journal Vedette, 
1792), pp. 1-5 
565 It is this connection between the army and the people that will create fierce debate in the future when armed 
forces are used against the people; how can an army comprising French citizens be turned against those citizens 
in times of unrest?  
566 Deputy Barère, 23 August 1793, cited in Serman, Wiliam and Bertaud, Jean-Paul. Nouvelle Histoire 
militaire de la France, 1789 – 1919. (Paris: Fayard, 1998), p. 79 
567 Galisset, Charles Michel. Corps du droit français, vol. 1 Issue. 2, Paris, 1843, p. 1043 
568 Corvisier, Andre. Histoire Militaire de La France de 1715 à 1871, tome II. (Paris, France: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1992), pp. 238-244 
569 Robert Peel had originally stated that, in Britain, ‘the police are the public and the public are the police.’  
570 See Beatrice Heuser’s discussion of Guibert’s legacy in Heuser, Beatrice. Guibert: prophet of total war? 
In: Förster, Stig and Chickering, Roger, eds. War in an age of revolution, 1775–1815. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), pp. 46-67.  
571 Guibert, Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, Comte de. Essai Général de Tactique. Tome Premier. (London: 
Libraires Associés, 1772), p. li 
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Consequently, he advocated the formation of a milice – an army comprising the citizens of 
the state, rather than a professional body of troops. These conscripts would fight to defend 
the nation when called upon, cutting army maintenance costs. Further, the size of a milice, 
motivated by the desire to defend their way of life, their livelihoods and family, would be 
nearly ‘invincible’. Of equal importance to Guibert was that such an army could serve a 
purely defensive purpose. The nation’s formidable force coupled with domestic prosperity 
would mean the country would have ‘nothing to fear from its neighbours’ and nor would it 
‘want to initiate anything with them.’572 Thus, internal stability would provide the foundation 
for external harmony.  
Guibert’s Essai provided the French state with the perfect model for the levée en masse. 
Guibert would not live to see it realised, however. He died in 1790, the same year that his 
lesser known, but equally important work, De la Force Publique (On Public Force) was 
published. In some ways, this latter work can be seen as a rejection of Essai. Whereas Essai 
had advocated for a defensive citizen army, in De la Force Guibert found himself troubled 
by the dangers presented to civil liberties by arming citizens. He came to consider that there 
was a crucial distinction between the internal and external theatres and therefore suggested 
that professional military forces should be removed from duties of domestic security since 
they do not possess the requisite mentality. In the words of Guibert, the military mindset is 
‘by its nature in opposition with all the principles of citizenship. Soldiers must have a thirst 
for war, and citizens a love of peace.’573 As such, he argues that the military should be 
separated into a force du dehors and a force de dedans – an external, and an internal force.  
Guibert’s idea of forming two distinct forces, one internal and one external, was as 
progressive as it was influential. It seems that De la Force inspired the reform of the Parisian 
police system,574 indeed, many of the post-revolution policing reforms seem to follow his 
advice almost to the letter. For example, shortly after the fall of the Bastille, not only was 
the regular army pushed out of Paris, but the Lieutenancy-General, a ‘tyrannical’ and 
militarised police institution that had lasted for 120 years under the ancien regime, was also 
572 Guibert, Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, Comte de. Essai Général de Tactique. Tome Premier. (London: 
Libraires Associés, 1772), p. liii 
573 Guibert, Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, Comte de. De la Force Publique. (Paris: Economica, 1790/2005), p. 
9 
574 Tenenbaum, Élie; “La Sentinelle Égarée? L’armee de Terre face au terrorisme”; IFRI, June 2016, vol. 68 p. 
12 
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dissolved.575 In its stead, a milice – La Garde Nationale, was formed under the jurisdiction 
of the legislature. A condition of joining the Lieutenancy-General had been tours of duty in 
the army,576 however the Garde Nationale was recruited from the citizenry with its officials 
chosen by public vote. In a speech in 1791, Robespierre proposed ten conditions that would 
be essential for the Garde Nationale to adhere to. Conditions III and IV directly reflect 
Guibert’s writing on the distinction between internal and external forces:  
III – Line troops will remain responsible for fighting the external enemies; they can never 
be used against citizens. 
IV – The Garde Nationale alone will be employed, either to defend from attacks on liberty, 
or to restore internal public tranquillity if disturbed.
577
    
Despite the high hopes in the early days of the revolution for a progressive system for 
maintaining order and a strict delineation between internal and external force, the military 
steadily began to play a greater role across the country. Napoleon himself was the 
embodiment of France’s flexible distinction between internal and external security, returning 
from his campaign in Egypt in 1799 to carry out a military coup on 18 Brumaire. After the 
coup, Napoleon was seen as the man who could restore order to France and the military were 
considered the most effective tool to achieve this.578  
Provincial France was particularly vulnerable to episodes of disorder. Before the revolution, 
the Maréchaussée had been France’s military rural peacekeeping force. It had existed since 
the middle ages as an independent military unit. In 1763, Sir William Mildmay, the head of 
the Anglo-French Commission in Paris, saw the Maréchaussée in action and remarked that 
they were engaged in ‘a kind of perpetual war, not against a foreign enemy, but against such 
of the native subjects as disturb the peace and violate the laws of their country.’579 In 1791, 
this force was transformed into the Gendarmerie nationale; a ‘troop specially intended for 
575 Stead, Philip John. The Police of Paris. (London: Staples Press Limited, 1957), pp. 63-64; Denis, Vincent. 
Une Histoire de l'identité. France 1715-1815. (Paris: Champs Vallon, 2008), p. 145 
576 Denis, Vincent. Une Histoire de l'identité. France 1715-1815. (Paris: Champs Vallon, 2008), p. 144 
577 Robespierre, Maximilien de. ‘Œuvres complètes de Maximilien de Robespierre’, tome 6. (Paris: Bureaux 
de la Revue historiques de la révolution française, 1950), p. 642 
578 Emsley, Clive. Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp. 56-57 
579 Interestingly, Mildmay also wrote that while such a force would be beneficial to the UK, it would have to 
operate not as an independent military unit, but be ‘subservient wholly to the civil power.’ See: Mildmay, 
William. The Police of France: Or, an Account of the Laws and Regulations Established in that Kingdom, for 
the Preservation of Peace and the Preventing of Robbers. (London: E. Owen & T. Harrison, 1763), p. 31 
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internal service.’580 The Gendarmerie retained the Maréchaussée’s military status and the 
fact that it operated under the control of the Minster for War.  
Napoleon was a great admirer of the Gendarmerie and, as his correspondence demonstrates, 
he was highly reliant on their ability to deal with provincial disturbances, make arrests, and 
counter the growing threat from brigands.581 He also frequently requisitioned Gendarmes to 
supplement his ranks when on campaign. For example, the Gendarmes played a role during 
the Peninsular War and the repression of Madrid, during Napoleon’s ill-fated Russia 
campaign at the battle of Borodino and during the War of the Sixth Coalition during the 
battle of Leipzig. Even in the modern era, the Gendarmerie, by virtue of its military status, 
is deployed both at home and abroad. For example, the continuing threat of insurrection in 
the early twentieth century led to the formation of the Gendarmerie Mobile in 1921 as a unit 
for maintaining or restoring public order – a function it still serves to this day. The 
Gendarmerie Mobile have also frequently been deployed overseas; for example, during wars 
in Indochina (1946 – 1954), Algeria (1954 – 1962) and even in Afghanistan (2001 – 2012).582 
Of course, it is not just what we might term France’s ‘middle tranche’ or paramilitary forces 
that have been deployed domestically, but conventional forces as well. The army’s role 
transitioned from defence of the revolution from internal threats, to defence of the nation 
from external threats and, finally, to expansion of the empire. However, historically, the 
army have always been on hand to play a role in quelling public unrest. In addition to the 
army’s role in domestic pacification, France has also faced significant threats to its territorial 
integrity over the years. Unlike Britain, which has only seen one large-scale pitched battle 
on its territory in nearly three hundred years (Culloden, 1746), France has had to fight foreign 
invaders on its soil in at least 159 major battles over the same period.583 Also unlike Britain, 
which, due to its geography, has remained relatively safe from foreign invasion, France 
experienced enemy occupation as recently as 1940. This has necessitated a different and 
580 ‘Troupe spécialement destinée au service intérieur’ – Loi du 14 septembre 1791 portant institution, 
composition, droits et devoirs de la force publique 
581 ‘The confidential correspondence of Napoleon Bonaparte with his brother Joseph, sometime king of Spain 
: selected and translated, with explanatory notes, from the "Mémoires du roi Joseph"’. (London: J. Murray, 
1855) 
582 Le Parisien. ‘Les gendarmes mobiles visés en Afghanistan’, 8 January 2010. See: 
http://www.leparisien.fr/oise-60/les-gendarmes-mobiles-vises-en-afghanistan-08-01-2010-769519.php 
(accessed 10/05/2019) 
583 Author’s calculation based on pitched battles fought on land during the War of the First Coalition, the 
Peninsular War, the War of the Sixth Coalition, the Hundred Days War, the Franco-Prussian War, the First 




flexible strategic approach to defence that encompasses both internal and external 
operations. Thus, while the presence of troops on the streets in Britain may provoke a 
reaction of surprise from the public, from the French perspective it is plus ça change…  
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6.3. Countering Riot, Protest, and Insurrection in France
Sur une barricade, au milieu des pavés 
Souillés d'un sang coupable et d'un sang pur lavés, 
Un enfant de douze ans est pris avec des hommes. 
- Es-tu de ceux-là, toi ? - L'enfant dit : Nous en sommes.
- C'est bon, dit l'officier, on va te fusiller.
Attends ton tour. - L'enfant voit des éclairs briller,
Et tous ses compagnons tomber sous la muraille. 
Victor Hugo, Sur une Barricade, 1872 
6.3.1. France: left, right, everything all at once 
In 1947, the French economist Jean Labasse published his book Hommes de droit, hommes 
de gauche; for Labasse, political divisions in France were so entrenched and irreconcilable 
that he attempted to explore the particular ‘spiritual structures’ of those who find themselves 
on opposing sides of the political spectrum in order better to understand the reasons for these 
divergent views. Labasse believed he noted significant differences in the character of those 
on ‘the left’ in France and those on ‘the right’. He wrote that ‘the spirit of the left is about 
protest and demands against what is established’ while, by contrast, the right is about 
‘certainty, dogmatic assurance, anonymous constancy, respect.’584  Furthermore, according 
to Labasse, not only is there little to no overlap between the respective mindsets or practical 
characteristics of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’, but he also viewed protest firmly as a 
characteristic of the left.585 
A  number of prominent French academics and policymakers have argued to the contrary of 
this view; not least Charles de Gaulle who, as was noted previously, stated that France is 
neither left nor right wing, but ‘everything all at once.’586 De Gaulle’s then Minster for 
Justice, Alain Peyrefitte, argued similarly in his 1976 book Le Mal Français. Here he wrote 
that ‘[a]ll French people, deep down, remain ready to stand up against the state.’587 He 
argued that within each French citizen there exists a deeply-ingrained spirit of rebellion 
584 Labasse, Jean. Hommes de droit, hommes de gauche. (Paris: Économie et humanism, 1947), p. 13 
585 Ibid. 
586 de Gaulle, Charles. Entretien avec Michel Droit, troisième Partie, 15 December 1965. See: 
https://fresques.ina.fr/de-gaulle/fiche-media/Gaulle00112/entretien-avec-michel-droit-troisieme-partie.html 
(accessed 20/12/2017) 
587 ‘Chaque francais, au fond de lui-même, reste prêt à se dresser contre l'état.’ Peyrefitte, Alain. Le Mal 
Français. (Paris: Plon, 1976), p. 56 
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which encompasses a feeling of ‘nostalgia’ for revolutions, a glorification of the ‘anarchist 
mythology’, a tendency to recoil at the notion of state-imposed order and a hatred of ‘les 
flics’ or ‘les poulets’.588 Thus, for de Gaulle and Peyrefitte the notion that protest, or at least 
a desire to challenge the status quo, is a characteristic of ‘the left’ is clearly mistaken; instead 
the power of the state and its perceived intrusion on national life render protest a 
characteristic of the French in more general terms. 
De Gaulle, of course, was famous for wanting to carve France in his own image, and the 
embracing of contradictions is typical of ‘Gaullism’.589 Nevertheless, the notion that protest 
and dissent are defining and ubiquitous national characteristics seems to be a widely-held 
view in France. This is due, in no small part, to the fact that some of the most important 
social changes in France have occurred as a result of popular protest rather than through 
protracted political reform.590 Most notably, of course, in 1789 when popular revolution 
based on the (then) radical principles of universal liberty, equality, and fraternity sowed the 
seeds for the modern French system that we recognise today. Indeed, the historian Jonathan 
Fenby writes that the lasting impact of the Revolution created a desire for radical political 
and social overhaul that is unique to France.591  
This could be seen clearly during the 2005 banlieue riots,592 when disaffected young French 
citizens of predominantly Middle Eastern, African and North African heritage rioted in the 
suburbs for three weeks resulting in the imposition of a state of emergency. Despite the 
widespread violence and destruction,593 many French citizens understood the anger of the 
rioters who had let their rage at poor housing conditions, police brutality, and general racial 
discrimination boil over. Indeed, British-born author and French citizen Lucy Wadham 
588 “Flics” and “Poulets” are both slang terms for the police. The English equivalent of “Flic” would be “cop” 
while “pig” would be the British equivalent of “Poulet”. The term “poulet” to describe the French police force 
originated in 1871 following the construction of the new police headquarters on the site of an old Parisian 
poultry market. 
589 Berstein, Serge. Gaullism. The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World. Second edition. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 307-308 
590 Wadham, Lucy. The Secret Life of France. (London: Faber & Faber, 2009), p. 210 
591 Fenby, Jonathan. The History of Modern France. From the Revolution to the War with Terror. (London: 
Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 3 
592 ‘Les banlieues’ refer to the outskirts or suburbs of a city. As in most cities around the world, the suburbs 
comprise people of all ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds. Indeed, in Paris, around 75% of the city’s 
population technically live in a banlieue. However, in the French language, les banlieues refers to areas of low-
income housing and the individuals of predominantly non-French heritage who reside there.      
593 Riots occurred in 300 French cities. Around 8,000 cars were burned during the riots and 2,760 people were 
arrested. See: Gross, Oren & Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala. Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and 
Practice. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 200 
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contends that protest (or at least dissent) is almost considered a rite of passage in France and 
it was the 2005 riots that marked the point at which the second and third-generation 
immigrants who were participating in the riots became ‘truly French.’594  
Thus, dissent, resistance, and protest should be considered as accepted, essential, and 
formative components of France’s national character. Interestingly, there is also a clear  
dialectical aspect to the French psyche that is reminiscent of Simmel’s arguments on the 
tension between structure and agency; while the French will recoil at, and even react 
violently to, the idea of restrictions to public liberties, Peyrefitte also argued that they 
simultaneously yearn for the ‘expeditious’ and ‘merciless’ imposition of order.595 The result 
is individual and societal division due to the tension that exists between the belief in the need 
for systemic overhaul and the acknowledgment that forcibly implementing changes would 
threaten France’s republican values in the present. 
Evidence of this dialectic can be found in a circular issued to various French départements 
in November 1793 by a temporary administrative commission that had been established in 
Lyon. This circular offered instructions on post-Revolution governance; the pertinent 
passage read: ‘…to be truly Republican, each citizen must experience and bring about in 
himself a revolution equal to the one which has changed France.’596 This statement is a 
recognition that a disconnect may exist between individual beliefs and the general will; it 
actively encourages each citizen to challenge, even change, their own views in order to better 
adhere to the principles expected of a French citizen. This ‘character versus self’597 
dichotomy further elucidates what de Gaulle meant when he spoke of the ‘currents’598 that 
move within the French people; this tension manifests in a populace that simultaneously 
craves radical change (or, as Labasse wrote, ‘protest and demands against what is 
established’) and demands social and political ‘constancy [and] respect’.  
594 Wadham, Lucy. The Secret Life of France. (London: Faber & Faber, 2009), p. 210 
595 Peyrefitte, Alain. Le Mal Français. (Paris: Plon, 1976), p. 56 
596 'Instruction adressée aux autorités constituées des départements de Rhône et de Loire, par la Commission 
temporaire de Lyon (16 November 1793), reprinted in Walter Markov and Albert Soboul, ed., Die Sansculotten 
von Paris: Dokumente zur Geschichte der Volksbewegung, 1793-1794, Berlin, 1957, p. 224. 
597 The ‘character versus self’ dichotomy is a concept from fiction writing. It represents the idea that a person 
can be torn between their own ideas about how things should be (the self) and the normative expectations that 
are transmitted by wider society that constrain one’s actions (the character). The result is often some form of 
internal or external confrontation. We could refer to Winston, the protagonist from George Orwell’s 1984, as 
an example of this. Externally, Winston, supports the party; internally, he rejects it. This tension ends up 
destroying him.   




Typically, throughout history, the French polity has maintained constancy by obliging the 
calls for ‘expeditious’ and ‘merciless’ action through the use of the military. Indeed, prior to 
the twentieth century, the army was used extensively as a tool or repression by the French 
state. This is reflected in chart eleven which illustrates 151 significant instances of the 
French army being deployed against the people since 1800. The majority of these (83%) 
occurred between the years 1800 and 1871.599 There were, of course, a number of significant 
incidents post-1871. For example, in 1891, the military’s killing of nine workers who were 
peacefully protesting against a twelve-hour working day in the industrial town of Fourmies; 
the mass deployment of the military under Georges Clemenceau during the Miner’s strike 
of 1906 and again in 1907 during the revolt of the Languedoc winegrowers; and the 
deployment of army to counter PCF strikes that were perceived to have taken an 
insurrectionary character in 1947 and 1948.   
In spite of these aberrations, as chart eleven clearly illustrates, incidences of domestic 
military deployment for the purpose of countering civil disorder have been on a downward 
trajectory since 1871 and the events of the Commune. While the revolutions of 1830 and 
1848, even the rural revolts of 1851 were undoubtedly significant episodes in France’s 
history, the inescapable conclusion based on the data is that the Commune represents the 
clearest formative moment for France.  
599 N.B. this excludes an incident in Sevins in 2014 when a 21-year-old protester by the name of Rémi Fraisse 
was killed by an OF-F1 stun grenade thrown by a Gendarme. Protests had escalated over plans to construct a 
dam in the area. Fraisse’s death resulted in further violent protests across France and the cancellation of the 
dam project. This clearly was a ‘significant’ incident and provoked much debate among policymakers and in 
the French media over the appropriate use of force. However, it was excluded as it did not involve the 
deployment of regular troops, but the Gendarmerie Nationale who were acting in their capacity as forces de 
l’ordre; forces under the control of the civil power for the purpose of maintaining order.     
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Chart 11: Riots, Protests, Insurrection. Domestic deployments, 1800 - 2019 
Source: Archives Nationales, Secondary Literature600 
With this in mind, this chapter will first explore some of the essential historical context such 
as Napoleon’s efforts at restoring order to the country through the Gendarmerie during the 
early nineteenth century. This section will focus on the language used by officials to refer to 
the rural population arguing that dehumanising references to the ‘savagery’ of the inhabitants 
facilitated the use of force. It will then analyse in depth the events of the Commune and the 
rhetoric used by French policymakers at the time. Again, it draws out from the rhetoric the 
idea of detachment from the adversary in order to justify the extreme measures that are taken. 
It will compare this to the language used during the events of the Languedoc winegrowers’ 
revolt of 1907 – another significant formative moment in France’s past due to the mutiny of 
a regiment who refused to fire on their compatriots. It will compare the themes in the 
examples to argue that by 1907 there has been a clear shift in cultural preferences away from 
the idea of using the armed forces as a tool for maintaining internal security.       
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6.3.2. ‘The restoration of the country’  
In his study of domestic state violence in France from the Croquant revolt of 1594 to the 
events of the Commune in 1871, the British historian Howard Brown explores the phases of 
popular revolt and the repressive responses by the French state. Using Max Weber’s theory 
of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, Brown argues that French 
policymakers have historically oscillated between employing reasonable, but coercive force 
against their citizenry in order to quell simmering civil unrest on the one hand, and using 
unreasonable, excessive and repressive domestic state violence through the use of the armed 
forces on the other. According to Brown, it is these cycles of popular unrest and military 
repression that have given modern France its character; for example, not only was military 
repression seen as an essential part of the ‘civilizing process’ of rural France,601 but episodes 
of repression also made the general population more likely to resist the polity, thus 
embedding a sense of resistance into the general psyche.602  
As noted at the start of the chapter, the majority of the domestic military deployments to 
counter episodes of civil unrest that were identified in the data occurred in the nineteenth 
century Of course, France’s tendency to rely on the military was not something that began 
in 1800. During the eighteenth century there were frequent examples of soldiers being used 
in a domestic capacity; not least during and after the French Revolution when military force 
became the first resort in the polity’s attempts to control the parts of the country that were 
still experiencing political instability as a result of the chaos of factionalism, rampant 
criminality and general civil unrest.  
The nature of the threat was encapsulated in an inaugural address by General Calvin who 
was appointed by Napoleon as commander of the army stationed in the Vaucluse on 6 March 
1800. He stated: ‘The reign of factions is over; that of order is beginning. The Government 
detests the wicked, and I declare in its name that I will make open war on the brigands who 
are devastating the countryside.’603 This is an interesting early example of militarising a 
threat.  Brigandage, which was essentially a criminal act, was treated as a state of war in 
601 Brown, Howard. ‘Domestic State Violence: Repression from the Croquants to the Commune.’ The 
Historical Journal, 42:3 (1999), p. 660 
602 Ibid. pp. 597-662 
603 Brown, Howard. Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice and Repression from the Terror to 
Napoleon. (Charlotessville: University of Virginia Press, 2006), p. 302 
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order to justify a military response. Indeed, typically in rural France it has always been 
military, rather than civil, units that have dealt with unrest and maintaining order and the 
origins of the military unit Gendarmerie Nationale can be traced back to the sergents hired 
by Philippe Augustus during the crusades of 1190.604 This not only makes the Gendarmerie 
France’s oldest institution, but also illustrates over eight hundred years of using the military 
to maintain order on the national territory.605   
The Gendarmerie had subsumed the Maréchaussée of the Ancien Regime following the 
events of the Revolution.606 However, Napoleon, suspicious of the Gendarmerie’s ‘esprit 
vaurien’607 endeavoured to reform the unit into one that would eventually become ‘the first 
soldiers of the republic’. Its purpose, according to the law of 1798 would be ‘to ensure within 
the Republic, the maintenance of order and the execution of the laws. A constant, ever-
watchful surveillance constitutes the essence of its service.’608 Although this law placed law 
placed the Gendarmerie partly under the jurisdiction of the ministry for war and partly under 
the ministry of the interior, its fundamental military status could not be ignored: in July 1801 
by the decree of 12 Thermidor (Year IX) recruitment was expanded in order better to deal 
with the threat of brigands. The decree increased its capacity to 26 legions comprising 1,750 
cavalry brigades and 750 infantry brigades.609 Men who joined the Gendarmerie were 
required to have extensive military experience, to have served in at least three of the four 
campaigns that had been waged since the outbreak of the Revolution and, furthermore, to 
have served at least four years in the cavalry. Furthermore, on the buttons of their uniforms 
the words ‘force à la loi’ were engraved and the symbol of the fleur de lys that had been 
previously been visible on the uniforms had been replaced by the image of a grenade.610  It 
was to the Gendarmerie, through their campaigns in rural France, that Napoleon attributed 
‘the restoration of the country.’611 
604 Diamant-Berger, Marcel. Huit siècles de la gendarmerie. (Paris: J.F. Editions, 1967) 
605 Emsley, Clive. Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), p. 13 
606 The English equivalent of the Maréchaussée would be constabulary; a word associated with the civil police 
force. However, the Maréchaussée were a military unit and would later be reorganised into the Gendarmerie. 
607 ‘Villainous spirit’ – Luc, Jean-Noël. Gendarmerie, état et société au XIXe siècle. Histoire de la France aux 
XIXe et XXe siècles – 59. (Paris: Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2002), p.38 
608 LOI DU 28 GERMINAL AN VI, Loi relative à l'organisation de la gendarmerie nationale. No. 1807, 
Donnée à Paris le 28 germinal an VI, 17 avril 1798 
609 AF/IV/1707-AF/IV/1718 - p. 25, Organisation de l'armée de la République. 18 thermidor an IX 
610 Emsley, Clive. Gendarmes and the State in Nineteenth-Century Europe. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), p. 42 
611 Letter from Napoleon to Joseph Fouché, Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, Vol. 10, No. 8,375, 10 ventôse, 





6.3.3. Detachment, dehumanisation and the use of force 
 
Eugen Weber’s book Peasants into Frenchmen examines the use of force in rural France by 
tracking the French polity’s attempt at socially and politically integrating France’s provincial 
population into the nation as a whole. He argues that there was the prevailing assumption 
that two versions of France existed: the cultured France that one found in the cities along 
with fine art, literature, music, theatre and politics; and the savage France of the provinces 
where only ‘officials’ and ‘soldiers’ would dare to venture.612  
 
Indeed, Weber dedicates some time to detailing some of the references to the savagery of 
rural dwellers in the language of the gentry in the nineteenth century. For example, a 
guidebook from 1857 wrote that the country’s villages were ‘hardly touched by 
civilization.’613 Following the rural revolts of 1851, officials and military personnel would 
refer to the ‘savagery’ and ‘barbarism’ of the locals. One particularly astonishing passage 
from the memoires of a landowner from Limousin in 1867 refers to the French peasants who 
worked for him as follows:  
 
‘animals with two feet, hardly resembling a man. [The peasant’s] clothes are filthy; under 
his thick skin one cannot see the blood flow. The wild, dull gaze betrays no flicker of 
thought in the brain of this being, morally and physically atrophied.’
614
   
 
 
By treating the rural populations as less than human, the soldiery was able to detach from 
them which, in turn, facilitated the use of extreme measures. These measures included the 
mass employment of military tribunals, arbitrary arrests, excessive use of force to quell 
dissent, even the formation of corps d’éclaireurs (‘flying columns’) of between 200 and 400 
men charged with hunting those accused of brigandage and immediately trying them often 
without evidence. Indeed, a trial was not allowed to occur more than twenty-four hours after 
the capture of a brigand, thus due process and defence for those accused was entirely lacking 
 
612 Weber, Eugen. Peasants into Frenchmen: the modernization of rural France, 1870-1914. (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1976) 
613 Chevalier, Elisa. Guide pittoresque de la Nièvre. (Paris: 1857) p. 274 cited in Weber, Eugen. Peasants into 
Frenchmen. the modernization of rural France, 1870-1914. (Standford: Stanford University Press,1976), p. 5 
614 Romieu, Marie Sincère. Des paysans et de l’agriculture en France au XiXe siècle. (Paris: Intérêts, mœurs, 
institutions, 1865), p. 319 
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leading to the accusation that the éclaireurs brought ‘the Terror to the provinces.’615 
However, by virtue of the ‘savagery’ of the rural population, these actions did not incur 
much ire from French policymakers as repression was seen as the path to civilisation.   
Rural France seems to have borne the brunt of the more long-lasting and repressive military 
policies throughout the nineteenth century. However, there are of course significant 
examples in France’s history where the armed forces have also been used in an urban setting. 
It was Paris that was the epicentre of the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, for example. While 
Lyon and Paris were also blighted by revolts and military repression in 1831 and 1832, 
respectively. Paris was again the subject of a mass mobilisation of troops in 1871 when a 
radical socialist government ruled Paris. The question this raises is why, if these cities were 
‘civilised’, was the use of military force deemed acceptable? The following section will 
examine in depth the events of the Commune with a particular focus on the rhetoric that was 
used by French policymakers and their reactions to the use of the armed forces against the 
Communards.  
6.3.4. The Commune, 1871: the ‘enemies of civilisation’616 
The French Third Republic was formed against a backdrop of both extreme internal and 
external instability. Its predecessor, the Second Republic, had been the masters of their own 
downfall following the ill-advised declaration of war against Prussia. There had been 
concerns among the French government that German unification would shift the balance of 
power on the continent irrevocably away from France and, thus, parliament declared war on 
16 July 1870. France had no allies and was not ready for a war against such a well-resourced 
and well-trained adversary and initial French advances into Prussia in early August were 
beaten back with relative ease. One month later the war was all but over. On 1 September, 
at the battle of Sedan, France lost 17,000 troops and had another 21,000 captured. By 
contrast, Prussia lost just 2,000. The next day, Napoleon III surrendered along with 100,000 
of his troops. France had lost its leader and the path to Paris was now clear for the Prussian 
army. 
615 Brown, Howard G. Ending the French Revolution: Violence, Justice, and Repression from the Terror to 
Napoleon. Charlottesville. (Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 2006), p. 318 
616 Chaurand, M. le baron. Annales de l’assemblé nationale. Compte-rendu in extenso des séances, tome VI, 4 





The Third Republic, along with a government for continuing the war known as the 
Government of National Defence, was proclaimed by Leon Gambetta at the Hotel de Ville 
in Paris just two days after the capture of Napoleon III. However, with the Prussian armies 
rapidly advancing, the French government relocated its capital to Tours. The siege of Paris 
would last from 19 September to 28 January during which time 400,000 Prussian soldiers, 
under the command of Helmuth von Moltke, surrounded the city, bombarded it with heavy 
artillery, and gradually starved the Parisians. Desperation led the Third Republic to sign an 
armistice agreement and, following an indemnity agreement that involved the French ceding 
control of Alsace-Lorraine, the Prussians allowed food to flow back into Paris. Their final 
humiliation would be the brief, symbolic victory parade held on the Champs-Élysées before 
the Prussian army departed Paris.  
 
Some Parisians felt let down by the government’s capitulation and wanted France to 
continue the fight; on 12 February 1871, the famous poet and author Victor Hugo returned 
from political exile to address the National Assembly and, in typically poetic fashion, 
implored the French ‘to strengthen, to reaffirm, to regenerate, to become again the great 
France, the France of [17]92, the France of the idea, the France of the sword.’617 Hugo’s 
reference to the ‘France of 1792’ was also one of the reasons for growing radicalisation. 
Many people, including the radical Louis Auguste Blanqui, had been ashamed of the 
government’s failure to invoke this spirit of resistance in the struggle against the Prussian 
siege.618    
 
In consequence, radicals began staging demonstrations calling for ‘la république 
démocratique et sociale’.619 Many of these demonstrations were attended by members of the 
increasingly politicised National Guard which, due to the exodus of the middle and upper 
classes during the siege, had come to be dominated by the working classes. These 
demonstrations would often result in violent clashes with regular troops. The most serious 
of these occurred on 18 March when troops attempted to remove 170 cannons from 
Montmartre. The National Guard attempted to prevent the regular troops from removing the 
cannons, capturing and executing two Generals of the French army in the process. In an 
 
617 Hugo, Victor. Oeuvres complètes de Victor Hugo. Actes et paroles 3. (Paris: J. Hetzel, 1880), p.103 
618 Blanqui, Louis Auguste in Le Goff, Phillipe ed. The Blanqui Reader: Political Writings, 1830-1880. 
(London: Verso, 2018), pp. 271-280 
619 Claretie, Jules. Histoire de la Révolution de 1870-1871, Volume 2. (Paris: L’Éclipse, 1872), p.77 
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address to the National Assembly, President Adolphe Thiers declared it to be ‘an open revolt 
against the national sovereignty’ perpetrated by ‘[c]riminals, fools… [who] disorder and 
ruin’ Paris.620  
After the execution of the Generals, the radicals marched towards the Hôtel de Ville, 
capturing it and raising their solid red flag while other National Guardsmen raided local 
gunpowder stores. The Commune was declared and, for seventy-two days it ruled according 
to revolutionary principles including the separation of church and state, the abolition of the 
death penalty, and secular education. The government of the Third Republic could not stand 
for an independent government within its borders and took swift action to crush the rebellion; 
during April and May they laid siege to Paris with the army pushing into the city on 21 May. 
What followed was the so-called semaine sanglante (‘bloody week’) where an extended 
period of brutal repression took place at the hands of the French army. No quarter was given 
to the Communards as unarmed men and women, prisoners, innocent bystanders and even, 
on 24 May, the archbishop of Paris, were summarily executed. There were reports of 
beatings, rapes and even corpse mutilations. The savagery of the soldiers prompted the 
American minster to France, Elihu Washburne to declare his shock. He wrote in his 
memoires that  
The rage of the soldiers and the people knows no bounds. No punishment is too great, or too 
speedy, for the guilty, but there is no discrimination. Let a person utter a word of sympathy, 
or even let a man be pointed out to a crowd as a sympathizer and his life is gone. … A well-
dressed respectable looking man was torn into a hundred pieces … for expressing a word of 
sympathy for a man who was a prisoner and being beaten almost to death.
621
  
At the end of the week, in a letter entitled ‘Paris burns’, the French author Émile Zola 
described Paris as ‘a cemetery full of corpses and smoking debris, a field cursed and 
620 Thiers, Adolphe. Jurisprudence générale du royaume en matière civile, commerciale et criminelle : ou 
Journal des audiences de la Cour de cassation et des Cours royales. (Paris: Bureau de la Jurisprudence 
Générale, 1871), p. 29 
621 Hill, Michael. Elihu Washburne: The Diary and Letters of America’s Minister to France during the Siege 




deserted, like the fields of Babylon and Thebes.’622 Some of the highest estimates place the 
death toll at 30,000 people.623  
 
This was a war (albeit a limited war in terms of time and geography) between working class 
revolutionaries and the state and it left an indelible mark on France. But how did the 
policymakers of the time react to the events? Chart twelve provides a summary of 119 
statements that were analysed during the early stages of the Commune and during the 
‘bloody week’. Like the British case, statements supporting the use of the armed forces are 
coded in green and are to the left of the chart. Neutral statements that state facts without any 
discernible tone are coded in orange in the centre and negative statements that condemn the 
use of the armed forces are in red on the right of the chart.    
 
 
Chart 12: Reactions to the use of the army against the Commune – 1871 
 
 
Sourcess: Archives Nationales, l'Assemblée nationale, Sénat 
 
622 Zola, Émile. Le 25 mai 1871 - 4 ème letter – ‘Paris brûle’ 
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First, it is worth noting the extreme political division in the tone of the debate. This supports 
de Gaulle’s claim that France is a country of ‘everything all at once’. There is an interesting 
spread between the positive statements, which comprise 51% of the total, and the negative 
statements, which make up 37%. This is a tangible piece of evidence which illustrates 
France’s tendency to see polarised views on certain issues. This is compared with the British 
charts, which generally convey consensus.  
The most frequently referenced positive themes from the speeches and statements are that 
the use of the army was necessary given the threat and that the army conducted itself 
admirably. For example, according to the Minister for the Interior, Ernest Picard, France had 
been ‘struck by an insurrection which has no equal in history’ but the ‘army has fulfilled its 
duty … and defends the cause of France with intrepidity and patriotism inequal measure.’624 
Picard’s reference to patriotism is interesting given that the army was fighting French 
citizens. However, it relates to another frequently mentioned theme, which is that the 
situation constituted a state of war. Again, Picard stated: ‘The state of war is blatant. The 
declaration of a state of siege is therefore not dictated by political considerations, but by 
defence needs.’625 This is an interesting statement in that it conveys a sense of rational 
necessity; Picard is not suggesting a military response for emotive or moral reasons, but 
rather it is a calculated assessment based on the perceived level of the threat and the 
requirements of the state at that time.   
The centre-right politician Antonin Lefèvre-Pontalis argued similarly with the succinct 
statement that ‘[i]t's necessary to use force against violence.’626 Again, this is a matter-of-
fact statement that is removed from moral argument. Pontalis is simply stating that as soon 
as the National Guard and the Communards took up arms, they constituted a threat to the 
stability of Paris and, through Revolutionary ideas that spread to other Communes across 
the country, to France as well. As a result, in his view, the only recourse was the use of the 
armed forces in order to meet and quell the threat.  
624 Picard, Ernest. Journal officiel de la République française, 4 April 1871, no.94. p. 392 
625 Picard, Ernest. Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes, 20 March 
1871, Annexe no. 59 
626 Lefèvre-Pontalis, Antonin. Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, 
annexes, 20 March 1871, p. 10 
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There are numerous other examples of individuals who argued along similar, rational lines. 
For example, Centrist Étienne Vacherot stated ‘In such a situation, [of a municipal Paris] I 
declare to you that, on my own account, I see no other guarantee of order than a state of 
permanent siege.’627; another minister declared that ‘Society will not be possible if such 
attacks cannot be suppressed by force…for there can be no freedom when violence prevails 
in any form.’628 The irony of the latter statement is, of course, that extreme violence was 
used in order to suppress the Commune. Nevertheless, the speeches and statements are 
replete with fairly unemotive references to the rather biblical notion of violence begetting 
violence.  
There are of course more emotive references in the statements. One of the most prevalent 
relates to the concept that, upon taking up arms against the state or even by rejecting the 
values that were perceived to represent France, members of the Commune had forfeited their 
rights as citizens. For example, the vice-President of the Senate, René Bérenger stated ‘they 
threatened Paris, and by that very fact they prevented Paris from being free.’629 This is a less 
rational statement that falls broadly within the concept of an appeal to emotion. He implies 
that the actions of the Communards contravened the vague, undefined notion of Parisian 
values thereby undermining the city’s freedom.  
Interestingly, Bérenger refers simply to ‘they’, perhaps in an attempt to delineate between 
the two sides and detach himself from the adversary. In fact, this idea of detachment is one 
of the most glaring themes that comes across in the speeches. All of the members of the 
Commune were French citizens. Although they had rejected the authority of the Third 
Republic, their disdain was not based on any anti-French sentiment, but rather a different 
version of France that respected what they felt were true Republican values (la république 
démocratique et sociale’). Nevertheless, the French policymakers refer almost exclusively 
to ‘brigands’, ‘bandits’, ‘criminals’, ‘insurgents’, and ‘enemies’. The implication is that their 
criminal status puts them in opposition to France’s values, forfeiting their rights as citizens 
and transforming them into legitimate targets. For example, Joseph de Carayon-Latour, a 
politician and colonel in the French army at the time, declared that ‘[w]e should consider 
627 Vacherot, Étienne. Journal officiel de la République français, 8 September 1871, no. 250, p. 3296 
628 Picard, Ernest. Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes, 20 March 
1871, p. 41 
629 Bérenger, René. Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes, tome II, 
20 March 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 35 
216 
them as they deserve, as bandits and enemies’.630 While one statement quite explicitly 
declared that those who had killed the two generals at Montmartre could no longer be 
considered French. A witness to the incident stated that one of the generals ‘had the 
misfortune… to receive two new wounds.’ And that [u]nfortunately these wounds had been 
made by French hands.’ Jules Favre, Minister for Foreign Affairs, immediately asserted that 
‘Those hands are not French!’631 There are also references to battles between the ‘soldiers 
of France’ and the ‘insurgents’,632 the ‘bandits of Paris’,633 of a ‘fight against the enemies of 
France’,634 against ‘our internal enemies’635 and against ‘the enemies of civilisation.’636 
This brings us back to the notion of dehumanisation and detachment that was discussed 
earlier.   It is a basic psychological fact that humans have an innate ability to form 
attachments. Indeed, modern attachment theory posits that it is not so much an ability as a 
need.637 In other words, it is constitutive to our humanity. To take this a step further, we are 
more likely to form attachments to things to which we can identify and empathise. In short, 
humans will naturally identify with other humans. Samuel L.A. Marshall addressed a similar 
point in his book Men Against Fire where he noted that around 75% of the US soldiers in 
the Second World War would intentionally miss their targets.638 With this in mind, when 
faced with a conflict situation it is necessary to employ methods that sever, or at least limit, 
attachment. One such method is to appeal to the sense of duty; to return to the rhetoric of 
policymakers during the Commune, one statement argued that ‘one would fail all one’s 
duties towards the State and the fatherland if one were not to shoot [at the crowds]’.639 A 
second method is to rhetorically distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This is what the French 
state did when referring to the ‘savages’ of rural France and again here by implying that the 
630 Carayon-Latour, Joseph de. Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, 
annexes, tome II, 20 March 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 62 
631 Favre, Jules. Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes, tome II, 20 
March 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 15 
632 Ibid. 
633 Carayon-Latour, Joseph de. Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, 
annexes, tome II, 20 March – 12 May 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 62 
634 Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes, tome V, 19 August – 16 
September 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 417 
635 Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes, tome V, 19 August – 16 
September 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 415 
636Chaurand, M. le baron. Annales de l’assemblé nationale. Compte-rendu in extenso des séances, tome VI, 4 
Décembre 1871 au 13 Janvier 1872, p. 47 
637 Johnson, Sue. Attachment Theory in Practice: Emotionally Focused Therapy (EFT) with Individuals, 
Couples and Families. (New York: The Guildford Press, 2019), p. 5 
638 Marshall’s book is controversial and the sources for his statistics are highly questionable. Marshall, Samuel 
L. A. Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command (Infantry Journal, 1947)
639 Lasteyrie, M. de. Annales de l'Assemblée nationale: compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes, tome
V, 19 August – 16 September 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 482
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Communards were ‘uncivilised enemies’ thus justifying the use of force. There is a clear, 
and shocking, example of this in one particular statement taken from a period during the 
‘bloody week’. Here, Adolphe Thiers is recounting the actions of the troops to the assembly: 
in the midst of the waves of a population that surrounds them on all sides, they see in front 
of them men, women who are not armed with rifles. They, who did not hesitate before the 
Prussians, hesitated before this multitude…. we had to bring them back from the left bank 




Thiers laments the fact that the soldiers would not fire at the unarmed men and women who 
they were facing. Clearly, their proximity meant that they could see the faces and the genders 
of their opposition. The troops would automatically have formed attachments; they would 
have viewed the masses as compatriots, not targets. Thus, it was necessary to withdraw his 
troops to a position where the crowd was amorphous or, at least, where the crowd’s faces 
became silhouettes, in order to shoot more effectively.    
Unlike the British Hansard archives, the French sources annotate many of the speeches with 
the reactions of the crowds (e.g. ‘assent on the left benches’, or ‘applause from the right and 
centre benches’). There are also annotations that indicate widespread approval throughout 
the assemblée nationale and many of the descriptive anecdotes (such as that quoted above) 
incite praise from all benches of parliament regardless of political affiliation. It is often as if 
the officials are revelling in the brutal conduct of the military when a member recounts the 
actions taken against the insurgents. For example, when the Minster of the Interior spoke of 
the bravery of the troops in their actions defending France from insurrection, the annotations 
indicated ‘renewed and very lively applause’ and when one individual referred to the actions 
of the National Guard, the annotation indicated that members from ‘all sides’ shouted 
‘insurgents!’.641 This implies that there was a degree of unity and consensus, regardless of 
political affiliation, when it comes to those who are perceived to have forsaken the norms 
and values of the state and risen ‘in open revolt’ against it.  
640 Carayon-Latour, Joseph de. Annales de l'Assemblée nationale: compte rendu in extenso des séances, 
annexes, tome II, 20 March – 12 May 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 36 
641 Journault, M. Annales de l'Assemblée nationale: compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes, tome II, 20 
March -12 May 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p.218 
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Having said this, as the chart demonstrates, there are still a significant number of voices who 
opposed the actions of the state during the Commune. Here it is worth drawing a brief 
comparison with the British case following the Peterloo massacre. In that instance, the 
rhetoric demonstrated that there was general approval of the actions of the troops with 
comparatively fewer negative reactions. However, here, there is a greater degree of dissent. 
The most frequently referenced theme is that the actions of the state were dangerous and 
provocative. Given the scale of the killing that occurred at the hands of the army, this is 
unsurprising. One of the most vocal opponents to the events was Louis Blanc. In one 
particularly emotional outburst he argued that the repressive use of force may inspire new 
revolutions. He stated: ‘my God! Sirs, if I were convinced that the politics of force could 
save my country, would I speak as I speak?’.642 Blanc’s position is ironically similar to the 
one made by his colleagues to justify the use of force in the first place, in short that violence 
begets violence. However, Blanc’s argument is that this creates a cycle of violence that is 
difficult to break.  
Blanc’s is not the only emotional response to the events. Indeed, most of the objections to 
use of force are moral rather than practical. For example, references to the ‘tyranny’ or 
‘despotism’ of the state, rejections of the repression as anti-French or anti-Republican, 
references to the unjustified suppression of civil liberties, to the ‘savagery’ and ‘brutality’ 
of the army. Again, Blanc reminded the assembly that they should not think that in Paris 
there are only insurgents, only people who want blood and destruction. ‘Don't believe it’ he 
states, ‘I am talking about this population which is made up of men who, like you, are 
interested in order.’643 However, one of the most poignant was perhaps by M. Brunet who 
referred to the ‘fratricidal struggle in Paris’644. Fraternity was of course one of the pillars of 
the French Republican system and Brunet’s statement would thus have been a striking 
reminder that the bodies lying dead on the streets of Paris were not foreign enemies, but 
French citizens. 
A further category that bears mentioning is the references to history in the speeches and 
statements. After all, it is these references to past experiences that arguably provide some of 
the strongest evidence for the influence that history exacts on cultural preferences. There are 
642 Blanc, Louis. Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes, tome II, 
20 March -12 May 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 10 
643 Ibid. 
644 Brunet, M. Annales de l'Assemblée nationale: compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes, tome II, 20 
March -12 May 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 627 
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unsurprising references to the French Revolution and often the 1848 revolution (which is 
mentioned 130 times in one parliamentary session).645 The military’s interfering role in 
politics is raised in the context of the coup d’état on 18 Brumaire in 1799. There are also 
references to events that occurred in the seventeenth century and even one statement that 
even mentions Oliver Cromwell’s questionable use of the army following the first English 
Civil War (‘In England, the key to Parliament [i.e. the troops], that key which Cromwell put 
in his pocket, remained there’).646 Interestingly, the events of history are interpreted in very 
different ways. For example, the revolution of 1848 is invoked in both a sense that supports 
the use of the armed forces and also in a context that rejects it.  This ‘war of memory’647 
reflects the dialectical nature of French politics and the constant debate over the implications 
and interpretations of certain historical events. 
The analysis shows that there is an interesting balance between the positive and negative 
opinions on the use of military force. There are relatively few neutral statements which is an 
indication of the strength of feeling in French politics. Sitting on the fence is rare and most 
comments are made not to state a fact, but to convey a broader moral or practical point. 
Having said this, chart 12 does clearly illustrate the connection that the French state draws 
between internal and external security and the fact that the war with Prussia had directly led 
to the event of the Commune comes across very clearly in the statements. It is also worth 
noting that very few of the dissenting voices actually had a problem with the concept of 
deploying the army against the enemy in the first place – many even declared that the threat 
to Paris and France as a whole was undeniable. Instead, most of the opposition came from 
the prolonged state of siege and the military repression that stemmed from it. Some noted 
the ‘hunting’ of Republican journalists, arbitrary arrests, and unjustified use of force; these, 
it was argued, are not French values.  
645 Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes, tome V, 19 August – 16 
September 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871) 
646 Blanc, Louis. Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes, tome V, 
19 August – 16 September 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 433 
647 ‘In France, the past is never fixed. There is a constant war of memory among politicians on how to harness 
it.’ Florian Gallieri comments to author, 22 September 2018  
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6.3.5. The impact of the Commune 
The aftermath of the Commune illustrates a fascinating cultural difference between Britain 
and France. In Britain, following the events of the Peterloo massacre, which had resulted in 
the deaths of eighteen civilians, Robert Peel founded the metropolitan police force in order 
to limit the military’s role in domestic affairs. In France, following the 1848 revolution, the 
state devised a piece of legislation that presented the military with more authority in times 
of crisis. This law is known as the ‘state of siege’ and was introduced on August 9, 1849. 
Article one of this law declared that a state of siege could be called ‘in the event of imminent 
danger to internal or external security’.648 The events of the Commune, as noted earlier, 
resulted in as many as 30,000 deaths at the hands of the military. However, again, rather than 
retract the state of siege law or take legislative steps to redefine the military’s role on the 
national territory, the French state instead cemented their faith in the military as an internal 
force by simply adapting the phrasing of article one to make it less ambiguous. With the law 
of 3 April, 1878 the working of article 1 of the state of siege law was modified from 
‘imminent danger’ to ‘imminent peril’ resulting ‘from a foreign war or an armed 
insurrection.’649 
It also added a temporal dimension to the terms of the state of siege declaring that prior to 
its implementation, its duration should be announced. Following the expiration of this 
period, the state of siege was automatically lifted, unless a new law extended it. In the wake 
of the Commune, in some municipalities, it was maintained until 1876 and, in the legislative 
elections of 1876, there were still four departments subject to a state of siege: Seine, Seine-
et-Oise, Rhône and Bouches-du-Rhône. One can only assume that it is France’s historical 
precedents for deploying the armed forces on the national territory (see chart 10) and a 
general civic tolerance of a permanent and visible military presence among them, that led to 
the decision to grant more power to the military following an episode of severe repression, 
rather than less as was the case in Britain.  
While the military’s role on the national territory for the purposes of quelling civil unrest 
was reduced during the Third Republic, there were still a number of tragic incidents resulting 
from their use – often under a state of siege. For example, in 1891 a conscript army that was 
poorly trained at dealing with civil unrest, was called to Fourmies in the Nord department. 
648 Projet de loi du 28 juillet 1849 sur l'état de siege. Chapitre III : Des effets de l’état de siege. Article 1. 
649 Loi du 3 avril 1878 relative à l’état de siege. Article 1.  
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Here peaceful demonstrations by industrial workers were taking place against a twelve-hour 
day. The mantra of the demonstrators was ‘C'est les huit heures qu'il nous faut !’650. 
However, the 145th infantry felt threatened by the gathering crowds and opened fire killing 
nine men and women, one girl was just eleven years old.  This event certainly marred the 
image of the army as an internal force and it would be sullied even further in the early 
twentieth century under Georges Clemenceau’s tenure as Minister for the Interior.  
6.3.6. The Languedoc Revolt (1907) 
In the first few months of the Third Republic, Georges Clemenceau had been appointed as 
the mayor of the 18th arrondissement of Paris and was also elected to the national assembly. 
He had tried, unsuccessfully, to mediate between the government and the Commune; the 
government’s position was intransigent, and the radical Commune refused to recognise his 
authority as mayor. Clemenceau’s frustrations at the impasse led him to declare that he was 
‘caught between two bands of crazy people, those sitting in Versailles and those in Paris.’651 
Clemenceau’s direct manner of speaking and his uncompromising manner led him to be 
given the nickname of ‘tiger’. On several occasions throughout his career, he would 
demonstrate that this moniker was well-earned; in March 1906 he was appointed as the 
Minister of the Interior, that same month he ordered the mobilisation of 20,000 soldiers to 
deal with a large-scale miner’s strike that resulted from a mine collapse in Courrières. The 
presence of the troops did nothing to calm the miners, but, following mass arrests, they 
eventually backed down.  
However, the following year Clemenceau was again confronted with a major crisis when 
winegrowers in the Languedoc region went on tax strike. Demonstrations grew almost 
exponentially in size over the weeks with protests held on each Sunday. The first on 31 
March saw around 500 protestors in attendance. A week later there were 1,000; a week after 
that 5,000.  By 9 June around 600,000 people had turned out to protest and concerns were 
650 Cherat, Didier. Les petites histoires de l'Histoire de France. (Paris: Larousse, 2018), p. 44 
651 Clemenceau, Georges in Fenby, Jonathan. The History of Modern France. From the Revolution to the War 
with Terror. (London: Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 167 
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growing in government over a potential insurrectionary movement.652 Clemenceau felt a 
show of force was necessary and ordered around 25,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry troops 
to the region to supplement the Gendarmerie who were already there. However, the 
military’s presence just exacerbated the situation leading to clashes and several deaths when 
the troops opened fire.653  
6.3.7. Responses to the use of the army during the Languedoc Revolt 
Chart 13 provides a summary of 109 statements that were analysed during the revolt of the 
Languedoc winegrowers. Like chart 12 which outlined the rhetoric around the use of the 
armed forces against the Commune, we also see the clear divided opinions that seems to be 
an enduring character of French politics. Indeed, in this case, the division appears to be even 
more marked: 61% of the statements oppose the idea of deploying the armed forces, 34% 
approve, and just 5% could be classified as neutral statements.    
652 Maurin, Jules and Pech, Rémy. 1907, les mutins de la République: la révolte du Midi viticole, (Toulouse: 
Privat, 2007), ; Smith, Andrew W. M. Terror and terroir: The winegrowers of the Languedoc and modern 
France. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016) 
653 Grossin et Bancel, Chefs de bataillon. ‘Emploi de la force armée sur le territoire métropolitain de 1791 à 
nos jours’, Prix Fondation Maréchal Leclerc de Hautecloque, 2016. See: https://www.fondation-marechal-
leclerc.fr/cba-grossin-et-bancel-prix-fondation-2016/ (accessed 09/01/2018) 
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Chart 13: Reactions to the use of the army during the Languedoc Revolt - 1907 
Sourcess: L'Assemblée nationale, Sénat 
In terms of the positive statements, once again the notion that the level of the threat 
necessitated the military response is the most mentioned. There were references to the 
‘revolutionary state’654 or the ‘forces of revolution’655 that were operating in the region. 
There were also numerous anecdotes about ‘suspicious men with big clubs’ or the ‘hostile 
crowd’ that pelted the troops with stones. In eyes of the those on the side of justifying the 
use of the army, this lack of respect for the law meant that the citizens had forfeited their 
rights. For example, Clemenceau himself delivered this stark warning:  
654 Jaurès, Jean cited in Journal officiel de la République, Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés : compte 
rendu in-extenso, 28 Juin 1907, p. 1564 
655 Benoist, Charles cited in Journal officiel de la République, Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés : 







































































































































































































































They disrupted the public services, they forced us … to make the troops march to enforce 
respect for the law. They revolted against the troops, they riddled [the troops] with stones, 
revolver shots. They burned down the Perpignan prefecture, they burned down a police 
station in Béziers, they tried to burn down the Narbonne sub-prefecture. All these are actions, 




It is interesting that Clemenceau lays the blame entirely at the doorstep of the protesters. It 
was their actions that ‘forced’ the state to take action in order to ‘make them pay.’ Having 
said this, compared with the rhetoric used during the Commune, there are no references to 
‘enemies’, ‘insurgents’, or even ‘criminals’. Instead, they are simply referred to as protesters 
who have disrespected the law. Thus, it is by virtue of their abandonment of the state’s legal 
norms that their rights to peaceful treatment have been forfeited. There is a sense in the 
positive rhetoric, however, that the policymakers are trying desperately to justify their use 
of force. The problem is that the presence of ‘suspicious men with big clubs’ in no way 
justifies a deadly response by French infantry and cavalry units and this is frequently pointed 
out by the opposition voices.  
 
Félix Aldy, for example stated that ‘there is a great danger in sending the army against the 
people. In the present circumstances, it has been done with absolutely incomprehensible 
lightness.’ He mentions that when he arrived in Narbonne he observed ‘the occupation by 
armed force, the occupation most painful for French hearts, that of our own troops having 
invaded part of our territory like a conquered country.’ Aldy opined that the deployment had 
gone ‘beyond the limits of legality’.657 His colleague Jean Jaurès stated that the government 
has ‘brutalize[d]’658 the locals while Allard Betoulle stated that he reproves of the ‘policy of 
provocation and bloodshed.’659  
 
Some of the harshest criticisms referred to Clemenceau’s actions as tyrannical or despotic. 
Several even invoked historical experience to compare him to a glory-hunting Napoleon. In 
a verbal confrontation with Clemenceau, Albert Bedouce stated that ‘Without doubt, with 
 
656 Jaurès, Jean cited in Journal officiel de la République, Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés : compte 
rendu in-extenso, 28 Juin 1907, p. 1567 
657 Aldy, Félix cited in Journal officiel de la République, Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés : compte 
rendu in-extenso, 28 Juin 1907, p. 1561 
658 Jaurès, Jean cited in Journal officiel de la République, Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés : compte 
rendu in-extenso, 28 Juin 1907, p. 1564 
659 cited in Journal officiel de la République, Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés : compte rendu in-
extenso, 28 Juin 1907, p. 1579 
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your occupying armies you are strong, strong like Bonaparte at the Pont d'Arcôle…’660 
While, following a comment by Clemenceau, Paul Constans simply responded by stating 
‘Ave, Caesar!’.661  
It is perhaps telling than on the positive statements, there is only one reference to positive 
historical precedent. This was the simple statement by Clemenceau ‘that we are in a situation 
which has no equivalent, at least not after the Revolution’ and that this unprecedented 
moment meant the use of the army was appropriate. However, in France, conviction on a 
particular issue is often accompanied by historical evidence to emphasise the point. History 
is not just ‘a thing of the past’ in France, it is also a blueprint for the present and the future. 
See, for example, the case of the Commune where historical experience was frequently 
invoked on both sides of the argument. The fact that Clemenceau and the other pro-military 
deployment voices have not referenced the past makes their argument far harder to accept 
for the chamber as, to draw a comparison with a courtroom, they have not demonstrated 
precedent that would make their actions permissible.  
However, one interesting area of convergence between the two sides is on the issue of the 
mutiny of the 17th regiment. This unit primarily comprised people from the Languedoc 
region and had been stationed at nearby Agde during the demonstrations. They had heard 
the bursts of fire by other army units and, as a result, they took the decision to mutiny instead 
of facing their fellow citizens. They looted the armoury of their barracks while refusing to 
march. The mutiny forced a vote of no confidence in Clemenceau as fellow politicians grew 
concerned that it could result in a revolution or a military coup d’état.  However, the situation 
was resolved when Clemenceau agreed that the mutineers would not be punished for their 
actions.  
The local residents were incredibly grateful for the actions of the 17th and they were treated 
like heroes for putting their morals ahead of their duty. However, the incident had 
emphasised the sensitive nature of using the armed forces on the domestic territory; the 17th 
were a local regiment – they knew the land; they may have even known many of the people 
they would have been ordered to shoot. The situation was elegantly summarised by Raoul 
Montéhus’s 1910 song Gloire au XVII°. Its first stanza is as follows:   
660 Bedouce, Albert cited in Journal officiel de la République, Débats parlementaires. Chambre des députés : 
compte rendu in-extenso, 28 Juin 1907, p. 1555 
661 Ibid.  
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Gloire au XVII° 
Légitim' était votre colère 
Le refus était un grand devoir 
On ne doit pas tuer ses pères et mères 
Pour les grands qui sont au pouvoir 
Soldats votre conscience est nette 
On n'se tue pas entre Français 
Refusant d' rougir vos baïonnettes 
Petits soldats, oui, vous avez bien fait!662 
Although the chart shows that there are significant examples of negative statements being 
made against the idea of using the armed forces, interestingly many of those opposition 
voices also refer to the actions of the 17th in a negative manner. There are several mentions 
of it being a ‘deplorable’ act, for example. The conclusion we can draw from this is 
inescapably paradoxical; there is a simultaneous rejection of the notion of using the armed 
forces against the people and also of the armed forces for refusing to be used against the 
people. In other words, regardless of the moral aspects of the situation, as the ‘duty’ column 
on chart 13 illustrates, obligations to the state and respect for duty are still essential.  
6.3.8. Comparison of the Commune and the Languedoc revolt 
To summarise, this chapter has shown how the French state has a long history of deploying 
the military on its national territory for the purposes of quelling civil unrest. Rural France 
was subjected to some of the most regular occurrences of military repression, particularly 
through the use of the Gendarmerie, as part of the apparent ‘civilising process’. The rural 
population were seen as barbarous and less than human and this therefore legitimised the 
use of force against them.   
Equally, episodes of unrest in larger cities were accompanied by rhetoric that emphasised 
the lack of civility of the rioters, rebels, or insurgents. This was in full view during the 
662 Doubis, Montéhus Raoul Chantegrel-Pierre. ‘Gloire au dix-septième’, 1910 
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Commune where French citizens were referred to as ‘enemies of civilisation’ prior to a brutal 
military repression. Nevertheless, the data also show division in the rhetoric between those 
in favour of the use of the military and those against it. There were even starker divisions in 
the responses to the mobilisation of the army to counter the revolt in Languedoc. There were 
hardly any neutral statements (just nine in total); instead the bloody and heavy-handed nature 
of the deployment meant most statements were guided by emotion.  
Following the Languedoc revolt, the mutiny of the 17th regiment drove home the sensitivity 
of deploying the troops on the national territory. It acted as a powerful reminder that the 
‘enemy’ the military are required to face in such circumstances are friends, families, and 
compatriots. At a national level, the mutiny also highlighted the inexorable bond between 
the army and the nation. This relationship was subsequently cemented during the First World 
War with the deaths of over one million Frenchmen on French soil.  
Many of the themes observed in the rhetoric around the Commune and the Languedoc revolt 
are unique to that era highlighting the gradual change in the cultural preferences of the 
French over time and evidencing Vovelle’s statement concerning the ‘plurality or 
uniqueness’ of history.663 Like the British case, by comparing the two deployments and 
removing the themes that are not found in both, it will be possible to shed some light on 
what may be the core values of the French state in terms of preferences for domestic military 
deployments.  
663 Vovelle. Histoire des mentalités, p. 155 
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Chart 14: Comparison of reactions to the use of the military during the Commune 
and the Languedoc revolt 
Sourcess: Archives Nationales, l'Assemblée nationale, Sénat 
Chart 14 reveals a number of areas of continuity in the responses to the use of the armed 
forces. This suggests, in line with the hypothesis, that cultural preferences deriving from the 
interpretation of past events are constraining behaviour. There are relatively few mentions 
of themes in the neutral category, which, as alluded to earlier, is due to the divided nature of 
France’s political scene; everyone tends to have an opinion and unemotive statements of fact 
such as those frequently seen in the British rhetoric, are extremely rare. Nevertheless, there 
is a hint that domestic deployments should be supplementary to the civil forces, possibly 
























































































































































































Stronger themes emerge in the positive and negative categories. First, unlike the British case, 
there is a sense that an internal duty is something that will be expected of a French soldier 
(patriotism / duty), both the responses to the army’s role against the Commune and the 
Languedoc revolt see ten references to this category. There is also broad acceptance of 
domestic deployments by praising the conduct of the military once they are deployed – 
although there are fewer references to this during Languedoc coupled with far more 
references to their poor conduct, hinting at a shift in preferences.  
Perhaps the strongest themes to emerge here are not just the notion that using the army is 
appropriate in certain circumstances, but also that it should be considered necessary if the 
threat is sufficiently high. There were thirty references to this during the Commune and a 
similarly high nineteen mentions in 1907 – although again, the lower number of references 
to necessity given the threat coupled with a far greater number of negative statements 
suggests that the prevailing view at the time was that the Languedoc winegrowers did not 
constitute a serious threat to national security. This is an important point as it indicates a 
cultural acceptance of the army’s use on the national territory provided there is a serious 
threat, but a rejection if there is not.   
Furthermore, across both formative moments there is the common theme that one may forfeit 
one’s rights as a French citizen if rebelling against the state. This hints at the dialectical, 
even paradoxical nature of the French people’s relationship with the state that was referred 
to at the start of this section; although dissent and resistance are seen as important facets of 
the French national psyche, the structures of the state through its norms, laws, and 
institutions are also seen as being beyond reproach. Like Simmel’s theory of reciprocity, we 
see clearly how in France the individual will attempt to overcome the status quo through 
individual agency (or even collective agency through protests), which is met with resistance 
from state structures. Importantly, however, there are far fewer references in 1907 to the role 
that army should play in protecting these structures highlighting a likely shift in preferences. 
Indeed, the negative themes indicate that the Commune and the Languedoc revolt constituted 
such powerful formative moments that the French state may now completely reject the idea 
of deploying the army for the purposes of countering riot or protest. The themes show how 
there is a negative historical precedent for such actions, how it is tyrannical, despotic, 
repressive, dangerous, and provocative. However, the strongest evidence is that: 1) a total of 
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thirty-four statements refer to how using armed force against the people does not adhere to 
France’s values. There were twelve references to this category in 1871, compared with 
twenty-two in 1907; and 2) how the army should not be used against French citizens with 
nine references in 1871 increasing to seventeen in 1907. This is also despite the identification 
of fewer speeches and statements for the latter case.  
Crucially, there seems to have been a normative evolution in France’s approach to the use 
of the armed forces for maintaining order on the national territory; in 1871 there were 
frequent attempts by certain French policymakers to rhetorically detach dissenters from the 
state via words such as ‘savages’, ‘insurgents’, or even ‘evil’. By 1907, this language is 
absent and has been replaced by a clear recognition that the victims of the military’s use of 
force were French citizens.  
The notion that excessive military force is unacceptable when dealing with one’s own 
citizens was conveyed powerfully in both examples, but particularly during the Languedoc 
revolt following the mutiny of the 17th Line infantry. Between the two examples there 
seemed to be a change in cultural preferences away from using the armed forces for 
maintaining internal order. Crucially, the responses conveyed a recognition that political 
résistance is a central component of France’s value system and, in consequence, 
demonstrators are not, and should never be, considered as ennemis de l’intérieur.  
Summary 
Pascal’s famous axiom that ‘justice without force is powerless; force without justice is 
tyrannical’664 is fundamental to understanding French attitudes regarding the use of force on 
the national territory, particularly in the context of maintaining order. In the last two hundred 
years, there have been few, if any, other western societies that have been as willing as France 
to use the armed forces against their own citizens. Indeed, as this section has shown, there 
have been at least 151 significant instances when troops have been used against the people. 
The reflex to mobilise the army is largely due to the inextricable link that the French state 
draws between force, order and justice.665 Indeed, throughout history Pascal’s axiom has 
664 Pascal, Blaise. Pensées de Blaise Pascal, Tome Premier. (Paris: Ant. Aug. Renouard, 1812/1670), p. 241 
665 Peter Jackson has examined this theme in its international manifestations with a particular focus on French 
conceptions of international organisation before and after the First World War. See: Jackson, Peter. Beyond 
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frequently been invoked by French policymakers seeking to present the image of a strong 
state that is willing and able to guarantee public order and the security of its citizens,666 based 
on the principle that ‘what is right is strong and what is strong is just.’667   
This nexus between law, order, and justice is central to French political culture and, when 
understood in combination with Peyrefitte’s assertion regarding the French public’s desire 
for the swift and ‘merciless’ imposition of order, explains why the army has often been the 
first port of call for internal tasks compared with their British counterparts who have 
typically turned to the civil forces.  
We might posit, however, that following the events of the Commune, French conceptions of 
what was ‘just’ began to change and a gradual rejection of the idea of using the troops against 
French citizens developed. This rejection was exemplified by the negative reactions to the 
use of the army against the winegrowers at Languedoc. This does not mean that the 
fundamental belief in the appropriateness of using force to ensure order had changed, simply 
that the army were no longer considered to be the most suitable instrument to fulfil the task 
of maintaining order. As the following section will explore, the events of the First World 
War, which saw a rare moment of national unity in France, seem to have entrenched the 
nation, people, army nexus and fundamentally recalibrated France’s approach to the use of 
the military internally.     
the Balance of Power: France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
666 See: ‘La Vertu, sans laquelle la Terreur est funeste ; la Terreur, sans laquelle la Vertu, est impuissante.’ – 
Robespierre, Maximilien. ‘Rapport sur les principes de morale politique qui doivent guider la Convention 
Nationale dans l'administration intérieure de la République’, Convention Nationale, comité de salut public, le 
18 pluviose, l'an 2e. de la République, (De l'imprimerie des 86 départemens, 1794) p. 13 ; Barrès, Maurice. 
Mes Cahiers, Tome XI: Juin 1914- Décembre 1918, (Paris: Plon, 1938), p.331 cited in Virtanen, Reino. ‘Barrès 
and Pascal’, PMLA, Vol. 62, No. 3 (September 1947), p. 809 ; Édouard Herriot cited in Jackson, Peter. 
Beyond the Balance of Power: France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 461 ‘Notre nation est singulière : elle ne peut pas concevoir 
la force sans la Justice. L'un de nos grands génies, Blaise Pascal, l'a formulé de façon lumineuse : « la justice 
sans la force est impuissante. La force sans la justice est tyrannique ». Nous ferons tout pour que notre pays 
soit fort et juste.’ Valls, Manuel. ‘Déclaration de politique générale de M. Manuel Valls, Premier ministre’, 8 
April 2014. See: 
https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/190876-declaration-de-politique-generale-de-m-manuel-valls-premier-
ministre (accessed 21/09/2020) 
667 Pascal, Blaise. Pensées de Blaise Pascal, Tome Premier. (Paris: Ant. Aug. Renouard, 1812/1670), p. 241 
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Chapter 7 - The French Army and the ennemi de 
l’intérieur 
7.1. Introduction 
In France, as chart 10 illustrated, the army has been required to fulfil a variety of internal 
duties over time and, while quelling civil disorder has been a prominent role, the country has 
historically faced a serious threat of invasion from numerous foreign adversaries. In fact, 
over the last two hundred years, France has been involved in six wars that have taken place, 
at least in part, on French soil. These wars have involved 132 significant battles and 
occupation by enemy forces on five of those occasions.668 The common theme from all of 
these examples of enemy occupation is that France, even faced with invading forces, has 
still often found itself divided. 
For example, during the war of the Sixth Coalition an alliance comprising Austria, Portugal, 
Prussia, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK invaded France. They found that discontent 
among French locals at the dire economic situation, coupled with growing pro-Bourbon 
sentiment had resulted in limited resistance to their invasion. In fact, when British troops 
marched towards Toulouse, the French Marshal Soult is said to have remarked that 
‘practically the whole city is against being defended’.669 As was discussed in the previous 
section, the events of the Commune also highlighted ingrained ideological divisions. France 
again faced a Prussian invasion during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 to 1871 leading to 
their defeat, the occupation of Paris, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and the creation of 
the Commune where political grievances led to the establishment of a de facto independent 
state in Paris.  
Despite these frequent and surprising examples of division, France saw a rare moment of 
national unity in 1914 when German forces once again threatened to invade. On 3 August, 
German ambassadors accused France of attacking their forces at the border with 
Luxembourg and declared war.670 France had been prepared for this; as René Viviani stated 
668 Author’s calculation. See chart 10, p. 179 
669 Tombs, Robert and Tombs, Isabelle. That Sweet Enemy: The British and the French from the Sun King to 
the Present. (London, Pimlico: Random House, 2007), p. 286 
670 The German ambassador’s letter to the French president read as follows: ‘The German administrative and 
military authorities have noted a number of acts of marked hostility committed on German territory by French 
military aviators. Several of the latter clearly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of 
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to parliament, ‘we no longer allowed ourselves to believe in the sincerity of the peaceful 
declarations which the German representative continued to lavish upon us. We knew that 
Germany was mobilising.’671  
As well as providing France with a possible opportunity to reclaim their lost territory of 
Alsace-Lorraine, the existential threat presented by Germany led to political consensus. 
Even the Socialists agreed that mass mobilisation and military force was necessary to avoid 
‘economic and moral subjugation.’672 This national unity was exemplified by the temporary 
truce between the usually divided political forces within France known as the union sacrée. 
The sombre declaration read: ‘France […] will be heroically defended by all her sons, whose 
sacred union will not break before the enemy.’673  
This point is worth dwelling on; the wars of the previous century had seen the French 
population typically divided in their loyalties: between republicanism and monarchism or, 
in the case of the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war, republicanism and communism. 
National unity, even in the face of a serious external threat, was never guaranteed. However, 
during the First World War these political divisions were put aside with hundreds of 
thousands of Frenchmen sacrificing their lives in defence of the French way of life. As Fenby 
notes, these instances of national unity are ‘rare and bred by shock’674 Given the apparent 
infrequency of these unifying events, it is therefore worth analysing the rhetoric around the 
First World War as not only will it clarify the nature of the people, nation, army nexus, but 
it will elucidate the culturally determined conditions for widespread support for a concept 
such as the use of the armed forces, particularly in the face of a serious threat. 
this country… in the presence of these aggressions, the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with 
France.’ See: Viviani, René. Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Chambre des 
Deputés, Séance du 4 Aout 1914, p. 3111 
671 Viviani, René. Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Chambre des Deputés, 
Séance du 4 Aout 1914, p. 3111 
672 ‘La subordination définitive de la France. Son asservicement économique et moral, sa décadence 
inévitable.’ See: Poincaré, Raymond. Au service de la France, Tome I, Le lendemain d’Agadir. (Paris: Plon-
Nourrit et Cie, 1926), p.146 
673 ‘la France […] sera héroïquement défendue par tous ses fils, dont rien ne brisera devant l'ennemi l'union 
sacrée.’ 4 août 1914 : la naissance de l'Union sacrée. Assemblée nationale  
674 Fenby, Jonathan. The History of Modern France. From the Revolution to the War with Terror. (London: 
Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 2 
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7.1.1. National Unity: responses to and impact of the First World War 
Faced with imminent invasion by German forces, on 2 August 2014, the President of the 
Republic, Raymond Poincaré declared a state of siege throughout the country. All eighty-
six départements on mainland France were included in this decree as were the three 
départements in Algeria (Algiers, Constantine, and Oran).675 This state of siege would last 
for the duration of the war. Two days after its imposition, Poincaré summoned parliament 
for an extraordinary session. Solidarity would be essential if the enemy were to be defeated; 
thus, eighteen separate bills were introduced in this session that would transition the country 
to a state of war. As the Assemblée Nationale’s account of this session states, these bills are 
adopted ‘without debate, unanimously in the House and the Senate.’676 
Chart 15 reflects this unanimity; it shows just seven clear themes all of which are classified 
as statements in favour of the deployment of the military. The necessity to mobilise given 
the level of the threat is directly referenced thirty-one times and the fact that the state of war 
justified the extraordinary measures that were taken by the government twenty-four times. 
According to Albert Métin these ‘extraordinary resources’ were absolutely ‘necessary’.677 
Marcel Sembat stated similarly that ‘the needs of national defence’ required ‘additional and 
extraordinary’ measures.678 This was echoed by the secretary of state for foreign affairs, 
René Viviani who declared that ‘the salvation of civilisation’ was dependent on the decision 
to fight and that the government had ‘begun to take all the measures necessary for the 
[continued] existence of the nation.’679 Thus, any potential moral objections to the 
extraordinary measures were deemed to be subordinate to the existential threat that France 
was facing.  
675 Kamga, Gerard E. K. The State of Siege: Origin and History. Global Emergency and Counterterrorism 
Institute, p. 3 
676 Assemblée nationale, ‘4 août 1914: la naissance de l'Union sacrée’. See: http://www2.assemblee-
nationale.fr/decouvrir-l-assemblee/histoire/1914-1918/l-exposition-du-centenaire/le-parlement-s-ajourne-
1914/4-aout-1914-la-naissance-de-l-union-sacree (accessed  06/07/2019) 
677 Métin, Albert cited in Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Chambre des 
Deputés, Séance du 4 Aout 1914. 
678 Sembat, Marcel cited in Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Chambre des 
Deputés, Séance du 4 Aout 1914. 
679 Viviani, René cited in Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Chambre des 
Deputés, Séance du 22 Décembre 1914, p. 3125 
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Chart 15: Policymakers’ reactions on the need for mobilisation for First World, 1914 
- 1918
Sourcess: L'Assemblée nationale, Sénat 
The uniformity in the rhetoric is perhaps less surprising given the nature of the threat. 
Nevertheless, the discursive strategies used by policymakers to promote national unity are 
interesting. For example, one of the more forceful themes in the rhetoric was the need to 
protect France’s values. Viviani stated that France comprised ‘A free and strong people who 
uphold a secular ideal and unite in their entirety for the protection of their existence; … an 
armed nation fighting for its own life and for the independence of Europe.’680 There were 
also several references to core French principles of liberté, égalité, and fraternité; for 
example, Poincaré led the call for ‘brotherly affection for those of our colleagues who gave 
to the motherland what they held most dear’,681 while Viviani again emphasised the need for 
the ‘restoration of liberty’, and ‘vigorous action’ in defence of ‘the ideal of freedom and 
equality’.682  
680 Viviani, René cited in Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Chambre des 
Deputés, Séance du 4 Aout 1914, p. 3111 
681 Poincaré, Raymond and Viviani, René cited in Journal officiel de la République française. Débats 
parlementaires. Chambre des Deputés, Séance du 22 Décembre 1914, p. 3124 
682 Viviani, René cited in Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Chambre des 



























As noted previously, the invocation of history is usually seen as a prerequisite for legitimate 
argumentation in French political debate; as such there are, unsurprisingly, several 
references to events of the past. There are appeals to the spirit of the revolution and the 
Franco-Prussian war is mentioned quite frequently. For example, Viviani referenced ‘the 
glorious memories of our history’ in a general sense, while Poincaré offered some specific 
examples stating that ‘it seems that in this divine hour, the Fatherland united all the greatness 
of its history; the bravery of Jeanne la Lorraine and the enthusiasm of the liberating wars of 
the Revolution; the modesty of the generals of the First Republic and the unwavering 
confidence of Gambetta.’683 He concluded by exclaiming ‘May the vanquished of 1870 be 
the vanquishers of 1915!’ which, according to the annotation, was met with ‘lively 
applause’.684  
One statement by Ferdinand Bougère, at that point an independent French politician who 
played a key role in devising French conscription laws during the First World War, typified 
the need to learn lessons from the past in order to overcome the threat in the present. He 
called on his colleagues ‘to remember that, several centuries ago, internal division nearly 
cost France.’685 This brings us back to the initial point; victory over an enemy is only 
perceived to be attainable through national unity. A lack of consensus through political 
factionalism will undermine the state’s ability to persevere. As the Socialist politician Abel 
Lefevre stated, it is not just the army ‘which pushes back the invader. It is all of France.’686 
In short, consensus is key.  
Emerging from the conflict in 1918, the idea of a nation united seems to have persevered; 
an estimated 1.3 million French citizens had lost their lives in the conflict, with most losing 
their lives on French soil. The idea of using the military against one’s own population in the 
event of civil unrest suddenly seemed futile, counterproductive, even reprehensible. In 2016, 
two Battalion Chiefs of the French army emphasised precisely this point in an article on the 
evolution of the use of the army on the national territory. They wrote: ‘The Great War was 
683 Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Chambre des Deputés, Séance du 23 
Decembre 1914, p. 3122 
684 Poincaré, Raymond cited in Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Chambre 
des Deputés, Séance du 22 Decembre 1914, p.3123 
685 Bougère, Ferdinand cited in Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Chambre 
des Deputés, Séance du 8 Aout 1918, p. 2262  
686 Lefevre, Abel cited in Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires. Chambre des 
Deputés, Séance du 8 Aout 1918, p. 2253 
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the fulcrum of a notable upheaval: the common blood spilled over four years in the trenches 
now prevented the use of military force against fellow citizens.’687 
As a result, three years after the end of the First World War, policymakers of the so-called 
Chambre bleu horizon, (so named due to sheer number of former First World War 
servicemen who sat there, comprising roughly 44% of the total number of deputies) voted 
unanimously to form France’s first force that would be solely dedicated to maintaining 
public order. The implementation of the so-called Loi Organique of July 1921 created 100 
squadrons of what was named the Gendarmerie mobile.688 It would still adhere to military 
laws; however, the difference is that it would be the civil power through the Préfets that 
would hold the authority to call upon the unit. Thus, France began to develop a system of 
subordination to the civil power that was broadly comparable to that of Britain. Crucially, 
this unit was no longer to treat protesters as an enemy, but instead, as a ‘momentarily angry 
citizen.’689 The Gendarmerie Mobile grew rapidly in size over the years reaching a total of 
20,000 men in 1939. Today it consists of 109 squadrons across France divided across seven 
‘Zonal Gendarmerie Regions’. Instead of directly facing against protesters, its primary role 
is to channel protesters in as peaceful a manner as possible in order to avoid casualties. It 
was arguably the events of Languedoc that set France along this path and from 1921 
onwards, the use of there has been a steady ‘demilitarisation’690 of maintaining public order. 
The more passive internal role of the French armed forces is heavily emphasised in inter-
war recruitment campaigns.  
7.1.2. Inter-war recruitment 
After the First World War, Imperial Germany and the Ottoman Empire’s former colonies 
were mandated to the allied forces. As a result, on top of her existent colonial empire, France 
687 Grossin et Bancel, Chefs de bataillon. ‘Emploi de la force armée sur le territoire métropolitain de 1791 à 
nos jours’, Prix Fondation Maréchal Leclerc de Hautecloque, 2016. See: https://www.fondation-marechal-
leclerc.fr/cba-grossin-et-bancel-prix-fondation-2016/ (accessed 09/01/2018) 
688 Loi du 22 Juillet 1921, ‘Loi portant augmentation des effectifs de la gendarmerie et créant un état-major 
particulier de la gendarmerie’, Paris le 22 juillet 1921 (J. off. du 24 juillet 1921) 
689 Denis, Vincent. Manifestations: la police est-elle de plus en plus violente? Le Point, 17 December 2018. 
See: https://www.lepoint.fr/societe/manifestations-la-police-est-elle-de-plus-en-plus-violente-17-12-2018-
2279793_23.php (accessed 03/03/2019) 
690 Audibert Troin, Olivier & Léonard, Christophe. ‘sur la présence et l’emploi des forces armées sur le 
territoire national’. Assemblée Nationale. Rapport d’Information, N° 3864. Commission de la Défense 
Nationale et des Forces Armées, p. 125 
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gained new territories under the Sykes-Picot agreement in what is now Syria and Lebanon 
as well as adopting temporary ruling authority in Togo and Cameroon. More territory meant 
more manpower was needed in the Troupes Coloniales. This was a professional body of 
soldiers that had been formed in 1900 and its corps comprised regular troops rather than 
conscripts. However, following the serious losses that France incurred during the war as well 
as budgetary constraints as result of the post-war reconstruction effort, the Coloniales faced 
something of a recruitment crisis. Thus, in the inter-war years, the French office de 
recrutement ramped up its efforts to attract new recruits.  
Posters 1 and 2: (Left) Troupes Coloniales (1939); (Right) Troupes Métropolitaines (c. 1935)691 
Interestingly, the French recruitment drives in this period are similar to the British inter-war 
campaigns, which attempted to draw recruits in to ‘see the world’. The French also promote 
the idea of travel and adventure. For example, a poster from 1926 for the Troupes Coloniales 
published by the Ministère de la Guerre stated that the Colonial Army offers recruits ‘the 
chance to satisfy their taste for long voyages and adventure.’692 Others show soldiers 
standing proudly in foreign lands: on beaches, in deserts or travelling around tropical islands, 
or along rivers in the jungle. Most of the scenes they present are serene, conveying the idea 
not of combat, but exploration and adventure. For the Frenchmen who would have 
experienced the horrors of the First World War, these idealised depictions of life in la 
coloniale would probably have been quite appealing. One particular poster from 1939, 
691 DE 2013 PA 58 5. Affiche de recrutement : "Engagez-vous, rengagez-vous dans les troupes 
métropolitaines". c.1935 
692 DE 2015 PA 39 26. Service Historique de la Défense. Affiche de recrutement pour les troupes coloniales.  
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presented above (poster 1), shows three members of the colonial army standing in a field as 
cavalry troops, armoured vehicles and planes move towards them. In the sky, a setting sun 
is depicted as a globe highlighting France’s colonies; the sepia tone as the sun sets gives the 
impression of romance and glory that is attached to military service overseas.  
However, unlike the British posters of the same period, the French also emphasise a domestic 
role through the Coloniale’s terrestrial counterpart the Troupes Métropolitaines. Poster two, 
which was also released in the 1930s, shows a radio operator at the centre of the picture with 
the Eiffel tower in the background, the French tricolore emanating from the centre like radio 
waves. In the bottom left is an armoured vehicle and the bottom right shows a man on a 
motorcycle.693 The scene is far less dynamic than its Coloniale equivalent instead showing 
routine, functional duties.  
The inter-war recruitment campaigns highlight the simultaneous aspect of continuity and 
change that is typical of the French approach. Change is evident through France’s transition 
towards a preference for a less active military approach to issues of internal security, while 
continuity can be observed through the simple fact that an internal duty is still portrayed as 
essential. Unlike Britain, which has typically never portrayed the army as an internal force, 
the threat that France has faced from external enemies has necessitated treating internal and 
external security as a continuum. This view of security was justified when Germany again 
threatened, invaded and occupied France’s during the Second World War.  
7.1.3. The Second World War: disunity and resistance 
During the early stages of the Second World War, but prior to the German invasion of 
France, the French state seemed to have reverted to its traditional model of dissent and 
political division. The country was split between those that felt war was necessary and those 
that did not. For example, Socialist politician Marcel Déat famously published an article 
entitled ‘Mourir pour Danzig?’ that argued France should not risk its security for the sake 
693 The slogan: ‘engagez vous, rengagez vous’ which can be seen at the top of the poster is still used to this 
day. 
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of Poland.694 Even the then foreign minister Georges Bonnet remarked that France should 
‘not be heroic… We are not up to it.’695  
When war seemed unavoidable, the publication of communist newspapers and pamphlets 
was banned in order to mitigate the potential for disunity. Paul Reynaud was appointed as 
prime minister, but was approved for this position by only one vote. Even many members 
of his own party abstained from the vote. As Talbot Imlay notes, following Reynaud’s 
appointment many right-wing politicians even urged his government to declare war on the 
Soviet Union rather than Nazi Germany.696 However, Reynaud’s tenure as prime minister of 
France was short lived and after a campaign that lasted just six weeks the German forces had 
conquered France. On 4 June 1940, France held its last parliamentary session before the 
country was subsumed into the Third Reich. The session is a rather sombre affair; it is a by 
the numbers question and answer session relating to measures regarding prisoners of war, 
families of the dead, as well as the state of the country’s agriculture, infrastructure, and 
public health sectors.697 There is an air of resignation to the proceedings with attendant 
policymakers acutely aware of France’s rapidly crumbling military resistance. Just ten days 
later, Paris surrendered to the Germans.  
Divisions became further entrenched during Nazi occupation with the formation of so-called 
Vichy France. The Nazis allowed the French to maintain the Armée de l'Armistice, which 
was a limited force comprising French nationals that had the task of defending France in the 
unoccupied zone and, alongside the police force of the Groupes mobiles de reserve (GMR), 
maintaining internal order. Meanwhile, the brutal paramilitary group known as the Vichy 
Milice, which was largely composed of pre-war, far-right Frenchmen, had the role of hunting 
down and fighting French resistance fighters. The resistance, meanwhile, were mostly left-
wing Socialists and Communists. Thus, the battle for France’s liberty took on the character 
of pre-war ideological divisions.   
694 ‘Die for Danzig?’ - Danzig being the German name for the Polish city of Gdansk. See: Déat, Marcel. La 
marche à la guerre, "mourir pour Dantzig ?" Ministère des Armées. See: 
http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/162436/1676072/file/1919-1939-008.pdf (accessed 
08/09/2018) 
695 Fenby, Jonathan. The History of Modern France. From the Revolution to the War with Terror. (London: 
Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 271 
696 Imlay, Talbot C. ‘Paul Reynaud and France's Response to Nazi Germany, 1938–1940’, French Historical 
Studies, 2003, vol. 26, no. 3  
697 Chambre des Députés, 16e Lêgislature, Session Ordinaire de 1940. 4 Juin 1940. Journal officiel de la 
République française 
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At the forefront of the resistance movement was Charles de Gaulle who saw himself as 
France’s only hope; he wrote in his memoirs that ‘it was for me to take the country’s fate 
upon myself.’698 From his base in London he established the Free French Army, famously 
addressing his compatriots in July 1940 he declared that ‘Whatever happens, the flame of 
the French resistance must not be extinguished and will not be extinguished.’699 De Gaulle 
was arguably the progenitor of ‘alternative facts’,700 famously massaging historical events 
to promote national unity. For example, in a speech in Paris on 25 August 1944 following 
the liberation of the city he declared that it was the resistance movement and the French 
people, rather than the allied forces, that should be credited with pushing the Nazi occupiers 
out:  
Paris! Paris outraged! Paris broken! Paris martyred! But Paris liberated! Liberated by itself, 
liberated by its people with the help of the French armies, with the support and the help of 




7.1.4. The return of the ennemi de l’intérieur 
Following the Second World War, a new threat emerged that had the potential to undermine 
the ‘eternity’ of the French nation. Although Germany had been fully subdued and its 
territory carved up among the Allied powers, in its place, the threat of the USSR began to 
loom even larger. The perception of this threat was exacerbated by the first post-war general 
elections held in France in November 1946. Here, the French Communist Party (PCF) won 
182 seats. This represented the largest share of the vote at twenty-seven per cent.702 Here, 
the French view of security as both an internal and external phenomenon raised its head once 
more; the danger was not just invasion by conventional forces or the awesome power of the 
nuclear bomb, but also the threat from subversive elements. During the war, France’s 
698 Fenby, Jonathan. The History of Modern France. From the Revolution to the War with Terror. (London: 
Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 271 
699 Gaulle, Charles de. To All Free Frenchmen (1940) British Pathé, 4 July 1940. See: 
https://www.britishpathe.com/video/to-all-free-frenchmen (accessed 08/08/2018) 
700 This being the term used by Presidential counselor, Kellyanne Conway regarding Press Secretary Sean 
Spicer’s factually incorrect statement about the number of attendees at Donald Trump’s inauguration. 
701 Gaulle, Charles de. Paris Liberated speech, delivered at City Hall, Paris, France – 25 August, 1944. See: 
http://www.emersonkent.com/speeches/paris_libere.htm (accessed 08/08/2018) 
702 Élections législatives novembre 1946, 10 novembre 1946. Assemblé nationale élue en 1946. See: 
https://www.france-politique.fr/assemblee-nationale-1946.htm (accessed 09/01/2019) 
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successful, and ideologically Communist, resistance movement had illustrated how effective 
a relatively small number of troops employing guerrilla style hit-and-run tactics could be. 
Furthermore, when combined with conventional forces they had proven its ability to topple 
governments.703 Consequently, although the post-First World War environment saw the 
demilitarisation of the country’s approach to internal security, fears of a resurgent threat 
from ennemis de l’intérieur challenged the transition in France’s strategic thinking.  
The historical memory of the resistance and fears a Soviet fifth column was in the minds of 
French policymakers when dealing with the PCF. The radical politician and former French 
prime minister Henri Queuille had quipped that ‘politics is not the art of settling problems, 
but of shutting up those who pose them’;704 de Gaulle’s government demonstrated total 
adherence to this principle by ejecting the PCF from parliament. The PCF’s reaction was to 
increase their strike efforts, launching a series of nationwide demonstrations at coal mines 
and on railways. 
Tragically, on 3 December 1947 a postal train travelling from Paris to Tourcoing was 
derailed when the tracks were sabotaged. Railway sabotage had been a cornerstone of the 
French resistance’s strategy in the Second World War and this led the newspaper L’Epoque 
to run the, inflammatory and factually baseless, headline ‘Premeditation by Communist 
saboteurs.’705 The PCF’s case had not been aided by violent incidents in Grenoble and 
Marseille where rolling street battles had taken placed between Communists and Gaullist 
Rally of the French People (RPF) members. According to Jules Moch, the strikes had taken 
on an ‘insurrectionary’ character which necessitated a strong response. He deemed the 
Gendarmerie Mobile and the Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS)706 to be 
insufficient to deal with the threat and thus mobilised the armed forces to quell the unrest 
and several people lost their lives when the army opened fire on the crowds.  
As argued previously, France conceives of its national defence as simultaneously comprising 
an internal and an external element. While this is traceable to the French Revolution, it is 
703 Tenenbaum, Élie. ‘La Sentinelle Égarée? L’armee de Terre face au terrorisme’, IFRI, June 2016, vol. 68, 
p.14
704 Fenby, Jonathan. The History of Modern France. From the Revolution to the War with Terror. (London:
Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 327
705 Desanti, Dominique. L'Année où le monde a tremblé, 1947. (Paris: Albin-Michel, 1976), p. 352
706 The CRS are a civil force that subsumed the pro-Nazi Groupes mobiles de réserve (GMR) after the Second





arguably the post-Second World War threat environment that entrenched this strategic 
philosophy and bred the notion of ‘guerre sans front’ (war without [a] frontline). French 
experiences with fighting Communist guerrilla fighters in Indochina coupled with the 
overarching spectre of Communism presented by both the USSR and China meant that 
France had become particularly sensitive to the idea of insurrection and subversion at home. 
As a result, for the first time since the French Revolution the term ennemi de l’intérieur 
emerged in political discourse once again and a re-evaluation of the country’s existing 
conception of defence occurred.707  
 
 
7.1.5. Practical Response – DIT to DOT 
 
In his famed 1961 work Modern Warfare, Colonel Roger Trinquier wrote that ‘The defence 
of national territory is the raison d’être of an army; it should always be capable of 
accomplishing this objective.’708 However, during the Cold War the potential for subversive 
domestic threats reframed France’s understanding of what defence of the national territory 
entailed.709 The idea that battle-hardened French Communist sympathisers could use the 
experience they had gained in the Second World War in coordination with conventional 
Soviet forces meant that the perception developed that defence of the French territory ‘must 
no longer be conceived on its periphery, on its borders, but on its entire surface.’710  
 
The practical implication of this was the introduction on 29 September 1950 of a decree for 
‘Défense en surface du territoire métropolitain’. Article one of this decree stated that 
defence of the national territory was to be achieved by ‘Ensuring the security of 
communications, fighting against external elements …, opposing any attempt at sabotage, 
ensuring the maintenance of order.’711 This encapsulates France’s ‘full spectrum’ strategic 
 
707 Büttner, Olivier  and Martin, Annie. ‘Imaginaires de guerre : l’ennemi intérieur en Guerre froide. France 
années 1950’, La Guerre froide vue d’en bas, CNRS Editions, 2014, p. 21-39 
708 Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare, A French View on Counterinsurgency. (Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Publishing Ltd, 2006/1964), p. 3 
709 N.B. The perceived Bolshevik threat was just as prominent during the 1920s and 1930s. The difference in 
Cold War was the fear that the insurgency model had been honed by the predominantly Communist resistance 
movement in the Second World War. This combined with conventional Soviet forces and rapidly improving 
technology meant the threat felt substantively different to the French state.   
710 ‘Doit se consevoir non plus à sa périphérie, à ses frontiers, mais sur toute sa surface’ – de Tassigny, Général 
Jean de Lattre. ‘Essai d’adaptation de l’organisation militaire aux conditions futures de la guerre’, Revue de 
Défense Nationale, Avril 1947, vol. 3, no. 35, p. 431 
711 Art. 1. Décret No. 50-1189 du 29 Septembre 1950 relatif à l’organisation de la defense en surface du 
territoire métropolitain. Journal officiel de la Republique française, 30 Septembre, 1950, 10162  
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thinking at the time where the perceived severity of the threat led to a shift in approach. The 
introduction of Défense en surface was crucial in framing France’s post-war strategic 
thinking. Given the perception of a new, even unprecedented, threat environment, the armed 
forces would be expected to fulfil a variety of functions in order to counter both internal and 
external threats.  
Furthermore, through the reintroduction of conscription in 1954 (principally for the war in 
Algeria based on the claim that it was part of Metropolitan France), following its 
abandonment during the Indo-China war of 1947-54, the government of the fourth republic 
attempted to forge a renewed sense of national unity based on the closer integration of the 
ordinary citizen with matters of defence and security.   
On 27 December 1956, Défense en surface was updated and renamed to ‘Défense intérieure 
du territoire’ (DIT). Its purpose was similar to that of its predecessor; however, unlike article 
one of Défense en surface, which listed maintaining order as last in the list of responsibilities 
for the army, article one of DIT places it first.712 DIT  saw the army operating in tandem 
with the civil power across four principle areas: the metropolitan area, the defence zone,713 
the military region, and the département.714 These départements included those overseas in 
Algeria and, in fact, it was in Algeria in the fight against the National Liberation Front (FLN) 
that DIT was first implemented.715 Interoperability between the civil and military powers 
was a cornerstone of this strategy and responsibility for maintaining public order was 
determined by the implementation of a state of siege as defined by the respective laws of 
1849 and 1878. Simply put, prior to a state of siege being declared the civil power held 
responsibility. After it was declared authority was transferred to the military.716  
However, as the decorated French general Alain Bizard wrote, under the conditions of DIT 
‘Civil authorities then soldiers [found] themselves successively on missions for which they 
712 Art. 1. Décret No. 56-1313 du 27 Décembre 1956 relatif à l’organisation de la defense intérieure du territoire 
métropolitain. Journal officiel de la Republique française, 28 Decembre, 1956, 12578 
713 This comprised seven principle zones: 1) Paris; 2) Zone Nord (siège à Lille) ; Zone Ouest (siège à Rennes) 
; Zone Sud-Ouest (siège à Bordeaux) ; Zone Sud (siège à Marseille) ; Zone Sud-Est (siège à Lyon) ; Zone Est 
(siège à Metz), Ministère de la Défense. L'organisation territoriale interarmées de defense, 20 February 2020. 
See: https://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/organismes-interarmees/l-organisation-territoriale-interarmees-de-
defense/l-organisation-territoriale-interarmees-de-defense (accessed 09/06/2020) 
714 Art. 3. Décret No. 56-1313 du 27 Décembre 1956 relatif à l’organisation de la defense intérieure du territoire 
métropolitain. Journal officiel de la Republique française, 28 Decembre, 1956, 12578 
715 Tenenbaum, Élie. ‘La Sentinelle Égarée? L’armee de Terre face au terrorisme’, IFRI, June 2016, vol. 68, 
pp. 15 – 16 
716 Bizard, Alain. ‘La Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire (DOT)’ Pouvoirs. No. 38 revue française d’études 
constitutionnelles et politiques, n°38, 38 - L’armée, Septembre 1986, p. 87 
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[were] not prepared’.717 A clearer delineation of expectations was required, particularly 
given the souring relations between de Gaulle and NATO and the need to preserve their 
nuclear deterrent. Thus, Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire (DOT) was introduced, 
abrogating its predecessor. Crucially, DOT did not provide the military with such authority 
that it negated the role of the civil forces. In fact, civil defence still remained under the 
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of the Republic. Thus, the army would not substitute the 
civil power as had been mandated in previous doctrine, but would supplement it.718 This 
essentially formalised France’s domestic strategic principles of interoperability with civil 
forces that can be observed even today through operations such as Sentinelle.  
Arguably, the principle of interoperability and supplementing the civil forces arose from the 
May 1958 crisis. During the war in Algeria, the fourth republic had become increasingly 
unpopular, particularly in nationalist and military circles, for its concessionary approach to 
Algeria. After anti-French riots erupted in Algiers, General Jacques Massu issued the French 
government with an ultimatum: reinstate de Gaulle or the army would revolt. Behind the 
scenes, Massu and his generals devised a plan entitled Opération Résurrection. First, 
paratroopers landed on Corsica as part of Opération Corse then, if the French government 
would not give in to their demands, the army planned to launch part two of the plan which 
would see around 1,500 French paratroopers drop into Paris at key strategic locations, 
bolstered by the support of the Air Force.  
A snap vote taken at the senate resulted in a massive majority of 102-3 against offering de 
Gaulle support if he formed a new government. However, the President at that time, Pierre 
Pflimlin was forced to conclude that the fourth republic had very little power at that time. 
He is said to have exclaimed that ‘we claim to exercise power, but we do not have it.’719 
Pflimlin met de Gaulle at the Chateau Saint Cloud, where Napoleon’s Coup of 18 Brumaire 
had taken place, to discuss the handover of power.  
Given de Gaulle’s instatement as first president of the French Fifth Republic, only the first 
part of Opération Résurrection was enacted. The army had played a direct role in the 
collapse of the fourth republic, using the threat of violence on the French mainland to ensure 
717 Ibid. 
718 Bizard, Alain. ‘La Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire (DOT)’ Pouvoirs. No. 38 revue française d’études 
constitutionnelles et politiques, n°38, 38 - L’armée, Septembre 1986, p. 88 
719 Fenby, Jonathan. The History of Modern France. From the Revolution to the War with Terror. (London: 
Simon & Schuster, 2015), p. 351 
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they got their way. Ironically, the army’s assumption that de Gaulle would protect their 
French colonial and anti-Algerian independence interests quickly backfired when a 
referendum on the self-determination of Algeria saw 75.3% of voters on the French mainland 
in favour of Algerian independence – a higher proportion than in Algeria itself (69.5%).720 
In April 1961, the army once again attempted to carry out a coup d’état, this time in Algeria 
in what became known as the Algiers (or Generals’) Putsch. The Putsch failed, but it once 
again demonstrated the danger of an ideologically-motivated army. This was exemplified by 
the interview of General Jacques Massu who declared that the army ‘has not yet shown [its 
power], because the opportunity has not arisen. But the Army would use its power in a 
certain situation.’721 
Due to fears of a repeat of the episodes of 1958, Article 1 of DOT, which would be a 
mainstay of France’s Cold War national defence strategy, outlined a remit based on 
interoperability:   
The operational defence of the territory, in conjunction with other forms of military defence 
and with civil defence, contributes to the maintenance of the freedom and the continuity of 




Article 1 continued by outlining how the army should contribute to national resilience in 
both times of war and peace:  
1) to participate in the protection of military installations and, as a priority, of those
of the strategic nuclear force;
2) Ensure general coverage of the national territory on the ground and to oppose
actions taken by the enemy within this territory;
720 Loi no. 61-44 du 14 janvier 1961. Constitution de la Ve République, Référendum sur l'autodétermination 
en Algérie, 8 janvier 1961.  
721 Interview in original German: "Die Armee hat die Macht. Sie hat sie bisher nicht gezeigt, weil die 
Gelegenheit hierzu noch nicht gegeben war. Die Armee würde aber in einer bestimmten Situation ihre Macht 
einsetzen." Massu, Jacques interview with Hans Ulrich Kempski. ‘MASSU-INTERVIEW, Die letzte Kugel’, 
Der Spiegel, 3 February 1960. See: https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-43063185.html (accessed 
18/02/2017) 
722 Décret n°73-235 du 1 mars 1973 relatif à la défense opérationnelle du territoire. Article 1. Italics added for 
emphasis. 
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3) In the event of an invasion, to carry out military resistance operations723
In simple terms, DOT’s three core domestic roles for the army can be understood as protect, 
deter, and resist. This remit is a reflection of the French strategic culture which embraces 
both tangible and psychological dimensions.724 In practical terms, DOT provided the army 
with a guarding role and, of course, a combative role in the event of invasion; from a 
psychological perspective, it also implied that the army had a major role to play in 
deterrence. In the event that nuclear deterrence failed, a protection mission coupled with the 
‘general coverage’ of troops on French soil would persuade France’s enemies that an attack 
would not be worth it.725 In essence, DOT was the doctrinal embodiment of France’s 
dualistic strategic culture; an approach that bridged the gap between the internal and the 
external, the physical and the psychic. 
DOT gradually fell out of usage towards the end of the Cold War as it became clear that 
Communist insurrection or invasion was not going to happen and instead the responsibilities 
for the maintenance of internal order fell predominantly on the Gendarmerie and the CRS. 
However, the Défense en surface, DIT, and DOT doctrines had set a precedent; the army 
would now never find itself too far away from discussions on domestic security. Thus, when 
the threat of transnational terrorism began to grow in the 1970s, France took steps to 
integrate the armed forces into their security architecture through the terrorist response 
strategy known as Vigipirate.726 
7.1.6. Summary 
This section has examined France’s historical experience with threats from invasion. Wars 
of the nineteenth century were often marked by ideological division and, by extension, 
disagreements over who constituted the real enemy. However, the First World War saw a 
rare moment of national unity and, as the rhetoric illustrated, there were no contrarian views 
in the assertions of policymakers. The sacrifices of the French people during the war meant 
723 Ibid. 
724 Heuser, Beatrice. Nuclear Mentalities?: Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG, p. 75 
725 Tenenbaum, Elie. ‘The Strategic Role of Land Forces’, Études de l’Ifri, Focus stratégique, 78 bis. July 
2019, p. 42 




that it no longer seemed prudent to use the troops in an active capacity against dissenting 
citizens. This was illustrated by the inter-war recruitment campaigns which convey active 
duty abroad and relatively passive duties at home.  
 
Although the First World War provided a rare moment of national unity, stark ideological 
cleavages developed once again both pre and post-Second World War and the government 
of the Fourth Republic attempted to preserve a sense of unity through the reintroduction of 
conscription in 1954. This move coincided with the development of a new framework for 
national defence based on the perceived re-emergence of the ennemi de l’intérieur and the 
fear of Communist insurrection.  
 
DIT and then DOT would form the French approach to national security and although it fell 
into disuse towards the end of the Cold War, it resulted in the closer integration of the armed 
forces into matters of internal security for purposes other than quelling civil unrest. It also 
led to greater interoperability between civil and military forces and, thus, the rise of the 
principle of supplementing the civil forces. Overall, resistance to the idea of deploying the 
armed forces on the national territory was fairly limited during the Cold War period. Most 
military-oriented objections that were raised focused instead on the war in Algeria or the 
more passionate resistance to France’s nuclear programme and weapons testing in the 
Pacific.727 However, given the threat from the USSR and the possibility (if not probability) 
of subversive Communist elements, it seems that there was a degree of consensus that 
maintaining a large standing army based on the national territory was an eminently sensible 
thing to do. This epitomises the importance of the physical and moral spheres in French 
strategic thought; practically, deploying the troops was a rational response to the perceived 
threat; culturally, it was deemed acceptable due to the long historical precedent for deploying 
troops domestically.       
 
We might summarise by quoting the French foreign minister during the First World War, 
René Viviani, who stated that ‘to be victorious, heroism at the border is insufficient; there 
must be unity within.’728 This epitomises the French perception that if a putative threat is to 
be overcome, it requires national consensus. If we compare the positive rhetoric from the 
 
727 Kitschelt, Herbert P. ‘Political Opportunity and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four 
Democracies’, British Journal of Political Science, 1984, vol. 16, p. 71 
728 Viviani, René. Journal officiel de la République française, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Deputés, 
Séance du 23 Decembre 1914. p. 3125 
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Commune, Languedoc, and the First World War we see a pattern begin to emerge that hints 
at what this consensus (i.e. in terms of acceptance of deploying the military domestically) 
may be. 
Chart 16: La Commune, Languedoc, and First World War. Positive rhetoric 
compared 
Sourcess: Archives Nationales, l'Assemblée nationale, Sénat 
Chart 16 shows an interesting level of continuity in the rhetoric. As well as praising the 
conduct of the troops and drawing positively on historical precedents, all three cases also 
refer to the fact that domestic duties are expected of the military, that a high level of threat 
necessitated the use of the army, and that there was a need to protect French values. These 
concepts can be understood as the foundation for the criteria under which the armed forces’ 
usage on the national territory is deemed acceptable.    
However, as noted previously, the reaction to the government’s heavy-handed response in 

















La Commune WW1 Languedoc
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understanding the criteria for cultural acceptance of the deployment of the military. The final 
column, ‘state of war’ shows eighteen and twenty-four mentions for the Commune and the 
First World War, respectively. However, the fact that the situation constitutes a state of war 
it is not mentioned at all during the Languedoc revolt and, as a result, policymakers did not 
deem the use of the armed forces to be acceptable. Related to this is the fact that 
policymakers during Languedoc rejected the use of the armed forces as it: a) contravened 
France’s core values (twenty-two references) and b) involved French citizens (seventeen 
references).     
Combining these themes, it becomes clear that acceptance for the use of the armed forces 
can be found in France if the following conditions are met:  
1) The situation constitutes, or is perceived to constitute, a state of war.
2) The adversary represents, or is perceived to represent, an existential threat
3) The adversary is either not comprised of French citizens or holds views that are
perceived to be diametrically opposed to French values.
This is certainly indicative that historical experiences have enacted a degree of influence on 
France’s cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically. Indeed, historical 
experiences are constitutive to the unity of a nation. However, the question that now arises 
is whether the same logic holds for domestic deployments for the purposes of countering 
terrorism? After all, terrorism is a very different beast to countering domestic threats of riots, 
insurrection,  or invasion. The following chapter will examine the gradual integration of the 
armed forces into the counter-terrorist architecture through Vigipirate before analysing 
policymakers’ response to the use of the armed forces under Sentinelle. 
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7.2. The French army and counter-terrorism
In 2016, a French parliamentary report stated that, compared with the responses of other 
Western states, in its history, France has been the ‘exception in the definition and the 
implementation of a permanent government plan for the prevention and protection against 
the terrorist threat involving the armies on the national territory.’729 Few western states have 
militarised the threat to quite the same extent as France; but then few western states also 
have such a long historical precedent for using military units domestically or even to counter 
the threat from terrorism in the modern era.   
This chapter examines the evolution of France’s response to the threat of terrorism. It argues 
that its long historical precedent for the use of the military on the national territory has 
embedded a sense that ‘protection’, either of the organs of state or of the population, is the 
basis of any domestic duty. With the rise of transnational terrorism, the understanding of 
protection was expanded to encompass these new threats. Protection is still the primary duty 
of the army; however, if the state perceives terrorism as a crime, rather than as an act of war, 
what should the military’s role be? Furthermore, if the state believes the military can be 
effective in countering terrorism, but has typically played a supplementary role to the civil 
forces, how can an expanded domestic military mandate be justified to the populace? And 
what implications does this have for the concepts of continuity and change in strategic 
behaviour?  
To address these questions, this chapter first looks at how France has typically viewed 
terrorism from the war in Algeria to the present day. It then examines the tangible effect this 
has had on France’s response by looking at the various police, intelligence, and military 
agencies tasked with countering terrorism on the national terrorism under the banners of 
prevent, intervene, and protect. It then examines the evolution of the threat from 
transnational terrorism and the creation of the vigipirate system in 1978 arguing that this set 
a precedent for the gradual integration of the military into France’s counter-terrorism 
security architecture. It discusses some of the first overt military deployments on the streets 
of France for the purposes of countering-terrorism following a series of bombings in the 
1990s before turning to an examination of the rhetoric regarding Sentinelle. Finally, it 
729 Rapport au Parlement. ‘Conditions d’emploi des armées lorsqu’elles interviennent sur le territoire national 
pour protéger la population’, p. 13 
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compares the responses to Sentinelle with those gathered from previous eras of domestic 
deployment in order to argue that the French approach to domestic deployments is 
characterised by both strategic continuity and change. 
7.2.1. Counter-terrorism: what role for the army? 
As the previous sections have illustrated, a core facet of France’s strategic culture is the 
notion of a perceived continuum between internal and external security and, while the armée 
de terre certainly fulfils an active external duty, as a French parliamentary report noted, it 
has also ‘always’ played a domestic role.730 Maintaining public order and quelling civil 
unrest has historically been one of its most recurrent domestic duties, but has all but 
disappeared in the modern era due to the negative perception of past experiences such as the 
Commune and Languedoc. Thus, the perception has developed that requiring French soldiers 
to face French citizens is a violation of the nation’s core norms and values. After all, how 
can one talk of liberté, égalité and fraternité if the inherent right to protest is supressed by 
military force? This aversion resulted in a demilitarisation of the response to unrest and the 
gradual enhancement of the civil forces’ capabilities in dealing with public disorder post-
First World War with the creation of the Gendarmerie Mobile.  
The army has also fulfilled an essential internal function in terms of defence from invasion 
by facing external enemies, with varying degrees of success, in five wars on the national 
territory since 1800. However, the army also maintains a ‘strategic protection function’.731 
This can be understood as a domestic role in countering a range of threats: from conventional 
forces, to subversive internal actors, and even protection of the population from natural 
disasters such as avalanches or forest fires. This full-spectrum protective function was 
exemplified by the development of DOT doctrine during the Cold War where ‘protection’ 
was outlined in article 1 as the army’s primary duty. There has been significant continuity 
in France’s strategic thinking on this point, illustrated by the fact that every White Paper 
since the first in 1972 has reiterated the essential protective domestic duties of the armed 
forces.   
730 Audibert Troin, Olivier and Léonard, Christophe. ‘Sur la présence et l’emploi des forces armées sur le 
territoire national’. Assemblée Nationale. Rapport d’Information, N° 3864. Commission de la Défense 
Nationale et des Forces Armées, p. 125 
731 Livre Blanc. Défense et Sécurité Nationale – 2013, p. 91 
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Terrorism, however, poses something of a conundrum; it is disruptive, destructive, and 
coercive. Further, despite using violence to compel their enemy, it is neither as sustained nor 
as overt as an enemy invasion. It can involve foreign actors crossing the border into France 
(ennemi à l’intérieur) to carry out an attack, and, recently a more homegrown threat of 
French citizens attacking the national territory (ennemi de l’intérieur). Clearly, the state and 
its citizens require and desire protection from its effects. But who holds the responsibly as 
first responders to a hypothetical attack, the army or the civil forces? The answer to the 
question depends on the state’s cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces and 
whether it considers terrorism to be a crime or an act of war. If the former then, arguably, 
responsibility for protecting the populace should lie with the police and intelligence services. 
If the latter, to what extent should the army be involved? And what form should military 
protection take?  
Since the Second World War, France has had extensive experience with dealing with acts of 
terrorism both abroad and at home. These experiences have been formative to the nation’s 
conception of the threat both as a crime and as an act of war. France had faced asymmetrical 
threats during the Indo-China war of 1946 and, of course, during the war in Algeria between   
1954 and 1962 where the FLN had such success. These petites guerres,732 particularly in 
Algeria, were characterised by hit-and-run style attacks, bombings, assassinations, and even 
kidnappings. This led Trinquier to write that ‘[q]uite clearly, terrorism is a weapon of 
warfare, and it is important to stress it.’ 733 
In the late 1950s, the FLN brought their brand of resistance to the streets of France. Jacques 
Soustelle, then France’s minister for information, had clashed with de Gaulle over the latter’s 
increasing support for Algerian independence. Soustelle’s view of an Algérie française made 
him a target and, in September 1959 three members of the FLN opened fire on his car when 
it was stopped at a red light. Soustelle was unharmed, but one of the attackers, being pursued 
by the police, tried to cover his escape by shooting four members of the public at a metro 
stop, one of whom died. In contrast to Trinquier’s assessment of the terrorist threat, an article 
published in Le Monde declared that France ‘condemn[s] this criminal act.’734 
732 Petite guerre is nineteenth century term used to describe the first Algerian war. It stood in contrast to the 
Grande guerres that occurred between Europe’s major powers during the same period.  
733 Trinquier, Modern Warfare, p. 20 
734 Viansson-Ponté, Pierre. ‘L'attentat dirigé contre M. Soustelle est utilisé contre l'idée de négociation’, Le 
Monde, 17 September 1958 
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One cannot help but wonder if the Soustelle incident had occurred in Algeria rather than 
Paris whether it would have prompted a different response; Trinquier’s statement refers to 
terrorism as an effective means of resisting and repelling an adversary in the context of a 
broader insurgency campaign. Thus, terrorism was simply considered as the employment of 
alternative means of military resistance. The key point here is that, in France’s view, if an 
isolated violent incident with political motivations occurs within the context of a war, it is 
considered to be an extension of that state of war. If it occurs in a state during peacetime, it 
is a crime.  
This is the rationale that has guided France’s approach to terrorism until very recently. For 
example, the 1994 White Book states that ‘Terrorist action is arguably the main non-military 
threat that can affect our security.’735 While the 2008 iteration of the white book places 
transnational terrorism in the same bracket as cross border organised crime, claiming that 
the strengthening of intelligence capabilities will help ‘prevent its occurrence and limit its 
effects.’736 This view of terrorism as a crime has meant primacy for operations has typically 
been held by the police and intelligence services.737   
7.2.2. Counter-terrorism agencies up to 2015 
Before 2015, the fight against terrorism in France had typically been conducted via a 
combination of intelligence gathering, police work, and limited military efforts in the rural 
areas of France through the Gendarmerie. When necessary, these efforts have been 
supplemented with small numbers of regular troops deployed at strategic locations under the 
Vigipirate system and occasionally through the use of elite civil and military counter-
terrorist units in order to deal with hostage situations. The French approach generally adheres 
to the principles of Prevent, Intervene, and Protect. The following section will outline the 
forces that are involved at each of these stages. 
735 Italics added for emphasis. Livre Blanc sur la Défense, 1994, p.17 See: 
http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/le-livre-blanc-sur-la-defense-1994.pdf  
736 Défense et Sécurité nationale. Le Livre Blanc, 2008. (Paris: Odile Jacob, La Documentation Française, June 
2008), pp. 50-57 
737 See Frank Foley’s analysis on the predominantly civil responses to terrorism through intelligence and police 
efforts in France. Foley, Frank. Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the 
Shadow of the Past. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)  
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7.2.3. Prevent: Intelligence and police 
In terms of intelligence, France’s domestic agency the Direction Centrale du Renseignement 
Intérieur (DCRI) holds most of the responsibility. The DCRI was formed in 2008 via a 
merger of the two previous agencies known as the Renseignements Généraux (RG) and the 
Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) in order to centralise the response to 
terrorism.738 The DCRI coordinates with French police services such as the sous-direction 
anti-terroriste (SDAT) which also has a national remit under the direction of the Police 
Judiciare (Judicial Police). The DCRI’s foreign intelligence counterpart is the Direction 
Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE). Coordination between the two agencies has 
been increasingly important in the post-2001 threat environment given the rise of 
transnational terrorism.  
7.2.4. Intervene: Forces d’intervention 
In the event that the ‘prevent’ element of the strategy fails and an attack occurs, France has 
a series of both civil and military forces d’intervention on operational standby to resolve the 
situation. There are five principle agencies: BRI, RAID, the GIGN, BAC and the pelotons 
de surveillance et d'intervention de la Gendarmerie (PSIG). Each of these units holds a 
different area of jurisdiction and specialism. In fact, the Ministère des Armées’ schema 
nationale d’intervention (national intervention scheme) categorises France’s internal 
security forces in terms of their ability to deal with specific threats (see figure 1). According 
to this schematic, there are three levels of intervention: 1) Specialised, 2) Intermediary, and 
3) Elementary.
738 Projet de loi de finances pour 2008: Sécurité, D. LA CRÉATION DE LA DIRECTION CENTRALE DU 
RENSEIGNEMENT INTÉRIEUR (DCRI). See: https://www.senat.fr/rap/l07-091-328/l07-091-3286.html 
(accessed 01/02/2019) 
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Figure 1: France’s National Intervention Spectrum 
Specialised intervention requires personnel to be at ‘an extremely high level of expertise’ in 
order to carry out a ‘final assault’. These forces will be called upon when there is the need 
to ‘to neutralize the terrorists or the hostage-takers definitively, while thwarting or bypassing 
any obstacles.’739 In France the three units seen as capable of carrying out this mission are: 
1) the GIGN. This is France’s dedicated military counter-terrorism unit formed in 1973 in
the aftermath of the Munich attack. It usually operates in rural areas and in Paris, but given
its military status it also has the authority to operate overseas. 2) RAID. Formed in 1985,
this is the civil counterpart to the GIGN with national jurisdiction. 3) BRI. This is the civil
counter-terrorist and special operations unit that operates in Paris. It is the oldest of the three
units having been formed in 1964. All three of these units were active in Paris during 2015;
RAID and BRI at the Bataclan in November and all three at the Hypercacher supermarket
siege in Paris in January following the attacks on the Charlie Hebdo offices.
The intermediary category involves ‘first intervention’ when there is a need for a resolution 
to a situation as quickly as possible. The two principle units involved at this level are BAC 
and the PSIG. The BAC is a police unit founded in 1971 that predominantly operates in Paris 











and other provincial towns. Their role is to combat serious offences that often involve 
violence such as armed robbery, carjacking, gang violence as well as other crimes such as 
drug trafficking and production. The PSIG is a military unit that was formed in 1975. In the 
past they have been required to supplement the regular army for missions related to DOT as 
well as carrying surveillance operations and countering serious crime. A month before the 
attacks in Paris in November 2015, the BAC and PSIG had announced a strategy entitled 
BAC-PSIG 2016 which would enhance inter-agency cooperation, coordination and training. 
At the lowest echelon there are the ‘elementary’ intervention forces. These are the ordinary 
police and Gendarmerie personnel who do not necessarily have any specific counter-terrorist 
expertise, but will usually be ‘the first to arrive immediately on the scene and to face the 
terrorists.’740 Through these forces d’intervention it becomes clear that a blend of civil and 
military responses has been a mainstay of France’s counter-terrorist approach since the 
formation of many of these units in the 1970s.   
7.2.5. Protect: Police, Gendarmerie and the armée de terre 
In the 2013 iteration of the white book on security and national defence, ‘protection of the 
French territory and its people’ is listed as the number one strategic priority. While the police 
and Gendarmerie will always play a major role in fulfilling this task, it argues that there are 
seven core threats to the state which require a strategy based on protection and to which the 
armed forces must contribute. In order of perceived severity, these are: 
1) attacks by another state against national territory;
2) terrorist attacks;
3) cyber attacks;
4) damage to scientific and technical potential;
5) organized crime;
6) natural, health and technological crises;
7) attacks against our nationals abroad741
740 Ibid. 
741 Livre Blanc. Défense et Sécurité Nationale – 2013, pp. 47-48 
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Even in 2013, two years before France would face a wave of devastating attacks, terrorism 
is listed as the second most serious threat facing the nation and, unlike their British 
counterparts, the French have not shied away from integrating the army into their response 
to the threat. One of the main reasons for this is the historical precedent for the army in a 
domestic role that has been explored in this thesis. French strategic thinking on terrorism has 
arguably been guided less by the repressive aspects of quelling civil disorder (although this 
certainly contributed to the learning of lessons) and more in terms of countering both 
conventional and unconventional threats through defence against invasion or the significant 
protective role that the army played during the Cold War under the DOT doctrine. 
Consequently, the French army has arguably been fully integrated into France’s national 
defence model since the end of the Second World War.742  
Of course, during the early stages of the Cold War, military protection from terrorism on the 
national territory did not factor into French strategic thinking. Indeed, France’s first White 
Book on defence, published in 1972 within the strategic context of the Cold War, makes no 
mention of terrorism as a threat at all.743 However, throughout the 1970s the threat of 
transnational terrorism began to increase dramatically leading to the gradual integration of 
the army not just into general national defence, but also into a more specific counter-terrorist 
function.   
7.2.6. 1945 – 1978: The evolution of the threat and the introduction of vigipirate 
In the years following the Second World War, terrorism was largely seen as something that 
happened abroad as one of the tools in the insurgency toolbox. It was essentially viewed as 
something that was perpetrated by fighters who felt it necessary to level the playing field 
against militarily superior foes. At that point in time, that rationale was not necessarily 
incorrect; between 1945 and December 1973, France had only experienced two significant 
terrorist attacks. The first, the Soustelle incident discussed above. The second, a devastating 
bomb that was detonated in 1961 on a Strasbourg to Paris fast train killing twenty-eight. The 
attack was carried out by the far-right terrorist group, the Organisation armée secrete (OAS) 
742 Audibert Troin, Olivier and Léonard, Christophe. ‘Sur la présence et l’emploi des forces armées sur le 
territoire national’. Assemblée Nationale. Rapport d’Information, N° 3864. Commission de la Défense 
Nationale et des Forces Armées, p. 125 
743 Livre Blanc sur la Défense Nationale, 1973. See: http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/le-
livre-blanc-sur-la-defense-1972.pdf  
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whose ideology was based on the prevention of Algerian independence and whose 
membership comprised former military and political personnel, including Soustelle.  
The OAS had its roots in the political crisis of May 1958 that saw the collapse of the Fourth 
Republic and Charles de Gaulle reinstated as president. The perception that the army had 
given de Gaulle his power, who had subsequently abandoned them by speaking in favour of 
Algerian independence led to the formation of the OAS and a prolonged and deadly 
assassination and bombing campaign carried out in Algeria. The OAS would also 
successfully carry out two more bombings on mainland France in 1962 and 1963. While an 
associate of theirs, Jean Bastien-Thiry, a former Gaullist, would also attempt to assassinate 
de Gaulle in Paris by spraying his car with machine gun bullets.744  
The attacks by the OAS, were further evidence of the internal-external security connection 
in France. However, in spite of their impact they still represented fairly isolated incidents 
compared with the prolonged terrorist threat on French mainland during the 1970s. Table 12 
shows the dramatic increase in the number of significant attacks perpetrated in France during 
the Cold War.  
Table 12: Significant terrorist attacks in France, 1950 - 1989745 
The Munich attacks in 1972 of course marked the moment that the nature of the threat 
shifted. Not only did the attack force a re-evaluation of the security architecture in the west, 
but it also demonstrated to potential terrorists how they could effectively hurt western states 
who at that stage were almost entirely unprepared to deal with such unconventional methods. 
In France, the 1970s saw a series of bombings and shootings by various organisations such 
744 An interesting connection is that Bastien-Thiry’s attempt to assassinate de Gaulle provided the inspiration 
for Frederick Forsyth’s novel The Day of the Jackal. This is the book that was spotted among the belongs of 
Ilich Ramírez Sánchez while he was on the run in the 1970s and is how he got the nickname Carlos the Jackal. 







as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), Black September, the Rote Armee 
Fraktion (RAF), and perhaps most infamously, by Ilich Ramírez Sánchez also known as 
Carlos the Jackal.   
From the French perspective, and in spite of the recent formation of the GIGN, the response 
to most of these incidents was carried out by the civil forces. For example, in 1975 when 
members of the PLO took hostages at the Iraqi embassy in Paris, it was BAC who responded. 
While another hostage crisis in 1981, this time at the Turkish embassy carried out by the 
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, saw the Parisian police negotiate with the 
terrorists. As noted earlier, the limited direct role of the military in terms of countering 
terrorism was likely a function of the perception of terrorism as a crime.  
This is not to say that behind the scenes French policymakers had not devised plans for a 
more active role for the army. Indeed, as a French parliamentary report notes, It had ‘been 
planned for a long time that they [the army] can be deployed [on the national territory], in 
support of the civilian authorities and under the authority of the latter.’746 Again, here it is 
important to note the reference to supplementing the civil forces and subordination to the 
civil power. In short, at this point in time, civil forces were still firmly considered by 
policymakers as the first responders to terrorism with the army only available if absolutely 
necessary. Nevertheless, with the threat from transnational terrorism seemingly expanding 
by the day, the French government did deem it necessary to devise a contingency plan to 
allow for the troops to engage on the national territory outside of the confines of DOT.  
The contingency plan that had been devised to allow for such a full-spectrum national 
response to terrorism was given the name plan ‘pirate’ by an interministerial message issued 
in 1978.747 Pirate stood for Protection des Installations contre les Risques d'Attentats 
Terroristes à l'Explosif. (Protection of Installations against the Risks of Terrorist Explosive 
Attacks). Here we see once more the common theme of protection. In this context it was 
defined as ‘reduc[ing] vulnerabilities without inducing disproportionate constraints on the 
economic and social life of the Nation.’748 The units responsible for this task would be a 
746 Le plan Vigipirate. Ministère de l’intérieur, 1 September 2016. See: 
https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-des-dossiers/2016-Dossiers/Securite-les-grands-plans-d-
action/Le-plan-Vigipirate (accessed 05/09/2019) 
747 It was not legally codified until 2005. 
748 Le plan Vigipirate. Ministère de l’intérieur, 1 September 2016. See: 
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combination of the Gendarmerie Mobile, the CRS, judicial police and, of course, regular 
military forces. 
7.2.7. ‘Sommes nous en guerre?’ 
Towards the end of the 1980s, there was an interesting rhetorical shift in how French 
policymakers began to discuss the threat of terrorism. France experienced a series of attacks 
in 1986 perpetrated by members of the Fractions armées révolutionnaires libanaises 
(FARL) and Hezbollah. This led then prime minister Jacques Chirac to describe terrorism 
as ‘a form of war’.749 Of course, the September 1986 law on the fight against terrorism 
indicated that France still treated terrorism as a crime in a legal sense. It even established a 
circuit of judges known as le service central de lutte antiterroriste which was tasked with 
formally trying terrorists before a court of law.750 
Nevertheless, Chirac’s use of the term ‘war’ still constituted a clear rhetorical lurch away 
from the traditional view of terrorism as a crime. Furthermore, it was not just hyperbole as 
it also led to tangible shift in policy. First, in 1986 Chirac deployed two thousand troops 
for border control tasks and in order to secure a number of sensitive sites.751 Second, it 
forced a revision to existing terms of pirate. In 1991, it was renamed to vigipirate in 
order to encompass the need for VIGIlance. The newly formed vigipirate now adhered to 
two more core principles in addition to protection: 
1) Vigilance: improving ‘knowledge of the terrorist threat and its proper consideration
in order to adjust individual behaviour and protection measures’.
2) Prevention: ‘raising the awareness among state agents, operators and citizens of the
terrorist threat’752
https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-des-dossiers/2016-Dossiers/Securite-les-grands-plans-d-
action/Le-plan-Vigipirate (accessed 05/09/2019) 
749 Tenenbaum, Elie. ‘The Strategic Role of Land Forces.’ Études de l’Ifri, Focus stratégique, 78 bis. July 
2019, p. 19 
750 JO numéro 0210 du 10/09/1986, Loi n° 86-1020 du 9 septembre 1986 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme 
et aux atteintes à la sûreté de l'Etat. p. 10956 
751 These measures remained in place until March 1987. Tenenbaum, Élie. ‘La Sentinelle Égarée? L’armee 
de Terre face au terrorisme’, IFRI, June 2016, vol. 68, p. 19 
752 Le plan Vigipirate. Ministère de l’intérieur, 1 September 2016. See: 
https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-des-dossiers/2016-Dossiers/Securite-les-grands-plans-d-
action/Le-plan-Vigipirate (accessed 05/09/2019) 
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It also introduced an alert system for categorising the severity of the terrorist threat with each 
level, much like JTAC’s system in the British case, triggering specific responses. These 
categories are colour coded as: Yellow (increase vigilance); Orange (adopt measures to 
prevent a small-scale terrorist action); Red (adopt measures to prevent a serious terrorist 
attack); and Scarlet (adopt measures to prevent a major terrorist incident).753 At the highest 
levels it allows the government to halt commercial flights and even the distribution of tap 
water if deemed necessary. It also prompts the deployment of the armed forces to patrol the 
streets for the purposes of fulfilling a protection and deterrence function.   
It was this function that was implemented in 1995 following a high-profile hijacking of Air 
France flight 8969 followed by a series of bombings carried out by the Groupe Islamique 
Armé (GIA) in Paris and Lyon and, since then, troops have been permanently deployed on 
France’s streets in some capacity. This overt militarisation of the threat, despite the codified 
legal view of terrorism as a crime, paved the way for the unprecedented measures that were 
adopted by the French state following a shocking series of attacks perpetrated by IS in Paris 
throughout 2015.   
7.2.8. ‘Oui, nous sommes en guerre’754 
A French parliamentary report released the year after the attacks in November stated that 
‘the militarisation of the threat … has rendered it necessary to redefine the operational 
contract.’755  The report was referring to a perceived shift in the character of terrorism; it no 
longer seemed to be the case that attacks would be carried out by political activists with little 
or no military training. Instead, Islamist terrorism seemed to be characterised by a sustained 
and coordinated campaign of violence perpetrated by individuals with military experience 
who were not only ready, but also willing, to die for their cause.   
The first warning signs of an imminent escalation in the scale and nature of the threat 
occurred in December 2014 when three separate terrorist incidents took place in France. 
753 Ibid. 
754 Extract from a speech given by Manuel Valls the day after the Paris attacks in November 2015. ‘Il n’y aura 
un moment de répit pour ceux qui s’attaquent aux valuers de la République’, 14 November 2015. See : 
http://www.gouvernement.fr/partage/5846-manuel-valls-au-20h-de-tf1 (accessed 19/10/2016) 
755 Rapport au Parlement. ‘Conditions d’emploi des armées lorsqu’elles interviennent sur le territoire national 
pour protéger la population’, p. 38 
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First, in Joué-lès-Tours when a man armed with a knife attacked a police station injuring 
three officers before he was shot and killed. The second took place in Dijon when a man 
drove his car into crowds of pedestrians at five different locations injuring eleven. The third 
occurred the next day in very similar circumstances: in Nantes, a man driving a van 
deliberately crashed into a Christmas market killing one and injuring ten. As a precautionary 
measure, the government responded by increasing the threat level under vigipirate and 
deploying 300 troops across the country.  
Then, between 7 and 9 January 2015, France endured a series of deadly Islamist terrorist 
attacks across the île-de-France area of Paris that awoke French policy makers to the fact 
the limited military role under vigipirate may be insufficient to counter the threat. The first 
attack of 2015 was carried out by brothers Saïd and Chérif Kouachi who attacked the offices 
of satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. Armed with assault rifles, pistols, shotguns and 
grenades they entered the offices and shot and killed twelve workers, injuring eleven. The 
magazine had drawn condemnation from many Muslims over its depictions of the Muslim 
prophet Mohammed and the editor, Stéphane Charbonnier – who was killed in the attack – 
had even been added to Al-Qaeda’s ‘most wanted’ list in 2013.756 After the attack, the 
brothers exited the offices and can be heard on an amateur video shouting ‘we have avenged 
the prophet Mohammed! We have killed Charlie Hebdo!’757 
Just hours later, Amedy Coulibaly, an associate of the Kouachi brothers, shot and wounded 
a jogger in the Fontenay-aux-Roses area and the next day shot and killed a police officer and 
wounded a bystander. Coulibaly allegedly declared allegiance to the terrorist organisation 
Islamist State after the second shooting. On 9 January, Coulibaly killed four more 
individuals before taking hostages in a Kosher supermarket, while the Kouachi brothers 
barricaded themselves in the offices of a signage production company. After a tense standoff 
at both locations, members of the GIGN, BRI and RAID shot and killed all three assailants, 
756 Bennett, Dashiell. ‘Look Who's on Al Qaeda's Most-Wanted List’, The Atlantic, 1 March 2013. See: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/al-qaeda-most-wanted-list/317829/  
(accessed 02/06/2018) 
757 ‘On a vengé le prophète Mohammed! On a tué Charlie Hebdo!’ – Edouard de Mareschal and Stéphane 
Kovacs, ‘À Charlie Hebdo, les terroristes ont crié : « Allah akbar ! Nous avons vengé le Prophète!’, Le Figaro, 
7 January 2015. See: http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/01/07/01016-20150107ARTFIG00483-les-
terroristes-ont-crie-allah-akbar-nous-avons-venge-le-prophete.php (accessed 27/03/17) 
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firing 1,300 rounds of ammunition in the process.758 According to the French newspaper le 
Figaro, the streets of Paris had been ‘transformed into a war zone.’759 
Indeed, in the aftermath the comparisons with a state war were hard to avoid. Both civil and 
military forces had been engaged in firefights and, across the île-de-France area over the 
three days, a total of seventeen civilians lost their lives and twenty-two were wounded. In 
response to the attacks, Prime Minister Manuel Valls declared, ‘we must do everything 
possible to ensure security’ before announcing the implementation of Opération Sentinelle 
for the first time. 
Sentinelle was initially intended to be a temporary operation to supplement the civil forces 
in a similar manner to that which already existed under the vigipirate system. However, as 
the military governor of Paris, Général Bruno Le Ray, stated ‘the November attacks took us 
to the next level.’760 The number of troops on active deployment was increased by thousands 
and, following criticisms of inaction at the Bataclan, the operation evolved into a more 
‘permanent’, ‘reactive’, and ‘flexible’ operation compared with the relatively static guarding 
role that it had entailed in the past.761 For example, in 2016 a parliamentary report found that 
roughly 75% of the troops involved in Sentinelle before the November attacks were 
employed in static guarding roles.762 This, the report argues, is ineffective for countering 
marauding threats and a preferable ratio would be 80:20 in favour of dynamic patrols (i.e. 
patrolling along a pre-determined, but ‘unpredictable’ route).763 These recommendations 
were implemented in 2016 and military  patrols then became more akin to those the troops 
were used to conducting in overseas operations.  
758 It was widely reported in the French media (see footnote below) that 5,000 rounds of ammunition were 
spent. This was incorrect. According to a parliamentary inquiry into the incident, 5,000 was the number of 
rounds that had been requisitioned from the munitions stores. Of this number, 1,300 were fired. See: ‘Rapport 
fait au nom de la commission d’enquête relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l’état pour lutter contre le 
terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015’, tome 2: Comptes rendus des auditions, Assemblée nationale, no. 3922, p. 
149 
759 Cornevin, Christophe. ‘Sept heures d'assaut et 5000 munitions: le récit d'une opération d'une violence rare’, 
Le Figaro, 18 November 2015. See: https://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2015/11/18/01016-
20151118ARTFIG00345-le-commando-neutralise-a-saint-denis-etait-pret-a-passer-a-l-acte.php (accessed 
27/03/2017) 
760 Général Bruno Le Ray. p. 402 
761 Bollier, Séverine. ‘Sentinelle: Un dispositif optimise’. Armées d’aujourd’hui. No. 420. November 2017. 
p.36
762 ‘Points fixes’ is the term used by French policy makers. It is equivalent to the ‘static guarding’ role referred
to by British policy makers to describe the role of soldiers deployed under Operation Temperer.
763 Audibert Troin, Olivier and Léonard, Christophe. ‘Sur la présence et l’emploi des forces armées sur le
territoire national’. Assemblée Nationale. Rapport d’Information, N° 3864. Commission de la Défense
Nationale et des Forces Armées, p. 190
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In fact, taking into account the various tours of duty, throughout the course of 2015 a total 
of 70,000 troops were deployed on the French national territory and, at the time of writing, 
Sentinelle has constituted the largest deployment of troops on French territory since Algeria 
in the 1950s and 1960s.764 Furthermore, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, the 
number of troops deployed domestically has exceeded that of those deployed on operations 
abroad: Thirteen thousand troops are currently (2020) stationed on internal operations 
(missions intérieure – MISSINT), compared with just 6,100 on external operations 
(opérations extérieure – OPEX).765  
7.2.9. Operation Sentinelle rhetoric: continuity or change? 
Consequently, Sentinelle appeared to represent a fundamental change in France’s strategic 
culture; an unprecedented pivot away from external operations towards defence of the 
territory. Clearly, there are a number of aspects of Sentinelle that do indeed represent change, 
but to what extent can the operation be seen as a total deviation from France’s historically-
received cultural preferences for the use of force internally? This section will examine the 
rhetoric from 220 speeches and statements by high ranking policymakers and military 
personnel on both the nature and character of Sentinelle (Chart 17). It aims to explore the 
extent to which it truly represented a shift and whether a set of core cultural preferences can 
be traced across time.  
764 Talbott, John E. The War without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962. (London: Faber & Faber, 1980), 
p. 48
765 7,150 troops are stationed in former colonies such as the Antilles, Guyana, Mayotte/ La Réunion, New
Caledonia, and French Polynesia.  The 6,100 troops deployed externally are part of two major operations. 1)
Opération Barkhane in Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Chad. 2) Opération Chammal in Syria and Iraq.




Chart 17: Policymakers’ reactions to Opération Sentinelle - 2015 -2017 
Sources: L’assemblée nationale, Sénat 
Change… 
The theory of change in strategic culture advanced in this thesis argues that shifts may occur 
if there are the appropriate institutions to enact change, a leader who is bold enough to push 
changes through, and, crucially, a normative environment that is receptive to a change being 
made. Sentinelle certainly adheres to these criteria for change given 1) the strong historical 
precedent for military operations on the national territory as well as institutions that are 
capable and willing to amend their approach; 2) A leader who had sufficient charisma to 











































































































































































































































































































































































































of the Army Jean-Pierre Bosser declared, ‘[t]he public would not understand if the army 
remained in its barracks during a terrorist attack.’766  
The notion that Sentinelle was unprecedented or a fundamental strategic shift was conveyed 
quite forcefully in the speeches and statements. In fact, in the neutral category it was the 
second most frequently referenced theme. For example, the Socialist party senator Gilbert 
Rodger stated that ‘the national territory ‘has become the first theatre of engagement.’767 The 
Communist party member, Michelle Demessine argued that the severe threat had meant that 
national defense has taken on ‘a new dimension’.768 Yvon Colin, the representative of the 
département of Tarn-et-Garonne in the senate, stated that the ‘exceptional mobilisation of 
forces on the national territory has led to significant [strategic] adjustments.’769 And the 
foreign minister Yves le Drian explicitly stated that Sentinelle ‘marks a major shift in the 
positioning of our armies… Due to the very nature of the threat.’770 
Related to the idea of an unprecedented response from the French state was the idea that it 
was proportionate to the unprecedented threat posed by radical Islam. In fact, the ‘necessary 
given threat category’ was by far the most commonly referenced theme with thirty speeches 
and statements. Policymakers referred to the ‘particularly strong terrorist threat’, an 
‘evolved’ threat that involved ‘militarized and professionalized modes of action, of the 
commando type’,771 another speech by the Paris representative in the senate, Layla Aïchi, 
directly referred to how ‘such a deployment, following the terrible attacks which struck our 
country, was necessary.’772  
There were also multiple references to the more forceful concept of a state of war. Le Drian 
spoke of ‘the war at home’,773 Manuel Valls (as quoted earlier in the thesis) declared that 
766 Bosser, Jean-Pierre. ‘L’Armée de terre, le territoire national et l’année 2015’, Revue Défense Nationale, 
January 2016, No. 786, p. 11 
767 Rodger, Gilbert cited in Sénat, Journal officiel de la république française, session ordinaire de 2015-2016, 
Année 2016. – No 26 S. (C.R.), Mercredi 16 mars 2016, p. 4140 
768 Demessine, Michelle cited in Sénat, Journal officiel de la république française, session ordinaire de 2015-
2016, Année 2016. – No 26 S. (C.R.), Mercredi 16 mars 2016, p. 4139 
769 Colin, Yvon cited in Sénat, Journal officiel de la république française, session ordinaire de 2015-2016, 
Année 2016. – No 26 S. (C.R.), Mercredi 16 mars 2016, p. 4136 
770 Drian, Jean-Yves le cited in Sénat, Journal officiel de la république française, session ordinaire de 2015-
2016, Année 2016. – No 26 S. (C.R.), Mercredi 16 mars 2016 
771 Ibid. 
772 Aïchi, Layla cited in Comptes rendus de la commission des affaires étrangeres, de la défense et des forces 
armées Mardi 17 novembre 2015.  
773 Drian, Jean-Yves le. Sénat, Journal officiel de la république française, session ordinaire de 2015-2016, 
année 2016. – No 26 S. (C.R.), Mercredi 16 mars 2016, p. 4132 
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France was ‘at war (...) yes, we are at war.’774 Yvon Colin even referred to how ‘a terrorist 
army … is a threat of unprecedented danger, which requires … an appropriate response.’775 
Thus, if Sentinelle constituted a shift in French strategy, then this was the rhetoric used by 
policymakers to justify the change. 
Another aspect of the rhetoric that seemed to indicate change is the number of neutral 
statements. To draw a brief comparison with the British case, most of the rhetoric across 
each of the formative moments fell into the neutral category in that it generally represented 
unemotive statements of fact and did not prompt any debate. As Heuser writes, [d]elving 
into deep thoughts or reconsidering basic assumptions and the ethical principles underlying 
them usually ‘makes Britons turn pink and twiddle their toes.’’776 The rhetorical analysis for 
the British case certainly supports this notion of consensus for fear of causing offence. By 
contrast, debate and division has long been a fundamental component of France’s national 
political culture. For most French citizens, it would be unconscionable not to have an opinion 
on a matter as important as domestic military deployments. Again, the rhetorical analysis in 
this thesis has supported this idea with just around thirty of the speeches on the Commune, 
Languedoc, The First World War, and the Gilets Jaunes being coded as neutral out of over 
three hundred that were analysed for these four cases. By contrast, Sentinelle does seem to 
have led to a shift in the tone of debate in France; as the middle column of chart 17 illustrates, 
there are many more unemotive statements compared with previous examples.   
Many of these neutral statements refer to how the operation, while neither inherently a good 
or a bad thing, must adhere to France’s norms and values and must balance the nation’s 
capabilities and resources. However, two of the most frequently-referenced neutral 
statements relate to the interoperability of the civil and military forces and how the military 
is supplementary, but not necessarily subordinate, to the civil power. This stands in contrast 
to the British case where there is a clear theme of subordination. However, for France, the 
army serves the purpose of enhancing the civil power through its specialist capabilities, but, 
while close cooperation and even coordination with civil forces is maintained, the armed 
forces retain a significant degree of autonomy on operational matters.   
774 Extract from a speech given by Manuel Valls the day after the Paris attacks in November 2015, ‘Il n’y aura 
un moment de répit pour ceux qui s’attaquent aux valuers de la République’, 14 November 2015. See : 
http://www.gouvernement.fr/partage/5846-manuel-valls-au-20h-de-tf1 (accessed 19th October 2016) 
775 Colin, Yvon. Sénat, Journal officiel de la république française, session ordinaire de 2015-2016, année 2016. 
– No 26 S. (C.R.), Mercredi 16 mars 2016, p. 4135
776 Heuser, Beatrice. Nuclear Mentalities?: Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG, p. 5
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Continuity… 
Despite the fact that Sentinelle appears on the surface, in terms of its scale and remit, to be 
such a shift in approach, the responses also reveal a great deal of continuity in terms of 
France’s preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically. As noted during the 
defence against invasion section, interoperability and supplementing the civil forces are two 
key concepts of France’s approach to national defence which emerged under the DOT 
framework that was discussed in the previous chapter. Further, through the pirate and 
vigipirate system devised during the Cold War, the army has been expected to play a 
supplementary role alongside the civil forces on matters of national defence.  
Tangible examples of this have been joint police and military patrols at Metro stations in the 
1990s and even joint counter-terrorist intervention missions carried out by BRI, the GIGN, 
and RAID. We can even trace references to interoperability in the rhetoric of the Commune. 
For example, one comment referred to how the national guard ‘was to share, with the army, 
the title, the honours and the obligations of the public force.’777 Further, Louis de Saint-
Pierre remarked that the national guard and the army were ‘both indispensable to the 
maintenance of the capital and obliged to replace each other for the guard of all the important 
points.’778 Thus, there is at least 150 years of historical precedent for these concepts. This 
notion of historical precedent bears dwelling on as it holds the key to understanding both the 
constraining effect of culture on France’s strategic approach and the conditions under which 
the deployment of the armed forces is deemed acceptable.  
Historical continuity in strategy in relation to Sentinelle can be understood according to two 
main principles: 1) the Internal – external security nexus; and 2) the ‘Protection’ mandate of 
the armed forces.  
777 Chanzy, M. Le Général. Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des séances, annexes, 
tome V, 19 August – 16 September 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 6 
778 The National Guard is, of course, a military unit. However, it was still seen as distinct from the regular army 
with more of a civil defence function. Thus, the principles of interoperability on the national territory still 
apply. 
For quote see: Chanzy, M. Le Général. Annales de l'Assemblée nationale : compte rendu in extenso des 
séances, annexes, Tome V, 19 August – 16 September 1871. (Paris: Wittersheim & Co., 1871), p. 122 
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1) Internal – External Security
First, despite the idea that Sentinelle represented a change in France’s strategic culture, the 
reality is that reflects the connection between the external and internal theatres of action that 
France has made throughout its history. In fact, the internal-external security nexus was one 
of the most prominent themes in the rhetoric with twenty-two references.  However, as this 
thesis has demonstrated, the internal-external security distinction, or rather the lack of it, is 
an enduring facet of France’s strategic culture. Past experiences with internal and external 
enemies meant it was counterproductive to the security of the state to draw such a division; 
the Commune saw twelve references to the nexus and the contextual chapter illustrated that 
the idea of an ennemi de l’intérieur in conjunction with external forces emerged during the 
French Revolution. This was also illustrated through the analysis of the recruitment 
campaigns after the First World War. Thus, despite the rhetoric on Sentinelle conveying a 
sense that this blurring of the lines is a modern phenomenon, it in fact derives from a long 
historical precedent.
2) Protection
The second clear strategically continuous theme relates to the idea of protection. As noted 
earlier in the thesis, protection of the state, its values, and its citizens has been a pillar of 
France’s strategic culture since the French Revolution. It became formalised through the 
DOT framework, but even under Sentinelle this core idea has not disappeared. Indeed, as the 
case with the lack of intervention during the attack at the Bataclan illustrated, the remit of 
the armed forces as part of Sentinelle is absolutely not one of intervention. This was 
encapsulated by a series of comments made by policy makers and military personnel. For 
example, a Colonel identified as ‘D.D.’ stated that the army would ‘have faced the difficulty 
of distinguishing the enemies from the civilians to be protected. We are not trained to 
discriminate under the conditions of an urban terrorist attack.’779 This was emphasised by 
Georges Fenech who, addressing Colonel D.D., said ‘you are a protection and security force, 
but not a force of intervention.’780  
779 Rapport fait au nom de la commission d’enquête, relative aux moyens mis en œuvre par l’État pour lutter 
contre le terrorisme depuis le 7 janvier 2015. Tome 2: COMPTES RENDUS DES AUDITIONS, Assemblée 
Nationale, no. 3922, p. 250 
780 Ibid. 
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Ultimately, the decision to deploy the troops was based on the powers available to the state 
and practical considerations such as the nature of the threat. However, its mandate was 
clearly one of protection rather than intervention. It was discussed earlier how France often 
sees strategic issues in terms of tangible and moral factors and Sentinelle is no different; 
indeed, the French academic Élie Tenenbaum wrote that Sentinelle can be understood as a 
combination of ‘resources’ and ‘posture’.781 Resources refer to what can be done in a rational 
and tangible sense, based on the tools that the state has available. ‘Posture’, meanwhile, is 
more of a moral consideration. Posturing, of course is a gesture intended to foment some 
kind of reaction from an actor; the military in this case are posturing to the enemy in order 
to dissuade them for attacking while simultaneously providing the general population with 
passive protection through their presence on the street. Seen in these terms, while the enemy 
may have changed, the military’s domestic role has not since the post-Second World War 
and the protective duties under DOT. Again, historical experiences have influenced cultural 
preferences, which are constraining France’s strategic approach. An analysis of France 
modern recruitment campaigns clearly illustrates these two enduring principles of an 
internal-external security continuum and a predominantly protective internal duty for the 
army.  
7.2.10. Modern recruitment 
In 2008, in a white paper issued by the Présidence de la République, the French government 
stated that the ‘traditional distinction between foreign and domestic policy has lost its 
relevance.’782 This is of course a reference to the impact that transnational terrorism had on, 
not just French, but global security architecture through attacks such as 9/11 in the USA, the 
Madrid train bombing in 2004, and the 7/7 bombing in London in 2005. France too had 
suffered a number of attacks from the Algerian group the GIA in the mid-90s, but post-2015 
the scale and intensity of the threat increased dramatically.  
The impact of transnational terrorism is clearly reflected in recruitment trends. After the 
attacks in November 2015, it was widely reported in the French media that the army had 
experienced a ‘bounce’ in recruitment, dealing with roughly 1,500 applications per day 
781 Tenenbaum, Élie. ‘La Sentinelle Égarée? L’armee de Terre face au terrorisme’, IFRI, June 2016, vol. 68, 
pp. 1-60 
782 ‘The French White Paper on defence and national security’, Présidence de la République, 2008. ch. 5, p. 4 
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compared to roughly 100 per day in ‘normal times’.783 One recruit, identified as Eliot in an 
interview conducted by the Le Monde signed up to the army just a few days after the attack. 
According to Le Monde, he stated ‘Liberté, égalité, fraternité. These three words are under 
threat.’784   
The elevated threat from what French political scientist Gilles Kepel calls ‘third generation 
Jihadism’785 also influenced the tone of recruitment campaigns. One clip from on the Armée 
de Terre’s official YouTube page even directly references the 9/11 attack before declaring 
‘faced with the current threats - a new strategy.’786 The advert goes on to show scenes of 
soldiers patrolling in train stations in France, fighting in wooded and desert environments 
and then dealing with civil unrest in an African nation. The clip clearly does not distinguish 
between the importance of the internal and external theatres, giving equal time to both and 
implying that, under this ‘new strategy’, the defence of France will be achieved across the 
globe and also on the national territory.  
Unsurprisingly, many of the advertisements also reference combat abroad in environments 
which often reflect the reality of the operations the armed forces are involved in at the time. 
For example, many of the advertisements show the army operating in woodland, among 
mountains ranges, in the desert, and on tropical islands. This matches operations in countries 
such as Afghanistan, Mali, the Antilles or Guyana. One modern recruitment poster even used 
the tagline ‘I want to push my limits beyond borders’; another declares ‘I have a thirst for 
adventure, [in aid of] those who are hungry for liberty’ (see posters five and six).787 Both of 
these posters imply that travel and action will be part of the job.788 There are also direct 
references to operations in Africa in at least seven of the twenty-two advertisements 
783 Floch, Benoît. ‘Attentats du 13-Novembre, Au centre de recrutement des armées : << Ce coup-là, je 
m’engage >>’, Le Monde, 19 November 2015. See : 
http://www.lemonde.fr/attaques-a-paris/article/2015/11/19/au-centre-de-recrutement-des-armees-ce-coup-la-
c-est-bon-je-m-engage_4813846_4809495.html (accessed 21 September 2018)  
784 Ibid. 
785 Kepel, Gilles. Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the West. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2017), p. 155 
786 L'armée de Terre. ‘Clip de l'armée de Terre 2009’, 4 March 2009. See: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WVWfO9F5vCw (accessed 02/02/2020) 
787 Armée de Terre – ‘J’ai soif d’aventure, pour ceux qui ont faim de liberté”. See: 
https://www.adforum.com/creative-work/ad/player/34522814/jai-soif-daventure/armee-de-terre  
(accessed 13/12/2019) 
788 Armée de Terre. ‘Je veux repousser mes limites’. 
See: https://fr.adforum.com/creative-work/ad/player/34522817/je-veux-repousser-mes-limites/armee-de-terre 
(Accessed 13/12/2019); 
Armée de Terre. ‘J'ai soif d'aventure’. See: https://fr.adforum.com/creative-work/ad/player/34522814/jai-soif-
daventure/armee-de-terre (accessed 13/12/2019) 
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examined. There is a significant degree of continuity in how the modern forces are portrayed 
in the adverts and how they were portrayed in the inter-war years; there is still clearly the 
theme of traveling abroad and adventure. One striking difference, however, is that the 
serenity of the inter-war recruitment posters has been replaced in the modern era by clear 
references to potential combat situations. An incredible 86.4% of the advertisements either 
directly depict combat or imply that combat may take place imminently. Further, 63.6% 
show shots being fired and 100% show visible weapons (the standard issue FAMAS assault 
rifle) and military uniforms.  
Posters 5 and 6: (Left, ‘J’ai soif d’aventure’, 2018); (Right, ‘Je veux repousser mes limites’, 2018) 
Table 13: Analysis of 22 French recruitment adverts, 2009 – 2019 












% 86.4 100.0 63.6 100.0 81.8 72.7 
Here it is worth drawing a direct comparison with the British case. Despite the fact that both 
Britain and France have comparable strategic cultures in that they both actively engage in 
operations involving combat, sometimes even unilaterally or through coalitions of the 
willing, Britain’s adverts show a softer version of the armed forces. Just 48% imply combat 
in Britain, while 36% show shots being fired. One might expect weaponry and military 
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uniforms to be present in every advert, but here as well the figure is just 72% and 80%, 
respectively. This discrepancy can perhaps be explained by the recruitment crisis and the 
shift in tone that occurred in Britain’s adverts post-2016. As a result, many of the adverts 
ceased referencing adventure and action and instead focused on the bonds of friendship that 
can be forged in the military.789 Some of the adverts in France also highlight camaraderie 
between recruits (one of the adverts is even given the title ‘fraternité’),790 however the core 
message that, if you join, you may be required to fight is rarely absent.   
The greatest similarities in the adverts of the two countries are in their references to operating 
abroad. In Britain 72% clearly depict external operations and, in France, this is only slightly 
higher at 81.8%. It was argued in the British chapter that when the army fights, it fights 
abroad. Clearly this is also the case for the French forces. However, as argued above, the 
crucial difference is that France has traditionally seen its defence in terms of a continuum 
between internal and external security. One advert broadcast in April 2015, states that 
‘Protection du population’ is one of the primary duties of the armée de terre; it then shows 
a soldier in full battle dress guarding the Eiffel Tower before cutting to a scene of soldiers 
patrolling on the streets of an African state. In fact, many of the taglines used in the adverts 
also reflect this combination of both an internal and external role. For example:  
- A l'étranger comme en France. (Both abroad, and in France - 2012)791
- Au sol. Au cœur des populations. Au service des français, pour résoudre les crises.
(On the ground. At the heart of the population. In service to the French, to resolve
crises. - 2013)792
- Armée de Terre 2014: Protéger les Français en métropole et outre-mer. (French
Army 2014: Protecting the French on mainland France and overseas – 2014)793
789 See British case 
790 Armée de Terre – ‘Fraternité’, 2016. 
See: https://fr.adforum.com/creative-work/ad/player/34523050/fraternite/armee-de-terre (accessed 
13/12/2019) 
791 Armée de Terre. ‘Clip de l'armée de Terre 2012’, 2 April 2012. See: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dsms9DbfIE0 (accessed 13/12/2019) 
792 Armée de Terre. ‘Clip de l'armée de Terre 2013 - Mars 2013’, 19 March 2013. See: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q5vOD_DI0C0 (accessed 13/12/2019) 
793 Armée de Terre. ‘Rétrospective 2014 : Le territoire national’. See: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dU55CfoUWWo (accessed 13/12/2019) 
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- Protection du population - operations extérieures (Protection of the population -
external operations - 2015)794
- Ici, ailleurs. Je défends mon pays. (Here, elsewhere. I defend my country - 2016).795
This is where the most striking difference between the two countries’ approach occurs. In 
France, 72.7% of the adverts show the armée de terre operating on the national territory for 
example in train stations, shopping malls or on the streets. This is compared with zero adverts 
in Britain that show a domestic duty. In fact, in the French case, eight of the adverts even 
show a domestic duty in the first scene perhaps indicating that operations such as Sentinelle 
are now the primary duty of the army. In fact, this would reflect the rhetoric of at least four 
different policymakers who all declared in one debate in the Sénat that the national territory 
has become ‘the first theatre of engagement.’796  
Overall, comparing the campaigns of the inter-war years with the more modern examples 
we can see a significant degree of continuity. There is very consistent messaging that the 
army is both an internal and external force. However, simultaneously we also see change. 
Conscription no longer exists in France and l’armée de terre is now a fully professional 
force. As a result, there has perhaps been a shift away from the concept of the citizen-soldier. 
Indeed, some of the earlier adverts from the modern era still show the blend between civilian 
and military life. One, which documents the experiences of ‘Martin’ shows him in civilian 
clothes as he signs up to the army, he then takes part in training exercises in military uniform. 
He is then shown on a rooftop, in civilian clothes with his partner before taking part in an 
operation that appears to be in Africa. Finally, he is shown with his partner in the delivery 
room of a hospital, again in civilian clothes.797 In this clip, Martin is clearly presented as part 
citizen, part soldier.     
794 TBWA Corporate. ‘ L'armée de Terre recrute’, 13 July 2015. See: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHGUiTe3ncY (accessed 13/12/2019) 
795 Insign. ‘Armée de Terre Recrutement – Campagne’, 2 January 2016. See: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kiUdiNSu9cA (accessed 13/12/2019) 
796 Colin, Yvon; Le Drian, Jean-Yves; Gilbert Roger; Leila Aïchi Sénat, Journal officiel de la république 
française, session ordinaire de 2015-2016, Année 2016. – No 26 S. (C.R.), Mercredi 16 mars 2016, pp. 4135 - 
4142 
797 Armée de Terre. ‘Armée de Terre recrute SPOT Martin’, 24 August 2008. See: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YRBLXWzZ0oE (accessed 13/12/2019) 
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In more recent adverts there are far fewer instances where the recruits are shown in civilian 
clothing. Instead they are shown as among the population, but not part of that population. 
They are guardians, stoic and courageous. For example, the narration in the background of 
one advert from 2016 states: ‘I am the guardian of priceless values, I stay alert so that you 
sleep in peace. Always standing tall, I advance to reduce fear. Here, Elsewhere, I defend my 
country and all its colours.’798 It is no coincidence that this transition occurred around 2015 
– precisely when Sentinelle, (which can be translated as sentinel or guardian) was
implemented. This is a crucial point as it signals to the general population that the troops on
the streets of France are not a threat to them or their public liberties, In the past, domestic
military deployments were met with more scepticism as the nature of the deployment was
often targeted towards to the population. However, the messaging from the Ministère des
armées and the Armée de terre itself is that they are there to fulfil a duty of public protection,
reassurance and the deterrence of potential terrorists. This is a duty that has been consistent
for the French army across time.
Screenshot of a televised advert from 2016. It clearly depicts the domestic duties of l’armée de terre 
by showing a group of four soldiers, in full battle dress and carrying their assault rifles, on what 
looks like a Parisian street.  
Unlike the British perception of the army as a predominantly external force, in France the 
perception is that it serves the dual purpose of defending the national territory both abroad 
and at home – this idea is clearly reinforced through the recruitment campaigns which also 
illustrate the core protective duty that the army plays on the national territory. In short, to 
798 Armée de Terre. ‘Armée de Terre Recrutement – Campagne.’ 22 Jan 2018. See: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kiUdiNSu9cA&ab_channel=Insign (accessed13/12/2019) 
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paraphrase Guibert, in modern France (i.e. post 1800) the armée de terre is, and always was, 
a force for dedans et dehors.  
7.2.11. National consensus and conditions for acceptance 
Further continuity in France’s preferences for the use of the armed forces internally can be 
traced by comparing the rhetoric from all of the cases to try and uncover the values that have 
been the most enduring over time. This will also allow us to identify the conditions under 
which the deployment of the military accepted in France. With this in mind, Chart 19 
compares the rhetoric from the Commune, Languedoc, the First World War, and Sentinelle 
to illustrate that despite assumptions of a change in strategy, there is notable consistency in 
France’s cultural preferences over time.  
As well as generally praising the conduct of the military, the rhetoric shows a number of 
other common themes regardless of the purpose of the initial deployments (riot and protest, 
defence from invasion, or counter-terrorism). In all cases, the most prominent criterion for 
cultural acceptance of a deployment seems to be a sufficiently high level of threat to justify 
the use of the armed forces. In other words, if the perception of the threat is low, then the 
use of the armed forces may be deemed unjustified. This adheres to the notion of a ‘ripe 
climate’; i.e. if the normative environment is unreceptive to a shift then it may be rejected. 
As an extension of this, if the situation constitutes, or is perceived to constitute, a state of 
war then there is more likely to be acceptance. This may explain why Valls and Hollande 
both referred to a state of war prior to the expansion of Sentinelle. The general opposition to 
the use of the army at Languedoc may be due to consensus that the situation in no way 
amounted to a state of war (see the third column of chart 18).   
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Chart 18: formative moments and the conditions for acceptance of domestic military 
deployment 
Source: Archives Nationales, Assemblée Nationale, Sénat 
It was argued previously that France often sees division in its political debates with each 
issue seeing a range of both positive and negative statements. The analysis of the language 
for the formative moments in France’s past seem to support this idea of division and, on the 
surface, it appears that Sentinelle does as well with chart 18 showing a typical range of 
positive and negative statements. However, it was also argued previously that France often 
finds itself caught between practical and moral forces; the practical side arguing for what 
can be done and the moral side arguing for what should be done. If the language used in 
relation to episodes of domestic military deployments such as the Commune and Languedoc 
is analysed, one finds that there are a plethora of moral objections to the use of the armed 
forces. Thus, the counter argument is a normative one in that a significant number of 
policymakers are stating that the armed forces should not be used in that situation.  
This stands in contrast to the negative arguments made in relation to Sentinelle; in this case 
the moral counter arguments are all but absent while most of the negative statements are 
























La Commune Languedoc WW1 Sentinelle
279 
too costly. In other words, the opposition argument to Sentinelle is not that it should not be 
done, but that it should be done in a more efficient way. Chart 19 illustrates this fact; it is the 
same as chart 18 expect all of the non-moral objections have been removed.  
Chart 19: Opération Sentinelle, practical objections removed 
Source: Assemblée Nationale, Sénat 
With all of the practical objection removed, chart 19 shows the remarkable level of 
agreement on the need for Sentinelle. Fenby notes that in spite of France’s tendency for 
political and ideological division, there are occasions when the French people have come 
together in one mind. His book, The History of Modern France, published after the Charlie 
Hebdo attacks, but before the attacks in Paris in November of the same year, argues that the 
severe threat of terrorism has been one of these national rallying points. It represented a 
chance for the whole country to unite against something as horrendous and categorically 
















































































































































































































































First World War, we might also add that and the November attacks as two more of France’s 
rallying points. 
The common themes that led to these moments of consensus are those that were outlined in 
chart 19. To summarise, if we combine all of the findings from the rhetoric, we see that the 
main historically enduring conditions for acceptance of a domestic military deployment that: 
1) a sufficiently high threat level to justify the use of force;
2) the declaration of a state of war (or at least the perception that the situation amounts
to a state of war);
3) the army serves a protective function for the state, its people and its values;
4) the enemy are not French citizens or are seen to uphold an ideology that is in
opposition to French values;
5) the civil and military forces act in tandem;
6) Historical precedent for the use of the armed forces can be demonstrated.
Crucially, in all of these cases, the threat is perceived to emanate from outside the French 
national community, if not physically then certainly spiritually. As the cases of Languedoc 
illustrates, if a deployment is made where any of these normative criteria are circumvented, 
then a putative deployment is usually met with disapproval. Here it is appropriate to return 
to the primary hypothesis which suggested that cultural preferences derived from the 
perception of the national historical experience would constrain behaviour and, the 
secondary research question which asked what accounts for episodes of change in strategy? 
In France, there is strong evidence to suggest that the long precedent for deploying the 
military domestically have cultivated a general acceptance of its occasional necessity. 
Negative perception of certain events such the Commune and Languedoc have cultivated a 
preference for more passive military deployments on the national territory and a rejection of 
the use of the armed forces against the French people. Even during the Cold War under DOT, 
the 1970s – 1990s under plan vigipirate, and 2015 to the present day with Opération 
Sentinelle military deployments on the national territory seem to adhere to the core 
normative principles outlined above. Thus, we might suggest that historical experiences have 
indeed guided cultural preferences, which have then altered the character of France’s 
domestic deployments over time.  
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In terms what accounts for change in strategy, France’s approach to the use of the military 
has also certainly changed over the years as evidenced by the six different categories of 
domestic deployment illustrated in chart 10 and the clear strategic and operational shift of 
Sentinelle.  Thus, we can conclude that France’s approach exhibits general historically 
derived cultural continuity, while also displaying shifts that are congruent with the secondary 
hypothesis regarding rapid and long-lasting change.  
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7.3. Conclusions – Continuity and change 
‘France, country of contradictions, is both boldly innovative and stubbornly conservative, 
revolutionary and traditional, utopian and routine. There is no country where things die faster, there 
is no country where memories live longer.’
799 
Émile Montégut, ‘Du Génie Français’ in Revue des Deux Mondes, 1857
As the French essayist Émile Montégut suggests, to the impartial observer, France’s political 
outlook can often appear contradictory, even chaotic. This point was highlighted in the 
eighteenth century by the king of Prussia, Frederick II, who famously wrote that ‘your 
nation, of all those in Europe, is the most inconsistent.’800 Often, France finds itself caught 
between the real and the ideal; the need for continuity and the yearning for change. This 
dialectic is something that is instilled in French students at an early age through a programme 
of civic education that promotes and encourages debate on historical and political issues. In 
1881, the French statesman and then-minister of public education, Jules Ferry stated before 
the Senate that this programme develops in ‘the heart and the mind of the child true ideas 
about the society in which he must live.’801 Ferry’s reference to both the heart and the mind 
hints at this inherent dialectic: the heart providing the philosophical argument about what 
should be done, the mind providing the rational argument about what can be done.  
In a sense, the French mindset is the quintessence of Simmel’s theory of reciprocity; a 
constant battle between structure and agency, between individualism and collectivism and it 
is this tension forms the foundation of the French strategic culture. In the early twentieth 
century, the French polymath Gustave Le Bon addressed precisely the concept of France’s 
tendency to embrace both continuity and change. He wrote:  
To consider for example only the narratives of history, it would seem that the French 
mentalité has changed tremendously for a century. In a few years, she went from Revolution 
799 Montégut, Jean-Baptiste Joseph Émile. ‘Du Génie français’, Revue des Deux Mondes, 1857, 2e période, 
tome 9, p. 108 
800 Frederick II. ‘Oeuvres complettes de Frédéric II, roi de Prusse: Tome Onzieme.’ (Berlin: Berlin, 1790), p. 
337 
801 Ferry, Jules cited in Marchand, Philippe. ‘L’instruction civique en France: Quelques éléments d’histoire.’ 
SPIRALE - Revue de Recherches en Éducation, 1992, no. 7, p. 12  
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to Caesarism, returned to the monarchy, had another revolution, then called a new Caesar. 
In reality, only the façades of things had changed.
802
 
Le Bon’s argument could equally be applied to Sentinelle which has arguably represented 
one of these ‘façades’ – for policymakers and the military it has certainly represented a shift 
in operational and even strategic terms. However, from a cultural perspective, the core 
French mentalité remains constant; acceptance of change, provided core values derived from 
the national historical experience are not contravened. It is through this dialectic that we 
observe the French approach caught between, as historian Beatrice Heuser writes, the 
‘psychic and the tangible physical dimensions...’803 This dialectic is something of great 
appeal to a nation which is often considered ‘daring’ in its vision, but ‘routine’ in its 
behaviour.804 This notion was perfectly encapsulated by Charles de Gaulle in a televised 
interview in 1965: 
France is everything all at once. It’s all of the French people. France is not left wing, it’s not 
right wing. Naturally, the French feel, as they always have, currents within them. There is 
the eternal current of motion which moves towards reform, which moves towards change, 
which is, of course, necessary. And then there is also a current of order, of rules, of tradition, 
which, too is necessary. It is all of this that represents France.
805
 
This tension between continuity and change is in full view with the case of Sentinelle. As 
the previous sections have suggested, France has a long history of repression and political 
interference at the hands of the army and yet this does not seem to have adversely affected 
collective attitudes towards domestic military deployments. Indeed, general support for the 
armed forces in a domestic role is exceptionally high and, as the French historian Bénédicte 
Chéron argues in her 2017 book Le soldat méconnu, in the modern era, French antimilitarism 
that emerged after the Second World War and gathered pace throughout the 1960s and 1970s 
seems to be a ‘distant memory.’806 On the surface, this may seem counter-intuitive, even 
paradoxical. After all, in Britain events such as the Peterloo massacre in 1819 forged an 
802 le Bon, Gustave. La Révolution française et la psychologie des revolutions. (Paris: Les Amis de Gustave 
Le Bon, 1901), p. 63  
803 Heuser, Beatrice. Nuclear Mentalities?: Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG, p. 75  
804 Siegfried, André. L’âme des peuples. (New York: Hachette, 1950), p. 50 
805 Gaulle, Charles de Entretien avec Michel Droit, troisième Partie, 15 December 1965. See: 
https://fresques.ina.fr/de-gaulle/fiche-media/Gaulle00112/entretien-avec-michel-droit-troisieme-partie.html 
(accessed 20/12/2017) 
806 Chéron, Bénédicte. Le soldat méconnu: Les Français et leurs armées : état des lieux. (Paris: Armand Colin, 
2018), p. 15 
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enduring aversion, to the notion of deploying the armed forces en masse domestically in any 
‘active’ context. What, then, accounts for this apparent change in France’s strategic and 
attitudinal approach? If, indeed, it is even a change at all.  
One argument would be that France’s threat perception led to a shift. The theory of strategic 
culture advanced in this thesis holds that strategy will evolve incrementally over time with 
rapid and long-lasting shifts only occurring if certain conditions for change are met; a 
receptive cultural climate is of paramount importance to this and a high threat perception 
due to a serious exogenous shock can certainly alter norms. For France, 2015 certainly 
represented one of these shocks. Thus, from the perspective of France’s policy makers, the 
rational response at that stage was to turn to the expertise of the army.  
From an operational perspective this constituted a significant change for l’armée de terre. 
The 70,000 troops that were deployed throughout the course of 2015 represented 105% of 
the country’s effective land forces. As such, it was necessary to recall 3,000 troops from 
external operations in the Antilles, Guyana, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific to meet the 
requirements of Sentinelle. Furthermore, training programmes at the ‘training centre for 
urban operations’ (le centre d’entraînement aux actions en zone urbaine - CENZUB) and 
the ‘combat training centre’ (le centre d’entraînement au combat - CENTAC) saw 70% of 
rotations cancelled.807 The demands placed on the French army to maintain such a large-
scale operation effectively created debate as to whether it would lead to ‘burnout’ and bring 
the military ‘to its knees.’808 
Nevertheless, in the eyes of the French policymakers who devised Sentinelle, the practical 
reality of the threat made the deployment of the armed forces a strategic necessity. However, 
this does not fully explain why public acceptance would be so high given the often negative 
national historical experience with domestic military deployments, nor does it offer a 
satisfactory explanation as to why deploying the military, rather than enhancing the 
capabilities of the civil forces was considered to be the appropriate strategic response. After 
all, as this chapter argued, France faced a similar threat from Islamist terrorism in the mid-
1990s with the GIA. However, these attacks led to different rhetorical responses to those 
807 Tenenbaum, Élie. ‘La Sentinelle Égarée? L’armee de Terre face au terrorisme’, IFRI, June 2016, vol. 68, p. 
27 
808 ‘L'armée française risque la surchauffe, met en garde la Cour des comptes’, L’Express. 14/11/2016. See: 
https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/la-cour-des-comptes-s-inquiete-d-un-risque-de-surchauffe-des-
armees_1850377.html (accessed 03/02/2017) 
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seen in 2015 and, while soldiers were deployed nationally under Vigipirate in the 1990s, the 
scale of the deployment paled in comparison to Sentinelle.809  
In fact, the 1995 case offers some insight into why the events of 2015 resulted in recourse to 
a primarily military, rather than civil, response. Here, historical experience of deploying the 
armed forces in a counter-terrorist context, albeit on a much smaller scale, created a 
precedent for public acceptance. Many citizens on their way to work in the mid-90s, 
particularly in Paris or Lyon will have seen heavily-armed troops in static guarding roles at 
metro stations, for example. The French army finds itself in a similar role under the remit of 
Sentinelle, which, putting aside budgetary and operational challenges, differs from previous 
deployments only in its scale. Protection, deterrence and reassurance, which have been long-
standing pillars of France’s internal strategic culture, are still the objectives of the operation 
while intervention is still firmly the role of civil security forces.  
We are still confronted with something of a conundrum relating to the widespread approval 
of Sentinelle in spite of the historical experience of military repression, massacres, and coups 
(some recent) which live long in the memories of the French people and form such an 
enduring aspect of the national consciousness.810 For example, a parliamentary report by the 
French politicians Olivier Audibert-Troin and Christophe Léonard expressed general 
support for Sentinelle but also made the astute point on the subtle linguistic distinction 
between the terms ‘ennemi à l’intérieur’ and ‘ennemi de l’intérieur’. Audibert-Troin and 
Léonard warned of the danger of using the first term, which appropriately describes a 
transnational threat (i.e. that of an external enemy who has penetrated France’s borders), 
interchangeably with the second, which, as this thesis has demonstrated, has significant 
‘historical resonance.’811  
This nuanced point on the importance of the past was expressed passionately in the French 
media after Benjamin Griveaux announced on 20 March 2019 that soldiers operating as part 
809 Hajdenberg, Michaël. ‘En 1986 et 1995, d'autres attentats, d'autres réponses politiques’, MediaPart, 20 
November 2015. See: https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/france/201115/en-1986-et-1995-dautres-attentats-
dautres-reponses-politiques (accessed 03/02/2017) 
810 Montégut, Jean-Baptiste Joseph Émile. ‘Du Génie français’, Revue des Deux Mondes, 1857, 2e période, 
tome 9, p. 108 
811 Audibert Troin, Olivier and Léonard, Christophe. ‘Sur la présence et l’emploi des forces armées sur le 
territoire national’. Assemblée Nationale. Rapport d’Information, N° 3864. Commission de la Défense 
Nationale et des Forces Armées, p. 217 
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of Sentinelle would contribute to the effort against les gilets jaunes protesters in 2019.812 
Following Griveaux’s announcement, the military governor of Paris, Bruno Le Ray gave an 
interview with France Info where he suggested that the troops would be used in an 
operational capacity and could ‘open fire (...) if their life is threatened or that of the people 
they defend’.813 Immediately, French news agencies published articles declaring it to be a 
departure from the original remit of Sentinelle, and a ‘disastrous’ and ‘risky’ decision.814   
One of the more aggressive responses came from the founder of the left-wing party La 
France Insoumise, Jean-Luc Mélenchon. In a televised debate on BFMTV between six 
politicians from opposing parties, Mélenchon shouted at François Bayrou, president of the 
centrist Mouvement Democratique party and supporter of the government’s plan to use the 
troops, ‘You have gone mad! A soldier is not a police officer!’815 On a separate occasion, 
Mélenchon wrote a letter to the Prime Minister of France, Édouard Philippe, declaring that 
the responsibility of the army is to defend the nation against threats, but ‘[i]n no 
circumstances can demonstrators be considered ennemis de l’intérieur.’816 
Historical lessons have therefore clearly not been forgotten; to paraphrase de Gaulle, they 
still form a powerful ‘current’ below the surface. The change in attitude in the form of 
widespread acceptance of Sentinelle is in fact not a change at all, but an idiosyncratically 
French philosophical acknowledgement of the severity of the threat and the resources and 
capabilities of the military.817 Thus, the mass deployment of the military is endured, even 
812 ‘Gilets jaunes’: les militaires de Sentinelle mobilisés samedi, annonce Griveaux | AFP Extrait. See: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2VM4jHA3C20 (accessed 02/01/2020) 
813 Le Ray, Bruno. Des soldats de Sentinelle mobilisés samedi pour la manifestation des ‘gilets jaunes’ : ‘les 
ordres seront suffisamment clairs pour qu'ils n'aient pas d'inquiétude à avoir’, interview with FranceTVInfo, 
22 March 2019. See: https://www.francetvinfo.fr/economie/transports/gilets-jaunes/si-leur-vie-ou-celle-des-
personnes-qu-ils-defendent-est-menacee-les-militaires-pourront-aller-jusqu-a-l-ouverture-du-
feu_3244961.html (accessed 02/01/2020) 
814 ‘Funeste’, ‘risqué’ : ‘AFP. ‘Gilets jaunes’: Sentinelle mobilisé samedi, Philippe annule son déplacement en 
Guyane’, Le Point, 20 March 2019. See: https://www.lepoint.fr/politique/gilets-jaunes-les-militaires-de-
sentinelle-mobilises-samedi-annonce-griveaux-20-03-2019-2302697_20.php (accessed 02/01/2020); 
Godignon, Lucas. ‘Déployer Sentinelle contre les gilets jaunes, une décision risqué’, L’Express, 21 March 
2019. See: https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/deployer-sentinelle-contre-les-gilets-jaunes-une-decision-
risquee_2068566.html (accessed 02/01/2020) 
815 Godignon, Lucas. ‘Déployer Sentinelle contre les gilets jaunes, une décision risqué’, L’Express, 21 March 
2019. See: https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/deployer-sentinelle-contre-les-gilets-jaunes-une-decision-
risquee_2068566.html (accessed 02/01/2020) 
816 Ennemis de l’intérieur left untranslated to illustrate the importance of the phrase in the context. See: 
‘Mobilisation de Sentinelle: Mélenchon veut que Philippe s'explique devant l'Assemblée’, Le Figaro, 22 March 
2019. See: https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/mobilisation-de-sentinelle-melenchon-veut-que-philippe-s-
explique-devant-l-assemblee-20190322 (accessed 02/01/2020) 
817 See Elie Tenenbaum’s argument in his article ‘La Sentinelle Égarée?’ where he argues that Sentinelle 
connects practicality through available ‘resources’ with more philosophical dimensions such as deterrence and 
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praised, due to the deterrent effect of a military presence and the utopian possibility of 
eradicating terrorist threats in the future.818 These more rational assessments are overridden 
by historical memory if the armed forces are directed towards the people due to negative 
perceptions of the historical experience during formative moments such as the Commune 
and Languedoc. The outcome is that we see a version of France that both embraces the need 
for change if the situation demands it, but equally one that insists on the importance of 
continuity through tradition and historical lessons.  
These two versions of France, that place equal weight on the importance of both revolution 
and convention, exist simultaneously creating the appearance of contradiction or dramatic 
shifts in approach. Thus, while change is certainly evident in France’s approach, historical 
experience and the cultural norms that derive from the perception of that experience lend the 
character of France’s strategic culture a significant degree of continuity as this thesis has 
demonstrated. In summary, historical experiences and cultural preferences constitute the 
prism through which all of France’s practical defence needs are viewed and interpreted. This 
means that while on the surface certain strategic decisions may appear to be a deviation from 
a norm, there is a continuous historical and cultural thread that guides their approach. 
Consequently, in answer to the question of whether continuity or change is the more 
enduring characteristic of France’s strategic culture, the answer is les deux, mon général!819 
reassurance through ‘posture’: Tenenbaum, Élie; ‘La Sentinelle Égarée? L’armee de Terre face au terrorisme’, 
IFRI, June 2016, vol. 68, pp. 1-60 
818 Beatrice Heuser makes a similar point in her book Nuclear Mentalities where she writes that France’s 
philosophical outlook meant they could accept the deterrent effect provided by the unrivalled and terrible 
destructive power of nuclear weaponry due to the noble objective of limiting, perhaps even eradicating all 
major war. See: Heuser, Beatrice. Nuclear Mentalities?: Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG. 
p. 76
819 ‘Both, General!’ A phrase that derives from the French military. It is usually an ironic response to a question
with two answers that are both equally possible.
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Chapter 8 – Conclusions and future research 
8.1. Summary of findings 
This thesis has examined the role of historical experiences in guiding cultural preferences 
for the use of the armed forces for maintaining domestic security in Britain and France. 
Contrary to the realist school of thought that promotes a theory of rational, goal-oriented, 
and largely acultural action, this thesis found that since 2001, the level of threat from Islamist 
terrorism faced by Britain and France has been comparable, they have similar threat 
perceptions, similar capabilities and resources and yet two distinct sets of strategic 
preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically have emerged. 
It set out to answer three questions: first, are Britain and France’s cultural preferences for 
acceptance or rejection of military forces domestically derived from the perception of the 
national historical experience? Second, do these cultural preferences have a constraining 
effect on strategic behaviour? And third, if evidence of historically-derived cultural 
constraint can be found, what accounts for episodes of change in strategy over time? 
The central finding, of the thesis addresses all three questions: differences in the perception 
of the national historical experience have influenced each state’s cultural preferences for the 
use of the armed forces domestically. In turn, this has constrained their behaviour. These 
divergent responses are a function of the strategic cultures in the two countries, defined as 
the set of actions, habits, preferences and expectations concerning the use of force resulting 
from the collective perception of the national historical experience. However, a theory based 
purely on the constraining influence of culture on behaviour would neglect the evidence of 
change in Britain and France’s use of the armed forces on the national territory over time. 
Operations Temperer and Sentinelle, for example, represented clear strategic shifts; the 
deployment of 950 troops in Britain as part of Operation Temperer was the largest active 
engagement of military personnel in peacetime for nearly a hundred years, while the 
mobilisation of over 10,000 troops as part of Opération Sentinelle is the largest number of 
troops on France’s territory since the war in Algeria.  
As a result, the thesis asked: what accounts for episodes of change in strategy? In response 
to these research questions a four-part hypothesis was presented that argued that states have 
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the potential to behave according to both continuity and change. The first part of the 
hypothesis posited that the perception of the national historical experience would indeed 
cultivate normative preferences which constrain behaviour. Part two argued that strategy is 
cultural and thus, like culture, it will evolve slowly over time as different threats emerge, 
new technology develops, and societal norms advance. However, the rate of change is 
usually slow due the externally constraining force of culture. Part three of the hypothesis 
suggested that the constraints of culture do not preclude the possibility for rapid and long-
lasting strategic shifts. However, a shift of this nature will only occur if there are social 
institutions that are capable of inciting change; a leader or government that is willing to push 
the changes through and a cultural climate that is receptive to a shift. Part four of the 
hypothesis argued that even if a significant change occurs in a state’s strategic culture, there 
will still be observable cultural values, deriving from the perception of the national historical 
experience, that permeate their approach.  
The strategic culture literature, it was argued, has two main gaps: first, there are relatively 
few studies that focus on strategic culture in a domestic context; and second, there is ongoing 
debate in the field as to what accounts for changes in strategic culture if strategy is 
constrained by historical experiences and cultural preferences. Consequently, the literature 
review aimed to construct a framework for understanding the historical experience, cultural 
preference, behaviour nexus and treats the three concepts as inter-dependent rather than 
mutually exclusive. In this, it avoids a potential criticism that it is using culture alone as an 
explanatory variable.   
For example, drawing on the lessons from the sociological and anthropological literature as 
well as the so-called ‘first generation’ of thought on strategic culture, it argued that culture 
cannot be used as variable, but instead must be considered as the lens through which we 
perceive and interpret the world. It affects and is affected by behaviour, just as it is guided 
by the past while also influencing the lessons we choose to learn from our experiences. As 
a result of this symbiosis, the thesis introduced a framework that took this potential for 
reciprocity into account. from the literature, the study then set out to tackle the research 
question by breaking it down into its component parts: 1) historical experience; 2) cultural 
preferences; and 3) behaviour with different approaches being applied to each stage to 
provide as comprehensive a picture as possible.  
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The first step was to identify the moments in each state’s past that have been the most 
formative to current approaches. To do this, all significant domestic military deployments in 
Britain and France between the years 1800 to 2019 were traced and charted. In Britain, 102 
deployments were identified and 420 in France. Each deployment was then coded according 
to its purpose. In Britain four types of deployment were identified (two active and two 
passive): 1) Quelling riot and protest (active); 2) Countering terrorism (active); 3) Providing 
personnel for striking civil service (passive); 4) Providing disaster relief (passive). In France, 
six types of deployment were identified (four active, two passive): 1) Quelling riot and 
protest (active); 2) Countering terrorism (active); 3) Defence against invasion (active); 4) 
Coup d’état (active); 5) Providing personnel for striking civil service (passive); 6) Providing 
disaster relief (passive). From the data that were gathered a series of formative moments (i.e. 
moments that led to a change in the era of domestic military deployments, or to a significant 
increase or decrease in the number of deployments) were identified.  
The next step was to gather the data on the language used by policymakers during each 
formative moment. Language was chosen as a proxy for preferences because of its role as a 
mode of social action and cultural expression that guides, and is guided by, our perception 
of the material world. Thus, it arguably reflects the norms and values of the time allowing 
us to trace continuity and change in cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces for 
domestic security across time. In total, 536 speeches and statements were analysed for the 
British case and 556 for France. The following section will summarise the core findings in 
each case.      
8.1.1. Britain 
In Britain there appears to be a general cultural aversion to the idea of deploying the military 
on national territory. Opinion polls and statements from political and military figures 
illustrate the sense that the British are uncomfortable with the idea. Despite this assumed 
rejection of the idea of using the military internally, at least 102 examples of significant 
military deployments on the national territory between 1800 and 2019 were found. This 
raised the question: if the army has been involved on the national territory with relative 
frequency, then where does the aversion to domestic deployments come from?  
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It was argued that traumatic historical experiences fomented a normative shift away from a 
reliance on the military as a force of maintaining order. Based on the data on domestic 
deployments, the Peterloo massacre of 1819 was the moment that fundamentally altered 
Britain’s cultural preferences. The fallout led to the creation of the world’s first police force 
just ten years later and, consequently, a dramatic reduction in the number of times the 
military were deployed against the people. The last time the military were used in an active 
capacity to quell civil unrest was 1919 in Liverpool and Glasgow. This essentially marked 
the end of the ‘riot and protest’ era of domestic deployments and the beginning of an era 
characterised by passive deployments for personnel provision or disaster relief under the 
Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) banner.   
However, this is not to say that there were no active deployments that occurred post-1919. 
From the 1970s the military became increasingly integrated into the domestic security 
architecture. The elevated threat from transnational terrorism in 1972 led to a reconfiguration 
of the elite troops of the SAS. The new Special Projects Team would now be given a role in 
countering terrorism. It also led to the formalisation of Britain’s MACP principle that 
ensures the armed forces can only be deployed under certain specific circumstances, not 
least in a capacity that is subordinate to the civil power. It was MACP that was invoked in 
1980 during the Iranian embassy siege, which saw widespread approval from policymakers. 
The general approval of the SAS’s role was due to the adherence to Britain’s enduring 
principles of subordination to the civil power, last resort, proportionality, and temporary 
action. A comparison of the responses to 1980 with those of Operation MARMION at 
Heathrow in 1974 yields a conclusion that the British people will likely reject a domestic 
deployment if it fails to adhere to those core principles.  
In the modern counter-terrorism era (post-2015), Operation Temperer received widespread 
acceptance from policymakers despite an assumption that the British are averse to the idea. 
David Cameron’s suggestion was that ‘we are rather over’ our past and that the public would 
be amenable to the armed forces being used for the maintenance of domestic security. 
However, the analysis of the language by policymakers at each formative moment in 
Britain’s past conducted for this thesis suggested that, quite to the contrary of Cameron’s 
assertion, the past is still very much Britain’s guide.   
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Interestingly, although Temperer had been implemented twice in 2017, Britain’s CONTEST 
outlined the potential for around 10,000 troops to be deployed in the event of a serious 
terrorist incident, and a formal recognition from military personnel that the lines between 
internal and external security had become blurred, modern recruitment campaigns still 
reflected the idea that the army is an external force. This was consistent with nearly one 
hundred years of recruit campaigns that portray the army as fighting abroad, not at home. 
Despite a change in the nature of domestic military deployments over time and the limited 
opposition to Temperer, further analysis of the language demonstrated remarkable continuity 
in Britain’s cultural preferences. By comparing the speeches and statements of policymakers 
during each formative moment, this thesis found that the British people are likely to be 
acceptant of domestic military engagements on the national territory if the perception of the 
threat is sufficiently high, but only if the following normative conditions are met: 1) the 
military are subordinate to the civil power; 2) the deployment is proportionate to the threat; 
and 3) the deployment was made as a last resort. These three core principles are the abiding 
and cultural preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically in Britain and any 
attempts to circumvent them will likely be met with widespread disapproval.  
8.1.2. France 
In France, it was argued that there is a general acceptance of the use of the armed forces for 
the maintenance of domestic security. Opinion polls suggested widespread support for 
Opération Sentinelle while some media debates following the tragic attacks in Paris in 
November 2015 even questioned why the army did not play more of a role. The data on 
domestic military deployments reflected a long historical precedent for domestic 
deployments with at least 420 significant internal operations found between 1800 and 2019. 
It was argued that this precedent for deploying the armed forces on the national territory has 
led to a general acceptance of the role that the army can play in maintaining domestic 
security. 
Despite such continuity afforded by historical precedents, an analysis of the language used 
at various formative moments in France’s past also revealed a clear shift in cultural 
preferences. For example, an analysis of the reactions to use of the armed forces against the 
Commune of Paris in 1871 found that policymakers at the time were generally in favour of 
293 
the use of the troops against the Communards. There were frequent references to the fact 
that the Commune constituted a serious threat to the state, that those involved were no longer 
French citizens, and that the situation was a state of war. By 1907 and the Languedoc revolt 
there was a general rejection of Clemenceau’s decision to deploy the troops. The reasons for 
this rejection were essentially the opposite of the views during the Commune; namely that 
the protesters were not a serious threat, that they were French citizens and thus the use of 
armed force against them was unjustified; that is, the situation in no way was akin to a state 
of war. Instead, the use of the armed forces against the people was seen as despotic, 
provocative, and dangerous.   
As a consequence, French people formed a closer bond with the nation and the army 
following the First World War leading to the formation of the Gendarmerie Mobile. This 
has held primacy for dealing with episodes of civil unrest from 1921 to the present day.  
During the Cold War perceptions of an ennemi de l’intérieur grew. As a result, the army 
once more became closer integrated into France internal security architecture albeit 
restricted to a protective role, rather than direct intervention. This preference has endured 
into the modern counter-terrorism era meaning that there is general acceptance for Sentinelle 
as it essentially serves as an extension of this protection function, and not as a force of 
intervention. Intervention on the national territory is still seen as the primary duty of the civil 
forces, particularly through elite civil forces such RAID or BRI. The GIGN will often 
supplement these civil forces of intervention just as the regular troops of the armée de terre 
will supplement the Gendarmerie or the CRS.  
However, it was also argued that the French people are rarely of one mind with ideological 
division featuring as an enduring aspect of France’s political culture. Analysis of the 
language used by policymakers at a series of formative moments also illustrated this division 
with each formative moment, with the exception of the First World War, showing multiple 
positive and negative statements. Sentinelle, too, displayed a spread of positive and negative 
statements although interestingly most of the objections to Sentinelle were not moral, but 
practical (i.e. it is too costly, or it undermines operational capacity overseas). Instead, in 
moral terms, there has been fairly widespread approval of Sentinelle.   
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This approval, it was argued, was due to the fact that the operation adhered to a series of 
normative principles that have endured across time. Based on the analysis of the rhetoric at 
each formative moment, a notable degree of continuity in preferences for the use of the 
armed forces domestically was uncovered. These principles were: 1) the level of threat is 
high enough to justify the use of the armed forces; 2) the situation amounts to a state of war, 
either through a formal declaration or a rhetorical militarisation of the threat; 3) the army is 
deployed in a primarily protective role in order to preserve the state, its people and its values; 
4) the enemy are either not French citizens or, by virtue of their actions, are no longer
considered to be French citizens; 5) any operations that are carried out will be in coordination
with the civil forces; and 6) Some historical precedent for the use of the armed forces can be
demonstrated. It was concluded that any domestic deployment on the French national
territory that does not meet all of these criteria will likely encounter significant public
resistance.
It was argued that Sentinelle has certainly represented a strategic shift in terms of its scope 
and the recalibration of France’s defence priorities away from the external theatre towards 
the internal. Here it was argued that France’s strategic culture tends to embrace both 
continuity and change, which, as this thesis argued, are not necessarily mutually exclusive; 
France is a bright example of a country that holds both as essential components of its 
strategic culture. It was argued, however, that cultural preferences deriving from the national 
historical experience are still likely to guide the character of any response that France may 
make.   
8.1.3. Expected versus actual finding: homegrown terrorism 
This thesis has charted over six hundred domestic deployments in Britain and France and 
analysed over a thousand speeches as well as supplemented the core analysis with an 
examination of dozens of army recruitment campaigns and media articles. Given the sheer 
quantity of data that was analysed it might have been expected that the rhetoric in both 
countries, particularly in the modern era would address the issue of attacks that had been 
perpetrated by British and French citizens.  One of the points of analysis in this thesis was 
the issue of the cognitive barrier of using troops against their own people, howsoever 
controversial.  
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For example, many of the threats in France (at present from Islamist terrorism) are indeed 
from French citizens. It is a painful fact for many of the French people that their own citizens 
have been responsible for many of the mass-casualty attacks in recent years. For example, 
Mohammed Merah, the gunman at the 2012 Toulouse and Montauban shooting which left 
seven dead was a French citizen of Algerian descent. Saïd and Chérif Kouachi, the brothers 
who carried out the Charlie Hebdo attacks were both French Nationals. Amedy Coulibaly, 
the third gunman who held hostages at a Kosher supermarket was also a French national.  Of 
the nine suspected perpetrators who carried out the November 2015 attacks in Paris, six were 
French nationals.820 Mohamed Salmene Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, the driver of the truck which 
killed 86 on Bastille Day in Nice was of Tunisian nationality, but had a French residency 
permit. Larossi Abballa, the man who killed a police officer and his wife in their home in 
Magnanville was a French citizen of Moroccan descent. 
Despite this long list of French citizens carrying out attacks, there are strangely few 
references to the fact many of the perpetrators were French citizens. In fact, based on the 
sample of 236 speeches and statements on Sentinelle, only two referenced the fact that the 
attackers were French. Table 14 displays the dearth of speeches and statements in the modern 
era that either refer to how the enemy, as French citizens, have forfeited their rights to civil 
treatment due to their actions or to how troops should not be used as the enemy are French 
citizens. All of the other incidents show how the issue of nationality and citizenship has 
typically been at the heart of debates on the use of the armed forces; the modern era and 
Sentinelle stands out clearly due to the lack of discussions on this topic. Clearly, this is an 
issue of sensitivity in France and while it would have been beyond the scope of this thesis 
to explore the issue of nationality, citizenship and Islamist terrorism, we might speculate by 
arguing that the lack of speeches on this subject is due to the large Muslim population of 
France and a desire to avoid alienating or scapegoating them.  




Table 14: Analysis of French speeches and statements on Sentinelle 
8.2. Britain and France compared, differences in approach 
There were of course a number of similarities in Britain and France’s approaches. Both seem 
to have moved away from the idea of using the armed forces to quell episodes of civil unrest. 
This is not to say that neither would reconsider the military’s role if disturbances escalated 
into insurrection or revolution, but for general dissent, or even rioting, both states seem to 
have developed a sense that the use of the military against one’s own citizens is abhorrent.  
There were also similarities in terms of the integration of the armed forces into counter-terror 
responses. Both Britain and France reacted to the attack in Munich in 1972 by developing 
dedicated counter-terrorist units (the SAS and the GIGN) and by gradually building a 
foundation for a greater role for the regular military in a protective capacity through MACP 
in Britain and Vigipirate in France. Indeed, as the minutes from the meeting where Operation 
Temperer was first devised indicate, Britain’s decision to develop the capacity to deploy the 
troops was a direct reaction to France’s Opération Sentinelle. Consequently, we cannot avoid 
the idea of transnational norm diffusion.821 However, while a stimulus may provoke a 
response, the nature of that response will still differ due to divergent strategic cultures which 
derive from very different historical experiences and, crucially, how those experiences are 
perceived. The following section outlines the two clearest differences in nature of the debates 
in Britain and France.  
821 Transnational diffusion, a theory first espoused by Francis Galton in 1889. See: Gilardi, Fabrizio. 
‘Transnational diffusion: Norms, ideas, and policies’ in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons 
(eds), Handbook of International Relations, (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012), pp. 453-477 
Enemy have forfeited rights 
(Positive statement) 
‘Enemy’ are French citizens 
(Negative statement) 
Commune 25 9 
Languedoc 13 17 
Gilets Jaunes - 6 
Sentinelle 2 0 
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8.2.1. Division versus consensus 
The differences between Britain and France also relate to the nature of the language used by 
their respective policymakers. As has been suggested throughout, France is characterised by 
division, this extended to episodes of both continuity and change in their strategies for 
domestic security as well as to the distribution of themes in the rhetoric that was analysed. 
Britain meanwhile saw general continuity in attitudes and far more consensus at particular 
formative moments – either totally supporting a deployment, or totally opposing it. At this 
point it is worth giving two brief examples, one positive and one negative. Chart 21 shows 
the reactions to Sentinelle and Temperer, respectively. we can see from the following pie 
charts which look at just the positive to negative statements in both Britain and France 
regarding Operation Temperer and Operation Sentinelle, respectively.  
Chart 20 – the reactions to Opération Sentinelle and Operation Temperer 
Chart 20 shows a fascinating paradox: in Britain there is an overwhelming acceptance of 
Temperer despite the general aversion to the idea of deploying the military. In France, there 
is more of a division despite acceptance of deploying the military. The reason for this can 
be understood as being a function of their cultures of political debate. Britain seems to shirk 
debate, while France embraces it. One of the most surprising examples of this found in this 
thesis was David Cameron’s assertion that ‘we are rather over’ our history and therefore the 
use of the armed forces domestically was the sensible thing to do. Despite an ingrained 
aversion to the use of the armed forces, there was no dissent on any of the benches in 






Chart 21 emphasises these differences by examining a case where there was general 
opposition to the use of the military. Again, in France during the Languedoc winegrowers’ 
revolt, just over a quarter of the speeches were still generally supportive of the idea of using 
the army. This is compared with the British case during the General strike of 1926 where 
just five percent of the statements were supportive.  
Chart 21 – the reactions to the Languedoc revolt and the General Strike 
Britain’s lack of serious debate on topics such as Temperer is emblematic of a wider culture 
of political disengagement. For example, since 2001 the average voter turnout for general 
elections in the UK has been 63.7 percent. Even the Brexit vote, arguably one of the most 
important political moments in modern British history, saw a turnout of 72.2 percent with a 
staggering 12.9 million people on the electoral register not casting a vote. This is compared 
with France where Presidential elections since 2001 have maintained an average turnout of 
around 84 percent.  
These levels of political engagement may account for the general continuity in attitudes in 
Britain over time; the ambient sense of how things are done is not transmitted in an active 
sense as they arguably are in France through programmes of civic education or even frequent 
debate, but rather through more passive means such as word of mouth. By contrast, France’s 
tendency to challenge and debate concepts makes long-lasting strategic change difficult to 
implement. In France norms are actively transmitted and political debate is encouraged from 
a young age. As a result, there is a strong sense of what should be done. This may account 
for why there have been a series of short-term shifts in approach over time, which, in keeping 






by a series of normative checks informed by factors such as the public’s perception of the 
national historical experience.     
8.2.2. The role of history 
The above point is also illustrated by Britain and France’s respective invocations of history 
in either a positive or a negative sense. The notion that harnessing past events can provide 
the impetus for present actions is undoubtedly a guiding principle of the French political 
ethos. Across the formative moments studied in this thesis, historical experience is invoked 
in some manner in forty-five separate speeches in France. The formal importance attributed 
to history can be traced to the French Third Republic’s mandating of compulsory primary 
education and, through the introduction of roman national, an attempt to instil a degree of 
national unity around the lessons of the past. Political debate in France is conducted much 
like proceedings in courtroom; a statement or suggested policy is deemed far more 
acceptable if the speaker can demonstrate an historical precedent.  
Chart 22: References to history (both positive and negative) 
Britain France
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By contrast, in Britain twenty-five references to the past were found. This is not an 
insignificant number, but is still far fewer than in France despite a similar number of 
speeches that were analysed. Although the case of Northern Ireland was largely omitted from 
the analysis in this thesis, it has still been influential in shaping British policy. As such, in 
the more contemporary examples (such as Heathrow, the Iranian Embassy siege and 
Operation Temperer) this thesis expected to find multiple references to Northern Ireland. 
However, there were only a small handful of mentions of the Irish campaign with most 
historical references being to Peterloo or Tonypandy. Again, this the supports the idea that 
norms in Britain are understood implicitly, but rarely voiced.  
In short, as posited in the second research question, historical experience constrains cultural 
preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically in both Britain and France. The 
difference is that constraint occurs rather passively in Britain, but in a more overt and active 
manner in France. Despite these differences, the significance of history’s effect on behaviour 
cannot be overstated; George Orwell once wrote that ‘those who control the past, control the 
future’. Orwell, of course, was referring to the rather dystopian idea of altering the facts of 
the past to suit one’s present agenda (‘Oceania has always been at war with Eastasia’). 
Neither Britain nor France could be accused of massaging history quite to this extent. 
Nevertheless, Orwell’s point about the constructed nature of historical experience is apt. 
Norms and values are transmitted across time, often subconsciously. As a result, individuals 
may have a general sense that ‘this isn’t the done thing’ without being able to trace formally 
the origin of that thought to arrive at an understanding of ‘why I think the way I do.’  
Often, the past is invoked in an ambiguous sense, such as David Cameron’s assertion about 
the ‘good historical reasons’ for Britain’s aversion to the use of the armed forces 
domestically. Further, many of the historical examples selected by policymakers in their 
speeches reflect episodes that happened in the recent past rather than objective, fixed points 
in time. For example, in France speeches on the Commune referred to the 1848 revolution; 
Languedoc referred to the Commune; the First World War referred to the Franco-Prussian 
war; and Sentinelle referred to several events, but most frequently the precedents set during 
the Cold War. Similarly, during the general strike in Britain, Peterloo was referenced several 
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times. In 2011 during the Tottenham riots, there were no references to Peterloo, instead, a 
similarly unpopular incident that occurred in Tonypandy, Wales in 1910 was mentioned.  
In short, although historical experiences are undeniably crucial in determining cultural 
preferences, historical memory itself is constructed; policymakers are able to pick and 
choose the moments in time that they believe are the most formative, just as they are able to 
pick and choose the lessons that are drawn from those experiences. Consequently, there is 
an element of irony to the idea that historical experiences lead to generally consistent 
strategic behaviour due to the fact that the interpretations of history itself are far from 
consistent. Nevertheless, the effect of history on culture is always formative and culture’s 
effect on behaviour is always constraining. Thus, any attempts to alter policy significantly 
and without an understanding of the past and the cultural sensitivities attached to it will likely 
be doomed to failure.  
8.3. Scope for future research 
The scope of this project has been necessarily broad in order to account for continuity and 
change across time. It is hoped its findings are robust and will provide a strong platform 
upon which to build future projects. With the bulk of the historical legwork already outlined 
in this thesis, it will now be possible to focus on more contemporary attitudes. With this in 
mind, there are two intended research projects for the near future. The first project aims to 
integrate the cases of Northern Ireland and Algeria in order to analyse empirically whether 
there are significant differences between the normative preferences for military deployments 
on the mainland and on overseas territories. This project will focus on continuity and change 
in the language during the Cold War period when troops deployments in Algeria and in 
Northern Ireland under Operation Banner were at their highest.  
The second intended research project is to integrate the German case which, as outlined 
previously, would make for an interesting comparison. What follows is some of the initial 
research and how it would fit within the findings of this thesis. 
Over the course of 2016, Germany experienced a wave of attacks at the hands of Islamist 
extremists. Fifteen lives were lost in nine separate successful attacks and a further three 
significant plots were foiled in Düsseldorf, Ludwigshafen, and Chemnitz. The most deadly 
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of these occurred on 19 December when the Tunisian national Anis Amri drove a hijacked 
articulated lorry into a Christmas market in Berlin. The elevated threat from Islamist 
terrorism led German news agencies to wonder what could be done; Der Spiegel led with a 
headline “A Country on Tenterhooks: Germans Wonder If Terror Can Be Prevented”822 
while the Handelsblatt published the simple, but hard hitting headline ‘Airtight borders, 
Bundeswehr on our streets’.823 There was also widespread criticism of Merkel’s immigration 
policy.824 However, in spite of this pressure, responsibility for countering the threat remained 
with the Civil power; Merkel defiantly stated to the Bundestag that ‘Germany will remain 
Germany, with everything that is dear and precious to us’.825 This echoed the statement she 
had made six months earlier that in spite of the elevated threat, ‘security measures will 
remain as they are at present’ and ‘sovereign tasks in Germany will be achieved through the 
Federal police.’826  
However, in keeping with the theme of continuity and change, as a reaction to the increased 
threat of Islamist terrorism, discussions were held in Germany for the deployment of the 
Bundeswehr domestically. These discussions were justified on the grounds of ‘the character 
and dynamic of current and future security-political threats.’827 Horst Seehofer, a German 
politician of the CSU and former Minster President of Bavaria, was perhaps the most vocal 
proponent of deploying the Bundeswehr. He stated that ‘we owe it to the victims, the 
affected, and the entire population that we review and re-adjust our entire immigration and 
822 ‘A Country on Tenterhooks: Germans Wonder If Terror Can Be Prevented’, Spiegel Online, 1 September 
2016. See: http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-searches-for-answers-after-recent-wave-of-
attacks-a-1105616.html (accessed 03 September 2020)     
823 ‘CSU-Reaktion auf Anschalg: Grenzen dicht, Bundeswehr ins Inland’, Handelsblatt, 21 December 2016. 
See: http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/csu-reaktion-auf-anschlag-grenzen-dicht-bundeswehr-
ins-inland/19160570.html (accessed 03 September 2020)     
824 ‘Thanks Angela for letting these terrorists go’ (trans.) Monika Pilath, ‘Danke Angela furs Reinlassen dieser 
Terroristen’, Die Zeit, 27 July 2016. See: http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2016-07/angela-merkel-
fluechtlingspolitik-attentate-verbindung-internationaler-blick (accessed 03 September 2020)     
An article summarizing the views of predominantly right-wing voices, domestically and abroad, in the wake 
of the terror attacks. The quote is attributed to Dutch far-right politician Geert Wilders. The author of the article 
itself does not hold the same view. 
825 Lauter, Rita. ‘Deutschland wird Deutschland bleiben’, Die Zeit, 7 September 2016. See: 
http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-09/angela-merkel-generaldebatte-bundestag-haushalt (accessed 
03 September 2020) 
826 ‘Die Sicherheitsmaßnahmen bleiben so, wie sie jetzt sind’ and ‘Hoheitliche Aufgaben werden durch die 
Bundespolizei in Deutschland geleistet’, Die Bundeskanzlerin, Presse- und Informationsamt der 
Bundesregierung, 5 December 2015. See: 
https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2015/12/2015-12-05-
videopodcast.html (accessed 03 September 2020)     
827 Baker, Alex and Wagstyl, Stefan. ‘Germany to push for progress towards european army’, Financial Times, 
2 May 2016. See: https://www.ft.com/content/e90a080e-107b-11e6-91da-096d89bd2173 (accessed 03 
September 2020)     
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security policy’828 and therefore, ‘[w]hen it comes to property protection, to ensure safety in 
crowded places, then the well-trained Bundeswehr soldiers should take over so that the 
police can perform their actual tasks’.829 
 In fact, recently the German police and military conducted joint counter-terror operations 
for the first time.830 This was an unprecedented moment for Germany that perhaps was not 
afforded the level of domestic (or even international) coverage that it deserved; Germany 
has severe restrictions on the deployment of the Bundeswehr for domestic purposes and civil 
control over domestic matters is a crucial component of the German political system. Even 
the Bundeswehr’s website notes that attacks in Paris and Germany have led to more debate, 
but that the legal hurdles are ‘high’.831  
Germany’s restrictions on the use of the armed forces domestically are a legacy of its 
experiences before and during the Second World War. Article 48 of the now obsolete 
Weimar Constitution related to the circumstances for the imposition of a state of emergency 
and allowed for the use of armed force if a) the President of the Republic deemed the state 
to be failing in its duties, and b) to restore public order or preserve public safety. Originally 
it was intended to be used to deal with rebellions and was often invoked in the 14 years of 
the Republic (between 1918 and 1933) to allow politicians to pass laws when there was no 
clear majority in parliament. However, most famously, Adolf Hitler invoked Article 48 after 
the 27 February Reichstag fire. Hitler made Hindenburg sign the Reichstag Fire Decree 
which suspended the Weimar constitution for the entirety of the Third Reich. During the 
Second World War, the Nazi party then used the military to consolidate their power and 
repress dissidents, contributing to the systematic killing of the country’s Jewish population. 
828 ‘CSU-Reaktion auf Anschalg: Grenzen dicht, Bundeswehr ins Inland’, Handelsblatt, 21 December 2016. 
See: http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/csu-reaktion-auf-anschlag-grenzen-dicht-bundeswehr-
ins-inland/19160570.html (accessed 03 September 2020)     
829 Horst Seehofer quoted in Adrian Arab, ‘CSU-Chef fordert bundesweiten Objektschutz durch die 
Bundeswehr’, Die Welt, 19 August 2017. See: 
https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article167826714/CSU-Chef-fordert-bundesweiten-Objektschutz-
durch-die-Bundeswehr.html (accessed 03 September 2020) 
830 Hein, Matthias von. ‘German soldiers as a domestic security force? Deutsche Welle, 10/03/2017, 
http://www.dw.com/en/german-soldiers-as-a-domestic-security-force/a-37881989 (accessed May 14th 2017) 
Knight, Ben. ‘Bundeswehr joins police for anti-terror exercises’, Deutsche Welle, 7 March 2017. See: 
http://www.dw.com/en/bundeswehr-joins-police-for-anti-terror-exercises/a-37843161 (accessed 14/05/2017) 
831 Trettenback, Marc. ‘Einsatz im Inneren: Rechtliche Möglichkeiten und Grenzen’, 10 March 2017. See: 
https://bit.ly/35gKBo7 (accessed 03 September 2020)     
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Hegel famously wrote that ‘The German spirit is the spirit of freedom’; deploying the 
Bundeswehr would be considered a step along the way to limiting the individual freedoms 
of Germany’s own people in a manner consistent with that seen during Nazi rule. However, 
the ‘spirit of freedom’ is also an abiding notion that stretches beyond domestic 
considerations. Even for modern-day Germans, it is a philosophy that extends to all people 
and nations and the notion of interference in another state’s sovereignty is considered to be 
an unconscionable and abhorrent concept. This philosophy is enshrined in Germany’s 
constitution and, consequently, through the attitudes of its citizens towards the use of force. 






 ‘Ad hoc’ 
Civil response with 




reluctance to use military 
The above table illustrates how France, Britain and Germany’s respective approaches to 
domestic military deployments for the purposes of maintaining domestic security could be 
categorised in a future research project. As this thesis has shown, France is more comfortable 
with long-term deployments of the army for the purposes of protection. However, their 
response cannot be considered a total militarisation of the threat as the protective duty of the 
army is largely just for show. They ‘posture’ in order to deter potential attackers and reassure 
the population but intervention is still seen as the domain of the civil forces. Britain 
meanwhile is more uncomfortable with deploying the armed forces on the national territory. 
However, as this thesis demonstrated, there is still significant precedent for the use of the 
armed forces internally throughout history. The principle of subordination to civil power 
means that the army is often on standby, to be used only as a last resort and usually on a 
short-term basis. In this sense, the British approach to domestic deployments is ad hoc. In 
Germany, there is widespread aversion to the use of the armed forces on the national territory 
in any active sense, this is in spite of a threat perception that is comparable to both Britain 
and France and similar military capabilities. In each case, behaviour is constrained by the 
cultural preferences of each state rather than an objective, rational assessment of the 
situation.  
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Post-2001, the armed forces have been required to operate across the full spectrum of 
scenarios as new threats emerge and the lines between internal and external security become 
blurred. In addition to traditional operations overseas, in the modern era troops have 
increasingly been expected to contribute to a number of domestic duties ranging from 
disaster relief, providing security at events, supplementing vital public services during 
strikes or, most recently, during health crises and, crucially, defending against the threat of 
terrorism. Excluding developments in 2020 and the Covid-19 outbreak, in France sixty-five 
significant domestic military deployments were counted for four different purposes. This is 
the most in the last 150 years. While in Britain, there have been seventeen significant 
deployments for three different purposes, the most in Britain’s history. If the trend is moving 
towards using the military as more than just a last resort, it will be of great importance to 
understand the formative historical experiences that have shaped current preferences and, of 
course, the conditions under which a deployment may be deemed acceptable. The findings 
from this thesis go some way towards that end. 
8.4 Methodological, empirical, and theoretical implications and contributions 
In 2004, R. Burke Johnson and Anthony J. Onwuegbuzi published their widely-cited article 
on how mixed methods research’s ‘time has come’ by generating ‘eclectic’ and ‘superior’ 
research.832 It is hoped that the approach taken in this thesis is a worthy contribution to the 
growing body of studies in the social sciences that use mixed methods techniques. Although 
certainly inspired by the works of strategic culture theorists such as Gray and Johnston and 
the conceptual approach adopted by the French Annales school, as far as the author is aware, 
there have been no previous studies that have taken an approach quite like this. Its broad 
scope across two hundred years and the need to combine empirical data on domestic troop 
deployments with in-depth content and discourse analysis necessitated a blend of both 
qualitative and qualitative techniques; it is this combination that lends it its flexibility and 
power as a methodological approach. 
Indeed, one of the major contributions of this thesis is its methodology, which could be 
applied to myriad studies across the field of International Relations. A researcher could use 
832 Johnson, R. Burke and Onwuegbuzi, Anthony J. Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose 
Time Has Come, Educational Researcher, Vol. 33, No. 7 (Oct. 2004), p. 14 
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this approach to analyse trends across a long period of time in their subject of interest. For 
example, attitudes towards immigration, climate change, international integration through 
the European Union to name but a few. In essence, the approach used in this thesis is a form 
of thematic indexing which would allow any researcher to group attitudes according to 
common themes thereby facilitating comparative analysis.  
One particular direction that the methodology of this thesis could be taken in relates to the 
second generation of strategic culture proffered by Klein. As mentioned in the literature 
review, the crux of Klein’s argument is that a disconnect may exist between what a state 
says and what it does. In essence, the state requires the means to legitimise its activities. This 
is the basis of securitisation theory, which examines the politicisation of certain threats that 
do not necessarily represent an existential risk to the survival of a given state. Using the 
methodology applied in this thesis, it would be possible to take a broad concept (for example, 
terrorism), and examine how the threat of terrorism is presented (or ‘securitised’) by political 
elites across time. This could be combined with a statistical analysis of actual terrorism 
attack data to ascertain whether the messaging presented by elites reflects the reality of the 
threat.  
This thesis has also made a significant theoretical contribution to the literature. Studies on 
strategic culture will make the broad assumption that history and culture matter as shaping 
or guiding influences to behaviour, but provide little empirical evidence as to how they 
matter, or focus on too narrow a time frame to capture normative and strategic evolution. 
Consequently, this thesis attempted to rectify this gap by assessing Britain and France’s 
preferences for the use of the armed forces domestically across the longue durée. It provided 
compelling empirical evidence, through extensive analysis of primary sources, of the 
historical sensitivities attached to domestic military deployments and the cultural 
preferences for the use of force internally that seem to have emerged as a result.  
This has implications for the ongoing debates on how we explain differences in state 
behaviour. Although of course it is not possible to generalise given the two-state focus of 
this study and the specific subject matter of domestic military deployments, it still constitutes 
a significant empirical contribution to the field of Strategic Studies and, more generally, 
International Relations, as it clearly demonstrates the importance of culture and the 
perception of historical experience in strategy making. Importantly, the empirical findings 
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in this thesis seem to contradict the realist and neo-realist assumptions about largely a-
cultural and a-historical action, such as those mentioned in the introduction by Shapiro, 
Byman, and Liu which argued that capabilities, resources, and threat perceptions are a more 
appropriate explanation for divergent preferences. This was shown not to be the case by the 
comparative approach adopted in this thesis; Britain and France’s overlapping capabilities, 
resources, and threat perceptions still generated divergent preferences leaving an 
explanatory gap that could be filled by an analysis of culturally-guided perceptions of the 
national historical experience.  
We should be cautious about dismissing the realist perspective out of hand, however. As the 
domestic deployment data in this thesis illustrated, there is also evidence of Britain and 
France altering their respective strategic approaches according to the threat environment at 
the time; for example, the transition in both states towards the use of the armed forces for 
counterterrorism purposes in the 1970s. Nevertheless, as one of the key findings in this thesis 
illustrates, and in keeping with the hypothesis, even in the event of a rapid shift in approach, 
a state’s response to a threat still seems to exhibit certain enduring and traceable cultural 
characteristics.833 The different responses of Britain and France to the Munich attacks in 
1972 is persuasive evidence of this fact.  
As a result, rather than arguing that a constructivist perspective is the most convincing, or 
indeed the realist perspective, perhaps the appropriate conclusion is not to view competing 
theories of state behaviour in terms of ‘either/or’. As the findings in this thesis highlight, it 
may be more appropriate to consider behaviour with reference to limited, or subjective, 
rationality. As Foley writes, building a more accurate and nuanced picture of state behaviour 
may require a transition away from ‘theory wars and towards complementary theory-
building.’834 Nevertheless, the exclusion of the role of historical experience and culture from 
any study in this field would always be guilty of committing an egregious sin of omission.   
833 See page 24 of this thesis. 
834 Foley, Frank. Countering Terrorism in Britain and France: Institutions, Norms and the Shadow of the 
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1812 6 0 Burton's Mill, Westhoughton Mill, 
Rochdale, Bolton (Luddite 
movement), at least two 





1815 1 0 Swing Riots 
1816 2 0 Spa Fields Riots, Ely and Littleport 
riots 
Riots/Protests 
1817 1 0 The Pentrich Rising Riots/Protests 
1818 7 0 Misc Yeomanry Deployments Riots/Protests 
1819 22 0 Peterloo Massacre, Misc. 
Yeomanry Deployments 
Riots/Protests 
1820 19 0 Radical War, Greenock Incident, 
Misc. Yeomanry Deployments 
Riots/Protests 
1821 3 0 Queen Caroline's Funeral, Misc. 
Yeomanry Deployments  
Riots/Protests 
1822 9 0 Misc Yeomanry Deployments Riots/Protests 
1823 7 0 Misc Yeomanry Deployments Riots/Protests 
1824 2 0 Misc Yeomanry Deployments Riots/Protests 
1825 3 0 Misc Yeomanry Deployments Riots/Protests 
1826 8 0 Misc Yeomanry Deployments Riots/Protests 




1831 3 0 Reform Riots (e.g. Queen Square, 












1837 2 0 Poor Law Riots / Worcestershire 
corps in Birmingham election 
disturbances 
Riots/Protests 
1838 2 0 "Battle of Bossenden Wood", Poor 
Law Riots 
Riots/Protests 
1839 1 0 Newport Rising Riots/Protests 
1840 
1841 3 0 Misc Yeomanry Deployments Riots/Protests 
1842 2 0 Plug Plot Riots, Coventry Colliers' 
riots, misc. Yeomanry 
Deployments 
Riots/Protests 














1851 1 0 Barham Warehouse Riots/Protests 
1852 
1853 
1854 1 0 Exeter Food Riots 











1866 1 0 Hyde Park demonstration (Reform 
League) 
Riots/Protests 






    
1870 
    
1871 
    
1872 
    
1873 
    
1874 
    
1875 
    
1876 
    
1877 
    
1878 
    
1879 
    
1880 
    
1881 
    
1882 1 0 Tredegar Riots Riots/Protests 
1883 
    
1884 1 0 Skye/Crofters Riots Riots/Protests 
1885 2 0 Misc Yeomanry Deployments Riots/Protests 
1886 
    
1887 1 0 SDF Trafalgar Square Riot 
('Bloody Sunday') 
Riots/Protests 
1888 1 0 Tithe Disturbances Riots/Protests 
1889 
    
1890 
    
1891 
    
1892 
    
1893 1 0 Featherstone Colliery Riots Riots/Protests 
1894 
    
1895 
    
1896 
    
1897 
    
1898 1 0 South Wales Coalfield Riots/Protests 
1899 
    
1900 
    
1901 1 0 Great Penrhyn Quarry Strike Riots/Protests 
1902 
    
1903 
    
1904 
    
1905 
    
1906 
    
1907 
    
1908 
    
1909 
    
1910 1 0 Tonypandy Riots Riots/Protests 
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1911 3 1 Siege of Sidney Street, National 















































1945 0 1 Atlee Striking Civil 
Service 





1947 0 2 Atlee - Haulage Driver's Strike, 
Coal transport crisis 
Striking Civil 
Service 




1949 0 3 Atlee - dock workers' strike 
(twice), Power Stations Strike 
Striking Civil 
Service 
1950 0 3 Atlee - dock workers' strike, 




    
1952 
    
1953 0 1 Oil Distributors' Strike Striking Civil 
Service 
1954 
    
1955 
    
1956 
    
1957 
    
1958 
    
1959 
    
1960 0 1 Seaman's Strike Striking Civil 
Service 
1961 
    
1962 
    
1963 
    
1964 
    
1965 
    
1966 0 1 Seaman's Strike Striking Civil 
Service 
1967 
    
1968 
    
1969 
    
1970 0 2 Dock strike, Refuse worker's strike Striking Civil 
Service 
1971 
    




1973 0 2 Glasgow Firebrigade Strike Striking Civil 
Service 
1974 1 1 On standby following State of Emergency; two week 
deployment at Heathrow (MACP invoked) 
1975 0 1 Glasgow Dustmen's strike Striking Civil 
Service 
1976 
    











1979 0 1 Winter of Discontent Striking Civil 
Service 
1980 1 0 Iranian Embassy Siege Counterterrorism 

















1994 1 Army posted to Heathrow 








2000 1 Fuel Strike Striking Civil 
Service 
2001 0 1 Foot-and-Mouth Epidemic Disaster relief 




2003 1 1 Heathrow CT deployment; 
firefighter's strike 
Counterterrorism; 
Striking civil service 
2004 
  




2009 0 1 Cumbria Floods Disaster relief 
2010 0 1 "The Big Freeze" Disaster relief 
2011 





2014 0 4 Southern England Flooding 
(Operation Pitchpole), Hospital 




Commonwealth Games (Glasgow); 
NATO Summit (South Wales) 
Service; Personnel 
Provision 
2015 0 1 Operation Shaku (Northern 
England Flooding) 
Disaster relief 
2016 1 Operation Tiddling (Flood relief) 
2017 4 0 Operation Temperer (twice), SAS 
London Bridge Attack; SAS, SBS 
raids in Manchester 
Counterterrorism 
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APPENDIX 2 – DOMESTIC MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS IN FRANCE 
Active Passive Description Purpose 
1800 1 Chouannerie (conclusion) Insurrection 
1801 2 Misc Gendarmerie Deployments 
(Lyon, Liamone / Golo,  
Insurrection 
1802 7 Misc Gendarmerie (Morbihan, 
Pontivy, Ploermel, Lorient, 
Vannes, Côtes-du-Nord) Sète is 
placed under a state of siege (see 
Brown ref) 
Insurrection 
1803 7 Misc Gendarmerie deployments 
(Nantes, Palluau, Montaigu, 
Macbecoul, Challans, Deux-
Sèvres, Alaine-et-Loire and 
surroundings) 
Insurrection 
1804 1 Misc Gendarmerie deployments 
(Paris) 
Insurrection 
1805 5 National Guard and Guarde de 
Ligne sent to Paris (Napoleon's 
letters) ; Gendarms sent to Puy de 
dome; misc gendarm to prevention 
of desertion at Etaples, un à 
Ambleteuse et un à Boulogne.   
Insurrection 
1806 2 Misc Gendarmerie deployment (Bressuire, Segré) 
1807 3 Misc Gendarmerie deployments (Saigne, Dordogne, 
Calvados) 
1808 2 Misc Gendarmerie deployments (Paris, Bayonne) 
1809 
1810 1 Misc Gendarmerie deployments 
1811 1 Misc Gendarmerie deployments 
1812 1 Caen Food Riots (4,000 troops 
deployed) 
Riot / Protest 
1813 4 PENINSULAR WAR (Battle of 
Nivelle; Battle of Nive; Battle of 
the Bidassoa); 1,200 troops 
stationed for six months in the 
Sarthe (to pursue just thirty three 
chouans) 
Riot / Protest; 
Defence from 
Invasion 
1814 23 WAR OF THE SIXTH 
COALTION (Battle of Brienne; 
Battle of La Rothière; Battle of the 
Mincio River; Battle of 
Champaubert; Battle of 
Montmirail; Battle of Château-
Thierry; Battle of Vauchamps; 
Battle of Mormans; Battle of 




Aube; Battle of Gué-à-Tresmes; 
Capture of Fort l'Écluse; Battle of 
Craonne; Battle of Laon; Battle of 
Reims; Battle of Arcis-sur-Aube; 
Battle of Fère-Champenoise; Battle 
of Saint-Dizier; Battle of 
Montmartre; Battle of Paris) 
PENINSULAR WAR (Battle of 
Garris; Battle of Orthez; Battle of 
Toulouse; Battle of Bayonne) 
1815 4 HUNDRED DAYS WAR (Battle 
of La Suffel; Battle of 
Rocquencourt; Battle of Issy); 
Morbihan Fair 
Riot / Protest; 
Defence from 
Invasion 
1816 1 Jean-Paul Didier and several rebels 
attempt to enter city via la porte de 
Bonne. General Donnadieu's men 
kill five of the insurgents  
Insurrection 
1817 5 Lyon Insurrection (troops sent to 
various location outside of Lyon), 






1820 2 Nicolas Lallemand shot dead, 
French Bazaar insurrection 
Riot / Protest 
1821 
 
1822 4 Charbonnerie insurrections in 
Belfort (January and July), 








1827 2 François Alexandre Frédéric de La 
Rochefoucauld's funeral - military 
charge the crowd ; Repression in 
Paris after barricades are erected 





1830 4 July revolution (Three Glorious 
Days) ; July-November Luddite 
strikes ; Disorder in Paris 
(October) ; violent student + 
worker demonstrations (December) 
Riot / Protest / 
Revolution 
1831 2 First Canut revolt Lyon ; Troops 
and National Guard maintain order 
in Paris 
Riot / Protest / 
Revolution 
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1832 3 Général Maximin Lamarque's 
funeral sees clashes between 
Troops and mourners. June 
revolution. Grenoble 
demonstrations met by troops. 




1834 8 Second Canut revolt (Violence met 
by troops in Lyon, la Croix-
Rousse, la Guillotière, Vaise, 
Saint-Clair, St. Etienne) ; Massacre 
de la rue Transnonain ; Paris 
Insurrection (Several days of 
violence) 







1839 1 Paris Uprising led by Louis 
Auguste Blanqui (Society of the 
Seasons) supressed by troops + 
national guard 
Riot / Protest 
1840 1 Paris tailors revolt Riot / Protest 
1841 4 Fierce fighting in Clermont-
Ferrand between troops and 
insurgents; Toulouse riots - troops 
despatched; Protesors in Auch 
erect barricades to block troops 
from reaching Toulouse; Census 
Riots in Paris (State of Siege 
enacted) 
Riot / Protest 
1842 1 Roubaix Riot / Protest 
1843 
1844 
1845 4 Roubaix; Troops stationed in 
August + Sept after fears of Tax 
riots; Parisian carpenters strike 
(troops placed at disposal of 
employers!)  
Riot / Protest 
1846 3 Food riots in Paris (State of Siege 
enacted) ; Military precautions 
taken in winter ; Saint-Étienne 
(troops intervene) 
Riot / Protest 
1847 4 Bread riots in Mulhouse ; Lyons ; 
Military precautions taken in 
winter ; Clash between the 
population and troops in Indre. 
Four of those who took part were 
executed 
Riot / Protest 
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1848 4 February Revolution; Rouen riots; 
March - May various uprisings ; 
June Days uprising 
Riot / Protest / 
Revolution 
1849 2 Street battles in Lyon - State of 
siege in 1st and 6th Military 
districts; Alexandre-Auguste 
Ledru-Rollin calls for protest in 
Paris which are dealt with quickly 
by the military 




1851 29 Coup d'état (Paris - overthrow of 
French Second Republic) ; 
Widescale provincial rebellions 



















1868 1 Toulouse (Republican demonstrators against conscription 
quickly dealt with by troops) 
1869 2 La fusillade d'Aubin ; La 
Ricamarie  
Riot / Protest 
1870 27 FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR 
(Battle of Bellevue; Battle of 
Châteaudun; Battle of Dijon; Siege 
of Belfort; Battle of Coulmiers; 
Battle of Amiens; Battle of 
Beaune-la-Rolande; Battle of 
Villepion; Battle of Loigny-
Poupry; Second Battle of Orléans; 
Battle of Beaugency; Battle of 
Hallue; Battle of Wörth; Battle of 
Borny-Colombey; Siege of Toul; 
Battle of Mars-la-Tour; Battle of 
Gravelotte; Siege of Metz; Siege of 
Strasbourg; Battle of Beaumont; 
Battle of Noiseville; Battle of 
Defence from 





Sedan; Battle of Wissembourg); 
Troops disperse crowds at Victor 
Noir's funeral ; Miner strikes at 




(Battle of Bapaume; Battle of 
Villersexel; Battle of Le Mans; 
Battle of the Lisaine; Battle of St. 
Quentin; Battle of Buzenval; Siege 
of Paris); March (Army remove 
cannon in Paris) ; May (150,000 
soldiers run riot) La Commune de 
Paris (Communard Uprising) 




Anzin (Troops kill two) Riot / Protest 
1873 
    
1874 
    
1875 
    
1876 
    
1877 
    
1878 
    
1879 
    
1880 2 
 
Roubaix and Tourcoing strikes - 
regulars dispatched 
Riot / Protest 
1881 3 
 
Troops called to strikes in 
Grand'Combe, Molières and 
Bessèges 
Riot / Protest 
1882 
    
1883 
    
1884 
    
1885 
    
1886 1 
 
Decazeville, Saint Quentin Riot / Protest 
1887 
    
1888 1 
 
Amiens Weavers' strike  Riot / Protest 
1889 
    
1890 
    
1891 5 
 
Fourmies (nine killed); Paris ; 
Lyon ; Marseilles; Charleville 
Riot / Protest 
1892 1 
 
Grèves de Carmaux 
 
1893 
    
1894 
    
1895 
    
1896 
    
1897 
    
1898 
 
1 Chantier protégé par la troupe, 
suite aux grèves dans la bâtiment 
Protection detail 
1899 






Draveil (shots are fired) ; chalon-
sur-saône strikes 
Riot / Protest 
1901 
    
1902 1 
 




Expulsion des chartreux de leur 
monastère 1903 
Riot / Protest 
1904 
    
1905 
    
1906 1 
 
Miner's Strikes (40,000 mobilized 
by Clemenceau - fighting in Paris) 
Riot / Protest 
1907 1 1 Revolt of the Languedoc 
winegrowers (shots fired) ; 
Soldiers replace sriking Parisian 
electricians (March)  





Riot / Protest 
1909 
 
1 Postmen's strike Striking Civil 
Service 
1910 2 1 Champagne Riots ; Railway strikes 
(la gréve des cheminots sur le 
réseau nord en 1910); Soldiers 
replace sriking Parisian electricians 
(March)  
Riot / Protest 
1911 1 1 Champagne Riots ; General Strike 
(guarding of buildings) 
Riot / Protest 
1912 
    
1913 
    
1914 13 
 
WW1 (Battle of Mulhouse; Siege of Maubeuge; Battle of 
Le Cateau; Battle of St. Quentin; Battle of Grand 
Couronné; First Battle of the Marne; First Battle of the 
Aisne; Battle of Flirey; First Battle of Albert; First Battle 
of Arras; Battle of the Yser; First Battle of Champagne; 
Battle of the Frontiers) 
1915 4 
 
WW1 (First Battle of Champagne; Second Battle of Artois; 
Third Battle of Artois; Second Battle of Champagne) 
1916 3 
 




WW1 (Second Battle of the Aisne; Battle of the Hills; 
Second battle of Verdun; Battle of Malmaison) 
1918 12 
 
WW1 (Spring Offensive; Third Battle of the Aisne; Second 
Battle of the Marne; Battle of Cantigny; Battle of Belleau 
Wood; Second Battle of the Marne; Battle of Château-
Thierry; Battle of Amiens; Hundred Days Offensive; Battle 






































1940 16 WW2 (Battle of France; Battle of 
Sedan; Battle of La Horgne; Battle 
of Montcornet; Battle of Arras; 
Siege of Calais; Battle of the Lys; 
Siege of Lille; Battle of Abbeville; 
Battle of Dunkirk; Operation 
Paula; Battle of Pont-de-l'Arche; 
Italian invasion of France; Battle 




1941 1 WW2 - VICHY FRANCE Defence from 
Invasion 
1942 2 WW2 - VICHY FRANCE, 
(Dieppe Raid)  
Defence from 
Invasion 
1943 1 WW2 - VICHY FRANCE Defence from 
Invasion 
1944 12 WW2 (Operation Dingson; 
Invasion of Normandy; Normandy 
landings; Sword Beach; Operation 
Dragoon; Liberation of Paris; 
Saint-Nazaire Pocket; Allied 
advance from Paris to the Rhine; 
Liberation of Nice; Siege of La 




1945 5 WW2 (Saint-Nazaire Pocket; 






Rhine; Siege of Dunkirk; 
Operation Nordwind; Colmar 
Pocket) 
1946 
    
1947 1 
 
PCF General Strike Riot / Protest 
1948 1 
 
PCF General Strike Riot / Protest 
1949 
    
1950 
    
1951 
    
1952 
    
1953 
    
1954 1 
 








































DOT Defence from 
Invasion 
1963 1 1 DOT; Large-scale miner strike 
(army replace) 
Defence from 
















DOT Defence from 
Invasion 
1968 1 1 DOT; May Revolution (Army on 
Standby) 
Riot / Protest / 
























































DOT; Aer Lingus Flight 164 






DOT; Affaire des Irlandais de 
















    
1986 1 1 2,000 troops stationed for border 
security and securing sensitive 
sites; Opération Hephaistos 
Counterterrorism; 
Diaster Relief 
1987 1 1 2,000 troops stationed for border 
security and securing sensitive 





1 Opération Hephaistos Diaster Relief 
1989 
 
1 Opération Hephaistos Diaster Relief 
1990 
 
1 Opération Hephaistos Diaster Relief 
1991 
 
1 Opération Hephaistos Diaster Relief 
1992 
 
1 Opération Hephaistos Diaster Relief 
1993 
 
1 Opération Hephaistos Diaster Relief 
1994 1 1 GIGN hostage rescue in Marseille 
(Marignane), Opération Hephaistos 
Counterterrorism 
1995 1 2 Troops reinforce gendarms after 
terrorist attacks; Opération 
Hephaistos; GIGN participate in 





1996 1 1 Port-Royal RER station attack, 400 




1997 2 1 Vigipirate 400 troops deployed in 
Paris; GIGN deployed against 







1998 1 2 Vigipirate; Opération Hephaistos; 




1999 1 1 Vigipirate; Opération Hephaistos Counter-Terrorism; 
Diaster Relief 
2000 1 1 Vigipirate; Opération Hephaistos Counter-Terrorism; 
Diaster Relief 
2001 1 1 Vigipirate troop reinforcement 




2002 1 1 Vigipirate - 800 troops stationed 
over the holdiday period; 
Opération Hephaistos 
Diaster Relief 
2003 2 2 Vigipirate - 800 troops stationed 
over the holdiday period 15 Dec - 
15 Jan 2003; Vigipirate - expanded 
from 800 - 1,000 after Iraq war 




2004 1 1 Vigipirate; Opération Hephaistos Diaster Relief 
2005 3 1 Vigipirate; 1,000 troops deployed 
after attacks in London; GIGN 




2006 1 1 Vigipirate; Opération Hephaistos Diaster Relief 
2007 3 3 Misc vigipirate deployment 
(Paris); GIGN deployed against 
gunman in Gensac-sur-Garonne; 
Opération Hephaistos; Inondations 
(Sud-Ouest); Missing person 
search in Cavayère (40 militaires 




2008 1 3 Vigipirate; Opération Hephaistos; 
opérations de déblaiement et de 
remise en état dans la commune 
d'Hautmont et les villages 
avoisinants; 350 men of the 3e 




2009 1 2 Vigipirate; Flood Relief; Opération 
Hephaistos 
Diaster Relief 
2010 1 4 Misc vigipirate deployments in 
Paris; Flood Relief; Opération 
Hephaistos; Heavy Snow relief; 




2011 1 2 3,400 troops stationed at 27 
strategic sites following death of 
Bin Laden; Opération Hephaistos; 





2012 2 1 Vigipirate - Joint police-Military 
patrols in Midi-Pyrénées; 1200 
troops deployed nationally for 




2013 2 2 700 troops in Paris after Boston 
bombing; troops refinofrce train 
stations after Mali intervention 




2014 2 3 Terrorist attacks in Dijon and 
Nantes trigger deployment of 300 
troops; 28/2 squadron of the Réole 
mobile gendarmerie kill activist 
Rémi Fraisse with H/E grenade; 
Opération Hephaistos; Operation 
Dragoon anniversary security; 
COP 21 security provision, 600 
troops mobilised. 




2015 4 2 Vigipirate in Jan after Hebdo; 
Opération Sentinelle post-Bataclan 
; GIGN participate in search for 
Kouachi brothers ;  GIGN placed 
on standby during Bataclan attacks 
; Legionaires help find Lucas 




2016 1 3 Opération Sentinelle; May Flood ; 
Guarding fan areas during Euro 
2016; Opération Hephaistos 
Counterterrorism; 
Disaster relief 
2017 1 2 Opération Sentinelle; Opération 




2018 1 1 Opération Sentinelle Counter-Terrorism; 
Diaster Relief 
2019 2 1 Opération Sentinelle; Gilets Jaunes Counter-Terrorism; 
Riot & Protest; 
Disaster relief 
